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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
The Scandinavian countries are well known for their egalitarian political economies 
which are constituted institutionally of their social democratic welfare (state) 
regime and industrial relations system(s). Before this dissertation, it was still an 
open question how this macro context influences Scandinavian attitudes towards the 
level of inequality in gross wages, from a comparative perspective. In its attempt to 
answer it, the dissertation uses a variety of data. First, survey-data from the Social 
Inequality Module of the International Social Survey Program was extensively 
analysed. Second, data from a survey experiment conducted by the author was 
analysed. Third, a media study was conducted analysing content from Danish and 
Swedish newspapers quantitatively and qualitatively. The dissertation finds that, 
compared to people in other western countries, the Scandinavians were 
exceptionally egalitarian in the period from 1992 to 2009. This Scandinavian 
egalitarianism seems constituted mostly of an aversion to top-level excess, rather 
than a wish to spoil the bottom of the labour market excessively. This 
egalitarianism cannot be ascribed to mainstream non-contextual explanations within 
the field, but instead rests on a perceived nexus of legitimated harmonic egalitarian 
societies. The attitudinal patterns of Danes and Swedes are however quite different. 
These differences are in congruence with the historical differences in the two 
countries’ political economies, and with differences in how the media in the two 
countries still represent “the rich”: The Swedish legacy of the ideological but 
peaceful class-society has evolved into representations of the rich as a class distinct 
from the middle class, and into attitudes divided by class and income. The Danish 
legacy of consensus democracy on the other hand has evolved into representations 
of the rich as part of the very wide perceived middle class, and very similar 
attitudinal patterns across class and other potential cleavages. 
DANSK RESUME 
De skandinaviske lande er berømte for deres egalitære politiske økonomier, 
institutionelt bestående af det socialdemokratiske velfærds(stats)regime og de 
skandinaviske arbejdsmarkedssystemer. Denne afhandling undersøger, hvordan 
denne makroniveauskontekst påvirker Skandinavernes holdninger til 
ulighedsgraden i bruttolønninger, i et komparativt perspektiv. Afhandlingen bruger 
flere former for data. For det første er surveydata fra modulet om social ulighed fra 
International Social Survey Program grundigt analyseret, for det andet bliver data 
fra et surveyeksperiment analyseret og for det tredje analyseres indhold fra danske 
og svenske dagblade kvantitativt og kvalitativt i et mediestudie. Afhandlingen 
finder, at sammenlignet med folk i andre vestlige lande, er skandinaverne 
exceptionelt egalitære, i perioden fra 1992 til 2009. Denne egalitarianisme synes 
mest at være forbundet med en aversion mod meget høje toplønninger. 
Egalitarianismen kan ikke tilskrives mainstream ikke-kontekstuelle forklaringer i 
forskningsfeltet, men hviler i stedet på en perciperet nexus af legitime harmoniske 
egalitære samfund. De danske og svenske holdningsmønstre er også ret forskellige. 
Forskellene kongruerer med de historiske forskelle i de to lands politiske 
økonomier, og forskellene i, hvordan medierne i de to lande præsenterer ‘de rige”. 
Den svenske arv som værende et ideologisk, men fredeligt klassesamfund 
transcenderer til konstruktioner af ”de rige” som en klasse distinkt fra 
middelklassen, og holdninger delt på klasse og indkomst. Den danske arv som 
konsensusdemokratiet transcenderer til konstruktioner af de rige som en af mange 
grupper i den brede middelklasse, og meget ens holdningsmønstre på tværs af 
klasser og andre potentielle skillelinjer. 
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1 
CHAPTER 1. SCANDINAVIAN 
EGALITARIANISM 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the Scandinavian’s relationship to 
economic equality. I will not research Scandinavian attitudes towards redistribution, 
but focus on Scandinavian attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages. 
As will be shown in sections 1.1 and 1.2, Scandinavian attitudes towards the level 
of inequality in gross wages are both very relevant as a topic of investigation and at 
the same time remarkably ill-investigated in existing research. Throughout the 
dissertation I define Scandinavians as Danes, Norwegians and Swedes and not in 
the broader Nordic sense including Finns, Icelanders, Greenlanders, Faeroese and 
the Ålanders. The overall research question (RQ) I seek to answer in the 
dissertation is:  
What attitudes do Scandinavians express towards the level of inequality in gross 
wages, how do these attitudes develop over time and why do the Scandinavians 
express these attitudes? 
The dissertation distinguishes itself from three or maybe even four classic ways of 
understanding (Scandinavian) attitudes to gross wages, but in many ways also 
borrows from all of them, taking up a form of middle position inspired by the 
ontology of Critical Realism (CR). Below I will give a brief summary of some key 
concepts and the position of the dissertation.  There will be more about the 
concepts’ assumed relations, how and why they fit ontologically, and the 
consequences for the research design in Chapter 2. 
First, it has been argued that generations of Scandinavians have a remarkable 
‘passion for equality’ (Andersen, 1983; Graubard, 1986; Svendsen, Svendsen, & 
Graeff, 2012). Scandinavian egalitarianism in this literature has thus been 
understood basically as a stable cultural trait. The second position is the material, 
structuralist position of some neo-Marxist literature, and some interpretations of 
Marx’s and especially Engels’ original writings. In very simple terms, here the 
material conditions of society and the related ownership structure of the means of 
production determines which social class dominates the macro-level superstructure 
of society. The superstructure hereafter imposes a micro-level ‘false consciousness’ 
on the working strata of society (Esping-Andersen, 1980; Hay, 2006; Marx & 
Engels, 1968; Marx, 1972). The third position is pure rational choice-inspired 
approaches to attitudes. Here attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages are 
seen as an outcome of the economic utility-function of the individual. In some 
accounts, the atomistic utility-maximising actors have no structural constraints 
imposed. In others, structures are part of the equations, but take the form only of 
formal institutions affecting the incentive structure in the individual’s utility-
functions (North, 1990; Rothstein, 2000). The fourth position is more an approach 
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than a position, but is important to mention. Much of the existing literature on the 
attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages is regression-focussed articles. It 
is not that there is anything wrong with applying the method of regression analysis, 
but implicit in its design is often a rather naïve positivist search for linear effects 
relevant across contexts and time. The simple view of causality underlining this 
search seems rather naïve given the contextual and complex understanding of 
causality in the critical realist ontology of the dissertation (more in Chapter 2). 
The dissertation distinguishes itself from the first and second position in 
emphasizing that attitudes cannot just be reduced to macro-level structures, that is, 
either a culture of equality or the superstructure of society. Instead, values and 
attitudes need to be reproduced, and in the process of reproduction, individuals have 
a reflexive potential allowing change in the attitudinal reproduction processes. This 
on the other hand does not mean that structures do not exist, are not relevant for 
attitudes, or that they are constituted only by the formal institutions of society, as in 
the third position. 
The monograph will operate with the term political economy (PE) to denote the key 
macro-level structures of society influencing the attitudinal formation at the micro 
level. There is not one agreed-upon definition of political economy, and the term 
has been used to refer to many quite different subfields. Mostly these studies are 
interdisciplinary and deal with the relation and interplay between especially the 
economic and political system (Weingast & Wittman, 2008). Following this broad 
demarcation, the term is to be understood equally broadly in the dissertation as the 
interplay between the economic and political spheres of society. The main 
institutions governing the two spheres – the industrial relations system (IRS) and 
the welfare (state) regime – are key concepts of the programmatic institutions 
constituting the political economy. Operating within these institutional spheres, the 
key actors in the focus of the dissertation are the labour/trade union movement, the 
corresponding organisations on the employer’s side and the strength and character 
of the traditional left wing of the political spectrum. The foundations behind these 
institutions and actors are argued to be the economic structures of society and 
especially the developing social class structures.  
The concept of PE has two sides in the dissertation. First, as may be revealed in the 
term economy, the PE is constituted by a formal and material side reflected in the 
programmatic institutions, economic structures and class cleavages in society. Just 
as importantly, the PE has a political side also. The outcome of the political fight 
between the key actors in the PE is not just the programmatic institutions 
established and the economic structures of society. Politics can be viewed as to a 
large extent a struggle over which ‘subjective worldviews’ shall dominate, and 
crucially ‘who’ collectively is defined as ‘the others’ (de Swaan, 1995; Rothstein, 
2000). Even as the struggle over subjective worldviews continues, these also 
become entrenched historically. Rothstein (2000) uses the term ‘collective memory’ 
to describe the outcome of this historical process. I think the term in itself is 
illogical, since a memory by definition is an individual-level phenomenon. I 
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therefore prefer the term ‘historically constructed normative institutions’ (HCNI) to 
denote basically the same phenomenon, which is: a particular representation of the 
past, a representation that in myths, presentations and stereotypes defines: ‘who the 
others are’ and in a sense also ‘who we are’.1 
A multiplicity of ‘others’ exists in the circles of social identification for a certain 
individual at a certain time (de Swaan, 1995). The concept of HCNI is related to the 
widest social identification circle where, according to de Swaan (1995), notions 
such as class and nation dominate. Even in this circle and therefore in the HCNI, 
several ‘others’ can exist in a given society at a given time, which depends for 
example on whether class or nation is emphasized as the social identification 
marker of interest. The level of inequality in gross wages can be viewed as attitudes 
towards the (class?) gap between the top and middle strata of society, and the 
relevant ‘others’ in the dissertation are therefore the top strata of society or, in a 
social constructivist sense, ‘the perceived rich’. It is argued that we should be able 
to get a sense of the background of the HCNI by reviewing the politico-economic 
history of the Scandinavian countries. Furthermore, to see traces of the myths, 
representations and stereotypes therein of how the Scandinavian media treats the 
subject of ‘the rich’. 
‘The dissertation analytically distinguishes between two levels. The aggregated 
perspective follows a long line of comparative research comparing the 
Scandinavian countries externally to other especially western countries. The 
disaggregated perspective investigates the internal similarities and differences 
within this Scandinavian model.
2
 
The dissertation argues that in the aggregated perspective the Scandinavians indeed 
do express a remarkable desire for a low degree of inequality in gross wages and an 
                                                          
1 Besides the concept of ‘collective memory’, several related but not necessarily synonymous 
concepts can also be found variously in the literature, also concerning Scandinavia. These 
include: ‘Stories of Peoplehood’ (Smith, 2003), ‘Imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1991), 
‘National Identity’ (Østergård, 1992), ‘National Ideas’ (Larsen, 2008) and ‘National Models’ 
(Kettunen & Eskola, 1997). Like the idea of a Scandinavian ‘passion for equality’, these 
concepts often lean towards the stable cultural trait tradition. The concept of HCNI in 
contrast emphasises that such macro-level narratives are, firstly, a contested terrain and, 
furthermore, need to be reproduced and can therefore change over time. 
2 The premise of the dissertation is that it makes sense theoretically and empirically to speak 
of a Scandinavian model in international comparisons and apply analyses on what here has 
been termed the aggregated perspective, comparing the Scandinavian countries externally to 
other (groups of) countries. The internal differences between the Scandinavian countries 
render disaggregated analyses very relevant also. See also Knudsen & Rothstein (1994) for a 
similar argument for, why it makes sense to speak of both ‘the Scandinavian model’ in the 
aggregated perspective, as well as a ‘West- and East Nordic’ model epitomised in in 
Denmark and Sweden respectively.  
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aversion to top excess. In spite of rather remarkable changes in especially the IRS 
and the global economy, Scandinavian egalitarianism is still strong and persistent. 
This egalitarianism is furthermore not explained by the dominant explanations from 
existing research. Scandinavia does not have some special egalitarian social 
cleavage structure, display some form of a distinct egalitarian justice belief culture, 
or socialise the still many trade union members to be extraordinarily egalitarian. 
Instead of these linear, law-like and mono-causal explanations, the aggregated 
results seem to suggest a Scandinavian nexus of legitimacy in which a perceived 
low degree of inequality in gross wages leads the Scandinavians to the following: 
First, to see their society as quite harmonic without major conflicts between social 
groups, and secondly and more importantly, this leads even the higher strata 
Scandinavians to be extraordinarily egalitarian – in comparative perspective.  
The disaggregated analyses investigating the internal differences between the 
Scandinavian countries reveal noteworthy differences especially between Denmark 
and Sweden. Furthermore, the results of these analyses suggest a high degree of 
consistency between attitudes, media content and the legacy of the differences in 
the political economies of Denmark and Sweden. The Swedish political economy 
was historically and until quite recently to a much higher extent than Denmark 
characterised by significant and politicised, ideological class cleavages. In recent 
decades, the compositional differences between Denmark and Sweden have 
disappeared to a high extent however. In terms of attitudinal patterns, significant 
between-group differences in attitudes and especially differences between social 
classes exist and have remained quite stable over time in Sweden. At the same time 
the intra-group differences remain small from 1992–2009. In Denmark and 
Norway, the attitudinal differences between social classes and other groups are 
small, whereas the intra-group differences skyrocket in 2009 for a majority of the 
groups investigated.  
The media studies investigates how ‘the rich’ have been portrayed in major 
newspapers in Denmark and Sweden from 1996 – 2013. In Denmark, qualitative 
analyses revealed that even during and after the financial crisis ‘the rich’ or rich 
individuals are almost never constructed as being really distinct from the middle 
class and the rest of society. In contrast, a large part of all the Swedish references 
explicitly refer to ‘the rich’ as a group or rich individuals distinct from the middle 
class and the rest of society. By representing the society as dominated by at least 
two social groups – the majority and the rich, Swedish media reproduce the image 
of the historical political economy of Sweden as a class society. The Danish media 
in contrast, by not representing the rich as distinct from the majority at all, 
reproduce an image of a ‘consensus-society’ without major social cleavages. It is 
important to emphasise the importance of perspective in these seemingly 
contradictory conclusions. Zoomed in on the disaggregated perspective, Denmark 
and Sweden clearly portray differences. In the aggregated perspective these internal 
Scandinavian differences dwarves compared to the differences between the 
Scandinavian countries and other western countries. 
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Through this short presentation of key results, it should be clear that the dissertation 
mainly points to a rather high degree of stability over time in Scandinavian attitudes 
towards the level of inequality in gross wages. Some cracks in the Scandinavian 
egalitarian equilibrium have appeared along the way though. Firstly, the standard 
deviations of the various measures of attitudes towards gross wages for especially 
Denmark and Norway increased dramatically from 1999 to 2009. Some of this 
increase in standard deviations is likely to be caused by the shock of the financial 
crisis and subsequent debates, and it was furthermore not possible to subscribe 
these increased standard deviations to any consistent new social cleavage emerging. 
In spite of this, the increased variability in attitudes could possibly lead to a 
changed average or median level of egalitarianism over time. In addition, in 
contrast to the qualitative media analyses of Swedish newspapers, the 
corresponding quantitative media analyses revealed quite substantial changes. From 
2006 and onwards the Swedish outputs look more and more like the corresponding 
Danish outputs. The total number of articles about ‘the rich’ declines dramatically, 
the quantitative differences between the various newspapers more or less disappear 
and the proportion of articles presenting ‘the rich’ in a positive light increases 
greatly. Lastly, one should not forget the significant changes happening in the 
Scandinavian political economies and especially in the Swedish IRS. It is not 
inconceivable that these tendencies could indicate a dynamic that is leading to a 
change in the Scandinavian egalitarianism(s) in the future.  
Some of the wider perspectives and contributions of the dissertation are also worth 
commenting on. The results of the dissertation clearly subscribes to the growing 
literature emphasising the power of social constructions. Two obvious results point 
in this direction. First, it is clear that the perceived level of inequality in actual gross 
wages constitutes a crucial ‘mental anchor’ for people’s attitude to the just level of 
the same. Even if the actual Scandinavian gross wage gap levels are approaching 
the size of similar gaps in at least some other western countries, Scandinavians still 
perceive lower levels of inequality in gross wages than people in all other western 
countries in the ISSP 2009 dataset. Second, it seems mostly to be past and not 
current characteristics of the Scandinavian political economies that drive the 
differences in attitudinal patterns and media output of Denmark and Sweden. The 
actual differences in the political economies and social class structures of 
contemporary Denmark and Sweden are not large.  
On the other hand, this dissertation does not implicate a radical social constructivist 
view of society – reality still matters. Even if the actual wage gaps in Scandinavia 
have increased and approach the level of other western countries, they are still small 
in comparative perspective. As Larsen (2013) puts it, even if there is no one-to-one 
relationship between ‘real’ changes in society and citizens’ perception of these 
changes, there are obviously interplays. This should come as no surprise given the 
well-known limiting cognitive factors: 
‘… the human inability to understand the world in its complexity, the 
human tendency to build identity based on in-group/out-group 
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mechanisms, the limited interaction between citizens within a large 
‘imagined community’ as a nation state, the simplifications (and 
sometimes distortions) made by mass media and political elites, and 
others’ (Larsen, 2013, p. 7). 
A straightforward consequence is therefore that, if the size of the wage gaps 
continues to increase in Scandinavia, it is likely – with a time lag – to have wider 
consequences. First, it is likely to change the presentations and stereotypes of 
society produced by the media. Ultimately, Scandinavians’ perceptions of both the 
size of the wage gaps, the character of society and their normative attitudes hereto 
must therefore be affected. As Homans (1961) states:  
‘The rule of distributive justice is a statement of what ought to be, and 
what people say ought to be is determined, in the long run, and with 
some lag, by what they find in fact to be the case’ 
Changed perceptions are furthermore likely to lead to other consequences besides 
changed normative attitudes. As stated in the famous Thomas theorem: ‘If men 
define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’. Scandinavian 
egalitarianism rests on a perceived reproducing nexus of just, successful and 
egalitarian societies. Changes in the actual reality, the media presentations and 
stereotypes, as well as Scandinavians’ perceptions of any of these three factors are 
the biggest threat to Scandinavian egalitarianism. 
This dissertation therefore also contributes to an emerging literature emphasising 
institutional feedback processes. The classic path dependency literature and rational 
choice (new)-institutionalism taught us that there are strong vested interests and 
many veto points embedded in existing programmatic institutions, making change 
difficult and costly. The institutional feedback processes emphasised in this 
dissertation and elsewhere could be conceived as a more sociological version of 
path dependency. Here perceptions, ideas of normality, norms of what is fair and 
just, and myths and presentations of virtuous or vicious circles drive the 
reproduction or dismantling of the normative institutions of society. As hinted 
above the normative institutions of society are inert, but changeable. They help 
individuals find meaning and identity, they shape their behaviour and ultimately 
they help form the background or context behind which voters and policy-makers 
guide the future development of the Scandinavian model. 
The first chapter will introduce the concept of the ‘Scandinavian welfare triangle’ 
and the importance of investigating the public legitimacy underpinning the three 
legs of this rather unique societal model. Attitudes to the level of inequality in gross 
wages can be conceived as constituting a central part of one of these legs of the 
Scandinavian welfare triangle – the market. The second section will make the not-
so-obvious argument that these attitudes are as important to investigate as attitudes 
to the state and redistribution as well as attitudes to gender roles, the family and 
work-life balance. The third section will argue that this endeavour is both under-
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researched and yet accessible. The fourth section builds on the arguments of the 
third section, trying to specify that investigating attitudes to the level of inequality 
in gross wages can be conceived as focussing on the relationship between the 
perceived top and middle of society. In contrast to the relationship between the 
perceived bottom and middle of society, very little is known about how 
Scandinavians and Scandinavian media relate to and treat this topic. The short fifth 
section briefly returns to the question why the three Scandinavian countries have 
been selected as cases and not all five Nordic countries. Finally, the outline of the 
dissertation will be described in the last section. 
1.1. THE EXCEPTIONAL SCANDINAVIAN WELFARE TRIANGLE 
AND ITS PUBLIC LEGITIMACY 
In general, viewed through the big aggregated comparative lens, the Scandinavian 
countries Denmark, Norway and Sweden are in the existing literature often seen as 
being quite exceptional countries. On quantitative measures of what could be 
equated with societal success, e.g. GDP/per capita, social and institutional trust, 
levels of happiness, corruption and social mobility, the Scandinavian countries 
consistently rank among the world elite (Ervasti, 2008; Larsen, 2013). The 
background to these results – for ‘why the bumblebee can fly’ (Dølvik, 2013; 
Lykketoft, 2006), have often been traced to some peculiar societal arrangements 
and quite exceptional institutional settings in the Scandinavian countries: the 
universal/social democratic welfare (state) regime, the Industrial Relations System 
(IRS), and the high level of economic equality these institutions are argued to 
produce (Addison & Schnabel, 2003; Christiansen, Petersen, Edling, & Haave, 
2005; Dølvik, 2013; Ervasti, 2008; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 
1999; Goul Andersen, 2012b; Larsen, 2006; Svallfors, 2004; Svallfors, 1997).
3
  
Central in introducing the Scandinavian societies as something quite unique in 
international comparisons were two seminal books by Gösta Esping-Andersen 
(1990; 1999). The three Scandinavian countries were here seen as epitomising the 
social-democratic welfare (state) regime. Esping-Andersen (1999)’s regime concept 
prompt the idea that welfare in a given country can be produced by the state, the 
market or the family or any combination hereof. This insight is encapsulated in the 
‘welfare triangle’ below, and has later been central to the ‘welfare mix’ literature.4 
                                                          
3 The Danish flexicurity model is for example a well-known modern description of the 
Danish labour-market triangle of a flexible labour market, generous social benefits and active 
labour-market policy (Jørgensen & Madsen, 2007; Wilthagen & Tros, 2004). 
4 This literature has expanded the triangle into a ‘diamond’ including voluntary organisations 
and even more comprehensive ‘welfare diamond/governance’ models. These include forms 
between pure state-, market-, family- or voluntary sector-produced welfare. A good way of 
categorising these blurry in-between forms includes distinguishing between who is financing, 
deciding and delivering a given welfare service (Goul Andersen, 2012b; Powell & 
Barrientos, 2004). 
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Figure 1-1 The Welfare Triangle  
 
 
Source: Goul Andersen (2012b, p. 14) 
Scandinavians’ attitudes to two of the three sides of the welfare triangle constitute 
well-established research fields. This is first attitudes to the size, role and scope of 
the welfare state (including redistribution). Secondly, it is attitudes to family, 
gender roles and work-life balance. Often the relevance of studying these two fields 
within attitudinal research seems so obvious that they are not even mentioned – 
especially for what concerns attitudes to the welfare state. In any case, the explicit 
or implicit assumption is that of course citizens’ attitudes to the welfare state are 
important to investigate. We live in democratic societies and citizens elect 
politicians as representatives of their values and attitudes, and expect them to 
implement policies in accordance with these (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; 
Blekesaune, 2007; Hedegaard & Larsen, 2014; Kumlin, 2004; Kumlin, 2007; 
Larsen, 2006; Linos & West, 2003; Rothstein, 1998; Svallfors, 2003; Svallfors, 
1997; Svallfors, 2012).
5
 If we therefore want to understand, which path the welfare 
state is- and will be following, changes in the attitudes of the citizens hereto are 
therefore an important factor to take into consideration (Easton, 1965a; Easton, 
1965b; Wlezien & Soroka, 2007).  
In addition, Scandinavians’ attitudes to family, gender roles and work-life balance 
are found quite obviously relevant to investigate. In feminist literature, these 
attitudes are seen as a measure to what extent males and females still live under the 
influence of a patriarchal hegemony. They can therefore be seen as a yardstick for 
the degree of emancipation of women in society (Borchorst, 2012; Lewis, 1992; 
Lewis, 2006). In terms that are more economic, these attitudes have all been seen as 
important in influencing the level of female labour supply. The dual-breadwinner 
model of the Scandinavian countries is often seen as a yardstick (Ellingsæter, 1998; 
Esping-Andersen & Saskia, 2005; Lewis, 1992), but in many other EU countries, 
                                                          
5 The ‘policy responsiveness’ literature investigates to what extent the reality functions like 
that (Burstein, 1998; Burstein, 2003; Page & Shapiro, 1983). 
State 
Families Market 
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and for the EU commission, increasing female labour supply is seen as a key tool 
for dealing with the ageing populations of coming years.
6
        
Except for a long tradition of investigating the degree of work orientation of not just 
women, but all other groups on the labour market (Atchley, 1971; Day & Bedeian, 
1991; De Vaus & McAllister, 1991; Mitchell, Ortiz, & Mitchell, 1987; Mowbray, 
Bybee, Harris, & McCrohan, 1995), Scandinavians’ attitudes to the third – market – 
leg of the triangle, and especially attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages, 
are, as I will document below, not very well investigated. This could be because – 
in contrast to attitudes to the welfare state and redistribution, as well as towards 
family and gender roles – it is at first glance maybe not so obvious why these 
attitudes are relevant to investigate at all.  
1.2. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO INVESTIGATE? 
This subsection will delve into why the level of inequality in gross wages earned on 
the labour market often has been seen as a non-issue – also theoretically. The 
assumptions behind such arguments will hereafter be questioned. First, I will 
present some of the classic arguments and positions concerning the issue of just 
wages. Thereafter I delve more deeply into some special features of the 
Scandinavian case(s) that make this issue even more relevant in this context. 
A narrative rooted in laissez-faire liberalism and in later neo-liberalism and neo-
classical economics, for a number of reasons suggest that there are no reasons to 
worry about people’s attitudes to the wages produced on an unregulated labour 
market. The basic narrative goes as follows. The invisible hand of the market will 
automatically insure equilibrium between the demand for and supply of workforce. 
The competition on the labour market will therefore insure that the wage-earners 
will always get the wage they deserve. This is because a fair wage in this narrative 
is defined by the individual worker’s productivity, i.e. its worth on the market.  
Some wage-earners’ productivity is higher than others, and it can often be increased 
by upgrading skills, further education and training. The differences in productivity 
between the wage-earners thus explain both why differences in wages exist, and 
why they should exist. Furthermore, because the free market is assumed to be 
always the most efficient allocation-mechanism securing a pareto-optimal 
condition, any attempts to interfere or regulate will lead to a loss of total welfare 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, 41-44; Kerr, 2011). The narrative sometimes leans more 
towards pragmatically/analytical arguments (e.g. Hayek, 1948). Sometimes moral 
or philosophical arguments are at the forefront (e.g. Nozick, 1974; Rand, 1964). 
Wages for different groups on the labour market, as well as the level of wage 
                                                          
6 When EU leaders met in March 2000 the Lisbon European Council considered that the 
overall target was to raise the employment rate for women to more than 60% by 2010. The 
‘Lisbon Agenda’ was based on a partnership between the Commission and the Member-
States (European Commission, 2010). 
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disparity is therefore per se just, as long as it is left to the free unregulated market to 
sort out the levels.  
Most people and indeed social scientists would not subscribe fully to the narrative 
just described, which some might even claim is also a bit caricatured. In spite of 
that I would claim the realm of gross wages somehow seems implicitly perceived, 
by attitudinal researchers at large, to belong mostly to the realm of market forces. 
Market forces, globalization and so forth are often viewed as external factors or 
pressures outside or on the edge of political control (for an introductionary 
discussion: Esping-Andersen & Saskia, 2005). Another argument could also be that 
attitudes are not as important in this case as in others, because everybody basically 
just wants to maximize their own wages (Mau, 2003; Svallfors, 2006; Svallfors, 
2007) (for more elaboration on this classic argument see Chapter 5). Personal 
economic utility and, maybe, bargaining power are what really matters, not 
individual attitudes. If these claims are not wrong, it could explain why attitudes to 
the level of gross wages is such a relatively under-researched subject. There are 
theoretical as well as empirical arguments however for why ruling out attitudes to 
wages as irrelevant can be criticized. 
First of all, the laissez-faire narrative above is by no means uncontroversial 
theoretically. The classic definition of politics by Lasswell (1936) – ‘who gets what, 
when and how’ – indicates that the question of wages and the distribution of 
incomes at large are by no means apolitical but rather a fundamentally political 
topic, with a long theoretical history connected. Both the notions that firstly, wages 
levels and wages disparity rates per se are just, when left to the free market to sort 
out; and secondly that wages are basically an apolitical matter, are not undisputed or 
shared by other traditions. Attitudes to wage levels and wage disparities are 
therefore not irrelevant to investigate.    
Already in classical Marxism, the question of what wages the workers earn on the 
market was central, and Marxism was highly critical of the narrative of laissez-faire 
liberalism above. The wages the working class (the proletariat) earned on the 
market were, firstly, not seen as just at all. On the contrary, the workers were 
considered to be exploited by the capitalists (the bourgeoisie) who owned the means 
of production. Furthermore, the theory predicted that those wages would even 
become more unjust over time. The prediction was that competition between the 
capitalists spurs centralisation of capital and a steadily worsening economic 
cleavage between the increasingly fewer and richer capitalists, and the increasingly 
impoverished working class. The theory predicts that competition on the labour 
market will bring the wages of the workers in time to the minimum subsistence 
level (Marx & Engels, 1968; Marx, 1972).   
Secondly, the question of wages was therefore not viewed as an apolitical matter at 
all. In the Marxian framework, the socialist or communist movement’s prime task 
was to break the circle of exploitation of the working class by the capitalists. The 
only way to do this was argued to be to radically transform society through a 
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revolution, since the exploitation was inherent in the capitalist mode of production. 
The socialist/communist movement had a tough adversary in the ruling capitalist 
class though. The superstructure of capitalist society – that is, state, culture, 
institutions and rituals – was argued to reflect the interests of the ruling capitalist 
class and seek to impose on the workers a ‘false consciousness’ that would prevent 
them from realizing their true objective economic interests – until class-
consciousness was achieved. Then the working class would cease being just a class 
‘in itself’ – that is a class having the same objective class interests, to being a class 
‘for itself’ that is a class with members subjectively aware of their common interests 
in changing the capitalist mode of production. The working class are therefore 
predicted to overthrow the ruling capitalist class in the proletarian revolution and 
substitute the capitalist with a socialist mode of production (Marx & Engels, 1968; 
Marx, 1972). 
Although Marxism may has been a forerunner in formulating a theoretical critique 
of the justness of outcomes achieved by leaving wage-determination solely to the 
market, neither theoretically nor empirically did the critique remain solely Marxist 
for long. The non-revolutionary trade/labour unions of western countries 
historically found a solution to insure, in their view, fairer wages for workers 
without having to resort to revolution. By sticking together and organizing 
themselves into trade/labour unions, the workers were able to offset the unequal 
balance of power with the capitalists, get more bargaining power and contribute to 
securing higher wages for the workers (Addison & Schnabel, 2003; Van Gyes, 
2001).  
In the Scandinavian countries, this led to the formation, by international 
comparison, of a rather unique IRS. I will describe the characteristics, formation, 
development and changes in the Scandinavian IRS(s) thoroughly in Chapter 3. In 
this section, I feature selected arguments as to why attitudes to wage levels and 
disparities are maybe even more important to investigate in a Scandinavian context 
than in that of most other places.  
First of all, as in other western countries, the trade/labour unions have always 
justified their existence precisely as a counterbalance to offset the unequal power of 
the employers against individual employees. They therefore clearly do not 
subscribe to the neo-liberal/classical narrative of wages being just when left solely 
to the market. Secondly, the state has and earlier had a prominent role in the 
Scandinavian IRS – though this is often overlooked (Dølvik, 2013).7 Since the 
characteristics of the regulations and interventions of the state depend on 
parliamentary power of different political parties and ultimately votes at elections; 
attitudes to wage levels and disparities are worth investigating because they can 
                                                          
7 As will be described in detail below in Chapter 2, this role of the state was not always as 
formalised as in the major continental European countries, and the form and scope of state 
influence varied a lot between the three Scandinavian countries. 
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influence future voting patterns on elections. This corresponds to the implicit 
assumptions underlying research into attitudes to the welfare state described above.  
Thirdly, most importantly and the most uniquely Scandinavian, the political game 
of negotiating and striking deals is not restricted to the parliamentary sphere. The 
Scandinavian IRS(s) historically crowded out a great deal of the determination of 
wage levels and wage disparity levels from the market into a quasi-political sphere 
of (centralised) collective bargaining negotiations. Two factors are important to 
mention concerning collective bargaining in Scandinavia.  
First, according to Åberg (1984), a symbiotic relationship exists between 
centralized collective bargaining and egalitarian attitudes of wage-earners, 
promoting a narrow wage dispersion rate between different occupations. The 
argument is basically that centralisation changes the focal point for wage-earners 
from the employers to other groups of wage-earners. In a centralised trade union 
movement, if a group of wage-earners demands more pay, they no longer merely 
have to have this claim accepted by the employers, but also legitimized by other 
groups of wage-earners. This shift in the focus leads to a need for more neutral 
criteria for evaluating what constitutes fair salaries than labour market strength or 
value among the different wage-earner groups. Åberg (1984) labels these more 
neutral criteria ‘non-market criteria’8 and claims that when the wage-earner groups 
eventually subscribe to these criteria, it becomes difficult to legitimise certain 
groups’ earning much more or much less than others – thereby promoting a high 
degree of equality in wage levels. If Åberg (1984) is right, centralisation in effect 
tends to crowd out the narrow, personal, utility-based view of wages in favour of 
attitudes and arguments of ‘fairness’. Attitudes – and not just personal economic 
utility or interests – therefore become important.   
Second, the outcome of negotiations in the form of collective bargaining 
agreements set the terms for different sectors of the labour market for 2–4 years and 
covered virtually all wage-earner groups – something that was and is unique in 
international comparisons. The attitudes of the individual trade union members – or 
the members of the employers’ federation for that matter – were and are 
furthermore quite important in this process. A collective agreement is in the Danish 
and Norwegian IRS is not enacted before being sanctioned by a ballot among the 
trade union members and the employer members of their respective organisations. 
In the Swedish IRS the members elect their representatives who then have the 
authority to approve collective agreements (Elvander, 2002; Galenson, 1952; Ibsen, 
Høgedahl, & Scheuer, 2011; Stokke, 2002; Åberg, 1984). In this way – and even 
more in the heyday of centralised collective bargaining – the development of wage 
levels for different occupations as well as the level of wage disparity in society was 
                                                          
8 According to Åberg (1984), these include a company’s financial capabilities in giving pay 
raises, the company’s market situation and future developments, the nature of the work, how 
dangerous it is and the education level of certain groups of workers. 
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a fundamental and salient political issue. Here the attitudes of trade union members 
and employers, at least in principle, and more so in Denmark and Norway than in 
Sweden, mattered in a much more direct way than in ordinary parliamentary 
politics. The system still exists today, but the coverage of the collective agreements 
of at least the traditional trade/labour unions is shrinking with the trade union 
density rates and the abandonment of centralised collective bargaining negotiations 
(Ibsen et al., 2011; OECD, 2004).  
As indicated above, big changes have taken place in the IRS(s) since the heyday of 
centralised collective bargaining negotiations around 1980, although features such 
as the trade union density rate, the level of coordination, cooperation and 
governability are still by international comparison very high (Dølvik, 2013; Erixon, 
2010; OECD, 2004). The effects of these changes make the issue of attitudes to the 
level of inequality in gross wages not less interesting to investigate. 
1.3. AN UNDER-RESEARCHED AND YET ACCESSIBLE FIELD 
OF RESEARCH  
In this section, existing literature will be reviewed and it will be argued that 
research into Scandinavian attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages 
does exist. For several reasons this literature could be supplemented however. The 
review refers mainly to contributions which have used the following survey 
question, as basis for creating their dependent variables:  
What do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid, regardless of what they 
actually get? 
The survey question stems from the Social Inequality modules I-IV (1987, 1992, 
1999 and 2009) of the International Social Survey program (ISSP). This will also be 
the approach in much of the survey-oriented analyses of this dissertation, and this 
selection will be discussed extensively in Chapter 4. 
The first reason for supplementing this literature is that, a substantial part of it 
seems conceptually, methodologically and empirically to some extent to conflate 
attitudes to the gross level of inequality in wages with attitudes to redistribution 
(Evans & Kelley, 2007; Gijsberts, 2002; Miller & Ortiz, 1995; Svallfors, 1995; 
Svallfors, 1997). Although the two concepts both deal with economic inequality 
and are therefore obviously related, they should, as mentioned above, be clearly 
separated as different concepts (Janmaat, 2013). Redistribution is maybe one of the 
absolute key outcome-components of the (welfare) state, as shown in the ‘welfare 
triangle’ (Figure 1-1). The institutions of the welfare state are the key factors 
affecting the level of redistribution in a society, and hence, if citizens want to 
change the level of redistribution in society, they should direct their attention and 
attitudes to the government, the parliament and the political parties within it.  
- 
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The gross level of inequality in wages on the other hand, at least in principle, 
belongs to the realm of the (labour) market in Figure 1-1. Citizens’ attention should 
therefore be directed mainly at the IRS – the institutions governing the development 
of wage levels – and to the key actors within the system. Another instance of the 
difference between redistribution and the gross level of inequality is the different 
measures used to evaluate their levels. Redistribution is often evaluated by the net 
Gini-coefficient, whereas the latter can be evaluated by gross Gini-coefficients, or 
better yet, gross decile wage ratios. The Scandinavian development in terms of 
these figures in a comparative perspective will be presented in Chapter 3.  
The second justification is that among the rather scarce existing literature on the 
subject, an even smaller part has much to say about the Scandinavian countries. 
One reason for this is that only Svallfors (2004; 1993; 1995; 1997; 2006) and 
Larsen (2006) have actually focussed on the Scandinavian attitudes towards the 
level of inequality in gross wage levels in a comparative perspective (Knudsen 
(2001) analyses only Norway in his article). In other research in the field, the 
Scandinavian countries are often not even included, or if they are, they are surely 
not the focus of attention (Arts, Hermkens, & van Wijck, 1995; Austen, 1999; 
Austen, 2002; Blanchflower & Freeman, 1997; Evans & Kelley, 2007; Gijsberts, 
2002; Headey, 1991; Kelley & Zagorski, 2004; Kelley & Evans, 1993; Kerr, 2011; 
Kluegel & Miyano, 1995; Mason, 1995; McCall, 2013; Miller & Ortiz, 1995; 
Pettersson, 1995; Szirmai, 1986; Szirmai, 1991; Verba & Orren, 1985). Osberg and 
Smeeding (2006) include Norway in their analyses and identify peculiar patterns for 
this country. Their mission is to identify and explain American exceptionalism, not 
Scandinavian exceptionalism, so they do not make much of the Norwegian results. 
With few exceptions, the analyses mentioned above are also performed on a rather 
aggregated level (Exceptions to the rule: Gijsberts, 2002; Headey, 1991; Kelley & 
Evans, 1993; McCall, 2013; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006; Szirmai, 1986; Verba & 
Orren, 1985). Important results often hide in aggregated analyses. To supplement 
this field of research, this dissertation will therefore conduct analyses on both the 
aggregated- and disaggregated level.  
Thirdly, it is perhaps apparent that many of the above-mentioned sources are hardly 
up to date and do not explore trends through time (Janmaat, 2013). As will be 
elaborated in Chapter 5, the majority of empirical analyses conducted in this 
dissertation are analyses of survey-data and in particular, of all four Social 
Inequality modules of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) from 
1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009.   
Data from the ISSP’s fourth round of the Social Inequality module of 2009 
including 38 countries with 53,155 respondents is especially important (ISSP 
Research Group, 2011). Data was collected in the immediate repercussions of the 
financial crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15
th
 
2008. The financial crisis made questions about wage levels – especially top wage 
levels – a very salient issue in Scandinavia as well as in other western countries. 
The ISSP has become a standard data source for comparative attitudinal research, 
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and the ISSP 2009 dataset clearly forms the most solid and comprehensive basis 
available for cross-national analyses of comparable data on attitudes towards wage 
gaps between occupations. In spite of this, utilizing this dataset to investigate 
attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages has, as far as the author is 
aware, not yet been done. Attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages 
therefore seems important to investigate, but – how can this notion be 
conceptualised? That is the topic of the next section. 
1.4. PUTTING THE RICH BACK INTO FOCUS 
Already at this early stage, it is important to delimit and elaborate the central 
concept of investigation in the monograph - the level of inequality in gross wages. 
This will be done by relating it to the broader concept of economic inequality. I 
claim that in principle the current state of economic inequality in society constitutes 
of three different, but surely interrelated phenomena. These three phenomena exist 
both in a factual, but just as important, a social constructivist sense. They can 
therefore all individually or collectively be the focus of institutional, media and 
public attention and ultimately of political action. These phenomena are:  
First, the overall level of income inequality is of course a subject for media and 
public attention, but also for institutional effort in itself. Research also indicates that 
the overall level is important for society in itself (Clark, Frijters, & Shields, 2008; 
Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). The debates often following developments in the 
official Gini-coefficient statistics are good examples of debates addressing the 
overall distribution in itself.  
The second phenomenon is the bottom-to-middle relationship in society. It is by 
now empirically and theoretically well established in existing literature that in a 
comparative sense there continues to be a comprehensive institutional effort 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999; Goul Andersen, 2012a; Larsen, 2007; Rothstein & 
Stolle, 2001; 2007; Rothstein, 1998), a positive media focus (Dejgaard & Larsen, 
2009; Larsen, 2006; Larsen & Dejgaard, 2013; Lundström, 2011; Van Oorschot, 
2000; van Oorschot, 2006), and continued attitudinal legitimacy in trying to lift 
people from the under- or working class into the middle class in the Scandinavian 
countries (Hedegaard & Larsen, 2014; Hedegaard, 2014a; Hedegaard, 2014b; 
Larsen, 2013; Svallfors, 2006; Svallfors, 2007). 
The third phenomenon is the top-to-middle relationship in society. A low degree of 
overall economic inequality – measured for instance by a low Gini-coefficient – 
rests as much on the proportion of the total wealth in society owned by the 
wealthiest, as on the proportion owned by the poorest (Bellù & Liberati, 2006; 
Farris, 2010).
9
 In spite of this, existing research is to a large extent silent in regards 
                                                          
9 This is often used as a critique of the Gini-coefficient. In response, so-called generalised- 
or higher-order Ginis have been developed. These weight differently incomes in different 
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to empirically and theoretically investigating the institutional effort or lack thereof 
restraining or enhancing wealth growth among the wealthiest in Scandinavian 
societies, in what light the media portrays ‘the rich’ in the Scandinavian countries, 
and the legitimacy among the Scandinavian populace of the level of earnings at the 
top of society. Internationally there seems to be a new spark of interest in public 
and media perceptions and presentations of the rich. Especially the literature about 
the ‘undeserving rich’ is a good example of this (Bamfield & Horton, 2009; 
McCall, 2013; Rowlingson & Connor, 2011).  
This monograph will take up the challenge of trying to fill in the Scandinavian void 
by focussing on the top-middle relation. The main dependent variable in the 
dissertation measures attitudes to the just wage-level ratio of unskilled factory 
workers and shop assistants to that of chairmen of large national corporations. The 
two first-mentioned occupations are hardly among the high-status or well-paid 
occupations on today’s labour markets. In spite of this, people in these occupations 
are still on the labour market and earning a regular market income. They can 
therefore hardly be conceived as the bottom of society, but maybe rather the lower 
middle- or working class.
10
 Scandinavians’ attitudes towards the level of inequality 
in gross wages can therefore be conceived as attitudes towards the top-middle gap. 
Besides attitudes, the media portrayal of the rich and its relation to popular 
perceptions and attitudes over time in the Scandinavian countries will therefore be 
investigated.  
The original social-democratic ideology dominating the creation of welfare states in 
Scandinavia at least had a legacy which indeed was critical of those at the top of 
society, or in other words, ‘the rich’. In the original Marxist version from which 
reformed socialists/social democrats owe their origins,
11
 the bourgeoisie (the 
capitalists or the rich) is the enemy of the proletariat (the working class, i.e. the 
majority), for the capitalists exploit the working class. The superstructure of society 
(i.e. culture, media, institutions and more) furthermore promote and reflects the 
values of the bourgeoisie, preventing the proletariat from realising their true 
objective class-interest in overthrowing bourgeois rule in the ‘proletarian 
revolution’ (Marx & Engels, 1968). 
                                                                                                                                       
parts of the income distribution, thereby making the proportion of the poor count more in the 
calculation than the proportion of the rich, for example. The standard Gini used in most 
instances does not use this kind of weighting (Bellù & Liberati, 2006; Farris, 2010). 
10 In the European Socio-economic Classification schema or ESeC, which can be conceived 
as a modern version of an occupational class ranking scheme, these occupations are ranked 
as ‘routine workers’ and ‘lower sales and service’ (Harrison & Rose, 2006; Rose & Harrison, 
2007). See more in Section 5.2.2.2. 
11 See for example: (Bernstein, 1899 [1993]; Kautsky, 1932). Esping-Andersen (1980) 
clearly underscores this point in actually labelling social democracy ‘revisionist Marxism’ (p. 
1). 
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This idea that the power of the capitalists was dangerous did not die out quickly 
when the majority in the workers’ movement gradually embraced representative 
democracy and the idea of a gradual transformation into a socialist society. The 
reformed socialists and the main social democratic political parties in Scandinavia 
for most of the last century kept some notions of the class struggle against the 
bourgeoisie as the ‘class-enemy’ at least in their official and highly ideological 
policy agenda programs (Esping-Andersen, 1980; Green-Pedersen, 2011; Nygård, 
2006; Socialdemokratiet). It is always a matter of discussion how much selected 
ideological statements from the official policy agenda programs or a few politicians 
on special occasions actually meant for the actual policy goals the social democrats 
strived to achieve. No matter what, it is clear that a certain degree of scepticism 
over the work, earnings and profits of ‘the rich’ is a part of the ideological legacy of 
social democrats in Scandinavia. This legacy at first glance probably was even 
more prominent before and during the ‘golden age of welfare capitalism’ (Flora, 
1986) when the social democratic actors helped shape the social democratic welfare 
regime. 
The idea of possible scepticism towards the rich does not rest solely on ideology. In 
a social constructivist sense there are good reasons to suspect that people have 
stereotypes about ‘the rich’, and that the media use these and deservingness criteria 
in presentations of them in the same way they do in presentations of ‘the poor’. 
Fiske, Cuddy and Glick (2007) claim that there are two universal dimensions of 
social cognition: warmth and competence. In other words they claim that all people, 
when dealing with an unknown ‘other’, evaluate whether the other has good or bad 
intentions towards you (warmth) and whether ‘the other’ has the ability to enact the 
perceived intentions (competence). Empirically investigating how Americans 
evaluate different groups on these two dimensions, they perhaps unsurprisingly find 
that groups such as the homeless, welfare recipients and poor blacks score low on 
both dimensions and stimulate both negative emotions and behaviour in the 
respondents. The opposite applies to groups such as middle-class Americans, 
Christians and housewives. Other ‘poor’ groups such as the elderly, retarded and 
disabled are viewed as warm but incompetent. They therefore prompt ambivalent, 
but more positive emotions and behaviour than the other poor groups. These results 
should come as no surprise following the deservingness literature (van Oorschot, 
2000; van Oorschot, 2006). What is interesting in our case is that ‘the rich’ – 
together with Asian people, Jewish people, female and minority professionals – are 
claimed also to stimulate ambivalent emotions and behaviour among the 
respondents. These groups score high on competence but low on warmth. Because 
of this mix, these groups are on the one hand appreciated and envied for their 
competence, but at the same time their low ‘warmth’ score makes the respondents 
judge their intentions as not to be trusted.  
The use of negative stereotypes of ‘the poor’ and deservingness criteria, tapping 
into different marginalized groups’ moral character in media representations of 
these groups is well known in the existing literature. Stereotypes are classical 
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subject material for media to build stories on (Gilens, 2000; Gilens, 1996; Larsen, 
2013; Larsen & Dejgaard, 2013). Similarly to the description above it is 
analogically likely that representations and stereotypes of the correspondingly 
deserving- or undeserving rich (McCall, 2013; Rowlingson & Connor, 2011) also 
exist in media output. An important prerequisite here is that ‘the rich’ must be 
considered to be a distinct group of ‘others’ separate from the ‘us’ of the middle 
class, in the HCNI of society. This means that – by investigating whether and how 
the media represents ‘the rich’ – traces of the myths, representations and 
stereotypes in Scandinavian HCNIs should emerge. 
This dissertation will thus fill the gap in knowledge about the relationship between 
the perceived top and the middle strata of society by investigating both the 
Scandinavian’s attitudes to the earnings at the top of society, the relationship 
between top and middle, the media’s presentation of the same issues as well as the 
background in the Scandinavian PEs. A longitudinal perspective is applied in all 
cases to allow for the possibility of capturing changes either of these empirical 
fields.
12
  
1.5. THE SELECTION OF THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES AS 
CASES 
Though an investigation of the current legitimacy behind the market leg of ‘the 
Nordic model’ could entail all five Nordic countries – Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland and Iceland
13
 – the focus of this monograph will be on only the three 
Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Norway and Sweden. There are a number of 
reasons for this case selection.  
First, there are empirical considerations. Finland and Iceland participated in only 
the last round of the ISSP Social Inequality module in 2009. The various rounds of 
this module are the main source of attitudinal data used in this monograph. The 
Scandinavian countries also participated in earlier rounds of the module, allowing 
for a longitudinal perspective. Second, though the often-used concept is the Nordic 
model, it is clear from a range of analyses that three Scandinavian countries are 
somehow more ‘core-Nordic’ than the other two. Finland and Iceland do not have 
the same tradition of a corporative IRS in which labour market regulations are 
mainly decided by compromises between the trade/labour unions and the 
                                                          
12 Although we are mainly interested in the current state of affairs, in the analyses that follow 
we will try to maintain a longitudinal perspective – utilising, among other sources, time-
series survey data and newspaper articles from a period of years. This cross-time 
comparative perspective helps us to know what is high and low, what constitutes a significant 
change, and what not (Svallfors, 1995).  
13 One could also separate the semi-independent, self-governing parts of the Danish 
Kingdom: Greenland and the Fareo Islands and the autonomous Region of Finland: the 
Åland Islands.  
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employers’ federations. In addition, their social democratic parties have not had the 
parliamentary and cabinet power as they do in the Scandinavian countries (Alestalo, 
Hort, & Kuhnle, 2009). Another example of the ‘core-Nordic’ focus of the 
Scandinavian countries is that data from only the three Scandinavian countries were 
used by Esping-Andersen (1990) in his original classification of the social 
democratic welfare-state regime. Also in later works Sweden and sometimes 
Denmark and Norway are most often seen as epitomising the Nordic model. This is 
not the case for Finland or Iceland. The Finnish welfare regime actually shares 
many characteristics with the conservative welfare regime, and in other aspects the 
Finns were much later to build the comprehensive welfare institutions for which the 
Scandinavian countries are famous. Iceland led the economic boom of the last 
couple of decades and followed with a range of neo-liberal reforms, fundamentally 
changing the Icelandic welfare regime in the liberal direction (Alestalo et al., 2009; 
Dølvik, 2013; Ebbinghaus, 2012). As will be apparent in the aggregated analyses in 
Chapter 5, also on the attitudinal side, the Finns and Icelanders do not follow their 
co-Nordics in the Scandinavian countries.  
Knudsen & Rothstein (1994) furthermore argue that Denmark and Sweden 
constitute the most important Nordic cases to investigate, epitomising the ‘West- 
and East Nordic’ model respectively. They argue that only Denmark and Sweden 
have undergone an independent state-building process. In contrast, Iceland, Finland 
and Norway for most of their history were subordinate ‘receiver-countries’ to the 
realms of Denmark and Sweden. The disaggregated context descriptions and 
analyses of chapters 3, 6 and 7 will therefore focus on the differences between 
Denmark and Sweden.  
1.6. OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The remaining parts of the dissertation are divided into seven chapters and a 
conclusion. First, Chapter 2 of the dissertation will delve more deeply into the 
metatheoretical considerations underlying many of the claims in the sections above. 
Among other things, concepts’ assumed relations, how and why they fit 
ontologically, and the consequences for the research design will be elaborated. 
Chapter 3 of the dissertation will describe the developing contexts – the 
Scandinavian PEs – of Scandinavian attitudes to the level of inequality in gross 
wages. The overall purpose of this chapter is to develop hypotheses on what 
patterns can be expected in the development of Scandinavian attitudes to the level 
of inequality in gross wages – in the aggregated and disaggregated perspective. 
Chapter 4 theoretically and empirically treats the methodological question of how 
to measure attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages. Chapter 5 is the first 
analysis chapter in the dissertation dealing with the aggregated level. In two 
separate analysis sections, the chapter deals with the question whether a 
Scandinavian egalitarianism is identifiable empirically. First investigating, which 
attitudes Scandinavians express towards the level of inequality in gross wages 
compared to people of other western countries, and how they have developed over 
- 
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time.  The second section turns to trying to explain the Scandinavian egalitarianism 
in attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages. Chapter 6 concentrates 
on the disaggregated level and investigates whether the three Scandinavian 
countries portray similar or different patterns of attitudes towards the level of 
inequality in gross wages. Chapter 7 is a study of the representations of ‘the rich’ in 
major Danish and Swedish newspapers from 1996 – 2013. Finally, the last chapter 
sums up and concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2. METATHEORETICAL 
REFLECTIONS 
This dissertation aims at contributing to existing knowledge on both the empirical 
and theoretical fronts. Empirically the aim is testing the claim whether – and if so – 
how and why Scandinavians have a ‘passion for equality’ (Andersen, 1983; 
Graubard, 1986).
14
 As was hinted at in section 1.3 (and will further be documented 
in Chapter 3), this is a widely held claim emerging from different scientific 
traditions. In spite of this, the assertion has not really been substantiated with 
empirical investigations into the actual attitudes of the Scandinavians, and certainly 
not with respect to how they develop over time. Instead, this ‘passion’ is often 
deduced theoretically, or for example by inferring the attitudes from the form and 
character of the existing institutional structure. Such arguments presuppose a direct 
link between the attitudes of citizens and the existing institutional structure in a 
given context at a specific time. As indicated above, both the empirical results, but 
also the ontology of the dissertation question or rather modifies these simple 
assumptions.  
Theoretically, this dissertation aims to contribute to answering the call of Korpi & 
Palme (1998): ‘the empirical testing of the macro-micro-links among institutions 
and the formation of interest and coalitions provides a major challenge for social 
scientists’ (p. 682). In trying to answer such a question, it is important to reflect on 
issues as to how the macro- and micro-level actually are linked, what they are 
constituted of, how one can investigate such links, and what validity and scope one 
can claim from the outcomes of such an endeavour. What are needed are, in other 
words, metatheoretical reflections.  
The dissertation is, as mentioned above, much inspired by the ontological position 
of Critical Realism (CR) and (what I hold to be related though more restricted in 
scope) the Social Mechanisms approach (SM) (Bhaskar, 2013; Hedström & 
Swedberg, 1998; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Ingemann, 2013; Wuisman, 2005). 
The basic ontological model of CR will therefore be presented briefly below. The 
various constituents of this model will then be discussed in relations to the subject 
of the dissertation. The outcome of this discussion should make it possible to, 
firstly, outline the components of the dissertation and their assumed relations and 
therefore, secondly, comment on the questions posed above: the macro-micro links, 
the methods and approach of investigation, and the scope of the findings.  
                                                          
14 And as indicated in the research questions above, the aim is to answer the question in a 
more complex way than by simply testing the claim. If it exists, it is also investigated what 
constitutes it, and whether the answer to this is different among the three Scandinavian 
countries, or in different periods of time, and, why it exists. 
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2.1. CRITICAL REALISM AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS 
The basic ontological model of CR with social reality separated into three strata is 
presented in Figure 2-1 below:  
Figure 2-1 The three strata of social reality in Critical Realism 
Real Actual Empirical 
Deep structures and social mechanisms Events and tendencies Observable experiences 
Source: author’s elaboration 
Critical realism is, as the name implies, an ontologically realist position. The social 
world therefore exists independently of the observer. However, as the figure above 
obviously implies, this reality is assumed to be more complex than – for example – 
critical rationalist positions assume. Events in the actual stratum are generated 
causally by (social) mechanisms in the real stratum. In contrast to the mono-causal 
universal laws in what some have termed the ‘covering law-account’ or ‘naïve 
positivism’, the real strata consists of a myriad of social mechanisms (causal 
potentials). The impact of these social mechanisms in a concrete situation depends 
on the interplay between these various social mechanisms unique for that context. 
Again, in contrast to naïve positivism, the social reality is therefore assumed to be 
contextual. Deeper structures are assumed in CR to condition the interplay of 
mechanisms in a concrete situation. In the social world these are to be understood 
as historically conditioned power structures and institutions – although the 
structures often seem conflated with the mechanisms in CR (Bhaskar, 2013; 
Ingemann, 2013; Kemp & Holmwood, 2003; Wuisman, 2005).  
The distinctive ontological assumptions obviously have epistemological 
consequences as well. The complexity of the social world and the limitations of 
human cognition make it impossible for an observer (a researcher) to comprehend 
or digest all the events and tendencies of the actual stratum. The empirical stratum, 
which is the observations or measurements conducted by the researcher, is thus 
only able to capture a part the actual stratum. The mechanisms and the deeper 
structures of the real stratum are furthermore not observable at all, but abstract 
phenomena.
15
 To mitigate the ontological complexities and the argued weaknesses 
of the inductive and deductive approach to conducting scientific investigation, an 
iterative, abductive research process is often recommended in CR. In very simple 
terms, this involves a dynamic interplay between data collection and interpretation 
as well as theoretical abstraction. It should be mentioned that there is great debate 
                                                          
15 To which we as humans – in contrast to the structures in natural sciences – may have an 
‘internal mode of interpretive access’. As with many epistemological claims, and claims 
about how in practice to translate the ontological complexities into practical research which 
still provides trustworthy ‘realist’ results, this is highly debated in CR (Kemp & Holmwood, 
2003; Sayer, 1992). 
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as to, firstly, what these abstract recommendations actually mean for how to 
conduct critical realist research in practice, and secondly, for how different this 
would be from the ‘standard’ practice of much existing research in social sciences 
(Kemp & Holmwood, 2003; Wuisman, 2005).  
There seems to be agreement however that the focus and scope must be on narrowly 
identifying the social mechanisms at play in the given situation and the contextual 
or structural underpinnings conditioning them. The outcome of the scientific 
process in CR and SM is therefore unsurprisingly not law-like formulations as in 
other realist/positivist traditions, but instead a myriad of context-restricted middle-
range theories (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). Even 
then, there is a stochastic element connected with any social mechanism, or in other 
words, causality in the social world. The same mechanism can produce different 
outcomes in different situations (Bhaskar, 2013; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; 
Ingemann, 2013; Wuisman, 2005). Wuisman (2005) elegantly describes this point:  
 ‘The validity of scientific explanation or understanding being 
conjectured is not determined in terms of true or untrue, but in terms of 
right or wrong and to what extent. The explanation and understanding 
are always partial and based on the selection by substantive abstraction 
of specific aspects or elements from reality.’ (p. 388). 
A consequence of these epistemological arguments is furthermore that future 
development or change is not deterministically decided by the mechanisms 
identified in a present context. Structures and relations can be stable and certain 
mechanisms can have prominence in a certain period in a certain context. However, 
the structures conditioning the social mechanisms are a product of human 
interaction, and as humans in CR are viewed as being intentional beings with a 
reflective potential, structural change is surely possible. The contextual limitations 
of the scope of social studies are therefore both in space and in time (Bhaskar, 
2013; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Ingemann, 2013; Wuisman, 2005). The concept 
of external validity is not ruled out totally though. Literature on CR and SM do 
emphasise however that in spite the contingent nature of context-bound structures, 
social mechanisms identified in one context probably also apply to many others 
(Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Kemp & Holmwood, 2003).  
2.2. THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE DISSERTATION 
Building on this rather short and simplified presentation of central arguments from 
the critical realism and social mechanisms traditions, the following paragraphs will 
seek to describe how this is implemented in and adapted to the dissertation. The 
discussion will be based on Figure 2-2 below.  
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Figure 2-1 The Basic Conceptual Model of the Dissertation 
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Media output 
Source: Author’s creation. 
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The first thing to notice about Figure 2-2 is that the dissertation is obviously 
interested in the macro-micro links, or what the SM and CR literature has dubbed 
situational social mechanisms, and which elsewhere has been labelled institutional 
feedback mechanisms (Edlund, 2007; Larsen, 2006; Larsen, 2013; Svallfors, 2007).  
As stated already in the very first section, the relevant macro-level structures in the 
dissertation are defined in terms of the two-sided political economy (PE). The PE 
was defined broadly as the interplay between the economic and political spheres of 
society, and the central constituent parts thereof: the material conditions, actors as 
well as programmatic institutions and HCNI were defined in the introduction. The 
arrows within the PE ‘hat’ in Figure 2-2 signify that the interplay between the 
central actors of the political economy at any given time, and importantly in the 
historical formation of the PE, is conditioned by the prevailing economic structures, 
which in turn condition the formation of the programmatic- and normative 
institutions. The prevailing institutions then obviously affect both the interplay of 
the actors at a later time, but also the economic structures of society. Note that the 
definition of structures in CR, presented above as ‘historically conditioned power 
structures and institutions’, fits nicely with the definition of PE – at least if the 
institutions are viewed as being both programmatic and normative.   
Once again it is important to notice the dual aspect of the PE. Besides the more or 
less material, programmatic institutions, the PE is also constituted of historically 
constructed normative institutions (HCNI). These are defined above as a particular 
representation of the past, a representation that in myths, representations and 
stereotypes define ‘who the others are’ and in a sense also ‘who we are’.  Some 
literature suggests that the HCNI are rather stable over time – especially when we 
are dealing with their effects on attitudes in which ‘group-thinking’ dominates, as is 
probably the case here (see Chapter 4 below).  
The arrows and boxes within the PE ‘hat’ do not seem controversial, and it will be 
clear in the next chapter, which seeks to describe the development in the 
Scandinavian political economies, how prevalent this often implicit overall model is 
– at least when it relates to the material, programmatic institutions. Furthermore, the 
dissertation does not focus on aiming to settle possible issues of causality within the 
‘hat’ of PE. Referring to the critical realist ontology described above, the PE is to 
be understood as consisting of central structures in the real strata of the dissertation. 
Even though the PE has a material side, the mechanisms within the PE and between 
the PE and the micro-level attitudes of the Scandinavians are to be understood as 
causal potentials. It is exactly the contingent, complex and contextual nature of the 
CR ontology which would render such an ambition futile.   
The focus of the dissertation is therefore contextually and theoretically restricted in 
space and time. The focus is to investigate how the political economy, and which 
parts of it, influences Scandinavian attitudes to the level of inequality in gross 
wages in recent decades. Referring to Figure 1-2, the focus and interest is not on the 
arrows within the PE ‘hat’, but instead on the larger vertical arrows - the situational 
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social or institutional feedback mechanisms - linking PE at the macro-level with 
attitudes at the micro-level. Chapter 3 relies on existing literature to describe the 
development in these macro-level phenomena of the Scandinavian political 
economy(ies). 
2.2.1. THE MEDIATING MEDIA 
As apparent in the name, a central mediating variable linking the macro- to the 
micro-level is the media output. It is very important to note that this view applies a 
different perspective than either side of the long causal discussion of whether the 
media content causally drives attitude formation, or whether attitudes drive media 
content. In other terms, these positions correspond to seeing the media content 
either as the main explanatory, or as the dependent variable (Baumberg et al., 2012; 
Baumberg, Bell, & Gaffney, 2013).  
In the dissertation it is assumed that, on the one hand, humans have a reflective 
potential and are thus not passive receivers of media content; they actively demand 
and search for information fitting their needs (Baumberg et al., 2013). The purpose 
of the information and images received through the media for the individual is not 
least to provide clear clues to the social identifications of the individuals – images 
and stereotypes of who and how ‘the others’ are, and hence of who and how ‘we’ 
are (de Swaan, 1995; Rothstein, 2000). As described in section 1.4, this means that 
in this way the media output – even if not just fed to a passive audience – must rely 
on the myths, representations and stereotypes of the HCNI to construct their stories. 
In our case the HCNI of relevance are the possible perceived deserving or 
undeserving rich (Fiske et al., 2007; Fiske, 2011; Gilens, 2000; Gilens, 1996; 
Larsen, 2013; Larsen & Dejgaard, 2013; McCall, 2013; Rowlingson & Connor, 
2011).  
Investigating media content could thus be used as a way to more-or-less directly, 
empirically investigate the actual substance of these otherwise abstract and slippery 
macro-level phenomena of HCNI in a given context at a given time (Larsen, 2013). 
This view contrasts the two classic ‘causal views’ above somewhat, because it is 
not the media content in itself which forms the attitudes of the Scandinavians. The 
situational social mechanisms actually influencing these attitudes stem from 
complex interactions in the real strata – that is, the PE. The media output is only an 
expression thereof, and only in this capacity do media contents influence the 
attitudes. In order to identify differences between the HCNI of the Scandinavian 
countries, Chapter 7 will investigate how major Danish and Swedish newspapers in 
the period 1996–2013 present the issue of  ‘the rich’. As argued in section 1.4 
above, the issue of ‘the rich’ is among other things a strangely forgotten aspect of 
the overall images of society produced by the media. 
Besides the central vertical arrows linking the PE to the media and the attitudes in 
Figure 2-2, there is also a thin arrow pointing from attitudes back to the media. This 
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of course signifies that humans are not passive receivers of media content, but 
actively demand and search for media that fulfil their demands. Because of this 
property, the potentially reflective and changing demand can lead to changes in the 
content of the media. This leads conveniently to a discussion how the relationship 
between the macro and micro level is seen in the dissertation.  
2.2.2. THE RESTRICTED SCOPE OF THE DISSERTATION 
In spite of some modifications; Figure 2-2 and the description above seems mostly 
to signify a structuralist ontology, which suggests that the dissertation ‘puts on the 
structuralist hat’ by claiming everything is structure and nothing is caused by 
individual reflection and action. As claimed in the introduction, this is a false 
characterization. Here it was argued that the dissertation deviated from two classic 
‘structuralist’ ways of understanding Scandinavian attitudes to the level of 
inequality in gross wages. These were, first, the position understanding 
Scandinavian egalitarianism as a stable cultural trait, and second the materialist, 
structuralist account of some Marxist/neo-Marxist literature.   
The mostly structuralist appearance of Figure 2-2 is to be understood as mainly 
conceptual and as a convenient way to delimit the scope of the dissertation. To 
repeat: the recommendations of CR and SM are conceptually limited research 
projects designed to identify the workings of particular social mechanisms in 
particular contexts. Limiting the scope of the dissertation to trying to understand 
Scandinavian attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages, and therefore 
how the macro-level PE influences these, are therefore well in line with these 
recommendations.  
The SM approach also operates with two other forms of social mechanisms: the 
‘action formation mechanisms’ (micro-micro links), which explains how attitudes 
and perceptions influence behaviour and actions of humans, as well as 
‘transformational mechanisms’ explaining how the actions and behaviour of 
humans influence the institutions and structures of society (micro-macro links) 
(Hedström & Swedberg, 1998; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010).
16
 Existing institutions 
and structures in CR are thus products of human interaction. Therefore, as was 
argued in sections 1.1–1.3, the relevance of studying Scandinavian attitudes to the 
level of inequality in gross wages is exactly because these are argued to be 
important to future developments in the Scandinavian model(s). The HCNI of 
society help individuals find meaning and identity, shape their behaviour, and 
ultimately help form the background or context behind which voters and policy-
makers guide the future development of the Scandinavian model. This said, and 
with the cognitive and material constraints and opportunities offered by the existing 
programmatic and historically constructed normative institutional structure, it is still 
the citizens and policy-makers of Scandinavia who are the prime vessels for the re- 
                                                          
16 This overall model is inspired by Coleman’s (1990) bathtub model. 
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or deproductions of the normative and programmatic institutions underlying the 
Scandinavian model(s). This is signified in Figure 2-2 by the thin arrow pointing 
from attitudes back to the PE ‘hat’.17  
2.2.3. THE COMPLEX HUMAN NATURE 
Conditioning all arguments about how the media functions, what social 
mechanisms are possible etc., is fundamentally an ontological view of human 
nature. A key point in critical realism is that the social world is complex and 
contextual. This means human nature is also complex, and as the SM literature 
emphasises, it makes little sense to assume certain social mechanisms at play 
beforehand, but rather, it makes sense to develop ideas about their nature and 
investigate these empirically (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998; Hedström & Ylikoski, 
2010). To quote March & Olsen (2006):  
 ‘…a theory of purposeful human behaviour must take into consideration the 
diversity of human motivations and modes of behaviour and account for the 
relationship and interaction between different logics in different institutional 
settings. A beginning is to explore behavioural logics as complementary, rather than 
to assume a single dominant behavioural logic.’ (p. 720). 
What are March & Olsen (2006) actually trying to unify here? Several different and 
often simplified ‘men’ have been proposed and discussed in order to indicate the 
core of human nature in various settings, or simply to be used as heuristic 
approaches to simplify model- and theory-building. 
A classic model and straw man is the economic man of Rational Choice, also 
mentioned in the introduction as representing the third classic position towards 
understanding Scandinavian attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages. The 
economic man strives to maximize utility. Sometimes utility is defined very 
narrowly as mere personal economic utility, sometimes it more widely encompasses 
any goal imaginable. Sometimes the economic man is seen atomistically as under 
no structural constraints, sometimes formal institutions are seen as having an 
influence on the incentive structure in the individual’s utility-functions (Coleman, 
                                                          
17 External factors such as globalisation, decrees and directives of the EU, UN and others, as 
well as intended or unintended tendencies of institutional change in the forms of 
displacement, layering, drift, conversion and exhaustion, surely affect the development in the 
political economy as well (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005).  These are all 
‘complications’ in the processes of production or reproduction of the macro-level structures 
and phenomena of society (Giddens, 1986). It seems likely however that in the long term the 
Scandinavian model is only likely to endure if the Scandinavians have egalitarian attitudes to 
the level of inequality in gross wages more or less matching the institutional setup of the 
model. 
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1990; North, 1990; Pierson, 2000; Rothstein, 2000).
18
 The widely defined economic 
man borders closely on the issue-voting political man of election research (Borre, 
2001) – acting rationally on convictions. There are also other men, such as the 
psychological man acting on impulse, and the sociological man, motivated by and 
acting on a logic of appropriateness in order to gain recognition, meaning and a 
feeling of self-worth and identity (March & Olsen, 2006). Besides the rather 
simplified ‘men’ described above, attempts have also been made to develop more 
complex and realistic ‘men’. The reflective political man for example also acts 
rationally on convictions. However, his attitudes are not externally given, but 
internally created and revised in the light of new information or arguments from 
other actors or sources (Borre & Goul Andersen, 2003; Larsen, 2006; Shamshiri-
Petersen, 2010).  
Following the quote of March & Olsen (2006) and all the different ‘men’ proposed 
must obviously lead to the conclusion that the issue of human nature is complex 
and, realistically, people are probably composed a little bit of all the different 
heuristics described above – although maybe of some more than others. 
Unfortunately this does not help us much to make sense of the social world. After 
all the main reason people have proposed and discussed – the various ‘men’ – is to 
simplify complexity and allow at least imperfect explanations of observable social 
outcomes. 
A potentially fruitful way out of this mess is to stick to the emphasis that humans 
have a reflective potential in CR. The word ‘institutions’ signifies at least some 
degree of stability over a certain amount of time. The only reason we therefore can 
claim that such things as normative institutions exist, is that people do not go 
around reflecting on and questioning everything all the time. This everyday 
unreflectiveness does not on the other hand mean that the potential for reflection is 
never utilized. The question of when the reflective potential of individuals is 
activated is probably hard to answer definitely, and it most certainly varies a lot 
between the various strata of a population.  
Nevertheless, if the focus is restricted to periods when a significant part of the 
population activate their reflective potential  – if such periods exist – it is likely 
they are associated with periods of great transformation or upheaval coupled with a 
                                                          
18 Another perspective on this difference is the argued difference between methodological- 
and structural individualism. The first label could indicate that this tradition is merely 
empirically interested in micro-level actions and motivations. However, the term is often 
associated with the view that social phenomena can only be understood by examining how 
they result from the motivations and actions of individual agents, and therefore leaning 
towards the atomistic version of rational choice without structural constraints.  The term 
structural individualism instead claims that actors indeed are under structural constraints, and 
structures are in principle explicable in terms of the individual’s properties – such as values 
and attitudes, actions and relations (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998; Hedström & Ylikoski, 
2010). 
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high degree of media exposure. These periods are often retrospectively labelled 
critical junctures. Critical junctures are often associated with such events as 
economic crises and/or great changes in the paradigmatic institutions of society 
(Hall, 2010; Hall, 1993; Pierson, 2000). Possible great upheavals in the PEs and/or 
economic crises in the Scandinavian countries should be identifiable in the 
descriptions of the recent history of the political economies of the Scandinavian 
countries in Chapter 3. 
How can Scandinavians be assumed to react attitudinally to situations of great 
upheaval then? Exactly because we can assume nothing simpler than a multi-
heuristics approach, we cannot deduce ex post how Scandinavians react to changes 
in their political economies. What is possible is to develop different overall 
scenarios. At a very general level, there are two overall scenarios. The first is what 
is known in existing literature on attitudes to the level of inequality as the ‘reaction-
hypothesis’. The opposite, ‘adaption-hypothesis’ assumes that people will not react, 
but adapt their attitudes towards the just level of inequality to the reality they 
perceive (Austen, 1999; Austen, 2002; Blanchflower & Freeman, 1997; Gijsberts, 
2002; Homans, 1961; Kelley & Evans, 1993; Kerr, 2011; Knudsen, 2001; Miller & 
Ortiz, 1995). 
It seems easiest to describe different mechanisms underlying the so-called 
‘reaction-hypothesis’. Following the homo economicus ontology, it is easy to 
assume that certain key actors will resist change, because they have strong vested 
interests in the existing order (Pierson, 2000; Pierson, 1993). If we follow the 
classic political, issue-voting man, if the attitudes of most Scandinavians are 
egalitarian, then we quite simply assume they will react in some kind of way in 
order to change major perceived threads in the egalitarian nature of society. This 
reaction could surely come in the form of votes in elections, but between the 
elections people can also react in different ways. They can affect media discourses, 
sign petitions, contact politicians or even participate in local democracy or civic 
society events in order to influence the situation.
19
 One could furthermore 
supplement this with arguments grounded in the sociological man heuristic and 
assume the main reason people will react in this situation is that signs of inequality 
threaten their HCNI of an egalitarian and just society (Larsen, 2013; Larsen, 2008; 
Rothstein, 2000).  
The various versions of scenarios following the reaction-hypothesis do not assume 
that people change their initial interests or values. However, because Scandinavians 
are here assumed be able to activate their reflective potential, this could also change 
their initial propositions, and in accordance with the ‘adaption hypothesis’ they 
adapt their initial attitudes to the new reality. Obviously, the idea of a reflective 
political man seems to have captured some of the consequences of such 
assumptions about human nature. People are here assumed to be reflective and to 
                                                          
19 See also the policy-responsiveness literature (Burstein, 1998; Burstein, 2003). 
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largely form their attitudes internally in the process. They could thus be assumed to 
listen to arguments from policy-makers or others and possibly change initially 
critical attitudes to the changes happening (Borre & Goul Andersen, 2003; Larsen, 
2006; Shamshiri-Petersen, 2010). The mechanism behind adaption to changes could 
also be much less reflective though. One obvious source is the social psychological 
‘belief-in-a-just-world’ theory. Here humans are assumed to have a fundamental 
need to believe in a world that is just, organized and predictable. They therefore go 
to great lengths to uphold this belief. In this context this means that Scandinavians 
adapt their values, attitudes and perceptions of society and equality to a new reality 
and re-legitimize it as just (e.g. Lerner, 1980).  
2.3. CONSEQUENCES FOR DESIGN 
The multi-heuristics view of human nature means we are not able in advance to 
predict Scandinavian attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages; thus it 
is the key empirical task of this dissertation to investigate them. From the 
discussion above it is possible to make a number of crucial distinctions. First, it is 
likely that although Scandinavians have a reflective potential, it is not utilized all 
the time. Periods of great upheaval in the PE and/or economic crisis are, secondly, 
crucial, because these can spur the activation of the reflective potential of a 
significant number of people. In such situations, Scandinavians have two options. 
They can either react to the changes if they do not fancy them, or they can adapt 
their attitudes to a new reality – both of these processes can occur more or less 
reflected.  
The first step in the endeavour of the dissertation is to try to identify the likely 
HCNIs of interest in the Scandinavian countries. That is how the past of the PE is 
presented. What representations in myths, presentations and stereotypes that could 
define: ‘who the others are’, and in a sense also ‘who we are’, are likely to be the 
result? Also, building on the past, can ‘critical junctures’ to the PE then be 
identified? Great upheavals in the PE and/economic crises could have possibly led a 
significant number of Scandinavians to re-evaluate and change the HCNI, and in 
turn their attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages. All of this will be the 
topic of the next chapter. Regardless, central questions are which ‘others’ society is 
perceived to be constituted of, and hence whether the attitudes of the Scandinavians 
are in accord with the present characteristics of the PE, or alternatively, whether 
they are still more influenced by the historical representations of the PE. As 
indicated above, probably neither is fully true, and a certain lag can probably be 
expected. 
There is also a second important consequence for the design induced by the critical 
realist ontology which is important to mention at this point. As was touched upon 
above, the complex contextual understanding of causality in critical realism 
obviously makes futile the attempts to find mono-causal, linear effects explaining 
the variation in attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages across 
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countries and time. Instead, contextual interaction effects might rather be located by 
applying regression methodology. In order to do justice to existing literature and 
methodology in the field, we will nevertheless try to explain Scandinavian attitudes 
to the level of inequality in gross wages by operationalising and testing standard 
linear explanations in the field by applying a rather standard multilevel regression 
approach. In order to do justice to the CR ontology, we will also extensively test 
contextual Scandinavian effects using cross-level interaction terms.  
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CHAPTER 3. THE DEVELOPING 
SCANDINAVIAN POLITICAL 
ECONOMIES AND EQUALITY 
This chapter will seek to describe in comparative and longitudinal perspective the 
development of the Scandinavian political economies will be sought described in 
comparative and longitudinal perspective. The political economy – the 
programmatic and normative institutional background, the actual level and 
character of inequality in gross wages, and the interplay of central actors in the 
Scandinavian countries in comparative and longitudinal perspective, constitute the 
context in which the Scandinavians’ attitudes to the issue form. If we want to 
understand how and why Scandinavian attitudes to the level of inequality in gross 
wages form we need first to get an understanding of the macro-level structures – the 
development of the dual-sided Scandinavian PEs in comparative and longitudinal 
perspective.
20
   
The next four sections will explore the assumptions made in existing literature on 
normative foundations, the historical interplay of central actors behind these state 
and labour-market institutions’ egalitarian character, and the relation between these 
institutions and the attitudes to the level of economic inequality of the 
Scandinavians. A fifth and sixth section will investigate how the actual level and 
character of inequality in labour-market incomes have developed in the 
Scandinavian countries in comparative perspective. Whereas sections 3.1–3.4 deal 
mostly with the middle and right box in the political economy ‘hat’ of Figure 2-2, 
sections 3.5–3.6 deal with the left box. The overall purpose of this chapter is to 
develop hypotheses on which patterns can be expected in the development in 
Scandinavian attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages – in the 
aggregated and disaggregated perspective. 
                                                          
20 It is a matter of discussion how far back in history one ought to look for the unique 
historical circumstances underpinning normative and programmatic institutions today. 
Knudsen & Rothstein (1994) argue that the timing and interaction of two great revolutions 
constitute crucial historical time points. First, the national revolution introducing liberty, 
democracy and political mass mobilisation, and second, the industrial revolution, 
fundamentally altering the basic structure of society and introducing crucial new players – 
the working class and the capitalist class. Even if Knudsen & Rothstein (1994) themselves go 
even further back in time in their article, the choice has here been to follow this lead. ‘The 
democratic class struggle’ (Korpi, 1983), between workers and capitalists, are crucial for our 
story, and the descriptions accordingly take their point of departure in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century.  
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The third section switches from the aggregated perspective of the first two sections 
to the disaggregated perspective, describing the historical as well as recent 
differences existing between Denmark and Sweden. The obvious question is: what 
about Norway? While Denmark and Sweden in many ways are quite different, 
Norway has on the other hand borrowed from both countries, not least concerning 
the characteristics of their political economy, as will also be hinted at in various 
places below. Denmark and Sweden have always been the two versions of the 
Scandinavian ideal type, which will also be apparent in much of the literature 
described below. Focussing on the two Scandinavian poles – Denmark and Sweden 
– therefore also lessens the task of creating clear scenarios of difference, the 
purpose of this chapter. The position of being between Denmark and Sweden will 
reveal itself in the attitudinal pattern of Norway. As was Esping-Andersen in 1980, 
we are forced by a limited amount of time to narrow the focus just to Sweden and 
Denmark. If we later have an extra five years, we could include the other 
Scandinavian countries, as Esping-Andersen himself managed five years later 
(1985). 
Concerning the institutions dealt with in the first four sections, it should be 
mentioned that it is a matter of debate whether the institutional spheres of the state 
and labour market should really be described as distinct entities, as the presentation 
below and much welfare-regime and IRS/employment models literature seems to 
suggest. This could also be a good reason to use the broader term of PE, as in this 
dissertation. Barth & Moene (2009) argue that in general a so-called equality 
multiplier exists, where state and labour-market spheres in effect spill over and 
enhance efforts in each sphere. They argue that a generous welfare state empowers 
weaker groups on the labour market and therefore in effect promotes wage equality. 
Conversely, wage equality increases welfare-state generosity. The argument is here 
that, when there is a high level of wage inequality, a large chunk of the poorer 
voters are concerned about their immediate consumption possibilities and therefore 
prefer low tax rates over much less direct effects via tax-financed welfare programs.   
In his effort to define ‘the Nordic model’, Dølvik (2013) also argues that a triangle 
of cooperation, risk sharing and coordination between the macro-
economic/industrial policies, the welfare (state) regime and the IRS are really the 
central features of the model. According to Dølvik (2013) this triangle enabled 
trust-creating decision-making processes between actors with opposing interests. 
The outcome was, besides trust between central societal actors, a unique connection 
between resources committed, policies enacted and goals strived for as well as a 
long-term focus on developing human capital. In spite the great extent of 
coordination between the state and the central actors in the IRS, these two 
institutional spheres will be described rather separately below, at least in the two 
first sections.  
These first two sections will follow the aggregated perspective and in turn describe 
common Scandinavian characteristics in terms of the welfare (state) regime and the 
IRS. The two descriptions given here can largely be conceived as classic and mostly 
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historical descriptions of ‘the Scandinavian (Nordic) models’ and the emphasis on 
economic equality in these. It will be argued though that little has been investigated 
as to the Scandinavians’ attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages in these 
classic works. Because the subject of the dissertation is wages, the IRS will be 
treated in more detail than the welfare (state) regime. The third section will switch 
to the disaggregated perspective and describe the historical as well as recent 
differences existing between especially Denmark and Sweden. Traces of the 
historically divergent paths can also be found in more recent developments in the 
two political economies. 
3.1. THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC SCANDINAVIAN WELFARE 
(STATE) REGIME AND NET INCOME EQUALITY 
Here, first, the Scandinavian welfare (state) regime institutions and their relations to 
economic inequality will be described. The ‘Nordic model’21 is, according to 
Alestalo, Hort & Kuhnle (2009), in comparative perspective characterised by three 
distinct features: stateness, universalism and equality. Whereas the former two refer 
respectively to the dominant role of the state in welfare arrangements and the 
character of the social rights supplied mainly by the state, the latter – equality – 
refers not to attitudes, but to a measure of outcomes secured in the form of ‘fairly 
small class, income, and gender differences’ (Alestalo et al., 2009, p. 3). Graubard 
(1986) famously claimed that people have a special ‘passion for equality’ in the 
Nordic countries. Substantiating this claim, he refers mainly to the character, 
quality and extent of the welfare-state arrangements and social rights in the Nordic 
countries (see also, Andersen, 1983). Whether the Scandinavians actually possess a 
‘passion for equality’ is therefore not directly substantiated empirically. The heavy 
emphasis on equality is also apparent in the seminal work which more than any 
other sparked the interest in the Scandinavian welfare (state) model: the ‘Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ by Gösta Esping-Andersen (1990). 
When Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999) labelled his three ideal-typical welfare (state) 
regimes the liberal, the conservative and the social-democratic regime, these terms 
were explicitly meant to reflect the ideologies and ideas of the political actors who, 
according to Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999), historically had been able to dominate 
during the building-up of the welfare institutions of the various western nations. 
Actors promoting the social-democratic ideology and ideas accordingly heavily 
influenced the welfare institutions in the Scandinavian countries – which are the 
countries closest to the social-democratic ideal type.
22
  
                                                          
21 And a range of other acronyms: ‘social democratic welfare regime’, ‘Nordic welfare 
regime’, ‘Nordic welfare state’, ‘universal welfare state’, ‘institutional welfare state’ and in 
the Nordic settings simply ‘the welfare state’ (Larsen, 2013). 
22 There is a wide range of literature concerning the historical roots of the western welfare 
states. A general conclusion is here that in an aggregated perspective the social democratic 
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According to Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999) the social-democratic ideology 
dominating the social-democratic regime is mainly a subscription to the value of 
equality. The understanding or definition of equality is furthermore very 
encompassing in the social-democratic regime. Equality is also a central value in 
the liberal regime. However, equality here mainly signifies equality of opportunity. 
In the social-democratic countries the definition is wider encompassing not just 
equality of opportunity, but also a goal of a high degree of actual equality of 
outcomes – among which is the distribution of income in society (Esping-Andersen, 
1990; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Kildal & Kuhnle, 2005; Larsen, 2013; McCall & 
Kenworthy, 2009). As the case above, Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999) does not 
provide direct evidence of the attitudes of the Scandinavians towards the level of 
economic equality. Instead he refers to the social-democratic goals and struggles of 
key political actors historically and their effects on current welfare arrangements. 
Elsewhere he claims that exiting welfare arrangements and outcomes can have 
second-order electoral feedback effects on attitudes, but again this is not 
substantiated empirically (Esping-Andersen, 1978; Esping-Andersen, 1980).  
3.2. THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM IN SCANDINAVIA 
AND GROSS INCOME EQUALITY 
The description above documents that people have argued that securing a high 
degree of income equality was from the start a central value embedded in, at least, 
the programmatic institutions of the social-democratic welfare states in the 
Scandinavian countries. The final ratio of net income inequality is not solely the 
result of the redistributive effects of welfare arrangements however. Obviously it 
also depends on the initial rate of gross income inequality. The rate of gross income 
inequality is at least in principle more dependent on the range of programmatic and 
normative institutions encapsulated in the concept of the IRS, and not on the 
welfare state institutions. As will be documented below, a range of authors within 
this field of research have argued, directly or indirectly, that the IRSs in the 
Scandinavian countries have also been uniquely committed to and successful in 
securing a high degree of gross income equality.  
A majority of the labour movement and thus the trade unions were, in Scandinavia 
as well as in other western countries, founded on what has been called an 
                                                                                                                                       
actors in Scandinavia – that is, the representatives of the working class, especially the trade 
unions and the social democratic parties – often engaged in compromises with the 
representatives of the peasants. These class-compromises are here argued to be quite special 
for Scandinavia (Baldwin, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Korpi, 
1983). This narrative can be supplemented by adding that the encompassing social 
democratic policies were made possible by low levels of corruption in the state apparatus 
prior to the welfare reforms in the Scandinavian countries (Jensen, 2013; Rothstein, 1998). In 
spite of this, the roots of welfare-state development are of course debated. Goul Andersen 
(2012b) identifies structural/functional, power-resource, ideational and institutional 
explanations behind welfare-state formation and change. 
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egalitarian ideology, with roots in Marxism, socialism and social democracy 
(McConnell, Brue, & Macpherson, 2009). Historically, several interrelated factors 
made the Scandinavian trade union movements more effective in gaining egalitarian 
outcomes. Also, to a greater extent than in many countries, they actually fought for 
equality overall and not just for economic improvements for certain groups of 
people.  
Above all the Scandinavian trade union movements have historically and in 
comparative perspective been very powerful and thus better able than trade union 
movements in other western countries to press their claims successfully against 
their employer adversaries, who at times were supported by the state. There are at 
least two reasons for why the Scandinavian trade union movements have been so 
powerful. First, as Figure 3-1 shows, they have been able, in especially Denmark 
and Sweden and to a somewhat lesser extent in Norway, to consistently secure very 
high trade union density rates (Visser, 1996b; Visser, 2006).
23
 Second, and just as 
importantly, the Scandinavian trade union movements have managed from very 
early on to retain a high degree of unity. The background to the high degree of unity 
is, first, that ideologically competing trade unions have been clearly marginalised, 
at least until recently (Jensen, 2007; Streeck & Hassel, 2003).
24
 Secondly, the 
individual trade unions were to a great extent – especially in Sweden and Norway – 
based on the principal of industrial unionism instead of craft unionism.
25
 It is 
straightforward to see that while the former should promote class-solidarity among 
workers, the latter should promote inter-craft competition. Industrial unionism 
therefore both increases the power of the unions to press claims by securing a high 
degree of unity supporting their goals, but also unity in fighting for overall goals 
benefitting the wage-earners as a whole, and more ideological ones such as 
equality, instead of narrow craft or occupational interests (Esping-Andersen, 1980; 
Visser, 1996a). This difference in the IRS of Denmark and Sweden is crucial and 
will be given more attention in the next section.   
 
                                                          
23 The dominant explanation for this Scandinavian discrepancy is that Norway abandoned the 
Ghent-system in 1938, while Denmark and Sweden retained the system (Due & Madsen, 
2008). The following countries have been included in Figure 3-1 as well as in corresponding 
figures in the next sections: Denmark, Norway and Sweden (the Scandinavian countries), 
Great Britain and USA (prime Anglo-Saxon countries), Germany and France (main 
continental European countries) and Italy (a large Mediterranean country).  
24 Instead the Scandinavian trade-union movements in general emerged as part of a wider 
social democratic labour movement incorporating among other things football clubs, 
breweries and of course the main social democratic political parties in the three countries.  
25 Members are in the former case organised according to industry – e.g. glass, wood, metal, 
shipbuilding, and in the latter case members are organised according to craft, skill or 
profession e.g. carpenters, fitters, plumbers and chefs (Visser, 1996a). 
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The employer organisations from quite early on also recognised certain rights of the 
trade union movements, such as the right of representation and the right to strike. 
This ultimately led to a very defining feature of the Scandinavian IRS in 
international comparisons – highly corporatist, centralised collective bargaining. In 
this bargaining the trade union confederation, the employers’ federation and 
sometimes the state arranged how the overall development in wages, working hours 
and other working conditions were to be on the labour market for a period of 2–4 
years (Elvander, 2002; Flanagan, 2003; Lund, 1981; Visser, 1996a; Visser, 1996b).   
A number of factors are interesting concerning how the centralized collective 
bargaining system was argued to help promote economic equality. First, the much-
centralised overall labour-market nature of the negotiations meant that issues and 
interests were at stake other than those which were usual in more decentralised 
collective bargaining negotiations. In sectorial-, craft- or firm-level negotiations the 
trade unions, as mentioned, fight to secure the interests of their members in only 
their sector, craft or firm. Because the trade union confederations represent many 
different crafts, sectors and firms in centralized collective bargaining negotiations, 
their interests are in promoting the conditions on the labour market in general via 
issues such as the profit/pay ratio or how much wages in general are to rise in a 
given period. However, this also meant that issues such as the inflation rate, overall 
economic development and the stability of the economy could not be ignored either. 
To improve conditions for wage-earners in general, these macro-economic issues 
are just as important as for example the profit/wage ratio (Flanagan, 2003; Visser, 
1996a).
26
  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Åberg (1984) argues that the extraordinarily centralised 
Swedish labour market system by itself promoted equality more than other 
countries' systems promoted equality and changed how its members perceived ‘fair’ 
salaries. Centralization in Åberg’s (1984) view therefore not only promoted a high 
degree of equality in wage levels on the labour market, but also instilled 
extraordinarily egalitarian attitudes among the Swedish wage-earners towards the 
wage gaps between occupations. One can see for example, in the so-called ‘solidary 
wage funds’ established in all three Scandinavian countries with an extra ‘lump sum 
reserved for the lowest paid’, an expression of egalitarianism put into practice 
(Dølvik, 2013; Lund, 1981, p. 466). 
This idea of a high degree of working class unity, especially in Sweden, as having a 
potentially transformative effect, is a tradition that not only Åberg (1980) represents 
(Esping-Andersen, 1980; Esping-Andersen, 1985; Korpi, 1978). There will be 
much more about these arguments in the next section. In spite of the assumptions of 
                                                          
26 The famous Swedish Rehn-Meidner model is maybe the best example of consciously 
intervening to improve wages and other conditions on the labour market in general, while at 
the same time securing low inflation, productivity and a stable macroeconomic development 
(Erixon, 2010; Flanagan, 2003; Jensen, 1989a; Jensen, 1989b; Visser, 1996a). 
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inter-class unity and egalitarianism in this literature, the industrial relations studies 
mentioned again do not seem to back these claims up with empirical investigations 
of Scandinavian attitudes.  
In spite of this lack of empirical evidence, the two institutional spheres of the 
Scandinavian PEs have been argued to be – at least in their heyday – very 
committed to securing a high degree of gross and net income equality. If this 
historical legacy persists and has parallels with the micro-level attitudes of the 
Scandinavians, they must be assumed to be more egalitarian-minded than are 
people of most other countries.  
3.3. DENMARK VERSUS SWEDEN  
The description above is largely a classic description of the Scandinavian welfare 
(state) regime and IRS and their emphasis on economic equality as compared to the 
institutions of other western countries. The descriptions therefore fit best with the 
heyday of these models. This is reflected in the dates of some of the literature 
described above, but also many newer sources largely stick mainly to these classic 
descriptions. One reason for this is that – as emphasized before – perspective 
matters. In the aggregated perspective, the Scandinavian IRSs are still, for example, 
characterized by a very high degrees of coordination, cooperation, governability 
and trade union density rates (Dølvik, 2013; Erixon, 2010; OECD, 2004).  
On the other hand, there are two main modifications due in the above picture. In 
this section, it will be documented, firstly, that substantial differences exist and 
existed between the political economies of especially Denmark and Sweden. These 
differences existed historically, but also leave traces today. The second 
modification to the picture above is that the events of the 1980s in many ways seem 
to be a crucial historical turning point or a critical juncture which at least for 
Sweden seems to have functioned also as a punctuated equilibrium, to use the 
lingua of the path-dependency literature (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Pierson, 
2004). The different paths that especially the Danish and Swedish political 
economies took following these events could thus be crucial for influencing intra-
Scandinavian differences in attitudes to the level of gross wages also today.  
If one were to put a single headline over the differences in the development of the 
political economies of Denmark and Sweden over the course of the 20
th
 century, it 
would sound like this: Class cooperation and consensus-seeking in Denmark versus 
ideological class struggle in Sweden. These historical differences between Denmark 
and Sweden will be presented in the first two subsections. A third and fourth 
subsection will follow the paths from what seems to be transformative events in the 
1980s until today.  
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3.3.1. CLASS COOPERATION AND CONSENSUS-SEEKING IN 
DENMARK 
Galenson (1952) is often credited as the first non-Scandinavian researcher to notice 
that there was something unique about the Danish IRS. He argued that the Danish 
system of labour relations was uniquely successful in handling labour conflicts and 
securing industrial peace, also compared to Norway or Sweden. According to 
Galenson (1952) this was, after the ‘September Agreement’ of 1899, achieved by a 
commitment by the employers’ organizations and trade unions to establish and 
respect institutions governing labour conflict. The result was argued to be ‘the most 
detailed and complete system of collective bargaining in existence.’ (Galenson, 
1952, p. 1). 
Galenson (1952) also claims that the social parties in Denmark were mindful of the 
interests of their adversaries. The federation of labour unions (LO) as well social 
democratic governments consistently took into consideration what he calls a broad 
social view of the economic and industrial situation. While fighting to improve 
conditions for the workers’, their representatives consistently considered the 
interests of their adversaries.
27
  
Industrialization started decades earlier in Denmark than in Sweden and Norway, 
and the guild monopolies were abolished in Denmark as late as 1862. This was just 
a decade before industrialization began, and it is argued to be a shorter interval than 
in any other country (Esping-Andersen, 1980; Galenson, 1952). Thereupon 
Galenson (1952) claims that one of the main reasons why the unique IRS came into 
existence in Denmark, and not elsewhere, is that ‘the corporate spirit of the guilds 
continued to permeate the labour market.’ (p. 2). Cooperation, not labour war, was 
in Galenson’s (1952) view therefore from the early days of Danish industrialisation 
the natural way to solve labour conflicts.  
Another effect, at least partly caused by the guild legacy, is as mentioned above that 
the trade union movement to a much greater extent than in Sweden and Norway is 
organised according to craft instead of by industry (Esping-Andersen, 1980; 
Galenson, 1952; Knudsen & Rothstein, 1994). In much of his early writing Esping-
Andersen (1978; 1980; 1985) puts great emphasis on this difference. Danish class 
structure, from the start of industrialisation until the early days of the emerging 
service (and welfare) economy of the 1960s and 70s, was argued to consist of a 
                                                          
27 These arguments resemble some the arguments put forward by the functioning of the 
Swedish industrial relations system. These are Åberg’s (1984) ‘non-market criteria’, 
focussed on the competitiveness of businesses, as well as some of the principles underlying 
the Rehn-Meidner model (Erixon, 2010; Flanagan, 2003; Jensen, 1989a; Jensen, 1989b; 
Visser, 1996a). In the aggregated perspective, in which these sources write, this also seems 
true. When disaggregating and focussing on the differences between Denmark and Sweden, 
as will be documented, consensus-seeking clearly seems to be more a Danish than a Swedish 
tradition. 
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large rural and urban petit bourgeoisie, a high proportion of skilled to unskilled 
workers and low degree of capital concentration.
28
 According to Esping-Andersen 
(1978; 1980; 1985) this caused a weak and steadily fragmented and decomposed 
working class and social democratic party. In contrast to the situation in Sweden, 
Esping-Andersen (1978; 1980; 1985) but also Korpi (1978) with good reason saw 
the Danish fragmented class and also working-class structure as problematic for 
achieving class unity behind a transformation of the society to socialism. Galenson 
(1952) on the other hand could be thought to see the high proportion of craft-
organised skilled workers in Denmark as part of a special advantage it enjoyed. The 
corporate guild spirit of the crafts in his view makes it natural for various groups to 
cooperate, compromise and seek consensus. 
Elvander (2002) and Due & Madsen (2008) use a more functionalistic argument to 
reach similar conclusions as Galenson (1952). They argue that in the long run it was 
and is in the interest of neither capitalists nor workers having a chaotic, 
uncoordinated and un-peaceful labour market. When transforming to industrial 
societies every country therefore in time sets up some form of programmatic 
institutions regulating especially labour market conflict – an industrial relation 
system. There was much variety in how this was done though. Elvander (2002) and 
Due & Madsen (2008) argue that when the labour movement was rather weak and 
fragmented, as in the pluralist/liberal IR regime, the state often had to take action 
and regulated via rather detailed labour market legislation. Within the boundaries 
set by the state legislation of for example a minimum wage, the determination of 
wages was left to non-centralised collective bargaining between the social partners 
at a sectorial-, craft- or firm level. When the social partners in contrast were strong 
and highly centralised as the case earlier was in Sweden, the state could leave the 
governance of the labour market more or less solely to the unions and employers to 
regulate. In the corporatist IR regime the regulation of the labour market was often 
decided by formalised corporatist coordination between the social partners and the 
state.  
The Danish IRS is, according to Due & Madsen (2008), a special hybrid. There is 
close interaction – albeit chiefly ad hoc – between the social partners and the state, 
especially in regards to labour-market policy as in the corporatist system. However, 
at the same time the basic issues of working conditions and wage levels are to a 
great extent ‘self-regulated’ in the collective agreements. One could speculate that 
in spite of the fragmented class structure and craft-organisation which Galenson 
(1952) describes, it is the ability of the social parties to reach a consensus, 
voluntarily build up and support an extensive institutional framework handling 
labour conflicts and maintaining labour-market peace, which has allowed the 
Danish IRS to retain a relatively high degree of independence from state regulation.  
                                                          
28 This will be described in much more detail in the next section. 
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3.3.2. IDEOLOGICAL CLASS STRUGGLE IN SWEDEN 
The peculiarities of the Danish IRS and broader political economy only really 
become clear by contrasting them with the history of the Swedish IRS and political 
economy.
29
 The Swedish labour movement in many ways has been historically 
more ideological than its Danish counterpart.  
Following the power-resource tradition, this does not seem strange (Elvander, 2002; 
Esping-Andersen, 1980; Korpi, 1978; Korpi, 1983). Esping-Andersen (1980) 
documents that, in contrast to Denmark, when Sweden, decades later than 
Denmark, finally started the transition to an industrial society, the outcome was a 
quite different class structure. In contrast to Denmark, a strong class of independent 
farmers – a rural petit-bourgeoisie – did not exist in democratic Sweden. Instead, 
the agricultural sector was to a large extent outmatched in the late 18
th
 century by 
cheap grain from the USA and Russia as well as cheap, high-quality meat and dairy 
products from, among other countries, Denmark. Within a few decades, this led a 
majority of the Swedes employed in agriculture either to have migrated or to have 
found jobs in the emerging industrial sector, but also in the booming mining and 
forestry sector. The majority of people in this new working class were thus, in 
contrast to Denmark, unskilled workers. Also in contrast to Denmark, many of 
these unskilled workers did not work in small businesses, having a personal 
relationship to the boss. Instead, they worked in large enterprises in mining, forestry 
and, in time, increasingly in factories. The capitalist class in Sweden therefore also 
emerged as much more concentrated than in Denmark. At the beginning of the 
industrial age a few major capitalists, having great impact on the policies of the still 
not fully democratic state, dominated it, and later the owners of the same 
enterprises would be dominant in the early days of the Swedish Employers’ 
Federation (SAF). Finally, and in contrast to Denmark, the urban petit-bourgeoisie, 
mainly in the form of small independent shop owners, was also much more 
marginal in Sweden. Instead, a vast majority of, for example, grocery shops, were 
owned by cooperatives.  
Sweden turned fully democratic in 1921. Nevertheless, as this transition happened 
they were, as described above, left with a class structure quite different from 
Denmark’s. The large, mainly unskilled working class was mobilized in the Social 
Democratic party and within a few decades was able to secure almost uninterrupted 
parliamentary majorities lasting decades with support of only the small Peasants 
Party (Bondepartiet). Except for the occasional quite strong communist parties, the 
Swedish non-social democratic left wing was much more marginal compared to that 
of Denmark into the early 1990s (see Figures 3-2 and 3-3 below). In contrast to 
Denmark, the Social Democrats in Sweden were thus to a greater extent able to 
remain ideological and, with a firm grasp on the government, pursue the class 
                                                          
29 See also Elvander (2002, pp. 210-213) for a similar short description and conclusion 
regarding the intra-Scandinavian differences in IRSs. 
- 
44
 
interests of the mainly unskilled factory workers whom they represented (Esping-
Andersen, 1978; Esping-Andersen, 1980; Esping-Andersen, 1985; Korpi, 1978; 
Nygård, 2006).  
In order to gain enough votes to become the prime cabinet-holding party from 1929 
and onwards, the Danish Social Democrats, in contrast to their Swedish 
counterparts, rhetorically became a ‘party for all the people’ instead of a ‘party for 
the workers’. In practice this meant they wooed not only the votes of all groups 
within the rather fragmented working class – unskilled and skilled of many crafts - 
but also on the votes of the farm workers who continued to exist in substantial 
numbers in the important agricultural sector, and to some extent the urban petit-
bourgeoisie also. In spite of this vote-seeking strategy, much wider than that of their 
Swedish counterparts, the Danish Social Democrats were only in the election of 
1935 ever close to having a majority themselves. In the elections from the 1960s 
onwards the social democrats had to share a steadily larger part of the substantial 
portion of left-wing votes with a number of smaller left-wing parties (see Figures 3-
2 and 3-3 below). From the very first social democratic cabinets, they had to rely on 
the support of the Social Liberal Party (det Radikale Venstre) representing farm 
smallholders, schoolteachers and academics. Even then, the Social Democrats 
mostly held minority governments. As Galenson (1952) described in relation to the 
IRS, this prompted or maybe rather forced the Social Democrats in Denmark to be 
masters of compromise and consensus-building – not class war. A Danish tradition 
of broad settlements evolved, whereby the four major ‘old’ parties, after receiving 
at least some concessions, always voted for the yearly state budget, but also in 
many cases other major reforms in Danish society. Another indication of the 
consensus-seeking nature of the Danish Social Democrats is that their various 
cabinets were mindful of not only the competitiveness of the industrial sector as in 
Sweden, but also very much of the agricultural sector (Esping-Andersen, 1980; 
Galenson, 1952; Nygård, 2006).  
It should probably be emphasized that the left-wing voter share of around 50%, 
which the left-wing parties taken together in all three Scandinavian countries 
managed to maintain more or less uninterruptedly until the 1990s, is very high in 
the aggregated perspective. The eventual social democratic decline in Denmark and 
Sweden more or less coincided with a rise in support for other left-wing parties. 
Although the Left therefore clearly remained strong in the Scandinavian countries, 
the tendencies towards decomposition and fragmentation observed and discussed by 
Esping-Andersen (1978; 1980; 1985) and Korpi (1978) are clearly real enough.   
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The Swedish IRS emerging from this class structure, as hinted above, was 
influenced by the more dichotomous class structure with many unskilled workers 
and a concentrated capitalist class. Since the Saltsjöbaden agreement of 1938, the 
Swedish IRS was very peaceful by international comparison, while in contrast to 
Denmark only once having the state intervene to resolve a labour dispute (in 1971) 
(Blyth, 2001; Elvander, 2002; Erixon, 2010; Korpi, 1978). For Elvander (2002) the 
fundamental condition for this Swedish labour-market model was that a small 
number of strong, centralized and encompassing peak organisations – the Trade 
Union Federation (LO) and SAF – represented the labour-market parties. This 
strong centralisation on both the employers’ and employees’ side was only possible 
because of the dominant dichotomous class structure. From the very early days of 
Swedish industrialisation SAF was dominated by the major capitalists described 
above, while the unskilled workers in the factories and mines of these capitalists 
came to dominate the LO (Esping-Andersen, 1980; Korpi, 1978). Swedish 
centralisation also contrasted with Danish decentralisation in another crucial way: 
In accordance the principles of representative democracy in Sweden and most other 
western countries, a collective bargaining agreement is enacted when the 
representatives of the employers and employees can agree. In very simple terms this 
meant that whenever the representatives of SAF and LO could agree, industrial 
peace prevailed (Elvander, 2002).  
In Denmark, a myriad of potential labour conflicts between the quite different 
groups of skilled and unskilled workers and various types and sizes of employers 
always existed. This led the LO and the Employers’ Federation (DA) to voluntarily 
set up the comprehensive institutions described by Galenson (1952) for handling 
these inevitable labour conflicts, including the famous labour courts and a clear 
tradition of state legislation if a mediation bid in collective bargaining negotiations 
is rejected. In contrast to Sweden and most other western countries, all collective 
agreement proposals and even the mediation proposal by the state mediator, are 
subject to a direct referendum among the union- and employer members in question 
in Denmark (and in Norway). In contrast to Sweden, in Denmark direct, not 
representative democracy thus rules the enactment of collective bargaining 
agreements. Only in the case when the state resorts to elevates the mediator’s 
proposal to legislation to resolve an often-prolonged labour conflict, does members' 
influence on the outcome cease. It could be seen as a testament to the consensus 
orientation of the parties in the Danish IRS that, in spite of the myriad of potential 
labour conflicts and the exceptionally democratic rules for enacting collective 
bargaining agreements, as of 2002 the Danish state has only had to intervene and 
resolve conflicts with legislation in a dozen cases. In Norway, the corresponding 
figure was 130 cases (Elvander, 2002).      
Entering the economic crises of the 1970s while at the same time having embarked 
on a transition from industrial into post-industrial societies, Denmark and Sweden 
inherited quite different political economies. The class structures had emerged 
differently and the characteristics of the programmatic institutions of the IRSs as 
well as the nature of class politics within the parliamentary sphere had followed 
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different paths. Denmark was the consensus-democracy with a tradition of broad 
settlements and ‘class cooperation’ in the parliamentary sphere, guided by a Social 
Democratic party claiming to represent the whole population and not just the 
(fragmented) working class. The IRS also secured industrial peace by a 
comprehensive system for handling labour conflicts and a willingness on the part of 
the social partners and their members to reach conclusions to everybody’s 
satisfaction.  
Sweden on the other hand inherited a political economy dominated by an 
ideological Social Democratic party, the main architect of the Swedish welfare 
society ‘Folkehemmet’. The Swedish Social Democrats to a great extent had kept 
representing the working class and their interests, but through a more or less strict 
application of the Rehn-Meidner model this was achieved while remaining mindful 
of Swedish industrial competitiveness (Berglund & Esser, 2014; Erixon, 2010). In 
the IRS, stable cooperation and compromise between representatives of big 
business and the working class (LO and SAF) reached its peak with centralised 
collective bargaining. While during the whole period benefitting from stability and 
the economic boom, the ideological differences between the two parties remained 
and could as we shall see be reviewed into open class conflict.   
In the aggregated perspective, the historical legacy of the political economies of 
Denmark and Sweden seems quite alike. As documented in sections 3.1-3.2, both 
the welfare-state institutions and the IRS institutions have been very committed to 
securing a high degree of gross and net income equality. This heritage, as argued 
above, could induce Scandinavians to be more egalitarian-minded than people in 
most other countries. In the disaggregated perspective, the historical legacies of the 
political economies of Denmark and Sweden are clearly quite different. Analogue 
to the above, if these historical differences persist and the micro-level attitudes of 
the Danes and Swedes parallel them, Danish attitudes to the level of inequality in 
gross wages might be consensual across social classes, and the corresponding 
Swedish attitudes more dominated by ideological differences in attitudes broadly 
reflecting the social classes of that society.  
3.3.3. TRANSFORMATIVE YEARS IN SWEDEN: THE 1980S AND 
BEYOND 
The works of Korpi (1978) and Esping-Andersen (1978; 1980; 1985) in many ways 
describe a crucial historical tipping point, although they quite obviously make some 
wrong interpretations of the changes they saw. They notice that the workers' 
movement in Sweden – to a rather large extent supported by the Social Democrats – 
in the period leading up to 1980, qualitatively changed its approach to capitalism. 
The Social Democratic Party and LO founded a joint commission on the idea of 
increased ‘economic democracy’ (ED). While renewing their official policy agenda 
program in 1975, the Social Democrats also emphasised that after having been 
architects of the welfare society, their goal now was progressing to a socialist 
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society through democratic revolution. LO and the Social Democrats therefore 
started to support different initiatives under the label of ED which, formulated 
nicely, were suggestions to increase democratic control over the economy. The 
initiatives included, first, suggestions of ‘co-determination’ in work i.e. a higher 
degree of shared authority at the individual workplace by the employer and the 
workers. Secondly they included a proposal for setting up a fund controlled by the 
labour unions. The fund’s revenues should stem from imposing a 20% profit tax on 
corporations. The purpose of the fund should then be to buy stocks and gain a 
shareholding majority in major Swedish corporations. These initiatives meant 
challenging the owners’ right to manage their companies and (in their words) their 
property rights (Berglund & Esser, 2014; Blyth, 2001; Erixon, 2010; Esping-
Andersen, 1980; Korpi, 1978).  
Esping-Andersen (1978; 1980; 1985) interpreted these emerging developments as if 
the Swedish social democrats were actually taking the next logical step in pursuing 
a gradual democratic transformation into socialism via de-commodified politics, 
which he defined as:  
‘…state policy which negates the exchange value principle with respect 
to consumption as well as production.’ ( Esping-Andersen, 1980, p. 25).  
This is somewhat different from his later, famous definition of de-commodification, 
wherein the exchange value principle is only meant to be negated in terms of 
consumption, but not production:   
‘de-commodification ... refers to the degree to which individuals, or 
families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living 
independently of market participation.’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 37).  
Esping-Andersen (1978; 1980; 1985) furthermore claims that the ability and 
willingness to pursue these policies was what enabled the Swedish Social 
Democrats, in stark contrast to the corresponding Danish party, to gain a majority 
of the votes of new lower-skilled white-collar workers appearing in the emerging 
transition to a post-industrial society. Esping-Andersen (1978; 1980; 1985) argues 
that this important emerging social class was not satisfied with the traditional 
‘bread-and-butter’ policies sufficient for gaining the support of the traditional 
unskilled blue-collar workers. Instead, they wanted no less than self-determination 
in their working environment.     
Whereas Korpi (1978) and Esping-Andersen (1978; 1980; 1985) seem to predict the 
ultimate success of Swedish social democracy – or ‘revisionist Marxism’ (Esping-
Andersen, 1980, p. 1) – in actually leading a democratic transition to socialism in 
the near future – the actual development proved to be quite different. 
According to Blyth (2001) and Erixon (2010) SAF was the key actor who mobilised 
their substantial resources to counter the development towards ED and socialism. 
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First, they tried the traditional employers’ weapon: In 1980, SAF enforced a lockout 
of three million workers. After the lockout, SAF felt that this weapon was too costly 
without having much effect, and they therefore switched to other means, namely to 
actively and openly undermine the centralised collective bargaining institution. In 
1983 the Metal Workers Union made a collective agreement with the Engineering 
Employers’ Federation outside the framework of centralised collective bargaining. 
Already before that SAF had openly said that their aim was to undermine the 
institutions of centralised bargaining and work for company-wide agreements 
instead. During the 1980s SAF also gradually withdrew from other cooperative 
institutions. This process was completed by 1991 (Notermans, 1999).  
The second weapon SAF used very offensively was to put great effort into trying 
actively to promote ‘new’ neoliberal/neo-classical ideas. According to Blyth (2001) 
SAF’s spending on this issue rose from 15 to 25 percent of their annual expenses in 
the late 70s. In 1982 SAF spend as much as 55–60 million Swedish krona just on 
advertising against the wage-earner funds. By comparison, in the parliamentary 
election in the same year all five political parties combined spent 69 million krona 
and by 1988 SAF’s annual expenditure on advertising its ideas had risen to 200 
million krona. Among other things, SAF supported think tanks such as the Centre 
for Business and Policy Studies (SNS) and ‘Timbro’ that actively promoted 
neoliberal ideas.  
Boréus (1997) argues that one measure of the success SAF, SNS and Timbro had in 
bringing neoliberal ideas to wider audiences and arenas can be seen in the output of 
the broadsheet newspapers. The proportion of opinion pieces referring to ‘new 
liberal ideas’ in the conservative broadsheet Svenska Dagbladet increased from 30 
to 70 percent of the opinion pieces on economic and ideological issues from 1975 to 
1989. In the more liberal broadsheet Dagens Nyheter, the increase from 1971 to 
1989 was from 15 to 30 percent (see more below). As in other countries, ideas like 
concern for the ‘natural equilibrium rate of unemployment’ (NAIRU) also started to 
appear in ministerial reports, and by the time a bourgeois coalition took office in 
1991, these ideas under labels as ‘normpolitik’ was openly guiding the economic 
policies of the coalition government (Blyth, 2001; Erixon, 2010).       
The fierce attack by SAF and allies was not uncontested. During the 1980s the 
conservative party (Moderaterna) allied with SAF, SNS and Timbro, and openly 
started questioning the economic sustainability of the welfare state. The Social 
Democrats, the ‘Left Party’ and to some extent the ‘Centre Party’ in their election 
programs on the other hand kept advocating positive welfare-state expansion – 
although the idea of a democratic revolution to socialism was soon abandoned 
(Nygård, 2006). As hinted above, this ideological struggle was also very alive in the 
comment sections of the largest serious newspapers. Boréus (1997) shows that 
ideological pieces in the period of 1969–77 in Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens 
Nyheter clearly leaned towards left-wing ideas, as for example in positive attitudes 
towards the public sector and distributive justice. After 1980 by contrast a vivid 
debate engulfed proponents supporting the welfare state and its positive effects and 
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opponents arguing against it. Boréus’ (1997) analysis includes only the liberal 
newspaper Dagens Nyheter and the conservative Svenska Dagbladet. It is therefore 
likely that the opposition to neoliberal ideas was even more ferocious in 
traditionally Social Democratic newspapers such as Aftonbladet. 
In spite of the initial fierce opposition to the neo-liberal ideas, the Social Democrats 
in turn adapted their ideas to the steadily more dominant neo-liberal discourse. 
Applying the concept of ‘the third way’, the Social Democrats in the 1990s started 
using some of the neo-liberal critiques in their election programs and statements in 
debates. They now argued that reforms and adaptation of the welfare state was 
necessary to insure the sustainability of the welfare state. The welfare state was now 
seen as a tool for strengthening Swedish competitiveness on a globalised 
competitive market. Competitiveness was furthermore seen as essential to 
maintaining the current level of welfare level. These chains of events were of 
course influenced by the severe economic crisis Sweden experienced from 1990/91 
to 1993, but still it was quite significant how differently the Social Democrats now 
legitimised the welfare state compared to only a few years before. The Swedish 
crisis in the early nineties has been argued to be caused by a cocktail of more or less 
simultaneous events in the global economy and on the global and especially 
European financial markets. In addition, a number of policy failures undertaken by 
Swedish governments of the 1980s and early 1990s worsened the problems 
(Boréus, 1997; Notermans, 1999; Nygård, 2006; Tranøy, 1999; Tranøy, 2001). No 
matter what the causes were, the crisis was severe (see Figure 3-3 below), and as 
argued above such a crisis, with associated rapidly rising unemployment rates, can 
have significant effects on attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages, by 
enabling the reflective potential of in this case the Swedes:  
CHAPTER 3. THE DEVELOPING SCANDINAVIAN POLITICAL ECONOMIES AND EQUALITY 
51 
Figure 3-2 Annual Harmonised Unemployment Rates for Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden 1983-2013.  
 
Notes: Calculated as percentage of Working Age Population 15-64 for Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
1983-2011. 
Source: www.stats.oecd.org. Data can be found under the menus Labour  Labour Force Statistics  
Short Term Statistics  Short Term Labour Market Statistics  Harmonised Unemployment Rates 
(HURs). Data retained at November 25th 2014. 
 
In contrast to the situation in Denmark, the traditional Swedish industrial relations 
institutions were, as described above, dependent on strong centralised peak 
organisations being able to reach compromises without the interference of the state. 
Traditionally, state mediation in this process was voluntary and of mostly of a 
consulting nature. Following the functionalistic model described above, the 
Swedish IRS was therefore in an unstable, uncontrollable and in the long run 
unsustainable state following the breakdown of centralised collective bargaining in 
the 1980s (Berglund & Esser, 2014; Due & Madsen, 2008; Elvander, 2002).  
Just as the economic crisis intensified in 1990, the breakdown of wage coordination 
at the same time exposed Sweden to a wage drift and inflation spiral twice as high 
as the OECD average. This situation led the government to appoint a special group 
of mediators – the Rehnberg Group. Under its direction, a ‘Stabilisation Drive’ was 
implemented. This ‘drive’ was more or less voluntarily negotiated with and 
accepted by 110 labour-union and employer organisations. In the bargaining round 
of 1993, the Rehnberg Group again took the initiative by issuing a declaration of 
the need for wage restraint for the sake of the Swedish economy before starting the 
actual negotiations. In 1995 on the other hand the negotiation process was again not 
very well coordinated and the outcome was again wage increases and inflation 
above the norm from 1991–95 as well as the European norm in 1995. In 1996, the 
government therefore finally urged the social partners to start drafting a reform of 
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the wage bargaining system. After much debate and disagreement, the result finally 
emerged as the ‘Industrial Agreement of March 1997’. This was renewed with the 
‘Industrial Agreement of 2012’ (Berglund & Esser, 2014; Elvander, 2002).  
During this whole process SAF, as described above, consciously relinquished its 
reins over conducting and coordinating collective bargaining. A good indication 
hereof is that the institution changed its old name to ‘Svenskt Näringsliv’ (SN) in 
2001. Whereas SAF translates to the ‘Swedish Employers’ Federation’, SN 
translates directly to ‘Swedish Business’ (although they officially label themselves 
the ‘Confederation of Swedish Enterprise’ in English). This change of name 
signifies the much narrower scope of the institution than it had before. This is 
because, first, the focus is now on business and not employers in general. Second, 
some would maybe even claim that the organisation has reduced its traditional 
scope inasmuch as it now functions mainly as a lobbying organisation for business. 
The Swedish state, as indicated, has instead taken over a much more active 
coordinating role, pushing for the creation of new institutions in the Swedish IRS, 
and insisting that the sectors most exposed to international competition should be 
setting the Swedish wage trend, which other sectors should follow (Berglund & 
Esser, 2014; Svensk Näringsliv, 2013). 
Much can be said about the specifics of these reforms; of crucial importance in this 
case are two things. The negotiations now had to meet the same deadlines as in the 
Danish collective bargaining system. Three months before the expiration of the 
previous agreement, the negotiations for a new agreement have to start, and one 
month before an old agreement expires, a new, powerful and impartial mediator 
intervenes. This new regime was first restricted to negotiations within the industrial 
sector, but quickly spread into other sectors after being broadly hailed as a success. 
It is important to note the conspicuous similarities with the ‘old’ Danish model 
described already by Galenson (1952).  
3.3.4. CONTINUITY AND GRADUAL CHANGE IN DENMARK: THE 1980S 
AND BEYOND 
It seems quite clear that the political economy of Sweden went through some rather 
substantial struggles and changes from the 1970’s crisis up to the beginning of the 
new millennium. In many ways, Denmark did not follow Sweden’s path. In the 
Danish parliamentary sphere, the magnitude of the rhetorical struggle, and in the 
differences between the policies that left- and right-wing governments actually 
conducted, seem substantially smaller than Sweden’s. 
Starting with the parliamentary sphere, Nygård (2006) argues that in most cases the 
Conservatives, Liberals (Venstre) and Social Liberals (Radikale Venstre) quite 
defensively argued for reductions in social expenditures made necessary by the 
strain of the 1980's economic recession. Though they did not openly advocate 
welfare-state expansion as did the Social Democrats and the Socialist People’s 
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Party (SF), this was in most cases a much more hesitant approach than that which 
the conservatives used in Sweden. In addition, Nygård (2006) in some ways 
actually seems more or less to replicate a central argument of Esping-Andersen 
(1978; 1980; 1985) though applied to more recent times: that the relatively weak 
Social Democrats have not been able to pursue class interests in the same way as 
their Swedish counterparts. At the same time, the Danish Right is argued to have 
been consistently influenced by or at least to have not challenged Social Democratic 
welfare ideas. Nygård (2006) also argues that even at periods in the 1980s when 
public sentiment seemed to be supportive of lowering public expenditures, the 
Conservative government hesitated to attack the welfare state due for fear of being 
punished by the electorate. The Danish political climate throughout the 1980s but 
also somewhat in the 1990s remained much more consensual than that of Sweden. 
Much the same slowly changing path-dependent developments can be found in the 
Danish IRS. Due & Madsen (2008) argue that although the centralised collective 
bargaining negotiations between LO and DA, as in Sweden, ceased in the 1980s, 
this transition was much less conflictual and in practice meant much less change 
than in Sweden. What followed was a change in what Due & Madsen (2008) label 
‘centralised decentralisation’. On the one hand, bargaining rights were delegated 
down to the firm level. The sectorial-level organisations also took over running the 
decisive collective bargaining negotiations from the central organisations. These are 
clear signs of decentralisation and they could spark de-coordination. The Danish 
IRS throughout the period have in practice remained highly coordinated though. 
First, the now crucial sectorial organisations have merged – or in other in other 
words ‘centralised’ – which has lessened the possibilities for coordination. Taking 
over the negotiations from the central organisations DA and LO, the agreement 
between the key sectorial organisations – the Confederation of Danish Industry (DI) 
and the Central Organisation of Industrial Employees in Denmark (CO-industri) – 
now functions openly as a trendsetter for  collective bargaining negotiations, which 
the rest of the labour market follows. The agreements between DI and CO-industry 
are less detailed however and now function rather to give a framework for 
negotiations in other sectors and at the firm level (hence the delegation mentioned). 
Besides having other functions, the central organisations LO and DA now play a 
key role in coordinating the various collective bargaining negotiations for LO/DA 
areas not covered by the DI/CO-industry agreements.       
Due & Madsen (2008) suspect that the Danish IRS – under the triple pressure of the 
EU, the national political system, and parties at the firm level – could be 
transforming into a new ‘multilevel regulation’ phase. Here the guiding role of the 
sectorial organisations could be challenged, and top-down control supplanted by 
bottom-up initiatives. The question is of course whether coherence and coordination 
can be maintained within such a system, and obviously also whether this is really 
the direction the IRS is taking. In accordance with the ontology of critical realism, 
the complex interplay of structures and various social mechanisms in a given 
context makes the future hard to predict. 
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While Sweden had its crisis in the early 1990s, then as it can be seen in Figure 3-3 
above, Denmark was hit much harder by the financial crisis in 2008 than Sweden 
was (Goul Andersen, 2013). The financial crisis in Denmark could therefore 
constitute the same kind of reality or reflective shock elaborated in chapter 2.
30
  
The histories of the recent decades of the Danish and Swedish political economies 
are in some ways path-dependent on their historical legacies. On the other hand 
especially Sweden’s political economy seems to have undergone some rather 
radical changes. Crucially both the Swedish IRS and the interplay between central 
actors in the parliamentary sphere over time seem to move more and more in the 
Danish direction. This means fewer ideological differences in the parliamentary 
sphere concerning the management of the economy and the distribution of 
resources in society, as well as a more decentralised, yet highly institutionalised and 
coordinated IRS. If these more recent developments, with some lag, influence the 
micro-level attitudes of the Danes and Swedes, Swedish attitudes should gradually 
become consensual across social classes. In Denmark, the tendency as time passes 
seems to be one of steadily and gradually ever more blurred ideological class 
differences.        
3.4. THE PASSION FOR EQUALITY IN SCANDINAVIA IN THE 
AGGREGATED AND DISAGGREGATED PERSPECTIVE 
Many have claimed that income equality seems to be a central feature of the 
Scandinavian countries, in the aggregated perspective. Their arguments are, first, 
that various characteristics of the IRS produced both a high degree of unity in 
fighting for egalitarian goals of wage-earners in general instead of craft or sectorial 
interests, as well as the power and the institutions to achieve these goals to a great 
extent. Interestingly, the unique centralised collective bargaining negotiations in 
Scandinavia were not only argued to produce an egalitarian wage distribution 
between occupations, but also to instill egalitarian attitudes among wage-earners. 
Secondly, a high degree of net equality is also is largely argued to be the result of 
the welfare arrangements in Scandinavian countries. The rather unique welfare 
arrangements are supposedly the result of the strong equality, and social-
democratically oriented political actors in the past. This triangle – outcomes, 
welfare arrangements and past political struggles – have led people to claim that 
Scandinavians have per se a passion for equality. Neither the welfare (state) regime, 
nor the IRS traditions substantiate these claims of egalitarianism empirically 
however.  
In the disaggregated perspective, significant historical differences were argued to 
have existed between the paths of the Danish and Swedish political economies from 
the transition to industrial societies until today. In the parliamentary sphere it is 
                                                          
30 In section 4.3 below, the effect of such a shock will be sought modelled in a survey 
experiment. 
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argued that the nature of social democracy in Denmark historically was heavily 
influenced by a large rural and urban petit bourgeoisie, a high proportion of skilled 
workers and low degree of capital concentration, causing a weaker, more 
fragmented and decomposed working class and social democratic party than in 
Sweden. In Denmark, the Social Democrats therefore early on became masters of 
compromise, and rhetorically presented itself positively as a ‘consensus-
democracy’. In Sweden, the Social Democrats also had to compromise and ally 
with the Peasants Party (Bondepartiet). The power structure was more unequal than 
in Denmark though, and the Social Democrats with an almost uninterrupted grasp 
on government were able to a much greater extent to pursue the class interests of 
the mainly unskilled factory workers whom they represented historically. 
The IRSs of Denmark and Sweden also historically seem to have been heavily 
influenced by these legacies. In Denmark a very comprehensive IRS developed. In 
spite the fragmented and craft-organised nature of the labour unions and few large 
dominating businesses, this allowed extraordinarily peaceful labour relations and a 
high degree of independence from state interference. The traditional Swedish IRS 
was maybe even freer of state intervention. In addition, this system for decades 
managed to secure a high degree of labour peace. In contrast to Denmark, this was 
the result of a high degree of centralisation of power and authority within both LO 
and SAF, and of the centralised collective bargaining between the two peak 
organisations. 
The 1970s and 80s seem to have constituted a crucial historical turning point. In 
Sweden the virtual social democratic monopoly of the cabinet was broken, and the 
centralised collective bargaining institution collapsed with the ferocious struggles 
between SAF and its allies versus LO and the social democratic party pressing for 
ED and socialism. After the collapse of centralised bargaining and years of wage 
drift and ad hoc attempts to curb it, the Swedish IRS in the late 1990s emerged as 
seemingly copying central features of the ‘old’ Danish industrial relations model. 
The former, very ideological Social Democratic party also moderated its ideological 
stance considerably during the 1990s. ‘The third way’, competitiveness and the 
sustainability of the welfare state were now on the agenda, not transition to 
socialism. 
While the Swedish political economy until the late 1990s thus was characterised by 
great upheaval and ideological struggle, the Danish seemed to follow a rather slow-
changing path of adaptation based on a rather high degree of consensus. In some 
ways, the Danish IRS has changed quite a lot. Centralised bargaining has ceased 
and much has been decentralised and delegated to the sectorial and firm level. On 
the other hand, the Danish IRS in the ‘centralised decentralisation’ phase is still 
highly coordinated, following the trend set by the key collective agreements 
between DI and CO-industry, and the guidelines set by the political system. In the 
political sphere no bourgeois governments have seriously challenged the legitimacy 
of the welfare state, while the social democratic-led cabinets on the other hand have 
been very keen on being fiscally responsible and securing a competitive economy. 
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The Danish tradition of broad settlements has also been largely maintained. The 
Danish consensus democracy therefore still seems vital, although possible future 
threats of a ‘multilevel regulated’ IRS seem real. 
Danish and Swedish micro-level attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages 
form within the context of the changing conditions of the political economies of 
Denmark and Sweden. The key empirical issues are, as described above, whether 
they parallel the respective political economies of the two countries. If so, a 
subsequent question is, whether changes in the political economies translate directly 
into changed attitudinal patterns, or whether there is a substantial lag ‘from macro 
to micro’. This obviously provokes the question whether Swedish attitudinal 
patterns, after the changes in their PE of the last couple of decades, in recent 
surveys may have started to resemble the corresponding Danish patterns.  
Scandinavian attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages do not form in a 
vacuum. The context in which they form constitutes the political economies of the 
three countries in comparative and longitudinal perspective. Besides the 
programmatic and normative institutions of the welfare (state) regime and the IRS, 
and the interplay of central actors, the actual levels and character of economic 
inequality in the three countries are for obvious reasons also important. The next 
section will delve more deeply into the factual developments. 
3.5. CLASS STRUCTURES, GROSS WAGE INEQUALITIES AND 
TOP INCOME SHARE 
The previous sections dealt with the historical developments of the Scandinavian 
political economies and their focus on economic equality. These sections therefore 
dealt mostly with the middle and right box in the political economy ‘hat’ of Figure 
2-2. Missing is still the left box however. The Scandinavian context for forming 
attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages also obviously includes the 
factual level and developments in the level of wage- and economic inequality in 
Scandinavian societies.  
These ‘facts’ as mentioned above are obviously outcomes of the institutions 
described above. On the other hand, the arrow of causality not only flows from 
institutions to the level and character of economic inequality. The equality 
multiplier is a good theoretical example of such mechanisms running in the 
opposite direction (Barth & Moene, 2009). Here a low degree of net inequality is 
argued to empower weaker groups on the labour market, giving them the strength to 
secure higher wage levels and therefore a lower degree of gross or wage inequality. 
Also a low degree of wage inequality supposedly allows even the low-paid on the 
labour market to be concerned with more abstract, tax-financed welfare 
programmes, instead of their immediate consumption possibilities via tax cuts (this 
is illustrated by the arrows in both directions in Figure 2-2). 
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While the mechanism proposed to be driving the first effect is basically that of 
power resources, the second effect is more interesting for the purpose here. Here the 
idea in fact is that a low degree of wage inequality changes the preferences, or in 
other words, the attitudes of the lowest-paid strata on the labour market, towards 
welfare programs. While this may be true, it is clear that in order to understand the 
background to Scandinavians’ attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages, it 
is imperative to investigate on what level of economic inequality the Scandinavians 
actually live, and its character, in comparative and longitudinal perspective. 
This section therefore progresses in the following order. The standard measure of 
economic inequality is the Gini-coefficient. The first graph to be shown therefore 
portrays gross Gini-coefficients calculated for the working-age (18–65 years) 
population. The graph is therefore an expression of an attempt to adapt the standard 
measure of economic inequality to form a proxy for a measure of the actual the 
level of inequality in gross wages. Because of its deviance in this respect, it will be 
portrayed together with a direct measure of the overall wage dispersion level: the 
9
th
/1
st
 deciles gross earnings ratio.  
As was hinted in the introduction and in the description of the Scandinavian 
political economies above, the overall level of inequality is not only relevant in 
itself. The descriptions of the political economies of Denmark and Sweden above 
hinted that a crucial variable could be whether the society is perceived as dominated 
by conflicting classes with very different interests, or instead a myriad of crafts and 
professions, each with special interests needing to be reconciled. These questions 
might depend furthermore on the economic distance or relationship between the 
median earner and the top and bottom earner respectively. The overall measure of 
wage dispersion will therefore be disaggregated on the 9
th
/5
th
 deciles as well as the 
5
th
/1
st
 deciles (Aaberge & Atkinson, 2013). 
The issue of ‘the rich’ follows directly from the issue of the perceived strata making 
up the society. A subsection will therefore, by using data from the World Top 
Incomes Database or WTID, look at how rich the Scandinavian rich actually are in 
comparative and longitudinal perspective (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 
2014; Atkinson & Piketty, 2007; Atkinson & Piketty, 2010). 
This section finishes with a discussion of the development in the actual class 
structures of the Scandinavian countries. As seen above, several authors have 
emphasised the quite different roots the Danish and Swedish class structures had 
when they became industrial societies, and the effects of this on the class structures 
in this period. The section above is silent as to what happened to the Scandinavian 
class structures entering the post-industrial society though. 
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3.5.1. THE AGGREGATED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEVEL OF 
INEQUALITY IN GROSS WAGES  
Studies on the level of inequality in society often use the net Gini-coefficient as a 
benchmark. Figure 3-4 below portrays the results of an attempt to modify the Gini-
coefficients to make them more or less able to measure the gross level of wage 
dispersion. The modified form shown here are gross Gini-coefficients calculated 
among the working age populations of 18–65 years. It is not a perfect measure of 
the gross level of wage dispersion. On the positive side, the ‘welfare-state effect’ of 
public benefits and transfers, as well as the ‘whole population view’ of the 
commonly shown net Gini-coefficient country rankings have been excluded. On the 
negative side, there are still a lot of students included in age groups below 30, 
having no or very low labour-market earnings. The same is true on the upper end of 
the age-scale, where many retired and especially people on early retirement benefits 
are present. In addition, none- labour-market or wage-related earnings like capital 
income or self-employed income are also included. In sum, the figure portrays a 
somewhat blurry approximation of the level of gross wage dispersion. Also shown 
below in Figure 3-5 is therefore a direct measure of wage dispersion levels in the 
form of the 9
th
/1
st
 deciles gross earnings ratios. These are calculated on the gross 
earnings of full-time dependent employees (‘dependent’ means non-self-employed 
employees). In both cases, the same countries are included as in Figure 3-1 above. 
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With the reservations described above concerning the gross Gini-coefficients, it 
actually seems to be possible to see the proposed egalitarian effect of the IRS in 
Scandinavia compared to other western countries. No country in the left part of 
Figure 3-4 rivals the three Scandinavian countries after 1991, and among the other 
OECD countries not shown, only Switzerland and Iceland seem to rival the three 
Scandinavian countries after the year 2000, with coefficients markedly below 0.4. 
Going further back in time, holes in the data-series make direct comparisons 
difficult. In spite of this, the three Scandinavian countries are clearly among the 
very lowest as far back as we can trace them. Going back to 1990 and before, the 
Scandinavian coefficients even seemed quite a lot lower than now – around 0.3. 
The direct measure of the wage dispersion levels portrayed in the right part of 
Figure 3-4 largely portrays a similar picture the left part. There are some significant 
differences though. Norway and Sweden are in recent data the two countries with 
the lowest ratio, around 2.3, and hence almost equal wage dispersion levels. 
Denmark is third lowest in the figure with a ratio of 2.8, but though they are not 
shown in the figure, Finland and Belgium actually have markedly lower ratios for 
recent years than Denmark. Denmark’s ratio is therefore clearly still low, but at 
more or less the same level as New Zealand, Iceland, France and Greece. Actually 
Denmark and Norway’s ratios have since the mid-1990s been rising steadily (the 
starting point of Norway in 1997 was as low as 1.9). The ratio in Sweden on the 
other hand has been quite stable since the mid-1990s. Because of these 
developments only Norway and Sweden can be said to have in recent years very 
low wage-dispersion levels in a western perspective, whereas Denmark no longer 
does. If we go back to the mid-1990s and before, then even if we are again troubled 
with gaps in the data-series, and can only make tentative conclusions, all three 
Scandinavian countries seemed to have exceptionally low ratios in a western 
perspective.  
Without making staunch conclusions, the results seem to suggest that the 
Scandinavian industrial relations system at its peak actually seemed to produce 
exceptionally egalitarian overall wage-dispersion levels. The gross Gini-coefficients 
calculated for the working-age part of the population was around 0.3. With the 
gradual decline of the system, the exceptional wage-dispersion levels seemed to 
follow somewhat. The current coefficients below 0.4 are still very low in western 
comparison. As for the direct measure of wage-dispersion levels, the right side of 
Figure 3-4 reveals that Denmark seems to have left its egalitarian position 
somewhat. Especially in Denmark, but in time also in Norway, it seems the 
diminishing trade union density rates and the diminishing coverage of collective 
bargaining agreements correlate with less exceptional and less egalitarian wage-
dispersion levels.  
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3.5.2. THE DISAGGREGATED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEVEL OF 
INEQUALITY IN GROSS WAGES  
In this subsection, the wage-dispersion levels will be disaggregated on the 
relationship between the median earner and the top and bottom decile respectively. 
It is important to investigate whether the rising overall tendencies in Norway and 
especially Denmark are caused by the richer strata increasing their earnings 
dramatically or conversely, whether the poorer strata left behind, and also obviously 
how this compares to the development in other western countries. These questions 
obviously state something about the ability of the Scandinavian IRS to maintain 
their historically egalitarian character. Together with the development in the 
political economies described above, these factual developments should form a 
reservoir from which stereotypes, narratives and perceptions of the social 
constitutions can form in the minds of the Scandinavians and hence influence their 
attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages.  
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The disaggregated Figure 3-5 portrays very interesting results. On the left side we 
see that the distance between the median and top decile earnings in Scandinavia are 
still markedly smaller than any other country in the table than Italy. Norway is even 
quite a lot more egalitarian than Denmark and Sweden throughout the period. This 
is rather surprising given the rather high gross Gini-coefficient obtained by Norway 
in 2004. Probably this difference signifies that forms of income other than labour-
market income mattered more in Norway than elsewhere in the first years of the 
new millennium. 
The right side of the figure shows that Norway and especially Denmark are less 
capable of keeping the cohesion between the median and bottom deciles in the last 
one or two decades, and the tendency is that the gap continues to grow. Both France 
and Italy, but surely also Sweden, portray the opposite tendency by maintaining 
smaller gaps. In Figures 3-4 to 3-5, the United Kingdom and especially the United 
States unsurprisingly show much higher degrees of inequality than all other 
countries portrayed. 
While the increasing inequality in gross wages in Norway and especially Denmark 
seems to be caused more by an increased distance between the bottom and the 
middle, rather than an accelerating top, it remains to be seen what has happened to 
the really rich in society. Using data from WTID, Figure 3-5 below will portray the 
developments in income shares of the top 1% and top 0.1% in society. 
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Taken at face value, Figure 3-6 shows again that the United Kingdom and 
especially United States from around 1990 clearly leave all other countries behind, 
with the richest 0.1% earning almost 10% of the national income in the US in 2012. 
The three Scandinavian countries are clearly still at the bottom except for an 
explosive Norwegian detour from 1993 to 2006. This detour has indeed been 
noticed in the existing literature. The general conclusion is that Norway in the early 
1990s experienced a mix of self-reinforcing coincidences. Norway entered an 
economic boom around 1992. The boom was coupled with decreasing interest rates 
and drastically increased gains on the stock market (both dividends and capital 
gains in general). Furthermore, regulation of the financial markets was substantially 
liberalised in the period, and credit rationing was abolished. In addition, a major tax 
reform in 1992 significantly reduced taxes on capital incomes (Aaberge & 
Atkinson, 2008). The spikes of 2000 and 2005 were mainly caused by the payment 
of extraordinary dividends in these two years in anticipation of the pre-announced 
increases in the dividend tax to be implemented in 2001 and 2006 respectively 
(Aaberge, Atkinson, & Modalsli, 2013).  
Compared to the two other Scandinavian countries, the Norwegian development 
from 1993 to 2005 at face value seems extraordinary. There are also some 
modifications to this picture, though. Aaberge & Atkinson (2008) emphasise and 
show that the estimated top shares inevitably differ across countries also because of 
differences in data sources and methods of calculation. The Swedish data from at 
least 1980 to 2005 do not incorporate income from capital gains as do the 
Norwegian. If these are added, the Swedish pattern to a greater extent resembles the 
Norwegian. The rise in top income shares is still markedly higher in Norway 
though. Capital gains are included in all Danish data in Figure 3-6, and even though 
the share of capital income in comparison to wage income gains for this group has 
clearly increased substantially, the overall income share is surprisingly stable 
compared to all other countries (Atkinson & Søgaard, 2013; Det Økonomiske Råd, 
2011).  
In the aggregated perspective, the three Scandinavian countries in the period from 
the early 1980s until today still have the lowest share of their national incomes 
owned by the top 1% and top 0.1% of society. The position is waning though, and 
countries such as France and Italy are more or less at Scandinavian levels. In the 
disaggregated perspective only Denmark seems to not have experienced rather 
sharp, but temporary, increased top income shares caused by high capital gains for a 
selected group of people. The temporality of these gains suggests the question 
whether the impact could be a perception in Scandinavian minds of a new class of 
emerging rich financiers, or whether conversely nothing much has actually changed 
in a social constructivist sense. On the other hand, the gains in time turn into 
inheritance, and as Munk et al. (2015) describe, this effect in Denmark is (maybe) 
unsurprisingly half the size of the corresponding Swedish one. 
- 
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3.6. THE FACTUAL CLASS STRUCTURES DEVELOPING IN 
SCANDINAVIA 
In the aggregated perspective, Figures 3-4 to 3-6 above portray the Scandinavian 
countries consistently maintaining a low degree of inequality in actual gross wage 
levels. If the overall measure of gross wage inequality is disaggregated, the 
Scandinavian countries furthermore reveal themselves to have consistently among 
the lowest gross income gaps between both the 9
th
 and 5
th
 income decile and 
between the 5
th
 and 1
st
 income decile. In addition, the income share of the top 1% or 
0.1% was consistently among the lowest in the Scandinavian countries.  
A closer look at the figures reveals trends towards gradual declines in positions of 
having extraordinary high degrees of gross income equality. In addition, even if the 
Scandinavian countries in the aggregated perspective followed roughly the same 
trend, there were differences also. Denmark and to some extent Norway since the 
1980s have experienced rather rapidly rising gross wage dispersion levels, caused 
especially by a greater gap between the 5
th
 and 1
st
 decile. The Danish 5
th
/1
st
 gross 
income decile ratios are in recent two decades at the same level as a number of 
other western countries’ corresponding ratios. The income share of the top in 
Denmark and possibly Sweden on the other hand remains extraordinarily low and 
almost constant. Sweden has also managed to keep the 5
th
/1
st
 gross income decile 
ratios extraordinarily low and almost constant since the mid-1990s. It should also 
be mentioned that Norway during the whole period had much lower 9
th
/5
th
 income 
decile ratios than any other country.  
In contrast to the analyses above, Table 3-1 below shows that the above extensively 
described historical differences in the occupational class structures between 
especially Denmark and Sweden seem to have almost disappeared in recent 
decades. In transitioning from industrial to welfare, service and knowledge 
economies, the class structures of Denmark and Sweden have largely converged. 
Table 3-1 hides a fact often overlooked even in recent literature applying a class 
perspective. The introduction and expansion of the welfare state in especially the 
social democratic welfare states in Scandinavia fundamentally altered the class 
structure. A large proportion of the workforce in Scandinavia is now employed in 
different parts of the public sector. Furthermore, if a household perspective on class 
is applied, a clear majority of working households has at least one member 
employed in the public sector. For a large part of the workforce, their employers 
and adversaries in for example collective bargaining negotiations are now not 
anymore capitalists or the management and a board representing shareholders. 
Instead, it is a municipality, a region or the state. It is obvious that this 
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fundamentally changes the nature of the struggle over for example wage increases, 
because the ones who have to pay are other citizens via their tax bills.
31
  
To sum up, it seems that if the patterns in the attitudes in Denmark and Sweden 
towards the level of inequality in gross wages are found in the present data to be 
very different, these differences cannot stem from differences in actual class 
structures in the present day. Building on the description of the development in the 
various components of the Scandinavian political economies described above, a 
number of scenarios will be deduced. These scenarios creates assumptions on which 
patterns can be expected to emerge in Scandinavian attitudes towards the level of 
inequality in gross wages and towards the presentation of ‘the rich’ in Danish and 
Swedish newspapers. 
Table 3-1 Economically Active Population According to Present Socio-Economic 
Position in the Nordic Countries, 2006 
 Denmark Norway Sweden 
Present socio-economic position (%)    
Managers, professionals and upper white-collar workers 27 17 23 
Lower white-collar workers 39 53 49 
Small entrepreneurs and managers of small enterprises 3 2 1 
Blue-collar workers 28 25 25 
Farmers and other agricultural producers 3 3 2 
Total 100 100 100 
(N) 1418 1672 1783 
Source: (Alestalo et al., 2009, table 2) European Social Survey 2006. Note: Includes only civilian 
employees, population over 15 years of age. 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ (February 18, 2009). 
Classification (ISCO 88): Managers …(1000-1239, 2000-3000, 3142-3144); Lower …(3100-3141, 
3145-5220); Small …(1300, 1310, 1312, 1319); Blue-collar …(6000, 6100, 6140-9330); Farmers 
…(1311, 6110-6130). 
3.7. SCENARIOS 
This last section of Chapter 3 will, as promised, try to deduce some scenarios of 
how Scandinavian attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages can be affected 
by the development in the various components of the Scandinavian political 
economy(ies). Because the media output, as argued in Chapter 2 in the dissertation, 
                                                          
31 This can have some of the same consequences as Åberg (1984) as described above claimed 
demands for wage increased can have in an industrial relations system dominated by 
centralised collective bargaining. Wage increases for a given occupation are here judged 
relatively to the wage development of other occupations, which are paying relatively by 
lower wage increases themselves. In the case of the public sector, the payment is even more 
direct. Everybody pays for the wage increases of an occupation primarily employed in the 
public sector via their tax bill.   
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is seen as a way to tap the contents of the HCNI, different scenarios of how ‘the 
rich’ are likely to be presented in Danish and Swedish newspapers is therefore also 
crucial. As above, the section will distinguish conceptually between the aggregated 
and disaggregated perspective.  
As described in Chapter 2, historically constructed normative institutions (HCNI) of 
the political economy are defined as a particular representation of the past, a 
representation that in myths, presentations and stereotypes defines ‘who the others 
are’ and in a sense also ‘who we are’. They are therefore by definition inert and, 
although the material side of the political economy influences them through history, 
the myths, presentations and stereotypes concerning for example ‘the rich’ and the 
class structure of society should largely be based on a historical representation of 
them. They are therefore not just an unbiased description of the current social 
stratification of society.  
The programmatic institutions, the material, economic conditions of society and the 
power and influence of central actors on the other hand do change progressively. In 
very simple terms, this leads to two overall scenarios. First, Scandinavians react 
attitudinally to the changes in the material aspects of the political economy. The 
nature of this reaction obviously depends on other factors such as the values of the 
Scandinavians, which is the topic of Chapter 4). The key point is that changes in the 
material aspects of the political economy should be traceable to the Scandinavians’ 
attitudes. Second, if the more immaterial HCNI really is what conditions 
Scandinavian attitudes, then changes in the material political economy should not 
necessarily matter – at least in the short term. Both of these scenarios seem overly 
simplified though. As discussed in Chapter 2, the normative institutions of the 
political economy are obviously conditioned by the development in the 
programmatic institutions, the material conditions and the power of the influence of 
central actors historically. A probably more realistic version of the second scenario 
is therefore as follows. Although Scandinavian attitudes are seen as a function of 
mainly the HCNI, because these are affected by, and change slowly with the 
changing material side of the political economy, empirically various time lags seem 
likely. The first of these time lags, between the changing material aspects of the 
political economy, the second, between the HCNI and hence how the media 
represents the social stratification of society and the rich, and finally between all 
these changes and the actual attitudes of the Scandinavians. On the basis of these 
premises, scenarios that are more specific will be developed below concerning the 
development in Scandinavian attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross 
wages. There will be a distinction made between the aggregated and disaggregated 
perspective, and furthermore between the level and the trend. Obviously, hints of all 
of this are found in the final paragraphs of the various sections above. 
In the aggregated perspective, the key assumption must be that the overall level of 
Scandinavians’ attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages must be rather 
egalitarian. The classic descriptions of Scandinavian political economy emphasise 
the ‘passion for equality’ characterising its institutions that are committed to a high 
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degree of gross and net equality. If we take the components one at a time, starting 
first with the institutions of the IRS, then, in spite the changes described, the 
institutions of the Scandinavian IRS are still characterised by a very high degrees of 
coordination, cooperation, governability and trade-union density rates. Second, the 
Scandinavian left-wings and trade-union movements – although increasingly 
weakened and fragmented – are still, in a comparative perspective, quite strong. 
Third, the Scandinavian wage-dispersion rates, and the share of national income 
earned by the rich, are still small in a comparative perspective. So if the historical 
and current legacy of the PE persists and parallels the micro-level attitudes of the 
Scandinavians, they must be assumed to be more egalitarian-minded than people in 
most other countries. 
If we turn from the level to the trend, some changes can possibly be expected: First, 
the trade-union density rates are clearly declining, there is a rise in ideologically 
competing unions and the days of centralised collective bargaining negotiations are 
long gone. Second, the virtual monopoly of the Social Democrats on the cabinet has 
surely disappeared, and the traditional trade-union movement is struggling to 
maintain its influence after the collapse of formal and informal cooperative 
institutions. Third, the traditional working class is much reduced in size and 
significance, as elsewhere in the western world. In Denmark and Norway, but less 
in Sweden, the trend is also clearly towards wage-dispersion rates steadily closer to 
the OECD average. On the assumption that that Scandinavians react more directly 
to changes in the more material aspects of the political economy, as the first overall 
scenario describes, then these changes should influence Scandinavian attitudes also. 
It could be that they are becoming less egalitarian over time. It could also be that 
the Scandinavian attitudinal patterns will become less aligned to class, because the 
class-based organisations have also weakened. 
The above chapter is also very much focussed on the disaggregated perspective, 
and especially on the differences between Denmark and Sweden. As was elaborated 
above, historically the PEs of Denmark and Sweden developed quite differently. 
The history of the Danish political economy in both the spheres of industrial 
relations and in the parliamentary sphere was one of institutionalised class 
compromise and consensus, maybe best described by the expression ‘consensus-
democracy’. Even recent developments in the Danish PE do not seem to change this 
picture dramatically – except by blurring the ideological class cleavages even 
further. This consensual development should surely affect the presentations of the 
rich in the Danish HCNI. The idea of the consensus-democracy is basically that the 
society is not constituted of a few social classes with diverging interests, but instead 
of a great number of sectorial groups, each with their interests to be bridged in 
compromises. As was hinted in sections 1.4 and 2.2 and will be elaborated further 
in Chapter 7, this legacy – and very recent heritage – should lead the Danish media 
to not present the rich as a very distinct group at all, but rather as part of the broad 
range of groups making up the middle class. If all of this translates into Danish 
attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages, they should to a great 
extent be consensual across social classes. Therefore even if Danish attitudes 
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towards the level of inequality in gross wages are mostly conditioned by the present 
and more material changes in the political economy, an egalitarian, but non-
cleavaged attitudinal pattern is to be expected.  
In Sweden the situation is quite different. The historical legacy of the political 
economy in Sweden is to a greater extent than in Denmark one of ideological class 
struggles in the IRS as well as in the parliamentary sphere. While the events of 
especially the 1980s can be seen as a revival of an even more open class struggle, 
the outcome in the last couple of decades are maybe signs of a divergence from the 
ideological, class-struggle path. Crucially, both the Swedish IRS and the interplay 
between central actors in the parliamentary sphere over time seem to move more 
and more in the Danish direction. This means, first, fewer ideological differences in 
the parliamentary sphere concerning the management of the economy and welfare 
state, as well as the distribution of resources in society. It secondly means a more 
decentralised, yet highly institutionalised and coordinated IRS. Both the media 
output, but also Swedish attitudes are therefore to a greater extent at a watershed 
than they are in Denmark. The Swedish HCNI could still be influenced by the still 
quite recent legacy of a quite vivid class struggle. It therefore seems likely that the 
Swedish media might still be influenced by this overall societal image in presenting 
the social stratification of society and the place of the rich in it. Because of the lag 
described above, it is more an empirical question, whether Swedish attitudes to the 
level of inequality in gross wages will be mostly influenced by the historical 
ideological class legacy, or by the more recent developments. If Swedish attitudes, 
in accordance with the second overall scenario, are still mostly dominated by the 
HCNI, they could be still more dominated by ideological differences in attitudes, 
broadly following the ‘old’ social classes of society. If they instead – in accordance 
with the first overall scenario –start with some lag to parallel the more recent 
developments in the Swedish PE, Swedish attitudes should to an ever greater extent 
gradually become consensual across social classes, as the corresponding Danish 
attitudes is assumed to be.  
It should be mentioned that there is also a third possibility: that attitudes towards 
the level of inequality in gross wages somehow stem directly from the changes in 
actual wage-dispersion levels and actual class structures. However, as argued 
already above, the Scandinavian levels do not seem that different on the various 
measures in Figures 3-4 to 3-6 and Table 3.1, although the trend is somewhat 
different. It therefore seems that, if the patterns of attitudes in Denmark and Sweden 
towards the level of inequality in gross wages are found in the present data to be 
very different, these differences cannot stem from differences in actual class 
structures in the present day.  
Chapter 3 dealt with the key issue of the political economies of Scandinavia, and 
how they can be expected to influence Scandinavian attitudes to the level of 
inequality in gross wages. This corresponds to the ‘hat’ and the arrows leading from 
the hat to the media rectangle and from there to the attitudinal ellipse in the bottom 
of Figure 2-2. The next logical step is then to focus on the contents of this ellipse 
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and ask questions such as: How can we measure attitudes to the level of inequality 
in gross wages? What are then the properties of the measure we end up with, and 
what should we take into consideration when interpreting the results? The topic of 
Chapter 4 is therefore theoretically and empirically to seek answers to these key 
methodological questions concerning the dependent variable of the dissertation.   
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CHAPTER 4. MEASURING ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS THE LEVEL OF 
INEQUALITY IN GROSS WAGES 
This chapter will deal with the most central methodological issue of the dissertation 
– how can we measure attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages? 
What are then the properties of the measure we do end up with, and what should we 
take into consideration when interpreting the results? The section starts out 
theoretically by reviewing existing literature on the relationship between values, 
attitudes and opinions expressed in surveys. In this section, a number of claims 
concerning the measure derived will be made. In the second part of this section, it is 
tried empirically both to test some of the claims made in the theoretical review and 
also more generally to investigate the properties of two possible measures of our 
main dependent variable. Finally, in the third part, the crucial relationship between 
factual views or perception of an average wage level for a given occupation, and the 
normative opinions and attitudes towards the same will be investigated.  
The general argument of the chapter is that no quantitative measures of attitudes 
towards the level of inequality in gross wages can be viewed as completely 
absolute, in the sense that they measure exactly the same across countries and time. 
This should come as no surprise, because of the CR-inspired complex and 
contextual ontology of the dissertation described in Chapter 2. The attitudinal 
patterns thus form and are influenced by the characteristics of the relevant macro-
level structures prevailing in a given context at a given time. It will be argued that 
what is later labelled the more absolute measure suits our purpose better than what 
will be labelled the relative measure, in being, as the label implies, more absolute. 
The experimental results of section 4.3 show that even for this more absolute 
measure, respondents’ answers depend greatly on their perceptions of the actual 
levels of inequality in gross wages. These perceptions therefore form a crucial 
‘mental anchor’ which can be manipulated by the researcher in experiments. In the 
real world they depend on the influence of the macro-level structures of the dual-
functioning political economy described in Chapter 2-3. The experimental results 
will also show that even if respondents’ expressed attitudes towards the level of 
inequality in gross wages depend on their perceptions of the actual level of 
inequality in gross wages, they do not simply extrapolate from what people ‘do 
earn’ to what they ‘should earn’. Instead, and especially when provoked or given 
surprising information, respondents seem to reflect and take a clear attitudinal stand 
on the issue of just wages. This fits well with the notion of humans having a 
reflective potential which can be activated, but is not utilised in every situation, as 
described in Chapter 2. In more detail, the first section deals with the existing 
literature on values, attitudes and opinions expressed in surveys. It will be argued 
CHAPTER 4. MEASURING ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE LEVEL OF INEQUALITY IN GROSS WAGES 
 73 
that the central dependent variable at the same time features two important and at 
first glance contradictory properties. First, it is suited to measuring norms at the 
macro (societal and group) level, and second, it can be expected to be more volatile 
over time than stable fundamental values the individual is supposed to internalise 
by the socialisation of primary and secondary socialisation agents, after which these 
should remain rather stable through time. This last property is crucial in order to be 
able to identify cracks or changes in the supposedly egalitarian normative 
foundation of the Scandinavian populaces that legitimises the Scandinavian model. 
If a variable that measures stable, fundamental values was used, then in principle 
changes should be expected between generations, but this is too long a period to 
encapsulate much effect from the changes in the PEs over the last couple of 
decades, as described in Chapter 3. Some analyses in Chapter 6 will disaggregate 
attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages between generations to test 
for this possibility, though. 
The second section is mainly empirical. To measure attitudes towards the level of 
inequality in gross wages, a specific set of items from the Social Inequality Module 
of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP - 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009) was 
recoded and used as the dependent variables throughout most survey-oriented 
analyses of the dissertation. With such a rather narrow selection of dependent 
variable, it was found crucial already at this early stage of the dissertation to 
thoroughly discuss and empirically investigate the consequences of choosing this 
measure, its relation to other measures and concepts, as well as to conduct 
robustness checks to validate the results. The third section, investigating the 
relationship to the factual views or perceptions of the level of inequality in gross 
wages, can be seen to be perhaps the most central of the robustness checks of the 
dependent variable. 
4.1. VALUES, ATTITUDES, OPINIONS AND GROUP THINKING 
The dissertation investigates attitudes, or rather opinions, expressed in surveys. A 
great deal of literature deals with the relation between, at the highest or most 
abstract level, belief systems and fundamental values, and then, perceptions and 
attitudes, and finally, views and opinions expressed by individuals in surveys. 
Notice also that on each level there is a clear distinction between norms and 
perceptions. At the highest abstract level, belief systems for example signify an 
individual-level ontology or assumptions about what the reality consists of, while 
fundamental values signify fundamental ideas of what the individual wishes the 
reality should consist of (Shamshiri-Petersen, 2010). According to Shamshiri-
Petersen (2010), many attitudinal researchers fail to distinguish these concepts or to 
draw the right conclusions concerning the level of internal and external validity that 
a given empirical investigation based on such a distinction has. The following 
section will therefore first try to keep this dissertation from falling into this 
conceptual trap. The section will, secondly, try to develop ideas on how we can 
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interpret our dependent variables and the empirical results later in the dissertation, 
and suggest how we can test some of these ideas methodologically. 
Three overall arguments will be put forward in this section. First, the concepts 
above are not synonyms for the same thing. Even if it the lines between the 
concepts are blurred and it is debatable whether you can measure values, attitudes 
or even just opinions in surveys, there is at least in principle a clear distinction and 
a hierarchy between the concepts. Second, for a number of reasons, it is not the 
hope to measure abstract values, but ‘only’ attitudes in this dissertation. Lastly, 
even if it is claimed that the more volatile attitudes, instead of the very stable values 
are being measured, a similar claim is that the main dependent variable is well 
suited for measuring norms at the group level where they are very much influenced 
by opinion leaders. The section starts out with a few demarcations of some of the 
concepts introduced above. As mentioned, at least at an ideal-typical level the 
existing literature describes a hierarchical relationship between the concepts 
mentioned above in relation to the level of abstraction and stability over time: 
Figure 4-1 The Ideal-Typical Relationship between Values, Attitudes and Opinions 
as well as Belief Systems, Perceptions and Views 
The normative side ‘what should be’ The perceptual side ‘what is’ 
 
 
  
Sources: Modified, but inspired by: (Olsen, 2008, p. 51; Shamshiri-Petersen, 2010, p. 48) 
There seems to be agreement that the lines between the different levels of the two 
hierarchies as well as between norms and perceptions are blurred. However, in 
maintaining the conceptual demarcations, what is important in our case are the 
differences in the formation and stability of the norms and perceptions at the 
various levels.  
At the most abstract level, values and belief systems are supposed to share two 
important characteristics. Firstly, they are often viewed as formed mainly in the 
primary and secondary socialisation processes of childhood. The most important 
socialisation agents are therefore the family as well as pre-school and primary 
school institutions. After the primary and secondary socialisation processes are 
Opinions 
Attitudes 
Values 
Views 
Perceptions 
Belief systems 
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over, values and belief systems are, secondly, argued to remain quite stable at the 
individual level through time (Shamshiri-Petersen, 2010). Value- and belief-system 
change therefore can be expected to be very slow and occur basically between 
generations. Value- and belief-system variation can be expected between cultures 
and societies or subcultures within a society that experience different primary and 
secondary socialisation processes. 
Attitudes and perceptions – on the second level of abstraction – are, as the arrows 
indicate, influenced by abstract values and belief systems. They are however also to 
a great extent argued to be influenced by tertiary socialisation agents, as for 
example the images the media produce as well as new personal experiences or the 
experiences of people proximate to you. Another way of putting this is that attitudes 
and perceptions are steadily reproduced, and as indicated in the research question of 
the dissertation, changes in the reproduction pattern of attitudes are in principle 
likely. Changes in attitudes and perception are therefore in principle expected to be 
much more frequent than value-changes. Variation can be expected on many levels, 
but obviously people exposed to different media outputs, opinion leaders, 
experiences and experiences of people proximate to them can be expected to have 
varied attitudes and perceptions to a given object or subject (Baumberg et al., 2013; 
Hedegaard, 2014a; Hedegaard, 2014b; Shamshiri-Petersen, 2010). This point will 
be qualified and elaborated below. A return to the lowest level of abstraction – 
opinions and views expressed in surveys and their relation to the other concepts – 
will also be made here. Before that, another conceptual hierarchy will be 
introduced.  
Kumlin (2007) introduces the following hierarchy of abstraction levels in attitudes 
to redistribution and the welfare state. One can further separate each level into 
different dimensions, objects and aspects: 
1. General welfare-state support 
2. Specific policy preferences about various aspects or parts of the welfare 
state 
3. Specific evaluations of welfare-state performance  
Kumlin’s (2007) conceptual hierarchy is based on a review of existing studies on 
the subject of welfare-state and redistribution attitudes. Therefore the inspiration 
seems mainly to be the actual empirical results of existing studies and the various 
types of survey measures actually applied in existing international surveys. Another 
way of putting it is that Kumlin’s (2007) model is an empirical and practical 
construct, while the model presented in Figure 4-1 above was mainly a theoretical 
one.  
Much research has been conducted on abstract questions of ‘general welfare-state 
support’. Taking the results as face value the general finding is that there is a 
surprisingly consistently stable, high degree of general welfare state support in 
western countries over time. Within the countries, trends and variations correlate 
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most with changes in the economic cycle and the ideological positions of 
respondents respectively (Kumlin, 2007; Svallfors, 2010). The relatively high level 
of stability over time seems to be in accordance with what was expected of the 
abstract values and belief systems in Figure 4-1 above.   
These ‘face value’ interpretations have been and can be easily criticised though. A 
hint of this is that even if the overall differences in levels of the various measures 
have been rather stable through time in the western countries, the results have 
appeared somewhat mysterious.  For example, dimensions that were expected to 
correlate do not correlate at all – and various attempts to explain the patterns in 
consistent ways have not been overly convincing (Kumlin, 2007; Svallfors, 2010).
32
  
Two overall interpretations can be made of these results. First, as Svallfors (2010), 
one can claim there is something wrong in the way our investigations are handled. 
Our theorising and operationalising of both independent and dependent variables 
are not good enough; or, our methods and data are not good enough, and so forth. 
These arguments surely cannot just be dismissed, but there is maybe also a problem 
in using survey measures as abstract as the ones used in this tradition.  
It is an often-heard critique of the survey method in social sciences that the 
respondents’ answers to some extent reflect the norms of society, and not their 
actual personal attitudes. Acting according to a logic of appropriateness, the 
respondents seek to please the interviewer by giving satisficing answers that match 
the norms and values of the society. Experimental results suggest that this ‘social 
desirability bias’ is especially prominent regarding very general and abstract 
questions, such as the ones under scrutiny here (Goul Andersen & Nielsen, 2006; 
Lolle & Goul Andersen, 2013; Olsen, 1998; Szirmai, 1991).  
As Kumlin (2007) rather implicitly seems to suggest, to understand welfare-state 
attitudes and especially attitudes relevant to actual policies, there are clearly 
advantages moving down the latter of abstraction. Because the subject in the 
dissertation is not attitudes to the welfare state, the ‘specific policy preferences’ will 
not concern aspects or parts of the welfare state, but rather specific preferences for 
the level of inequality in gross wages. 
If the two conceptual hierarchies above are somewhat equated, the second 
abstraction-level concept of specific preferences for the level of inequality in gross 
wages should also share the properties of attitudes and perceptions described above. 
Attitudes should be more volatile because they are steadily produced and 
                                                          
32 For example, testing whether different material or objective cleavage structures in the 
different welfare regimes, which should manifest themselves in differences in attitudinal 
structures, could explain the patterns (Kumlin, 2007; Svallfors, 2003; Svallfors, 1997; 
Svallfors, 2010). 
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reproduced by tertiary socialisation agents such as the media and opinion leaders as 
well as personal experiences and experiences of proximate people.  
There are also reasons to modify the assumptions of individual volatility in this 
particular case though. Existing research suggest that on issues related to the 
distribution of incomes, social cleavages and social class in society, people’s 
attitudes often reflect less volatile ‘group-thinking’, than the case is on attitudes to 
other issues where individual reflections on the inputs described above play a larger 
role (Kumlin, 2007; Svallfors, 2010).  
The obvious question is then who and what are driving the groups’ thinking then? 
Existing studies suggest that the historical articulation of social cleavages in a given 
context (HCNI) as well as the existing institutional character of the welfare state, 
and we could add the whole of the political economy, serves a double function. 
First, it affects the extent to which opinion leaders or the elite-level class think 
about and politicise issues related to social cleavages, social class and redistribution 
at all. Second, the historical and contextual background then forms a basis or a 
reservoir of narratives (the HCNI), from which opinion leaders or the elite-level 
class to varying extents can articulate and politicise these issues (Kumlin, 2007; 
Svallfors, 2010). In addition: 
‘…such interests may be articulated and disseminated by political 
attentive ‘opinion leaders’ within social groups, rather than being 
calculated separately by each individual, based on independently 
gathered information’ (Kumlin, 2007, p. 370).  
Obvious candidates for ‘opinion leaders’ driving attitudes towards the level of 
inequality in gross wages are political leaders and leaders of trade unions. It also 
seems crucial how they express themselves concerning these issues in the media. 
As discussed in section 2.2.1, the media therefore mediates the influence between 
the macro-level structures and especially the HCNI and the micro-level attitudes of 
the Scandinavians. Obviously the various opinion leaders just mentioned are key 
actors in this process, as well as in the reciprocal process from micro to macro 
indicated in Figure 2-2.  
Therefore there are good reasons to believe that measures of specific preferences 
for the level of inequality in gross wages are suitable for two things. First, 
measuring norms and perceptions at the group level, and second, they can be 
expected to be more volatile over time than stable fundamental values and belief 
systems the individual is supposed to internalise by way of the primary and 
secondary socialization agents, after which they should remain rather stable over 
time.  
In the section below we will try to empirically and methodologically investigate 
some of the forecasts of this section. One of the often-used dependent variables in 
the tradition of general welfare-state support, measuring attitudes towards the level 
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of economic inequality in society, will first be investigated. This measure – which 
will later be called the relative measure – is exactly such an abstract and general 
question. In the following subsection, it will be argued and shown that this measure 
is affected by many of the problems implicit above. These deliver counter-intuitive 
results and exhibit a social desirability bias. In addition, the intra-country variation 
forms a clear and reliable factor with other classical questions on the economic 
right-left scale of politics of the role of government towards unemployed and poor 
as well as questions about tax levels. The measure therefore largely seems to reflect 
respondents’ general idealogico-economic standpoint and socially desirable norms, 
instead of ‘independent’ attitudes to redistribution – whatever that means. It should 
be mentioned that obviously these characteristics are not necessarily negative per 
se. Depending on what the aim of a given research project is, these disadvantages 
can be advantages in other instances. The results do suggest though that it is 
important to be more cautious, when interpreting patterns of this variable, than has 
usually been the case in research having this measure as the key dependent variable.  
For sure, respondents’ answers to the relative measure do not reflect their attitudes 
to the gross level of economic inequality in society, the subject of the dissertation. 
With another, more absolute measure that we introduce, on the other hand, the 
respondent can be ‘tricked’ to give his/her opinion on a quite general and abstract 
concept, answering a very concrete question. Again, following the suggestions of 
this section, we will investigate whether this less abstract measure is less hampered 
by the disadvantages that the relative measure has in our case. Also, by using data 
from survey-experiments as well as different survey items in regular ISSP surveys, 
the relation between norms and perceptions of the gross level of economic 
inequality in society – and how it is actually possible to interpret respondents’ 
answers to these survey-items – will be investigated.  
4.2. INTRODUCING TWO POSSIBLE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The ISSP has become a standard data source for comparative attitudinal research, 
and the ISSP 2009 dataset forms the most recent, comprehensive and yet 
unexplored basis available for the cross-national analysis of comparable data on 
attitudes towards gross wages. Data from the ISSP’s Social Inequality module I–IV 
from 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009 will therefore be used in the remaining 
quantitative analyses of the dissertation.  
As Osberg & Smeeding (2006) argue the most straightforward way to investigate 
people’s attitudes towards income- or wage-inequality is asking them directly. 
Often the right questions are not present in the surveys, researchers then use proxies 
or try indirectly to measure a concept, but this is actually not the case here. In the 
Social Inequality module of ISSP as well as numerous other surveys, the statement 
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is proposed: ‘Differences in income in <country> are too large’.33The result is an 
ordinal scaled variable with the answer categories ‘Strongly agree, Agree, Neither 
agree nor disagree, Disagree and Strongly disagree’. This means the higher you 
score, the less egalitarian in principle you are. Table 4-1 below ranks the western 
countries participating in the various Social Inequality Modules of ISSP on the 
measure, which we henceforth call the relative measure.  
  
                                                          
33 The question is also posed in the ‘Role of Government’ modules of ISSP as well as a 
number of Eurobarometer surveys (Larsen 2006, p. 35).  
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In spite the presence of this item in numerous surveys and the fact that it seems the 
most direct measure of the concept of attitudes towards redistribution or net 
income-inequality (not necessarily the level of inequality in gross wages), good 
arguments exist of why not to use it in the analyses of this dissertation. A main 
critique of this ordinal-scaled item is that has a relative bias. It is clearly less 
obvious for a person to give a confirmatory answer to the question in the 
Scandinavian countries than in most other countries. Here the actual level of net 
income-inequality is, as we have seen in section 3.5, very low by comparative 
standards (Gordon Marshall, Swift, Routh, & Burgoyne, 1999; Larsen, 2006; 
Osberg & Smeeding, 2006; Svallfors, 2006). Because higher scores in Table 4-2 
above mean less egalitarian attitudes, then as we can see, the Scandinavian attitudes 
measured by this question therefore often seem surprisingly anti-egalitarian 
compared to other western countries (Evans, 1996; Larsen, 2006; Lübker, 2004; 
Osberg & Smeeding, 2006). This can also be seen as an example of a 
counterintuitive result argued to be widespread in abstract measures of ‘general 
welfare-state support’ in the section above: it just seems unlikely that 
Scandinavians, living in equality-enhancing institutional contexts, in absolute 
terms, dislike economic inequality less than people in most other western countries 
do. 
The measure mentioned above: ‘What do you think people in these jobs ought to be 
paid, regardless of what they actually get…?’, can be argued, though not to the 
same degree, to have this relative bias. The question is posed for a number of 
different occupations in the different Social Inequality modules of ISSP.
34
 It can be 
transformed into a more absolute measure of attitudes towards the level of 
inequality in gross wages. Many of the factors influencing the relative measure can 
thus be argued to be kept more constant (Larsen, 2006; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006). 
The first of these factors is, that the effect of the actual level of income-inequality in 
a country, which hampers the relative measure, is kept quite constant. A 
respondent’s opinion on what an unskilled factory worker ought to earn is not at the 
outset connected to the actual level or development of income-inequality in the 
respondent's country. This does not mean that contextual factors, and especially the 
perceived level of wages for the same occupations, are not important influences on 
the attitudes reported in the more absolute measure.  
A second, related advantage is that the welfare state is more out of the picture in the 
more absolute measure. The reason is that the question concerns attitudes towards 
gross wages and not attitudes towards the net distribution of income. The relative 
measure on the contrary could be interpreted as a proxy for an ideological position 
                                                          
34 In Social Inequality module round I and II from 1987 and 1992, the question was posed 
regarding eleven different occupations that varied marginally between the rounds. In the third 
round from 1999, the number of occupations was reduced to nine. In the recent fourth round 
from 2009, the number of professions was further reduced to five (ISSP Research Group, 
2002; ISSP Research Group, 2011; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006). 
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on the economic right-left scale of politics, heavily influenced by one's views on the 
role of government (Kumlin, 2007; Larsen, 2006). A confirmatory answer to the 
question can thus also be interpreted as a proxy for a political or ideological 
statement, also correlating with positive attitudes towards the welfare state, taxes 
and redistribution in general.  
The results of a factor-analysis and reliability test in Table 5-8 in section 5.2.2.2 
below seems to confirm this assumption. This analysis shows that all six items of 
the batteries of Q6 and Q7a-b
35
 in the ISSP 2009 source questionnaire correlate 
strongly in a factor analysis and reliability test (ISSP Research Group, 2011). They 
form a clear and reliable factor with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.637. These items all 
tap classical questions on the economic right-left scale of politics about the role of 
government towards unemployed and poor as well as questions about the tax level.  
Thus in accordance with Kumlin’s (2007) review, this indicates that when 
respondents answer answering the more relative question, the underlying basis is to 
a great extent their ideological position on the economic right-left scale, and maybe 
especially in regard to the role of government. This again relates to the argument 
made above that the relative measure is hampered by its abstractness. Moving down 
the ladder of abstraction, using the more absolute measure on the other hand, the 
respondent is ‘tricked’ into giving his/her opinion on a quite general and abstract 
concept in answer to a very concrete question. As Szirmai (1991) points out, the 
risk of ‘socially desirable responses’ is clearly minimised by using the more 
absolute measure. Again it should be emphasised that the disadvantages mentioned 
here concerning the relative measure could be advantages in other research projects. 
Researchers have to be aware of this and careful how they interpret the results 
therefore.  
Finally, the absolute measure is very versatile. It can be manipulated and adapted in 
many ways – all giving insight into different aspects of attitudes towards wages 
(Svallfors, 2004, p. 82). The analyses below will make good use of this advantage 
and adapt the measure to be able to tab four distinct dimensions of attitudes towards 
wages: levels of gross wages for different occupations, the level of inequality in 
gross wages and degree of justice in levels of gross wages for different occupations, 
and consensus. The main emphasis is of course on the second dimension: the level 
of inequality in gross wages. Only for the operationalisation of the dimension – the 
degree of justice in levels of gross wages for different occupations – will another 
survey item also be used. This resembles the more absolute measure, only ‘should 
earn’ is switched to ‘actually earn’.  
                                                          
35 When referring to specific questions in the ISSP 2009 survey. See the source questionnaire 
in Appendix C (ISSP Research Group, 2011). 
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4.2.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE 
MEASURE AT THE MICRO AND MACRO LEVELS 
In spite of the arguments for what above is called the more absolute measure, it is 
relevant to investigate its connection to the relative measure. In Table 4-2 below, 
the more absolute measure has been used to create a measure of attitudes to the 
level of inequality in gross wages. This absolute measure will be the most often 
used as dependent variable in the survey-analyses of the dissertation. The general 
idea is that, because the respondents are asked their opinion about a number of 
different occupations, we can get measures of how much more they think some 
professions should earn beyond what others should earn. In this version we measure 
how much more the respondents think chairmen of large national corporations 
should earn than shop assistants or unskilled factory workers. In the table below, we 
simply correlate it with the relative measure at the individual or micro level.   
Table 4-2 The Individual Level (Micro) Correlation between the Relative Measure 
of Attitudes to Income Inequality and our suggestion of a more Absolute Measure of 
Attitudes to the Level of Inequality in Gross Wages in ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999 and 
2009 
  Correlation (unstandardized) Pearson’s r Standard error 
1987 All countries 0.971*** 0.133 0.068 
1992 All countries 1.006*** 0.057 0.127 
 NO 0.329*** 0.264 0.033 
 SE 0.507*** 0.376 0.050 
1999 All countries 0.399*** 0.035 0.059 
 DK 0.286*** 0.183 0.041 
 NO 0.135*** 0.128 0.024 
 SE 0.981*** 0.311 0.068 
2009 All countries 0.818*** 0.017 0.234 
 DK 0.293 0.031 0.261 
 NO 0.311 0.044 0.194 
 SE 0.757*** 0.136 0.176 
Notes. The index of the more absolute measure are created by taking the individual-level statements of 
how much the respondent thinks a chairman of a large national corporation should earn. This score is 
then divided by the average of the score of the lower-level occupation: a shop assistant and an unskilled 
factory worker. In 1992 the shop assistant is not in the index, because there was no question regarding 
this occupation in Sweden that year. In general, people do not seem to distinguish much between these 
two occupations. The measure and results for 1992 should therefore be comparable to the other years. 
All values for this variable over 1000 have been set as missing. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 1987: N (national level) = 9, n (individual level) = 11,404. 1992: 
N (national level) = 17, n (individual level) = 19,088. 1999: N (national level) = 27, n (individual level) 
= 36,655.  2009: N (national level) = 38, n (individual level) = 43,646. Author's own calculations.   
Sources: the Social Inequality Module (I-IV – 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009) of the International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP).  
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Table 4-2 shows that the relative and the more absolute measures of attitudes 
towards the level of inequality in gross wages, in general as well as in the 
Scandinavian countries, correlate at the individual level in the four datasets. All 
correlations are also positive, which is the expected direction. It means that the 
more people disagree that the income differences in the respondent’s country are 
too large, the more on average people will also tend to accept bigger wage gaps 
between chairmen of large national corporations and unskilled factory workers/shop 
assistants. The size of the correlations as measured by Pearson’s r is in most cases 
not overwhelmingly strong though, and the correlations of Denmark and Norway in 
2009 are not even significant, which seems to be caused mostly by high standard 
errors. 
The results seem to suggest that, as expected, we are dealing with two distinctly 
different measures. It is worth noticing that the strength of the correlation is not the 
same in all instances. Especially the Swedish correlations are quite strong in 1992, 
1999 and 2009, whereas the Danish and Norwegian correlations in general are 
weaker than the overall inter-country correlations. As we will return to below, this 
could be because one effect of politicising the matter of wages is a stronger 
correlation with the relative measure, signifying a respondent’s economic, political 
position. 
The same kind of positive correlation at the macro- or country level is not expected 
though. This is because the relative measure was argued above to have a stronger 
relative ‘bias’, from the existing level of income inequality. In Table 4-3 below, this 
thesis is investigated by aggregating the means of the two variables of Table 4-2 
and correlating them. 
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Table 4-3 The Country Level (Macro) Correlation between the Relative Measure of 
Attitudes to Income Inequality and our suggestion of a more Absolute Measure of 
Attitudes to the Level of Inequality in Gross Wages in ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999 and 
2009 
  Correlation (unstandardized) Pearson’s r Standard error 
1987 All countries 4.216*** 0.480 0.061 
1992 All countries -0.802*** -0.098 0.054 
1999 All countries -2.089*** -0.244 0.038 
2009 All countries -1.233*** -0.030 0.179 
Notes. The index of the more absolute measure are created by taking the individual-level statements of 
how much the respondent thinks a chairman of a large national corporation should earn. This score is 
then divided by the average of the score of the lower-level occupation: a shop assistant and an unskilled 
worker in a factory. For 1992 the shop assistant is not in the index because there was no question 
regarding this occupation in Sweden that year. In general, people do not seem to distinguish much 
between these two occupations. The measure and results of 1992 should therefore be comparable to the 
other years. All values on this variable over 1000 have been set as missing before aggregating.  
The means of the relative and the more absolute measure have been aggregated. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 1987: N (national level) = 10, n (individual level) = 15,982. 1992: 
N (national level) = 18, n (individual level) = 22,876. 1999: N (national level) = 29, n (individual level) 
= 46,607.  2009: N (national level) = 38, n (individual level) = 53,155. Author's own calculations.   
Sources: the Social Inequality Module (I-IV – 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009) of the International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP).  
 
With the exception of 1987, and with the strength of the correlations varying quite a 
lot in the other three surveys, we find the inverse relationship between the relative 
and the more absolute measure on the macro level in Table 4-3, from what we 
found in the micro-level analysis of Table 4-2.
36
 A closer look at the corresponding 
scatterplots actually reveals that three clear outliers among the 10 countries, in this 
dataset, actually cause the positive correlation in 1987 (USA, Hungary and Poland). 
If those are left out of the analysis, the tendency among the remaining seven 
countries is clearly a negative correlation. The same is to some extent true for 1992, 
creating a weaker negative correlation than it could have been. For 1999 and 2009 
there are also outliers and for 2009, some are very large. The amount of countries in 
these datasets is large enough for them not to affect the trend-line dramatically, 
though the extreme outliers for 2009 do manage to make the correlation for 2009 
much weaker than for 1999.  
This result clearly seems to confirm the idea of a stronger relative bias existing in 
the relative measure than in the more absolute measure. While the relative measure 
might still be good at capturing variation in attitudes towards net income inequality 
between individuals within a country – attitudes which are strongly correlated with 
attitudes to the role of government – the relative bias seems so strong that the 
                                                          
36 The results could therefore be seen as an example of the phenomenon known as the 
atomistic/ecological fallacy phenomenon, which concerns having data at one level – micro or 
macro – and making conclusions at another level – again micro or macro – which could 
obviously be misleading (Hox, 2010, p. 3). 
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measure seems quite poor at validly capturing between-country variations in 
attitudes to the same.
37
   
To sum up: First, it is an obvious ascertainment that the relative measure 
conceptually should not measure attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages, 
but rather attitudes to net income inequality in general, and is therefore not suitable 
for the dissertation. Second, the empirical results in the section above suggest that 
there are other good reasons to use a more absolute measure, instead of the relative 
measure, in the forthcoming analyses of the dissertation: First, the relative measure 
clearly seems to be more ‘biased’ by the existing level of income inequality in the 
countries. The Scandinavians therefore appear quite anti-egalitarian in Table 4-1, 
but this does not mean that they wish in absolute terms for a less narrow level of 
inequality in gross wages than many of the South- or East-European countries at the 
bottom of the table. Second, the relative measure correlates suspiciously strongly 
with items measuring the extent and role of government responsibility. This 
suggests that by using the relative measure we are at best measuring individual-
level attitudes to the level of net inequality, heavily influenced by the redistributive 
efforts of the welfare state, instead of the level of gross inequality in wages, as we 
seek to do here. The abstractness of the question also means that the measure, at the 
same time, probably has a substantial ‘social desirability bias’.  
The more absolute measure should be less biased by both the existing level of 
income inequality in the country and less influenced by attitudes to the welfare 
state. In addition, the absolute measure has a methodological advantage in being 
very concrete instead of abstract. According to existing survey-methodological 
studies, this should lead to less ‘social desirability’ bias in the survey responses 
because, firstly, it is less clear what the socially desirable answer to the question 
actually could be. In addition, it is sufficiently concrete for the respondent to 
actually feel that he/she has a qualified opinion on the matter.   
As argued in the previous, more theoretical section, moving down on the ladder of 
abstraction from the relative to the absolute measure also enables us to capture 
rather volatile attitudes instead of the more stable values. Because of this volatility, 
and because attitudes are supposed to be constantly reproduced mainly in tertiary 
socialisation processes, this allows an identification of cracks in the legitimacy of 
the supposedly egalitarian Scandinavian model. Still, the review also suggests that 
                                                          
37 The relationship between the relative measure and attitudes to the justness of the perceived 
wage levels of a chairman of a large national corporation and an unskilled factory worker has 
also been investigated. Again, the variables in general correlate in the expected direction. 
The egalitarian respondents on the relative measure also have a tendency to wish for higher 
wage levels for unskilled factory workers and lower wage levels for chairmen of large 
national corporations. As the case was above, the correlations are not overwhelmingly strong 
and some are even insignificant. These results again point to the fact that the measures are 
clearly distinct and probably on different levels of abstraction in Kumlin’s hierarchy 
(Kumlin, 2007). 
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people’s attitudes to the absolute measure to a large extent should be characterised 
by ‘group-thinking’, and possibly even ‘class-thinking’, rather than by individual 
reflection, with opinion leaders using ‘historical articulations of particular social 
cleavages’ or HCNIs (Svallfors, 2010, p. 245) as a reservoir from which to draw 
narratives and hence to form attitudes. This surely also signifies that the 
respondent's interpretation of the more absolute measure is dependent on the 
context of the macro-level structures in which he/she lives. Even the more absolute 
measure is therefore not perfectly absolute.   
The absolute measure is also very versatile, as seen in the two examples in the 
previous subsection, and this advantage will be utilised to investigate different 
aspects or dimensions of attitudes to wages below. Finally, the relative and absolute 
measures do correlate at the individual level. The relative measure is after all an 
often-used and -tested measure of attitudes to income inequality, so seeing these 
correlations enhances the validity of the new absolute measures introduced. 
Probably because of the stronger relative ‘bias’ of the existing level of income 
inequality on the relative measure, the opposite correlation is found at the macro 
level, though. The next step is to investigate the relation between the left and right 
side of Figure 4-1 – the relationship between attitudes: ‘what should be’, and 
perceptions: ‘what is’.  
4.3. TOP OF THE MIND 
The purpose of this section is to try to investigate what is on ‘top of the mind’ 
(Zaller, 1992) when respondents answer how much a chairman of a large national 
corporation, a shop assistant or an unskilled factory worker ought to earn. 
Obviously, the best candidate is the respondents’ view on how much they think 
typical persons in these occupations actually earn usually – especially because the 
‘do earn’ question is asked right before the ‘should earn’ question in the Social 
Inequality questionnaires. The ‘do-earn’ question therefore form a ‘mental anchor’ 
for the ‘should-earn’ question (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). We will discuss 
below whether this is an advantage or not. As promised above, we are therefore also 
finally returning to the lowest level of abstraction in Figure 3.1 – normative 
opinions, and factual views expressed in surveys. To investigate the relations 
between normative opinions and factual views, the two data sources will be used: 
First, items from the Social Inequality module of ISSP on normative opinions and 
factual views will be correlated. Secondly, results from a survey experiment trying 
to manipulate the respondents’ ‘top of the mind’ will be presented.  
Throughout this section we therefore touch upon methodological and theoretical 
questions that, though strongly related, are separate. First, to what extent does the 
‘do-earn’ question function as a ‘mental anchor’ for the ‘should-earn’ answers, and 
what are the consequences thereof? Second, how strong do the normative opinions 
and factual views actually correlate, and if they correlate strongly, can we then 
claim that respondents present independent normative opinions on ‘just earnings’, 
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or do they simply extrapolate from ‘do’ to ‘should earn’? Third, what can we say 
about the causal direction? Does it run from factual views to normative opinions, 
the other way around, or both? Fourth, earnings from what occupation do the 
respondents actually have in mind when answering the question – a chairman or a 
CEO of a large national corporation?  
One of the main claims in the existing literature is the argument that, in any context, 
a person’s attitudes to the level of inequality in society is very dependent on the 
actual level of inequality in the given society in a given time. As early as 1961, 
Homans stated: 
‘The rule of distributive justice is a statement of what ought to be, and 
what people say ought to be is determined, in the long run, and with 
some lag, by what they find in fact to be the case.’  
Homans’ (1974) statement elegantly describes the adaption hypothesis, which 
assumes that people’s attitudes will adapt and in time find the perceived level of 
inequality – or specifically, differences in wage-levels between occupations – 
legitimate (Austen, 1999; Austen, 2002; Blanchflower & Freeman, 1997; Homans, 
1961; Kelley & Evans, 1993; Kerr, 2011; Knudsen, 2001; McCall, 2013; Miller & 
Ortiz, 1995). In this literature the actual or rather perceived level of inequality in 
gross wages in society at a given point in time is an independent variable 
influencing the dependent variable – people’s attitudes to the just level of inequality 
in gross wages in society. The question is whether we can trust this assumption 
concerning the causal direction. We first see how the two concepts correlate in the 
Social Inequality data:   
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Table 4-4 The Correlation between Perceptions of and Attitudes to the Just Level of 
Inequality in Gross Wages in ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009 
  Correlation (unstandardized) Pearson’s r Standard error 
1987 All countries 0.534*** 0.771 0.004 
1992 All countries 0.399*** 0.520 0.005 
 NO 0.547*** 0.709 0.015 
 SE 0.629*** 0.756 0.022 
1999 All countries 0.196*** 0.447 0.002 
 DK 0.551*** 0.727 0.014 
 NO 0.565*** 0.697 0.017 
 SE 0.277*** 0.542 0.010 
2009 All countries 0.278*** 0.564 0.002 
 DK 0.273*** 0.448 0.015 
 NO 0.137*** 0.386 0.009 
 SE 0.216*** 0.599 0.009 
Notes: The two indexes are created by taking the individual-level statements of how much the 
respondent thinks a chairman of a large national corporation actually earns and should earn, respectively. 
These two scores are then divided by similar averages for lower-level occupations – how much a shop 
assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory actually earn and should earn, respectively.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 1987: N (national level) = 9, n (individual level) = 11,410. 1992: 
N (national level) = 17, n (individual level) = 19,156. 1999: N (national level) = 27, n (individual level) 
= 34,099.  2009: N (national level) = 38, n (individual level) = 41,894. Author's own calculations.   
Sources: the Social Inequality Module (I-IV – 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009) of the International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP).  
 
Table 4-4 shows that the correlation between perceptions of and norms regarding 
the level of inequality in gross wages is, both within the Scandinavian countries and 
in the countries overall, strong and highly significant. The obvious question is then 
whether the correlation is an instance of multicollinearity, i.e. the two variables are 
really part of the same underlying concept. The correlations are quite far from 
perfect though (Pearson’s r =1.0), which would be likely if respondents just took 
the ‘do earn’ statement, which they are asked about first, and extrapolated it to 
‘should earn’ (For a similar argument: Szirmai, 1986). It should be mentioned that 
the final multilevel models in Chapter 5 also control for the effect of perceived level 
of actual inequality in gross wages (PLI). In addition, here the conclusion is that a 
substantial part of the variance on the dependent variable is explained.  
To qualify whether respondents simply extrapolate from ‘do earn’, or, do in fact 
separate the concepts, a survey experiment was conducted among a slightly non-
representative panel drawn from respondents participating in various other Danish 
surveys.
38
 The basic design of our survey experiment was therefore as follows. The 
                                                          
38 The panel for example oversamples the proportion of youth respondents, because 
‘Ungdomsvalget 2011’ (the youth election 2011 ed.) was a survey conducted among students 
in upper secondary education in 2011 (Department of Political Science at Aalborg 
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panel participants were first randomly assigned to one of four groups. The first 
group is the control group. Panel participants in this group are only asked the 
central question used to create the main dependent variables in the dissertation: 
‘What do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid, regardless of what they 
actually get…?’ The occupations mentioned are: a chairman of a large national 
corporation, a CEO of a large national corporation, and an unskilled factory worker. 
There is thus a dependent variable created for each of these occupations.  
Groups 1 to 3 get different kinds of ‘treatments’ before answering the items for the 
dependent variables. Differences in scores on the dependent variables of the control 
group and any of the three experiment groups must therefore be due in principle to 
the effect of the treatment, or in other words, the intervention. The logic of this 
design is shown in Figure 4-2 below. Below the figure, the questions for the 
dependent variables and the various interventions are presented: 
  
                                                                                                                                       
University, 2011). The frequencies attained in the panel cannot therefore be generalised with 
usual confidence intervals to the population of Danes. Furthermore, as the case is with any 
panel, respondents actually agreeing to be members of a panel and thus participating in a 
number of surveys, can be expected to be markedly more politically interested and with a 
higher degree of political knowledge than the average population. This bias – a form of panel 
attrition – can also be expected to increase over time (Anhøj & Kjærsgård, 2013). 
Fortunately the generalisability of the panel to the population of Danes is not that crucial an 
issue in our case. In accordance with the logics of classic experimental designs, we aim to 
isolate the effect of our intervention by randomly assigning the panel participants to the 
control and experimental groups. In principle, as long as a given panel participant has the 
same probability of belonging to either of these groups, and as long as other factors are kept 
constant, a given systematic variation can be subscribed to the intervention  (Druckman, 
Green, Kuklinski, & Lupia, 2011; Gaines, Kuklinski, & Quirk, 2007).   
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Figure 4-2 The Design of the Survey-Experiment 
 Intervention Dependent variable 
Control group  Dep. Var. ‘should’ 
Exp. Gr. 1 ‘Do earn’ Dep. Var. ‘should’ 
Exp. Gr. 2 Info: the correct amount Dep. Var. ‘should’ 
Exp. Gr. 3 Info: the correct amount*3 Dep. Var. ‘should’ 
Notes: 
- Dependent variable ‘should’: Next, what do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid. How 
much do you think they should earn regardless of what they actually get per year before 
taxes…(translated from Danish). 
- ‘Do earn’: We would like to know what you think people in these jobs actually earn. Please write in 
how much you think they usually earn each year before taxes. Many people are not exactly sure about 
this, but your best guess will be close enough. This may be difficult, but it is very important. So please 
try…(translated from Danish). 
- Info: the correct amount: A CEO of a large Danish corporation on average earned 6.7 million Danish 
kroner per year before taxes in 2011. A large Danish corporation is here understood as a corporation with 
a turnover of 0.5 million Danish kroner or more. An unskilled factory worker on average earns 300.000 
kr. per year before taxes…(translated from Danish). 
- Info: the correct amount multiplied by 3: A CEO of a large Danish corporation on average earned 
20.1 million Danish kroner per year before taxes in 2011. A large Danish corporation is here understood 
as a corporation with a turnover of 0.5 million kroner or more. An unskilled factory worker on average 
earns 300.000 kr. per year before taxes…(translated from Danish).  
 
The treatment or intervention for experimental group 1 is therefore a few seconds of 
extra reflection over the actual wage level – a mental anchor, before respondents 
answer the item on just wage levels – just as it is in the original Social Inequality 
surveys. The interventions for experimental group 2 and 3 actively try to model the 
respondents’ ‘top of the mind’ regarding actual earnings, especially at the top of the 
occupational hierarchy. The ‘info’ language was on purpose written in a very 
objective and neutral manner in order to make it seem trustworthy to the panel 
participants. In spite of this, we cannot be sure that everybody believed the 
information and thereby adjusted their attitudes accordingly. The results of the 
dependent variables for all four groups are presented in Table 4-5 below:  
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Table 4-5 Survey-Experiment Results 
 A chairman of a large 
Danish Corporation 
A CEO of a large 
Danish corporation 
An unskilled 
factory worker 
Control group N valid 135 133 137 
 N missing 623 625 621 
 Mean 732,729 1,876,140 252,220 
 Median 500,000 1,000,000 250,000 
 Stand. 
Dev. 
923,416 2,600,028 278,854 
Experiment group 1 N valid 154 154 154 
 N missing 604 604 604 
 Mean 1,020,473 2,003,083 410,140 
 Median 600,000 1,200,000 290,000 
 Stand. 
Dev. 
1,277,161 2,428,106 788,177 
Experiment group 2 N valid  163 160 
 N missing  595 598 
 Mean  4,181,520 353,988 
 Median  3,000,000 300,000 
 Stand. 
Dev. 
 7,612,923 483,726 
Experiment group 3 N valid  157 159 
 N missing  601 599 
 Mean  64,604,807 288,891 
 Median  4,000,000 300,000 
 Stand. 
Dev. 
 469,458,000 163,180 
Source: Folkepanelet’ (Department of Political Science at Aalborg University, 2013). N=685.  
 
As we saw above and will see in later analyses there are many large outliers in the 
results of Table 4-5 above. This is reflected in the high standard deviations and in 
skewed means. We will therefore use and interpret medians as measures of central 
tendency.  
Experimental group 1 is, as described above, given a few seconds priming or 
reflection over the actual wages in the three occupations. Compared to the control 
group, this has the effect in all three cases of increasing both the medians and 
standard deviations. Concerning the unskilled factory workers, the standard 
deviation is actually more than doubled. There clearly seems therefore to be an 
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effect of the ‘reflection-intervention’, or in other words, priming a mental anchor ‘at 
the top of the mind’ of panel participants about the occupations’ actual earnings. 
This is an interesting methodological conclusion which could suggest some form of 
‘response set’ bias or rather un-reflected randomness existing in the raw control 
group answers. I believe it speaks to the credit of the drafting teams behind the 
Social Inequality surveys that they have primed this reflection into the 
questionnaire by asking about views of actual earnings before opinions about just 
earnings, and thereby presumably gotten less biased, more reflected and ‘true’ 
attitudes to just wages from the respondents. In addition, the results are a clear 
reminder of the argument behind Figure 4-1: that there are clearly certain biases in 
opinions and views expressed in surveys, and that these have to be considered when 
extrapolating attitudes and perceptions from these responses. 
Experimental group 2 got correct, factual information on how the wage levels of the 
two occupations actually were in 2011. The intervention can therefore be seen as 
testing the effect of correct information, although it is obviously debatable how to 
define a large Danish corporation (cf. notes beneath Figure 4-2). The result of the 
‘reality-intervention’ is a markedly higher median score and standard deviation for 
the CEOs, than in both the control group and in the first experimental group, where 
panel participants were subjected to the ‘reflection-intervention’. For the unskilled 
workers the median score also rises to 300,000 kroner, which is in accord with the 
real median wage level revealed to these panel participants. Experimental group 3 
received exaggerated information on how much top CEOs earn in Denmark. The 
effect on the CEO median scores is ‘only’ a rise to 4 million kroner. The standard 
deviations on the other hand have exploded, compared to the other groups. A closer 
look at the distribution reveals that more than 50 % maintains that CEOs should 
earn ‘only’ up to 4 million kroner. At the same time, approximately 1/3 now 
indicate that top CEOs should earn 10 million and in some cases much more. In the 
second ‘reality-intervention’ experimental group, only 15 % of subjects claimed top 
CEOs should earn more than 5 million kroner.   
How can the results of experimental group 2 and 3 be interpreted? Firstly, in 
accordance with the adaption hypothesis, panel participants on average clearly 
adapt their just-earnings opinions in the direction of the information on actual 
earnings they receive – and especially at the top. The larger variation or flexibility 
regarding the top occupations is in accordance with results from existing research 
(Knudsen, 2001; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006). The medians of both experimental 
groups 2 and 3 are much larger than the corresponding control group medians. It is 
at the same time clear that this is not an expression of un-reflected extrapolation 
from ‘do earn’ to ‘should earn’. Especially for the top occupations, we see 
dramatically increased standard deviations, comparing experiment group 2 and 
especially 3 with the control group. People therefore clearly take a stand on the 
information received and most find the just top-earnings to be lower than the 
information about ‘actual earnings’. Especially in experimental group 3, many 
panel participants clearly seem provoked, taking a clear stand, which to a high 
degree polarises the distribution. This polarisation effect – on subjects becoming 
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salient and politicised – is also found in the literature on survey response patterns 
(Hedegaard, 2014b; Taber & Lodge, 2006). As was noted above, these patterns also 
fit well with the idea that people, if provoked or in some way pushed, activate their 
reflective potential and take a clear stand on normative issues reflected in survey 
questions. It is on the other hand by no means given that they do so all the time. 
There is also a last thing worth noticing in Table 4-5: The control group and 
experimental group 1 were asked about the just earnings of two top occupations – a 
chairman of a large Danish corporation, as in the Social Inequality questionnaires, 
as well as a CEO of a large Danish corporation. This is obviously to investigate 
whether people thought about the same top occupation when answering the 
question. Both the supposedly more un-reflected, control-group results, and the 
more reflected results of experimental group 1, clearly suggest that people do not 
think of the same occupation, because the CEO medians in both cases are twice the 
size of the chairman medians. In the Danish version of ISSP 2009, the median 
response of the chairman-variable is actually 500,000 Danish kroner, which is in 
accordance with what we see in Table 4-5.  
It is often the CEO compensation rates, which are discussed in the media, so it 
seems a bit unfortunate that the chairman is the occupation chosen to represent top 
occupations in the private sector in the Social Inequality questionnaires. In spite of 
this bias, there are reasons to believe that attitudes to the just earnings of chairmen 
of large national corporations is still a reasonably good comparative measure of 
attitudes to top earnings. Among western countries it is only in the US that the same 
person generally holds the two occupations at the same time (Lorsch & Zelleke, 
2005). There should thus be a reasonable degree of comparability, except with the 
US, between western countries on this measure in the Social Inequality modules. 
A final issue is the causal direction from factual views to normative opinions on the 
earnings of various occupations. In spite the strong assumptions encapsulated in the 
adaption hypothesis, the results above seem to suggest that it is not so simple. Even 
if respondents use their factual views as a mental anchor for their normative 
opinions, they do not just extrapolate from ‘do earn’ to ‘should earn’ in the ISSP 
surveys, or in the survey experiment. To do justice to Homans’ (1961) original 
claim of ‘…, in the long run, and with some lag’, these results do not rule out that 
the normative opinions in time will adjust to the factual views. The problem is that 
the suggested causal mechanisms – for example that people need to justify and 
believe that the reality they perceive is just, if they are not able in the short term to 
do anything successful to adjust it (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Lerner, 1980) – at 
least at first glance seem to become more speculative then.
39
  
                                                          
39 It should be mentioned that an analysis which is not shown, indicate that the relative 
measure functions as a moderator on the relation between the perceived level of actual 
inequality in gross wages and attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages. The results 
seem to suggest that egalitarian respondents, as measured by the relative measure, also have 
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It therefore seems more fruitful to assume a kind of reciprocal causality between the 
two. This reciprocal causality is also in good accordance with the critical realism 
expressed ontologically in the above conceptual model of the dissertation (Figure 2-
1). In theoretical terms, this means that people’s perception of the actual level of 
inequality in gross wages in society influences their attitudes to the same through 
feedback processes – pointing in the same causal direction between the two 
variables as in the adaption hypothesis. On the other hand it is obvious that in 
democratic countries the level of actual inequality in society should also hopefully 
be influenced by the desires of the citizens and key social actors historically as 
described above – pointing in the reversed causal direction. The mainly American 
policy-responsiveness literature also argues that this often the case at least in that 
context (Burstein, 1998; Burstein, 2003; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Stimson, MacKuen, 
& Erikson, 1995). The results above therefore seem to indicate that it makes sense 
to separate the concepts of factual views and normative opinions analytically – 
something that will also be practiced in various analyses throughout the 
dissertation. In theoretical and empirical terms, the two are closely related. This 
conceptual dualism will be maintained throughout the monograph. The 
interpretation of this relation or concept is crucial to the overall theoretical and 
critical realist stance of the monograph.  
                                                                                                                                       
a stronger tendency than inegalitarian respondents do (measured by the relative measure), to 
separate the questions of actual and just earnings. Further research could follow up on this 
lead. 
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CHAPTER 5. AGGREGATED SURVEY 
RESULTS 
The four chapters above have laid the foundation for finally starting to empirically 
investigate the research question of the dissertation: What attitudes do 
Scandinavians express towards the level of inequality in gross wages, how do these 
attitudes develop over time and why do the Scandinavians express these attitudes? 
In this first analysis chapter the focus will be on aggregated comparisons. This 
means the Scandinavians’ attitudes will be compared to similar attitudes of people 
in a rather large number of mainly western countries participating in the various 
rounds of the Social Inequality Module of ISSP. The chapter will furthermore be 
subdivided into two overall sections.  
First, explorative and descriptive analyses will be conducted investigating what 
attitudes Scandinavians express towards the level of inequality in gross wages 
compared to people in other western countries, and how these have developed over 
time. Utilising the versatility of the more absolute measure (Svallfors, 2004), the 
scope of these descriptive analyses will also be broadened to investigate four 
different dimensions of attitudes to gross wages.  
Second, after actually revealing a Scandinavian egalitarianism in different 
dimensions of attitudes towards gross wages in the first overall section, the second 
overall section turns to the third, why-part of the research question, and tries to 
explain the Scandinavian egalitarianism in attitudes towards the level of inequality 
in gross wages. This will be done via operationalising and testing the explanations 
for variation in attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages, which can 
be identified in existing literature. Methodologically multilevel analyses will be 
used in this overall section to try to do this. The primary focus in this overall 
section is therefore on explaining aggregate, which also can be called the macro 
level or cross-country variations – and especially a significant Scandinavian dummy 
variable. It can maybe seem strange that in spite the differences between especially 
Denmark and Sweden identified in chapter 3 and somewhat in chapter 4, all of 
these are all of a sudden lumped in a common Scandinavian dummy. Once again, it 
should be emphasised that this do make sense though. In the aggregated 
perspective, the Scandinavian countries should appear quite similar. This does on 
the other hand not mean that the Scandinavian dummy does not hide differences 
between the countries. These differences will be investigated in the analyses of 
chapter 6 following the disaggregated perspective. 
Multilevel analysis allows simultaneous controlling for differences in attitudinal 
structures in the various countries, as well as composition effects and their effect on 
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the overall variation between countries. Lastly, cross-level interactions testing for 
varying effects of covariates at the individual level between countries will also be 
tested here. Even if these analyses reveal interesting and substantive results in their 
own right, it is at the same time clear that, first, the explanations found in existing 
literature and their operationalisation, and second, the rather aggregated level of 
analysis, provoke further investigations. The subsequent analysis chapter will 
therefore first switch to a more disaggregated level of analysis, and second, broaden 
the methodological and data-scope of the analysis. Before all this, the first overall 
section starts out with the explorative, descriptive investigations of Scandinavians’ 
attitudes towards four different dimensions of gross wages, in comparative 
perspective. 
5.1. SCANDINAVIAN EGALITARIANISM DESCRIPTIVELY 
REVEALED 
The purpose of this overall section is to examine in depth the Scandinavians’ 
attitudes towards gross wages in comparative perspective. Do they stand out from 
those held by people in other western countries, and in that case, in what way and 
how does this develop over time?  
The overall section is mainly explorative in its nature. The subject is basically to 
investigate whether Scandinavians have – or rather still have – exceptionally 
egalitarian attitudes towards gross wages in a comparative perspective, as is 
claimed they do in the existing literature. Conversely, have declining trade union 
density rates and the decentralisation of the collective bargaining systems since the 
1980s, for example, led to an erosion of egalitarian attitudes? Is the combined effect 
of globalisation, individualisation and the weakened trade union-movements such 
that the attitudes towards gross wages of present-day Scandinavians no longer stand 
out in western comparisons? In addition, if they still stand out, in what ways, what 
have been the trends over time, and what does this tell us?  
Besides these rather generic questions, no other testable hypothesis will be 
presented regarding Scandinavian attitudes towards gross wages. The purpose of 
the overall section is instead to identify and describe the multifaceted concept of the 
Scandinavian attitudes towards wages in a two-way comparative perspective – 
across time and space. In this process, it is of course imperative to be mindful of the 
contextual influence on the interpretations of the results below. Svallfors (1997) 
recommends that because of the contextual ‘biases’ in interpretations and 
connotations of survey items across countries, researchers should not focus on small 
differences in gross percentages, even if these are statistically significant, but 
instead, focus on larger patterns and on how group patterns in attitudes differ 
between countries. Investigating differences in group patterns within the 
Scandinavian countries will be the primary focus of Chapter 6. It should also be 
mentioned that most of the analyses of this overall section was previously published 
in a working paper (Kjærsgård, 2012b).   
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5.1.1. HOW TO MEASURE ATTITUDES TOWARDS GROSS WAGES? 
Attitudes towards gross wages is a rather broad topic to investigate. As will be clear 
below, this concept is multidimensional, and for at least one of the dimensions 
several possibilities exist for how to measure the dimension. The actual measure or 
measures chosen must therefore be able to encompass these different dimensions.  
Fortunately, the above-mentioned, more absolute measure from the Social 
Inequality Module (I-IV) of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 
conducted in 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009 is such a measure. ISSP is one of the 
biggest international comparative survey projects existing. It today comprises 48 
countries (including the Scandinavian countries) (GESIS - Leibniz-Institute for the 
Social Sciences, 2013). To recap, the more absolute measure is the survey question: 
‘What do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid, regardless of what they 
actually get…?’. The question is posed for a number of different occupations in the 
various rounds of the Social Inequality Module.
40
  
Below will be, firstly, discussed how the measure has been used in existing 
research. It is argued that existing research has not used the potential of this 
measure fully because the focus is almost exclusively on the dimension of attitudes 
towards the level of inequality in gross wages. Inspired by the few studies actually 
utilising the versatility of the measure, a section defining, operationalising and 
analysing four distinct dimensions of attitudes towards gross wages will be 
presented.   
If we review the literature that uses the more absolute measure to create dependent 
variables, it becomes apparent that scientific contributions so far have focused 
mostly on what can be equated with one dimension of attitudes towards gross 
wages: Attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages. Despite the fact that 
only somewhat more than a dozen studies actually seem to be using the measure, 
the dimension is measured in several different ways. Typically an index is 
constructed on the basis of a ratio of legitimate wage level responses for a number 
of higher-level occupations to the corresponding responses for lower-level 
occupations (Austen, 1999; Austen, 2002; Blanchflower & Freeman, 1997; Evans 
& Kelley, 2007; Gijsberts, 2002; Kelley & Zagorski, 2004; Kelley & Evans, 1993; 
Kerr, 2011; Kluegel & Miyano, 1995; Miller & Ortiz, 1995; Svallfors, 1995; 
Svallfors, 1997; Svallfors, 2004; Svallfors, 2006; Szirmai, 1986). A different 
approach compares the ratio of a single occupation either to one another, or to 
                                                          
40 As mentioned above, in the Social Inequality module’s round I and II from 1987 and 1992 
the question was posed regarding eleven different occupations that varied marginally 
between the rounds. In the third round from 1999, the number of occupations was reduced to 
nine. In the recent fourth round from 2009, the number of professions was further reduced to 
five (GESIS - Leibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences, 2013; ISSP Research Group, 2011; 
Osberg & Smeeding, 2006, p. 459). 
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groups of other occupations (Arts et al., 1995; Larsen, 2006; Mason, 1995; Mason, 
1995; Svallfors, 1993; Svallfors, 1995; Svallfors, 1997; Svallfors, 2004; Svallfors, 
2006; Verba & Orren, 1985). Knudsen (2001) alone creates a measure, which 
focusses only on the high-paid occupations. His argument for this is that, while 
there is a high degree of consensus concerning what wage level is just for the low-
paid occupations, the variation is much larger at the top and therefore more 
interesting to investigate.   
In some contrast to other research contributions using the measure, Osberg & 
Smeeding (2006), Szirmai (1986; 1991) and McCall (2013) also try to include the 
measures for the perception of what the same occupations are actually paid on 
average, in a combined measure. These measures then show how much the 
respondents’ ideal of a fair degree of wage inequality deviates from their perception 
of what the actual degree of wage inequality is (Osberg & Smeeding 2006, p. 460 
and Szirmai 1991, p. 231).  
Kelley & Evans (2007) also develop a measure of ‘the ideal level of earnings 
inequality’ as above. However, they use a unique item from ISSP 1999. In contrast 
to the studies described above, their measure is based on what the respondents think 
people in their own occupation ought to earn. The ratio of these amounts and the 
actual average earnings of unskilled factory workers is then calculated. Because 
they furthermore assume the country samples are representative of the earnings 
distributions within the countries, they claim their measure is a quite accurate 
representation of the ideal or just level of earnings inequality within the countries. 
While Osberg & Smeeding (2006), Szirmai (1986; 1991), McCall (2013) and 
Kelley & Evans (2007) have an approach somewhat different to the other research 
contributions, the focus is still on, firstly, creating and using a form of measure of 
attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages. Secondly, the four 
contributions show to some extent a general trend in the contributions in trying to 
create merely one measure based on the survey question posed for a number of 
occupations.  
A possible explanation of why this is often the case, is that the contributions often 
seem to be focused on conducting regression analysis. There is of course nothing 
wrong with writing scientific articles applying regression analysis, but to conserve 
space and meet the page-number limitations of scientific journals, authors have 
probably often been forced to limit their preliminary descriptive analyses. The 
purpose of the preliminary descriptive analysis in these sources thus seems to be to 
create and present one measure that can be used as the dependent variable for the 
focal point of the article. This is a regression model seeking to explain variance 
within and between countries (see especially Szirmai 1991; Svallfors 1995; 
Svallfors 1997; Svallfors 2004; Austen 1999 and Austen 2002). 
Three clear exceptions to the rule above also have to be mentioned. Somewhat in 
line with Knudsen’s (2001) approach, Arts, Hermkens & van Wijck (1995) focus on 
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the upper and the lower end of the wage distribution in two separate measures. The 
upper end is defined by the occupation ‘managing director’, while the occupation 
‘unskilled factory worker’ defines the lower. Instead of just reporting their median 
just wages, as for example Headey (1991) does, Arts et al. (1995) divides the just 
earnings of each of these two professions in turn by the sum of the just earnings of 
the managing director and the unskilled factory-worker occupations.  
Szirmai (1986), Verba & Orren (1985) and Headey (1991) have an innovative and 
informative approach comparing the just, perceived and actual wage levels. They 
each use only national samples – a Dutch, American and Australian respectively. 
Headey (1991) for example uses an Australian sample and does not try to develop 
on or a few alternative measures of attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross 
wages. Instead, throughout the paper, he focuses on the 12 occupations mentioned 
in his Australian sample separately. He compares the mean scores for ‘perceived’ 
and ‘legitimate incomes’ for the 12 occupations in his survey, with their actual 
mean incomes in Australia. He investigates how the respondents’ answers 
concerning the 12 occupations correlate, and what effect the respondent’s own 
occupational status has on these answers. Especially, actually finding figures for the 
actual mean incomes of each of the 12 occupations is impressive. Szirmai (1986), 
Verba & Orren (1985) and Headey’s (1991) approach is therefore, although 
innovative and informative, probably only possible if, as they do, the focus is put on 
a single or a few countries.  
Even though she does not make a big issue of it, McCall (2013) innovatively 
develops measures of the justness of the perceived wages of unskilled workers and 
chairmen of large American corporations by dividing the respondents’ answers on 
desired wage levels for each of the two occupations by the perceived wage level of 
the same occupation.  
Headey (1991) and McCall (2013) thus answer Svallfors’ (2004) call by utilising 
the versatility of the more absolute measure. This overall section will follow this 
path. The focus is not on creating one dependent variable, but on making in-depth 
descriptive investigations of different dimensions of attitudes towards gross wages. 
Therefore the analyses below will not be restricted to one dimension or not even 
necessarily one measure per dimension, as the trend certainly is in the existing 
contributions.  
Methodological considerations, which are more practical, are also important. Larsen 
(2006) wisely emphasises two important aspects of how to treat the data. Firstly, 
one is wise to use the median instead of the – regularly used – mean as a measure of 
central tendency. One can create many measures based on the survey items 
mentioned, but all seem to be infected by the presence of extreme outliers 
influencing the mean a lot. The median is not to the same extent affected by these 
outliers, which is why it is a more obvious choice for a measure of central tendency. 
Secondly, as with all aggregated measures, the measures in the existing research 
conceal important information in the data. A high degree of tolerance towards the 
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level of inequality in gross wages can thus be caused by both tolerance towards top-
excess, and acceptance of very low salaries for the less skilled parts of the 
workforce, or both. By disaggregating and using ‘skilled factory worker’ as a 
middle category, Larsen (2006) finds interesting differences between countries that 
are not possible to detect with the aggregated measures of attitudes towards the 
level of inequality in gross wages (pp. 37-43).
41
  
If we review the existing research on the field, it becomes apparent that there seem 
room for improvement – a quest that this dissertation seeks to undertake. Firstly, a 
very concrete and practical methodological improvement is using medians instead 
of means as the measure of central tendency. Secondly, as quoted above Svallfors 
(2004, p. 82) correctly pinpoints the great versatility of the measure. The existing 
research seems not to take full advantage of this. As a starting point the measures 
will be disaggregated much more than what is usual in the existing research. Thirdly 
and most importantly, the versatility allows using the measure to investigate a 
number of other relevant aspects or dimensions of attitudes towards gross wages, 
instead of only focussing on attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages, 
as in most existing studies.  
Below, four such dimensions of attitudes towards gross wages will be identified, 
operationalised and analysed. These are: 
 The levels of gross wages for different occupations 
 The level of inequality in gross wages 
 The degree of justice in the levels of gross wages for different occupations 
 Consensus   
5.1.2. OPERATIONALISATION AND ANALYSES OF FOUR DIMENSIONS 
OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS GROSS WAGES 
In the sections below, the four dimensions will be operationalised and analysed in 
turn. The focus in all sections is on the Scandinavian countries. For each of the 
dimensions data and tables from both ISSP 1999 and ISSP 2009 will be presented. 
In this way, it is possible to investigate the development over a 10-year time span. 
A certain measure of attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages is selected 
and will be used as a dependent variable in the survey-oriented analyses in the later 
parts of the dissertation. Because of its centrality, for this particular measure the 
distributions of the western countries for all four rounds of the Social Inequality 
module will be presented. The comparative approach of this overall section is 
therefore not just cross-country, but also longitudinal. Because the number of 
                                                          
41 As mentioned, Knudsen (2001) and Osberg & Smeeding (2006) find that the respondents 
disagree much more about the salaries of the better-paid occupations than about those of the 
lower-paid ones. These results appear in disaggregated analyses, and confirm the value of 
doing so. 
- 
 
102 
occupations was reduced from nine to five from ISSP 1999 to ISSP 2009, it has not 
been possible to replicate all analyses. The occupation ‘skilled factory worker’ was 
removed, making it impossible to follow the approach of Larsen (2006) and 
disaggregate the general measures of attitudes towards the level of inequality in 
gross wages on ISSP 2009 data.  
5.1.2.1 Attitudes towards the Levels of Gross Wages for Different 
Occupations – the rather ordinary Scandinavians? 
Building on Headey’s (1991) approach, the first dimension – attitudes towards the 
levels of gross wages for different occupations – simply treats the question of how 
much the respondents in the different countries generally think the various 
occupations should earn. As such it should be the first very simple descriptive 
measure presented, giving a quick overview of the data. Straightforwardly, the 
medians for the different occupations in the different countries should be sufficient 
to measure this dimension. Unfortunately, it is not that simple, and one could 
suspect the difficulties in acquiring comparable measures are one of the reasons; 
others have not ventured into this task, at least comparatively. Kelley & Evans 
(1993) note the first difficulty:  
‘Cross-cultural comparisons are difficult because the original answers 
are in local currencies – dollars, pounds, forints, and so forth’ (p. 85).  
To overcome this and set a common standard, all indications of wage levels have 
been recalculated to ‘purchasing power parity’– (PPP) corrected US dollars.42 In 
principle, it should thereby be possible to compare directly how much a person can 
actually buy for the wage level indicated:  
‘The PPP currency values reflect the number of units of a country's 
currency required to buy the same quantity of comparable goods and 
services in the local market as one U.S. dollar would buy in an average 
country.’ (World Resources Institute, 1996, box 7.2).43 
                                                          
42 The wage-level indications have also been recalculated to Euros. See Tables 8-2 and 8-4 in 
Appendix A. 
43 There is also a difficulty with the 1999 data for the countries who were then members of 
the Eurozone. In a non-physical form, the Euro was introduced on the 1st of January 1999, 
but the physical currency of the countries was still local until the 1st of January 2002. This 
means that, while the respondents in these countries are asked to give their statements in 
French francs, German marks and Austrian schilling etc., the PPP-conversion rates for the 
same countries in 1999 assume that their currency is the Euro. Therefore it was necessary to 
firstly recalculate the local currency statements to Euros for the then-members of the 
Eurozone (also Slovenia), and then to PPP-corrected USD. The original members of the 
Eurozone were: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Monaco, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, the Vatican State and Austria. Therefore 
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The second difficulty, which Kelley & Evans (1993) did not face, is that it has been 
up to the individual countries to decide certain specifics of the question in 1999 and 
2009 (but not in 1987 and 1992). The instruction in 1999 and 2009 was merely that 
the specifics had to match the traditions in the country.
44
 The result was a great deal 
of variation in how the question was posed in the various countries. Firstly, it varies 
as to whether the respondents are asked to give their opinion on monthly or yearly 
wages. Secondly, it also varies as to whether the respondents are asked about gross 
or net wages. The tables below are obviously recalculated to portray yearly gross 
wages (while the corresponding tables for net wages can be found in Tables 8-1 and 
8-3 in Appendix A).
45
  
After all these corrections and recalculations it is possible to present simple 
descriptive tables describing what the median respondent in the various western 
countries thinks the various occupations should earn gross per year in PPP corrected 
USD in 1999 and 2009. In the table for 2009, all the five available occupations are 
                                                                                                                                       
recalculations from local currencies to Euros were made for: France, Portugal, Spain, West-
Germany, East-Germany and Austria. Furthermore the same recalculations were made for 
Slovenia in 1999. Even if this country was not one of the original Eurozone-members (they 
joined in 2004) their PPP-conversion rate clearly assumes that Slovenia had Euros in 1999. 
The same is not the case for Cyprus, though they became Eurozone-members in 2008. 
44 See the source questionnaires in appendix C and (ISSP Research Group, 2011). 
45 The monthly indications are easily recalculated to yearly wages by multiplying by 12. The 
second variation causes bigger problems, though. To make cross-validation possible, it was 
decided to recalculate all the respondents’ statements into both net and gross wages 
whenever possible. Income tax regimes are by default difficult to compare. It was therefore 
necessary to choose a specific conversion factor and live with the biases the selection 
inevitably causes. Using the OECD statistics for ‘Taxing Wages’, the conversion factor 
‘average rate of income tax and employee social security contributions (%)’ for ‘single 
persons at 100 % of average earnings, no child’ was chosen (OECD, 2014c). The 
recalculations from net to gross wages were done by using the following formula: Gross 
wages= (Net wages)/(1-income tax rate). In the opposite recalculation, from gross to net 
wages (to make the Tables 8-1 and 8-3 in the Appendix), the following formula was used: 
Netwages=Grosswages*(1-income tax rate). In both instances the income tax rate is 
measured in proportions. Surely, this choice of a tax conversion factor has some limitations. 
In recalculating there are probably often some deviations from the actual income tax a given 
occupation ought to pay in a certain country. On the other hand, it is difficult to find a better 
general conversion rate. The OECD database does not include tax regime data for all the 
western countries present in the two datasets. By choosing to present gross wages, the 
numbers of countries in the following tables are therefore a little bit lower than if net wages 
had been presented.  
In addition it should be mentioned that obviously the different price levels in the countries 
affect the PPP conversion rates a lot. Furthermore, especially for the countries with high 
income taxes (including social contributions), there is a big difference between net and gross 
wages. For the sake of comparison two alternative tables for each dataset have thus been 
calculated. These are firstly recalculations to net wages and secondly to Euros instead of PPP 
corrected USD (see Tables 8-1 – 8-4 Appendix A).  
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presented. In the table for 1999, the same five occupations as well as ‘skilled 
factory worker’ are listed. The result is shown below.46
                                                          
46 To conserve space in the tables below, which are already very big, abbreviations for the 
countries have been used. In Table 8-11 in Appendix A, a list of these country abbreviations 
can be found. 
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Table 5-1
47
 shows that, in comparative perspective, the Danish and Norwegian 
respondents do seem to envision rather high gross wages for the three lowest paid 
occupations. For the three remaining, more highly paid occupations, the median 
Danes and Norwegians are quite average, and for all occupations – except that of 
cabinet minister – Norway scores a little bit higher than Denmark. Sweden in each 
case scores a median substantially lower than the corresponding Danish and 
Norwegian. The Scandinavian medians show a rising tendency from the left to the 
right in the table.   
If the gross figures above are compared with the net figures in Table 8-1 in 
Appendix A, the Scandinavian countries in general score lower on net wages for the 
occupations than on gross wages. This is not surprising since the high income taxes 
pull the net wages scores down in the Scandinavian, but also Continental European 
countries. Not surprisingly, the tax rate matters more in these countries than it does 
in other western countries. Secondly, one could speculate that high staple goods 
prices in the Scandinavian countries pull down the score of the PPP-corrected USD 
of Table 5-1 and Table 8-1 in Appendix A somewhat. The Scandinavian positions 
are surely higher in the alternative table displaying non-corrected net Euro wages in 
Table 8-2 in Appendix A, than in the net PPP-corrected USD.   
If we turn to the general pattern in the countries, the respondents seem to agree on a 
hierarchy of the occupations. The highly paid occupations of the first three columns 
score above the country averages in all instances, while the lower paid occupations 
                                                          
47 Shown are Country Medians in PPP Corrected USD. 
The following countries asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, USA, United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The remaining countries asked about 
monthly salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these was made by multiplying by 
12 (cf. the national questionnaires are downloadable at: (ISSP Research Group, 2011)).   
The following countries asked about net salaries: Slovenia, Israel, Spain, Latvia, France and 
Portugal. In Poland, Bulgaria and Russia it was unspecified whether the respondents should 
think about gross or net salaries. The statements from these countries are assumed to be 
reflecting net salaries. The remaining countries asked about gross salaries (cf. the national 
questionnaires are downloadable at: (ISSP Research Group, 2011)).   
The PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 were taken from the 2010 version of 
World Economic Outlook. Because the rates are defined as: ‘National currency per current 
international dollar’, the recalculations were made by dividing the national currency 
statements by the current PPP-conversion rate (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2011).  
For the following countries preliminary recalculations from local currency to Euro were 
made – followed by another recalculation to PPP-corrected USD: France, Portugal, Spain, 
West- and East Germany, Austria and Slovenia. The reason for this is that the PPP-
conversion rates for these countries prescribes that the local currency be Euro, also for 1999. 
The Australian, Slovenian, Spanish and Portuguese statements furthermore were multiplied 
by 1000, because the respondents here were asked to answer in whole thousands of their 
local currency (cf. the national questionnaires are downloadable at: (ISSP Research Group, 
2011).  
 
CHAPTER 5. AGGREGATED SURVEY RESULTS 
 107 
in the three last columns score below. This is in accordance with findings in 
existing literature (Janmaat, 2013). Also the poorer countries/the ones with lowest 
wage levels – especially Central- and Eastern-European countries – have a tendency 
to be placed in the lower half of the columns, while the opposite is the case for the 
richer countries. Even if correcting with PPP rates, the actual context in a country 
thus seem to matter a lot for the median scores. As argued in the ‘top of the mind’ 
section above, this is probably because someone’s assessment of what people 
should earn in general takes the departure in an assessment of do actually earn in 
the context where they are In other words, the perceived wage levels form a mental 
anchor for the attitudes towards just wage levels for the individual.  
Other groups of countries do not follow the same rising pattern from left to right in 
the table as the Scandinavian countries. The Continental European countries portray 
the exact opposite pattern of a declining tendency from left to right in the table. The 
Anglo-Saxon countries with the exception of Great Britain and New Zealand are 
generally at the top of the table, while the post-Communist countries are 
consistently at the bottom.  
Neither the Scandinavian positions nor country averages are in general very special 
in a comparative perspective – except maybe the Danish and Norwegian medians 
for the two lowest-paid occupations. The pattern of the positions in the table on the 
other hand does not seem to be replicated by other groups of countries. In Table 5-2 
below will be investigated whether a similar tendency can be found for 2009. The 
table is a replication of Table 5-1 with newer data, except that the fourth column, 
with the ‘skilled factory worker’ occupation, is missing:
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Table 5-2
48
 generally repeats the patterns of Table 5-1 (the same applies to the 
alternative Tables 8-3 and 8-4 in Appendix A). The country averages of Denmark 
and Norway are still in the middle of the table, while Sweden places somewhat 
lower. A rising tendency from left to right in the table for the three Scandinavian 
countries is displayed. Going more into detail, Denmark and Norway are surpassed 
at the top concerning the two lowest-paid occupations by the newly included 
countries Switzerland and Flanders, and the Danes now want to pay the cabinet 
ministers substantially more than the Norwegians and Swedes. As was the case in 
1999, the Scandinavian countries place lower with a re-calculation to net yearly 
wages, but higher on non-corrected yearly net wages in Euros (see Tables 8-3 and 
8-4 in Appendix A).  
In addition, the other groupings of countries more or less repeat the pattern of 1999. 
The post-Communist countries in general still place at the bottom of Table 5-2. 
Countries such as Slovenia and Poland now have medians resembling the 
Mediterranean countries though. The Anglo-Saxon countries are still at the top of 
the table, while the Continental European countries still display a declining 
tendency from left to right in the table.  
Several newly included western countries are present in ISSP 2009. Among these 
are the Nordic countries Iceland and Finland. Iceland more or less follows the 
pattern of the other Scandinavian countries; the same is not the case for Finland. 
Finland’s medians for the two lowest-paid occupations are substantially lower than 
the Scandinavian levels, while the Finnish median for the Chairman occupation is 
substantially higher.  
In sum, the Scandinavian attitudes towards the levels of gross wages for different 
occupations at first glance do not seem particularly exceptional, compared to those 
                                                          
48 Notes: Shown are country medians in PPP corrected USD. 
 The following countries asked about yearly wages: Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand. The remaining countries asked about monthly wages. The 
recalculation to yearly wages for these was made by multiplying by 12. 
The following countries asked about gross wages: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and United 
Kingdom. In Spain, it was unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or 
net wages. The statements from these countries are assumed to be in net wages, because this 
was specified in 1999. The remaining countries asked about net wages (cf. the national 
questionnaires are downloadable at: (ISSP Research Group, 2011)).   
The PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 were taken from the 2010 version of 
World Economic Outlook. Because the rates are defined as: ‘National currency per current 
international dollar’, the recalculations were made by dividing the national currency 
statements by the current PPP-conversion rate (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2011). 
Source: Social Inequality Module IV (2009) of the International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP).  
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from other western countries, but a closer look changes this impression. The 
Scandinavian country-averages in 1999 and 2009 place in the middle of the tables. 
Furthermore, the Scandinavian medians for the individual occupations are ‘only’ in 
the case of Denmark and Norway, for the two lowest-paid occupations, positioned 
at the very top of the table. If one looks at the patterns across the occupations of 
different groups of countries in the two tables, the Scandinavian countries do seem 
exceptional by displaying a rising pattern from left to right in both tables. This is, 
firstly, contrary to the Anglo-Saxon and the post-Communist countries that are 
consistently placed at the top and the bottom of the tables respectively. Secondly, it 
is contrary to the Continental European countries (plus Finland) who display a 
general declining tendency from left to right in both tables. Scandinavian 
egalitarianism therefore, thus far, seems to be mostly characterised by a wish for 
rather small differences in gross wages, rather than wanting very high gross wages 
for the top or very low gross wages for the top, in comparative perspective. In the 
section below this subject will be more thoroughly investigated by looking into the 
attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages.  
5.1.2.2 Attitudes towards the Level of Inequality in Gross Wages – the 
egalitarian Scandinavians 
The second dimension – the level of inequality in gross wages – deals with 
respondents’ thinking about how much some professions should earn more than 
others. As described above, the existing studies have mostly focused on this 
dimension and different measures of this concept. The existing studies often use 
just one measure. In contrast to that approach, and by making use of the described 
versatility (Svallfors, 2004), competing measures will be constructed in Table 5-3 – 
5-5 below. First, in Table 5-3 and 5-4, three different measures of attitudes towards 
the general level of inequality in gross wages will be constructed. The first of these 
includes all five occupations present in both ISSP 1999 and 2009. It is a highly 
aggregated measure, indicating how much more the respondents think ministers, 
chairmen or general practitioners should earn than shop assistants or unskilled 
factory workers.  
Though highly aggregated measures are often used in existing studies, such 
measures could be argued to have certain biases compared to other measures, which 
can be constructed by using the occupations available in both ISSP 1999 and 2009. 
As mentioned above, clear indications exist of a bigger variation concerning the 
highly paid occupations than the lower paid ones (Knudsen, 2001; Osberg & 
Smeeding, 2006). This could be caused partly by the inclusion of ‘general 
practitioners’ in the top group. Larsen (2006) argues that in several countries 
doctors’ wages are not top level, but closer to medium level (p. 40). A second and 
less aggregated measure will thus be created by excluding doctors from the top 
group.  
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A third and even less aggregated measure will be created by also excluding ‘cabinet 
ministers in the national government’ from the top group. There are a number of 
arguments for this. First, a respondent’s view on how much a minister ought to earn 
could possibly be influenced by his/her level of sympathy felt for the current 
government (Kelley & Evans, 1993, p. 85). Furthermore, the same could also be the 
case regarding the general level of political and institutional trust in the country. In 
countries where these are low, as for example in post-Communist countries, 
Mediterranean countries and the US, the respondents are probably not willing to 
pay high salaries to ministers. Secondly and most importantly, the index, in which 
only ‘chairmen of large national corporations’ represent the top group, to a greater 
extent reflects the conditions on the private labour market or, in other terms, a 
classical worker-capital dichotomy. General practitioners and cabinet ministers are 
employed by or at least funded or subsidised by government institutions. The wages 
or profits of these groups are therefore also to a great extent a political matter, 
rather than mainly a subject of negotiation among labour market actors.  
In addition, as the case is with all aggregated measures, information is lost by 
aggregating (Larsen, 2006). Following the approach of Larsen (2006), the general 
1999 measures will be disaggregated. To tap the top-middle ratio, two competing 
measures are created. The first indicates how much the respondents think ministers, 
chairmen or general practitioners should earn more than a skilled factory worker. 
The second follows the arguments above and merely calculates a chairman vs 
skilled factory worker ratio. To tap the middle-bottom (of the labour market) ratio 
just one measure will be constructed. This indicates how much the respondents 
think a skilled factory worker should earn more than a shop assistant or an unskilled 
factory worker. Because the occupation ‘skilled factory worker’ is excluded from 
the occupational question battery in ISSP 2009, these disaggregated measures can 
only be constructed with 1999 data. The results are displayed in Table 5-3 and 5-4 
below:  
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Table 5-3 Attitudes towards the Level of Inequality in Gross Wages for Six 
Occupations in ISSP 1999, country medians 
AWage 
dispersion index 
BHigh- vs. 
Low paid 
occ. 
CChairmen 
vs. Low paid 
occ. 
DHigh paid 
occ. Vs. 
Skilled 
worker 
EChairmen 
vs. Skilled 
worker 
FSkilled 
worker vs. 
Low paid 
occ. RUS 4.67 RUS 6.00 FR 6.25 FR 4.17 FR 5.00 RUS 1.85 
FR 4.52 PL 5.19 RUS 5.71 RUS 4.08 SLO 3.75 LV 1.60 
 
GB 4.36 CZ 5.00 GB 5.56 PL 3.83 HU 3.75 BG 1.50 
PL 4.33 LV 5.00 LV 5.36 HU 3.75 GB 3.71 USA 1.45 
AUS 4.18 FR 5.00 CZ 5.00 CZ 3.67 CZ 3.50 GB 1.43 
CZ 4.17 GB 4.90 PL 4.67 SLO 3.50 LV 3.33 CDN 1.40 
USA 4.09 HU 4.57 HU 4.61 PT 3.42 PT 3.33 CZ 1.36 
PT 4.00 PT 4.50 CDN 4.47 GB 3.33 PL 3.33 CY 1.33 
LV 3.93 WD 4.29 USA 4.44 WD 3.25 WD 3.33 AUS 1.33 
NZ 3.89 ED 4.15 NZ 4.44 AT 3.17 NZ 3.33 ED 1.33 
HU 3.89 SLO 4.08 SLO 4.44 NZ 3.00 AUS 3.33 PL 1.33 
WD 3.84 USA 4.00 WD 4.44 ED 3.00 USA 3.25 NZ 1.33 
CDN 3.77 NZ 4.00 PT 4.35 IL 3.00 AT 3.20 PT 1.30 
ED 3.73 AT 3.89 ED 4.08 LV 3.00 CDN 3.20 WD 1.29 
AT 3.64 AUS 3.75 AT 4.00 AUS 2.92 ED 3.00 AT 1.25 
SLO 3.64 CDN 3.63 AUS 4.00 USA 2.86 RUS 3.00 ES 1.24 
CY 3.30 CY 3.50 IL 3.64 CY 2.67 IL 3.00 FR 1.21 
IL 3.30 IL 3.44 BG 2.86 CDN 2.50 CY 2.39 HU 1.20 
BG 2.79 BG 3.11 CY 2.83 ES 2.08 ES 2.00 IL 1.20 
DK 2.33 ES 2.57 ES 2.50 BG 2.00 BG 1.80 NO 1.20 
ES 2.31 DK 2.25 NO 2.13 DK 2.00 SE 1.78 SE 1.17 
SE 2.10 SE 2.21 SE 2.08 SE 1.88 NO 1.75 DK 1.15 
NO 2.02 NO 2.00 DK 2.00 NO 1.67 DK 1.67 SLO 1.14 
Average 3.60  3.96  4.08  2.99  3.03  1.33 
Scand. 2.15  2.15  2.07  1.85  1.73  1.17 
Others 3.82  4.23  4.38  3.16  3.05  1.35 
Notes: AThe wage dispersion index is calculated by summarising the statements for the three 
occupations: chairman of a large national corporation, minister in the national government, 
and general practitioner and afterwards dividing this figure by three. Hereafter the statements 
of the two occupations: shop assistant and unskilled factory worker are summarised and 
divided by two. Lastly, the first index is then divided by the second. 
BThis index is calculated the same way as the wage dispersion index, but the occupation 
general practitioner is withdrawn from the index of the top group. 
CIn the index of the third column the occupation minister in the national government is also 
withdrawn in the same way.  
DThe index of the fourth column is constructed by dividing the index of the average 
statements of the top occupations (chairman of a large national corporation, minister in the 
national government, and general practitioner), by the statements for a skilled factory worker. 
EThis index taps the chairmen vs skilled worker wage ratio. 
FThis index is the ratio of a skilled worker to the average of the two low-paid occupations – 
shop assistant and unskilled worker in a factory. 
Source: Social Inequality Module III (1999) of the International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP).  
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Table 5-3 clearly shows that the Scandinavian countries are exceptionally 
egalitarian in 1999. This is true no matter which of the three general measures are 
used (column 1-3), or after disaggregating in top-middle/middle-bottom ratios 
(column 4-6). The bottom of the table displays averages of the country medians. 
They show that Scandinavians only want the top occupations to earn around two 
times more than the bottom occupations, while the average of the medians in the 
remaining countries is approximately four times more. It is also worth noticing in 
the disaggregated measures of column 4-6 that the Scandinavian medians most 
clearly stand out from the remaining countries if we look at the top-medium 
relationship of column 4-5. As suggested above, this again suggests that 
Scandinavian egalitarianism is mostly characterised by an aversion to top excess, 
rather than a wish to spoil the bottom of the labour market.  
The extraordinary Scandinavian results are not the only result of interest in Table 5-
3. Firstly, it is clear that subtracting the occupations ‘general practitioner’ and 
‘minister’ in column 2 and 3 respectively actually makes a big difference in the 
country rankings. Withdrawing the general practitioner occupation, the scores of 
many post-Communist countries are increased notably. When subtracting the 
minister occupation, a similar but somewhat smaller effect can be seen for the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. The explanation of these results can be found in Table 5-1. 
The median should-earn wage of doctors in most post-Communist countries is thus 
markedly lower than the corresponding ‘minister’ and ‘chairman’ wages. This is in 
line with Larsen’s (2006) arguments, but not the case in general in other countries. 
In the Anglo-Saxon countries it is often the ministers who, according to the 
respondents, are not supposed to earn as much as the chairmen and doctors.  
Secondly, these results also indicate that many of the post-Communist countries 
apparently have accepted the greater wage dispersion rates followed by the 
transitions to market economy. This attitudinal transition is also noticed in some of 
the exiting studies that mainly use earlier data from 1987 and 1992 (Arts et al., 
1995; Austen, 1999; Austen, 2002; Blanchflower & Freeman, 1997; Gijsberts, 
2002; Janmaat, 2013; Kelley & Evans, 1993; Mason, 1995).
49
  
Thirdly, the conclusion of Larsen (2006) seems to blur when including the post-
Communist countries (column 4-5). Of the Continental European countries only 
France seems to be a real top-outlier, together with some post-Communist countries 
not included in Larsen’s analysis. There is not much difference between the 
remaining Anglo-Saxon and Continental European countries though. In column 6, 
                                                          
49 Results of the next subsection indicate by contrast that the attitudinal transition is not 
finished yet. Even if the median values of differences the level of inequality in gross wages 
have increased in many post-Communist countries, the respondents want to increase the 
actual wage levels of the low-paid occupations and by contrast reduce the wage levels of the 
high-paid occupations considerably. 
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the Anglo-Saxon countries are, as Larsen (2006) states, placed higher than the 
continental European countries, but this result is again ‘overruled’ by the score of 
many post-Communist countries (pp. 39-41). Table 5-4 below will replicate the 
analysis above, albeit with 2009 data. The absent occupation ‘skilled factory 
worker’ prevents the replication of column 4-6 of Table 5-3:  
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Table 5-4 Attitudes towards the Level of Inequality in Gross Wages for Five 
Occupations in ISSP 2009, country medians 
AWage dispersion 
index 
BHigh- vs. Low paid 
occ. 
CChairmen vs. Low 
paid occ. 
CY 6.47 CY 6.28 AUS 8.00 
AUS 5.81 AUS 6.15 FR 6.67 
CZ 5.74 AT 5.37 USA 6.49 
USA 5.51 FR 5.36 NZ 6.01 
FR 4.77 DE 5.05 DE 5.45 
GB 4.61 USA 5.00 GB 5.26 
DE 4.56 PL 5.00 HU 5.00 
PT 4.36 HU 5.00 PL 5.00 
NZ 4.33 RUS 5.00 PT 5.00 
CH 4.17 CH 4.78 RUS 5.00 
HU 4.17 GB 4.67 AT 4.83 
PL 4.13 PT 4.62 EE 4.67 
67 
AT 4.05 EE 4.50 CY 4.57 
RUS 4.00 NZ 4.33 CH 4.44 
ES 3.92 SLO 4.08 SLO 4.44 
. 
EE 3.91 CZ 3.87 FIN 4.17 
TR 3.33 PT 3.85 CZ 4.00 
FIN 3.33 FIN 3.75 IL 3.64 
SLK 3.30 TR 3.60 SLK 3.53 
HR 3.00 UA 3.33 HR 3.51 
SLO 2.89 HR 3.30 UA 3.33 
BG 2.87 IL 3.25 TR 3.20 
IL 2.86 BG 3.00 BG 3.08 
UA 2.79 LV 3.00 LV 3.00 
FL 2.67 FL 2.83 ES 2.86 
LV 2.67 ES 2.83 FL 2.84 
IS 2.53 IS 2.60 IS 2.67 
DK 2.53 DK 2.50 NO 2.33 
NO 2.32 SE 2.38 SE 2.22 
SE 2.30 NO 2.27 DK 2.00 
Average 3.80  4.05  4.24 
Skand. 2.38  2.38  2.18 
Others 3.95  4.24  4.47 
Notes: AThe wage dispersion index is calculated by summarising the statements for the three 
occupations: chairman of a large national corporation, minister in the national government and general 
practitioner and afterwards dividing this figure by three. Thereafter the statements of the two 
occupations: shop assistant and unskilled factory worker are summarised and divided by two. Lastly, the 
first index is then divided by the second. 
BThis index is calculated the same way as the wage dispersion index, but the occupation general 
practitioner is withdrawn from the index of the top group. 
CIn the index of the third column, the occupation minister in the national government is also withdrawn 
in the same way. 
Source: Social Inequality Module IV (2009) of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP).  
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Table 5-4 shows that the Scandinavian countries are still clearly the most egalitarian 
in 2009, no matter which of the three measures are used. The Scandinavian 
egalitarianism in attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages is thus 
clear and consistent in a comparative perspective. However, the Scandinavians have 
maybe become slightly less egalitarian. The Scandinavian median-averages of 
approximately 2.38 are thus a little bit higher than the 2.15 value for 1999. This 
possible anti-egalitarian move is still dwarfed by the comparison with the 
development in countries like Cyprus, Australia, as well as several post-Communist 
countries. As the case was in Table 5-2, the Icelandic medians are actually closer to 
a Scandinavian level, while the Finns have much higher medians. 
The most notable development in a comparison of Table 5-4 with Table 5-3 is 
furthermore that the Anglo-Saxon countries have climbed up the table, surpassing 
most post-Communist countries. The Anglo-Saxon countries are followed closely 
by Continental European countries such as Germany and France, while Flanders by 
contrast has values closely resembling the Scandinavian.  
For the reasons argued above the third measure in Table 5-3 and 5-4, called 
‘Chairmen vs Low-paid Occupations’ will be used as the central dependent variable 
in the survey-oriented analyses in the remaining chapters of the dissertation. It 
should be clearly stated here that, in spite the concerns raised in Chapter 4 above, 
concerning the contextual dependency and hence comparability of the chairman 
occupation in different countries, the low Scandinavian scores on all indexes 
constructed signifies that the Scandinavians really seem very egalitarian in 
comparative perspective. Because of the centrality of the ‘Chairmen vs Low-paid 
Occupations’ measure, it has been found relevant to display the results of all the 
four rounds of the Social Inequality module (1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009) in a single 
table, which can be seen below: 
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Table 5-5 Attitudes towards the Level of Inequality in Gross Wages for Three 
Occupations in ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009, country medians 
1987 1992 1999 2009 
AT 5.00 GB 5.56 FR 6.25 AUS 8.00 
USA 5.00 USA 5.33 RUS 5.71 FR 6.67 
GB 5.00 RUS 5.00 GB 5.56 USA 6.49 
WD 4.00 CDN 4.57 LV 5.36 NZ 6.01 
NL 4.00 WD 4.29 BCZ 5.00 DE 5.45 
AUS 3.36 ED 4.14 PL 4.67 GB 5.26 
CH 2.86 SLO 3.85 HU 4.61 H 5.00 
HU 2.50 NZ 3.65 CDN 4.47 PL 5.00 
PL 2.33 AUS 3.55 USA 4.44 PT 5.00 
  PL 3.50 NZ 4.44 RUS 5.00 
  BCZ 3.33 SLO 4.44 AT 4.83 
  HU 3.20 WD 4.44 EE 4.67 
67 
  IT 2.76 PT 4.35 CY 4.57 
  BG 2.67 ED 4.08 CH 4.44 
  NO 2.00 AT 4.00 SLO 4.44 
. 
  SE 1.92 AUS 4.00 FIN 4.17 
    IL 3.64 BCZ 4.00 
    BG 2.86 IL 3.64 
    CY 2.83 SLK 3.53 
    ES 2.50 HR 3.51 
    NO 2.13 UA 3.33 
    SE 2.08 TR 3.20 
    DK 2.00 BG 3.08 
      LV 3.00 
      E 2.86 
      FL 2.84 
      IS 2.67 
      NO 2.33 
      SE 2.22 
      DK 2.00 
Average 3.78  3.71  4.08  4.24 
Skand. -  1.96  2.07  2.18 
Others -  3.96  4.38  4.47 
Notes: The statements of the chairman of a large national corporation-variable are divided with an index 
constructed from an average of the statements for two lowest-paid occupations. Concerning the last part: 
the statements for the two lowest-paid occupations - a shop assistant and unskilled factory worker - are 
summarised and divided by two.  
BCZ signifies Czechoslovakia in 1992, but the Czech Republic in 1999 and 2009 
Sources: Social Inequality Modules I-IV (1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009) of the International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP).  
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Much of what is interesting about Table 5-5 is already mentioned above. Denmark 
did not participate in ISSP 1992 and none of the Scandinavian countries 
participated in 1987. In 1992, Norway and Sweden are again found at the very 
bottom of the table. Sweden this time even has a median value below 2.0, although 
as described above such minute differences should not necessarily be deemed 
significant. As far back as we have data therefore, Scandinavian egalitarianism 
seems clear.  
Two other things are maybe also important to notice concerning Table 5-5. First, 
the overall average of the non-Scandinavian medians continues to rise throughout 
the period covered by the four surveys. This is of course not a trend in all countries, 
and the strength of the trend varies a lot. It is remarkable that a country such as 
Australia for example starts out with a quite low median, in the comparative sense, 
of 3.36 in 1987 and ends up with a median of 8.00 in 2009. Also, as existing 
literature has described, the post-Communist countries seem to start out with a 
legacy of almost Scandinavian median levels: in several cases below 3, and 
certainly below 4 in 1987 and 1992. In 1999 and 2009 many of the same countries 
score almost double this median value. The varying trend over time identified by 
McCall (2013) for the USA, also by using other measures, can be seen in the table 
too.    
5.1.2.3 Attitudes towards the Degree of Justice in Levels of Gross 
Wages for Different Occupations – the unjust Salaries of 
Chairmen in Scandinavia 
The analysis of the third dimension – attitudes towards the degree of justice in 
levels of gross wages for different occupations – also incorporates data from the 
items asking how much the respondents think the people in different occupations 
actually earn usually. The disaggregated measures created below are inspired by 
Osberg & Smeeding’s (2006) aggregated measure of:  
‘…how much the respondents own personal estimate of the actual 
degree of inequality in pay among a range of occupations diverges from 
his or her own estimate of ‘fair’ inequality within this range of 
occupations.’ (p. 460). 
But instead of pooling all occupations into one overall measure as done by Osberg 
& Smeeding (2006) and Szirmai (1986; 1991), and more in line with McCall’s 
(2013) approach, the measures below will look at each occupation separately.  
A first step in creating these measures is, for each respondent, subtracting how 
much he/she thinks a certain occupation should earn, from the same respondents’ 
perception of how much the same occupation actually earns usually. A positive 
figure on this measure indicates that the respondent thinks a person holding the 
occupation should earn more than he/she is perceived to do usually. As the case was 
concerning the analysis of the first dimension, the problem with this preliminary 
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measure is that it is in local currency. Also, it varies again as to whether the 
respondents refer to a net or a gross sum, and to monthly or yearly salaries.   
To be able to compare the country median values in this case also, a second step is 
thus to standardise the preliminary first measure. This is done simply by dividing 
the preliminary measure by the ‘actually earns usually’ statement of the respondent 
for the same occupation. In this way, a standardised measure is created. The 
measure denotes by how big a proportion of the perceived wage level of a certain 
occupation the respondent would want the wage level to increase or decrease. The 
results of 1999 and 2009 are displayed below in Table 5-6 and 5-7: 
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The Scandinavian countries in the analysis of Table 5-6
50
 also stand out somewhat 
in 1999. For all other occupations than the chairmen occupation, the Scandinavian 
median values are quite close to zero in a comparative perspective. This means that 
the wages the occupations are perceived to earn usually seems more or less at a 
legitimate level in Scandinavia. The clearest example of this is that the 
Scandinavians only want to increase the perceived wages of unskilled workers by 
11 %, while the median average in the remaining countries is 43 %. The median 
Russian wants to increase wages by even as much as 150 %.   
A notable difference between Norway and Denmark versus Sweden is seen in the 
minister column. The very low Danish and Norwegian scores of minus 2 % and 8 % 
could possibly be seen as an effect of the relatively high level of political trust in 
these countries, in comparative perspective. The somewhat higher Swedish median 
of minus 20 % could be an effect of the economic and political crisis that Sweden 
faced in the early nineties – something Norway and Denmark did not face to the 
same extent in that period (cf. Chapter 3).  
Concerning the chairmen column, the Scandinavian medians are more in line with 
those of the other countries. The Scandinavian countries’ median average does not 
stand out from the remaining ones, but this average hides a big variation between 
the Swedish median of minus 32 % and the Danish minus 17 %. In a Scandinavian 
perspective, this overall result translates into quite a big dissatisfaction with the 
chairmen’s perceived wages in 1999 – especially in Sweden. The aversion to top-
level excess appears in a very clear form in Table 5-5 and is restricted mainly to the 
chairman occupation. The results thus suggest that the wage levels of chairmen are 
perceived to have increased too much beyond the country median wage level to be 
considered just.  
The Scandinavian medians are not the only results of interest. Firstly, the 
respondents in general do want wage levels to change, often quite a lot. At the same 
time, it is still quite clear, as argued many times above, that most respondents 
probably take as their point of departure their perception of the actual wage level of 
an occupation, when deciding on the just level. Secondly, the pattern of median 
attitudes across countries is quite similar: the two often best-paid occupations – 
government ministers and chairmen – ought to have their wages reduced; doctors 
                                                          
50 Notes: Calculated for each occupation by subtracting what the respondents in the various 
countries think that the occupations usually ‘actually earn’ from what the occupations should 
earn. This figure is then standardised by dividing it by the amount of the ‘actually-earns’ 
statement of the respondent. 
Source: Social Inequality Module III (1999) of the International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP).  
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wages are generally seen as just, while the remaining lower-paid occupations ought 
to have their wages increased, according to the respondents.   
Thirdly, of course interesting intra-country variations in this pattern exist. Maybe 
most remarkably, the post-Communist respondents are in general not satisfied with 
the perceived wages of general practitioners, but want to increase these quite a lot. 
This could possibly be caused by the low wage levels of the publicly employed, 
including doctors, in these countries. Doctors require a long and hard education and 
perform a crucial task in the society. This would probably lead many to think a 
quite high wage for this occupation to be deserved or fair. Fourthly, although the 
post-Communist countries have accepted the transition to market economy 
somewhat (see above), this table clearly indicates a socialist legacy (Arts et al., 
1995; Austen, 1999; Austen, 2002; Blanchflower & Freeman, 1997; Gijsberts, 
2002; Janmaat, 2013; Kelley & Evans, 1993; Mason, 1995). Table 5-6 show that 
post-Communist respondents clearly wish for a more compressed wage structure. 
Their medians indicate that they want to see government ministers’ wages reduced 
by as much as 40 %, and chairmens’ wages reduced by as much as 60 %. It is even 
more outstanding that they want to see wage raises for the remaining occupations 
by more than 100 % in some instances. The post-Communist countries portray great 
internal variations in patterns though. Table 5-7 below will replicate the analysis of 
Table 5-6 with data from 2009 (minus the column ‘skilled factory worker’):  
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Table 5-7 Degree of Justice in Levels of Pay for Five Occupations in ISSP 2009, 
country medians
 
a cabinet minister 
in the <national> 
government  
 
a chairman of a 
large national 
corporation  
 
a doctor in 
general practice  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled 
worker in a 
factory  
 CH 0.00 BG 0.00 UA 1.50 UA 1.00 UA 1.00 
NO -0.07 TR 0.00 RUS 0.67 TR 0.75 TR 0.82 
DK -0.11 CY -0.08 H 0.33 HR 0.67 RUS 0.67 
IS -0.11 EE -0.17 IL 0.25 PL 0.67 SLO 0.60 
NZ -0.17 UA -0.20 EE 0.25 H 0.64 HR 0.60 
CY -0.17 IL -0.25 HR 0.25 RUS 0.60 H 0.54 
AUS -0.20 FL -0.25 LV 0.14 BG 0.60 PL 0.50 
EE -0.20 NZ -0.29 TR 0.11 EE 0.60 BG 0.50 
SE -0.25 SLK -0.29 AT 0.00 LV 0.58 PT 0.50 
GB -0.26 HR -0.33 AUS 0.00 SLO 0.56 EE 0.43 
USA -0.28 CZ -0.33 FL 0.00 PT 0.50 LV 0.39 
FIN -0.30 LV -0.33 BG 0.00 SLK 0.43 IL 0.38 
BG -0.33 DK -0.33 SE 0.00 CZ 0.43 FR 0.36 
FL -0.33 PL -0.36 DK 0.00 E 0.38 IS 0.33 
DE -0.33 IS -0.38 FIN 0.00 FR 0.33 SLK 0.33 
FR -0.33 FIN -0.38 IS 0.00 IS 0.32 CZ 0.33 
PT -0.33 SE -0.38 FR 0.00 DE 0.25 E 0.33 
SLO -0.33 NO -0.40 NO 0.00 GB 0.25 DE 0.25 
IL -0.38 E -0.40 NZ 0.00 AT 0.25 AT 0.25 
TR -0.38 GB -0.40 PL 0.00 CY 0.25 GB 0.25 
HR -0.40 CH -0.40 PT 0.00 IL 0.25 CH 0.22 
PL -0.40 PT -0.44 SLK 0.00 FIN 0.25 AUS 0.20 
SLK -0.42 SLO -0.44 USA 0.00 CH 0.25 FL 0.20 
AT -0.44 DE -0.50 SLO 0.00 AUS 0.22 USA 0.20 
E -0.44 FR -0.50 E 0.00 USA 0.20 CY 0.18 
CZ -0.47 H -0.50 CZ 0.00 FL 0.20 NZ 0.17 
H -0.50 AT -0.50 CH 0.00 DK 0.20 FIN 0.10 
RUS -0.50 RUS -0.50 DE 0.00 NZ 0.19 SE 0.09 
LV -0.60 USA -0.60 GB 0.00 NO 0.19 NO 0.09 
UA -0.67 AUS -0.67 CY -0.13 SE 0.19 DK 0.09 
Average -0.32  -0.35  0.11  0.41  0.36 
Skand. -0.14  -0.37  0.00  0.19  0.09 
Others -0.34  -0.35  0.12  0.43  0.39 
Notes: Calculated for each occupation by subtracting what the respondents in the various countries think 
that the occupations usually ‘actually earn’ from what the occupations should earn. This figure is then 
standardised by dividing it by the amount of the ‘actually-earns’ statement of the respondent. 
Source: Social Inequality Module IV (2009) of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP).  
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Table 5-7 reconfirms the same pattern in Scandinavian median attitudes in 2009 as 
in 1999: The perceived wage levels of all occupations – without the chairmen-
occupation – are seen as, comparatively speaking, very just in Scandinavia (Sweden 
also still lags behind Denmark and Norway concerning the minister occupation, and 
even more than in 1999). The biggest intra-Scandinavian change in the 10-year 
period is clearly an increased degree of dissatisfaction with the chairmens’ 
perceived wage levels. The Scandinavian median average for this occupation 
increased from -0.24 to -0.37. This increase mirrors a general increase in 
dissatisfaction with perceived top wage levels in the countries in general, also seen 
in the ministers’ wage levels. Denmark and Norway therefore do not fully follow 
suit with this trend.  
The two other Nordic countries, each in their own way, resemble and differ from 
the Scandinavian countries. The Finnish respondents are more dissatisfied with 
ministers’ perceived wage levels and, to a lesser extent, with the shop assistants’ 
wages, than the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish respondents are. The patterns of 
the remaining occupations are quite similar. The Icelandic pattern is the same as the 
Scandinavian countries’ pattern in the three first columns. Concerning the two 
lower-paid occupations, the median Icelandic respondent wants significantly bigger 
wage increases than the corresponding respondent in the three Scandinavian 
countries.  
Besides the Nordic results, Table 5-7 reconfirms the general pattern of respondents’ 
wishing higher wages for the lower-paid occupations, lower wages for the higher-
paid occupations, and finding the perceived wage level of general practitioners fair. 
Some post-Communist countries are still among the most extreme in the columns. 
The transition to market economy is thus yet to become legitimate, as seen by this 
measure.  
Countries like the US and Australia seem to have experienced a rather dramatic 
attitudinal effect from the financial crisis in respondents’ wish for drastically lower 
wages for chairmen. As described above, most respondents in the US probably 
think of a CEO of a large national corporation, when answering the question about 
just wages for the chairman occupation (Lorsch & Zelleke, 2005). In spite of this 
difference between the US and other countries, the Americans do not seem to wish 
for radically different wage level ratios for the lower-paid occupations (Tables 5-3 – 
5-5).  
5.1.2.4 Degree of Consensus in Attitudes towards Gross Wages – the 
increasingly divided Scandinavians 
The consensus dimension concerns to what extent the respondents in the different 
countries agree or differ about the measures presented above. Dispersion measures 
like the standard deviation would normally be presented together with measures of 
central tendencies, as Tables 5-1 – 5-7 above display. This standard approach was 
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not followed, though. The tables above are big tables taking up a lot of space and 
containing a lot of information already. Graphically it was difficult to incorporate 
the dispersion measures in some of the tables. The tables furthermore already 
contained many countries and as much as six different measures per table. Extra 
information in the form of dispersion measures could easily have led to more 
confusion instead of clarification.  
If dispersion tables for all measures presented above were presented below, six new 
tables would be needed. To conserve space, just the results of these tables will be 
presented below. The tables are Tables 8-5–8-10 in Appendix A.51 
Tables 8-5–8-10 in Appendix A display a quite remarkable tendency: the degree of 
consensus in the Scandinavian countries generally becomes smaller from 1999 to 
2009.   
Going into more detail, Tables 8-5–8-6 show that especially the Norwegians and 
Danes disagree more about what the occupations ought to earn in 2009 than in 
1999. The Swedes have only slightly larger CoVs in 2009 than in 1999. This result 
can be found both by looking at the actual CoVs of the countries and by comparing 
their positions in the tables to those of other countries. The CoVs of Denmark and 
Norway on average rise significantly from 0.026 and 0.008 to 0.151 and 0.199 
respectively. For Norway this means that while the average deviation from the 
median was approximately 1 % from the median in 1999, it increased to 
approximately 20 % in 2009. Especially Norway moves from the bottom of the 
columns in 1999 to the upper-middle of the table. This Norwegian result is 
                                                          
51 To measure the degrees of consensus, the classic standard deviation will in general be 
used. Concerning the levels of gross wages for different occupations measures of Tables 5-1 
– 5-2, the standard deviation will not be used as the dispersion measure to be interpreted 
though.  Even though the national currency statements are recalculated to PPP-corrected 
USD in Tables 5-1 – 5-2, there are still quite big differences in the countries’ overall levels. 
The standard deviation can be roughly interpreted as the average distance from the average. 
Interpreting a standard deviation is therefore relative to which scale the measure of central 
tendency has. The consequence is that it is not possible to directly compare the standard 
deviations of countries which are quite different. To give an example, a standard deviation of 
1,000 PPP-corrected USD is quite small, if the median/average is 75,000 PPP-corrected 
USD. If the median/average instead is 7,500 PPP-corrected USD a standard deviation of 
1,000 PPP-corrected USD denotes a significant dispersion of the respondents’ statements. 
What is needed is therefore a standardised version of the standard deviation, i.e. setting the 
standard deviation values relative to the measures of central tendency and specifically its 
size. The ‘Coefficient of Variation’ (CoV) is exactly such a measure, which is why it is used 
in these two cases. The formula for calculating the coefficient of variation is normally: 
CV=σ/μ, but because the median is consistently used in the article as the measure of central 
tendency, a slightly modified version of the CoV is also uses here: CV=σ/M (σ = standard 
deviation, M = median and μ = mean).  
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furthermore in accordance with the remarkable degree of consensus Osberg & 
Smeeding (2006) finds for Norway, albeit with a slightly different measure.  
Tables 8-7–8-8 confirm this tendency even more clearly. For 1999 the Scandinavian 
countries are in general at the bottom of the columns, with very low standard 
deviations in a comparative perspective. The exception is the two first columns for 
Norway, at the very top of the table. This drops drastically after excluding the 
minister occupation in the third columns though. For 2009 Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden move from the bottom to the middle of the columns. Most of the standard 
deviations also increase quite significantly from below 0.1 to around 0.2.  
Tables 8-9–8-10 again confirm the tendency. The Scandinavian countries are 
generally in the lower half of the columns in 1999, with standard deviations below 
0.025. The exception is again Norway, which in 1999 has statistics for the chairmen 
and doctor columns which do not make any sense on the ‘proportion scales’ on 
which the measures of the justice dimension operates. These results thus serve as a 
textbook example of how much outliers can influence average, and hence standard 
deviation measures. If we ignore the Norwegian results the Scandinavian countries 
clearly move from the lower half to the top of the table from 1999-2009. Sweden is 
again the only country ‘left behind’, but this time only in the three last columns.  
The two other Nordic countries, Iceland and Finland, are not ‘as Scandinavian’ 
when measured on some of the other dimensions. Iceland, in all the 2009 tables, 
displays a very high degree of consensus not mirrored in the Scandinavian 
countries. Finland is less special in this respect, but also shows a higher degree of 
consensus than the Scandinavian countries in general.  
To sum up, the Scandinavians clearly show less consensus about the attitudes 
towards gross wages in 2009 than in 1999, but Sweden does so less than Denmark 
and Norway. This difference will be of crucial importance in Chapters 6–7. This 
result can be found in all Tables 8-5–8-10, but is of course more apparent in some 
than in others.  
5.1.3. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this section was in a two-way comparative perspective to examine if 
and how the Scandinavians’ attitudes towards gross wages stand out from those 
inhabited by people in other western countries and how the development have been 
from mainly 1999 to 2009. Four dimensions of this concept was operationalised and 
analysed:  
 The levels of gross wages for different occupations 
 The level of inequality in gross wages 
 The degree of justice in the levels of gross wages for different occupations 
 Consensus   
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The analysis of the four operationalised dimensions of attitudes towards gross 
wages clearly showed that the Scandinavian attitudes of both 1999 and 2009 (and 
1992) were in fact quite exceptional. The double comparative design – that is, 
comparative in both space and time – and in-depth analyses of four dimensions of 
the concept, furthermore contributes to a more complex, but also potentially 
dynamic understanding, of how the attitudes of the Scandinavians might be 
expected to develop in the future. This is in contrast to much of the existing 
research in the field.  
The Scandinavian countries most clearly and consistently stood out from the other 
western countries in investigations of the dimension of attitudes towards the level of 
inequality in gross wages: No matter which of the three aggregated, or the three 
disaggregated measures are used, the Scandinavians want very small levels of 
inequality in gross wages in 1992–2009. As argued above, these results can also be 
seen as a confirmation of reliability of the central dependent variable in the 
subsequent analyses, in spite the unavoidable ‘bias’ of contextuality in the 
responses (see Tables 5-3 – 5-5).  
The analyses of other dimensions furthermore substantiated that this egalitarianism 
seems mostly an effect of an aversion to top-level excess, rather than a wish to spoil 
the bottom of the labour market excessively. In the analyses of the dimension of 
attitudes towards levels of gross wages for different occupations, it was thus firstly 
made clear, and in time increasingly appeared to be consistent, that the 
Scandinavians want quite low salaries for the higher-paid occupations, compared to 
most other rich western countries. Contrasting the Anglo-Saxon, the Continental 
European and post-Communist countries, the Scandinavian countries displayed a 
rising tendency from left to right in both the Tables of 1999 and 2009 (see Tables 5-
1 – 5-2, as well as Tables 8-1 – 8-4 in Appendix A).  
Secondly, the aversion towards top excess seemed even clearer in the analysis of the 
dimension of attitudes towards degree of justice in levels of gross wages for 
different occupations. Scandinavians in general find the perceived wage levels of 
the occupations quite just in a comparative perspective. The two lower-paid 
occupations thus ought to have their wages increased by a maximum of 20 % 
according to Scandinavians in both 1999 and 2009, which in a comparative 
perspective is very little. The only real exception to this pattern was the chairman 
occupation. From a Scandinavian perspective thus, the wages of chairmen in 2009 
need to be reduced by 33–40 % (Tables 5-6 – 5-7).  
To sum up, in accordance with Åberg’s (1984), Graubard’s (1986) and Andersen’s 
(1983) assumptions in the 1980s, Scandinavians do in fact seem consistently to be 
exceptionally egalitarian, compared to citizens of other western countries’ in 1992, 
1999 and 2009. This egalitarianism furthermore seems clearly related mostly to an 
aversion to top-level excess, rather than to a wish to spoil the bottom of the labour 
market excessively. In the analysis of the last dimension: Degree of consensus in 
attitudes towards gross wages for different occupations, clear indications are found 
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of cracks in the Scandinavian egalitarianism. Although clearer in some tables than 
in others, a clear tendency of a decreased degree of consensus, measured by various 
dispersion measures, can be seen. In 1999 the Scandinavian countries were among 
those with the lowest standard deviations and Coefficients of Variation. But by 
2009, the Scandinavian countries had crawled upwards to the centre or even the top 
of the tables. The Scandinavians are thus clearly more polarised on these issues in 
2009 than in 1999 – Sweden less so than Denmark and Norway. This tendency 
could indicate a dynamic trend towards a change in Scandinavian egalitarianism in 
the future – in one direction or another.   
A final remark about the choice of focus is also in order. The two other Nordic 
countries Iceland and Finland are both present in the 2009 dataset. As described 
above, often the Scandinavian countries are not in themselves a focus of analysis in 
the social sciences. Instead, the Nordic countries and the Nordic model are often 
described as being special. In spite of this, the result shows that the Scandinavian, 
or maybe ‘core-Nordic’, attitudes towards gross wages clearly deviate from those of 
the Finnish and Icelandic respondents.  
The Icelandic attitudes in several aspects actually resemble the Scandinavian ones. 
This is not the case in the level of consensus and justice though. The Icelanders thus 
maintain a very high degree of consensus also in 2009. On the other hand a much 
higher level of Icelandic dissatisfaction (than that of the Scandinavian countries) 
with the wages of the lower-paid occupations, can be seen in Table 5-7. The 
Finnish attitudes were even less similar to the Scandinavian. Only in the analysis of 
the justice dimension do the Finns in general resemble the Scandinavians. The 
Finnish attitudes in fact more clearly resemble those of some Continental European 
countries, than the Scandinavian ones.  
5.2. EXPLAINING SCANDINAVIAN EGALITARIANISM?  
The analyses above focussed on the first two parts of the research question: What 
attitudes do Scandinavians express towards the level of inequality in gross wages, 
how do these attitudes develop over time and why do the Scandinavians express 
these attitudes? This second overall section will start delving into the third part. As 
mentioned above, the analysis of this overall section will still be conducted at the 
most aggregated level, with the three Scandinavian as well as 35 other countries 
included in the analysis. The main scope of the analysis here is accordingly to try to 
see whether the Scandinavian egalitarianism that appears in the descriptive analyses 
above can be explained by explanations identified in existing literature on the 
subject.  
Since Chapters 1–2 emphasise the main goal of the dissertation as identifying the 
macro-micro links driving the formation of Scandinavians’ attitudes to the level of 
inequality in gross wages, a method and hypotheses actually able to link the macro 
to the micro level are preferable. First, in each of the theoretical approaches 
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identified in existing literature as possible explanations for micro- and macro-level 
variations in attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages – except the one 
labelled ‘social cleavages’ – there will be a theoretical and analytical distinction 
between their possible macro- and micro-level effects, as well as a discussion of 
possible interactions between the two.  
Second, with these meta-theoretical and theoretical demands, multilevel analyses 
(MLA)
52
 was the obvious choice as the method applied in the analysis below. 
Multilevel analyses explicitly allows simultaneous control for differences in 
attitudinal structures in the various countries as well as composition effects, and 
their combined effects on the overall variation between countries. Lastly, cross-
level interactions testing for varying effects of covariates at the individual level 
between countries will also be tested here. Obviously the primary focus of these 
manoeuvres is still on explaining the aggregated – which also can be called the 
macro-level or between-country variations – and especially a significant 
Scandinavian dummy.  
It should also be mentioned that because of the contextual and complex ontology 
described in Chapter 2 that induces context-dependent effects and mechanisms, 
these cross-level interaction terms seem crucial if we are to understand and explain 
attitudinal patterns within a context such as the Scandinavian, exactly because they 
allow the identification of context-specific patterns of correlations. At the same 
time this also means the cross-country main-effect hypotheses dominating the 
existing literature is unlikely to explain much of the Scandinavian egalitarianism 
statistically. 
It should therefore also not come as a surprise that even if these analyses reveal 
interesting and substantive results in their own right, it is at the same time clear that 
first, the explanations found in existing literature and their operationalisation, and 
secondly the rather aggregated level of analysis, induce further investigations. The 
subsequent chapters will therefore both switch to a more disaggregated level of 
analysis and broaden the methodological and data-wise scope of the analysis.  
5.2.1. THEORY 
As described in Chapter 2, the dissertation will apply an open ontological approach 
as to which social mechanisms can possibly influence Scandinavians’ and others’ 
attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998; 
Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; March & Olsen, 2006). This means a rather large 
variety of theories relevant to explaining attitudes towards the level of inequality in 
gross wages can be identified in the existing literature. This overall section 
distinguishes between four main approaches that overlap somewhat and each of 
                                                          
52 This class of statistical analysis goes by many names, such as hierarchical linear models, 
nested models, mixed models, random coefficient, random-effects models, random parameter 
models, or split-plot designs. 
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which entails different traditions or sub-approaches. Except for the first approach – 
denoted ‘social cleavages’ – there will also be an analytical distinction between 
possible micro- and macro-level effects of the same approach, as well as 
possibilities for interactions between these levels.  
Two further points are worth emphasising at this point. First, some of the existing 
literature is in fact very much focussed on the effect of the unique context in which 
attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages form. This seems more or less to 
be one of the main theoretical ideas behind the International Social Justice Project 
(ISJP) and the corresponding book (Kluegel, Mason, & Wegener, 1995). Mason 
(1995) for example uses the unique contextual development in each of the emerging 
capitalist states in Eastern Europe as an explanation of the differences in attitudinal 
patterns seen in these countries. The emphasis of the dissertation, as well as of the 
underlying ontology is obviously also to a great extent on the unique contextual 
effects on attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages. This interest is 
not in the special contextual effects in each of the 38 countries in the ISSP 2009 
dataset, but only the three Scandinavian countries.  
This is not to say that macro-level effects will not be taken seriously or not 
investigated. On the contrary, the MLA approach allows the introduction of both 
macro- and micro-level variables into the regression equations. The macro-level 
variables entered with this form of multi-country analysis need to take a more 
general and formalised form in order to be possibly able to explain statistically the 
Scandinavian dummy – why Scandinavians are highly egalitarian. Another 
contribution in the above-mentioned ISJP leads us somewhat in this direction by 
distinguishing between countries oriented towards respectively the state, the 
market, and the corresponding principles dominating these spheres, as the crucial 
macro-level variable explaining the overall differences in attitudes between the 
countries (Arts et al., 1995).  
The approach below is, secondly, very much inspired by the ambitious and 
extensive approach of Szirmai (1986; 1991). Having had the advantage of being 
able to create and collect his own very expansive Dutch survey, he develops and 
tests elaborate path models with numerous micro-level independent variables 
operationalised from numerous theoretical traditions – economy, political science, 
(macro) sociology and social psychology. In contrast, we have to make do with the 
variables available in the ISSP 2009 dataset, as will be elaborated below. This is not 
as bad as it sounds though, for in addition, the purpose of the analyses of this 
section is not really on understanding the paths and relations of relevant attitudes 
and individual characteristics linked to attitudes towards the level of inequality in 
gross wages in a given context. Instead, the aim is to see whether the explanations 
of the existing literature enable us to statistically explain Scandinavian 
egalitarianism. All of this means that the theoretical and operationalisational work 
of Szirmai (1986, 1991) is very useful here. The elaborate path models though are 
not necessary, nor possible to replicate.  
CHAPTER 5. AGGREGATED SURVEY RESULTS 
 131 
This also leads to one final and at first glance preposterous claim. In general, the 
various modules from the ISSP, such as the Social Inequality Module, are focused 
on presenting items relevant to just the module’s theme. This is contrary to other 
cross-national survey programs e.g. the World Values Survey (WVS), the European 
Social Survey (ESS) and the Eurobarometer, which make items in their various 
rounds cover a range of different topics. All items from the ISSP 2009 dataset are 
theoretically thought to be connected to the theme of social inequality and thus 
relevant as explanatory variables in the multivariate models below. As will be made 
clear below, all of the attitudinal variables apparent in the ISSP 2009 dataset are in 
principle connected to the different justice beliefs and their sub-dimensions, while 
the various other variables fit with the other three overall approaches.  
5.2.1.1 Social Cleavages – Rational Choice and Sociological 
Extensions 
Two forms of non-contextual, explanatory models have dominated the existing non-
Scandinavian studies on the subject. The first of these is an often straightforward, 
rational choice-inspired model emphasising social cleavages and often just the 
marginal economic utility of the individual. Many elaborate theoretical models and 
arguments have been proposed in this tradition, but the central assumption is that 
individual attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages will reflect whether a 
given individual would benefit economically from an increased or decreased level 
of inequality in gross wages in the country. It can therefore also be assumed that 
clear cleavages exist in countries, reflecting different social groups or classes in 
society (Arts et al., 1995; Austen, 1999; Austen, 2002; Evans & Kelley, 2007; 
Kelley & Evans, 1993; Kluegel & Miyano, 1995; Mason, 1995; Svallfors, 1997; 
Szirmai, 1986; Szirmai, 1991).  
It should be stressed that not all existing studies emphasising social cleavages 
highlight just the economic marginal utility of the individual. Szirmai (1986; 1991) 
emphasises the importance of class-/group-based benefits and interest in increasing 
status as important attitudinal drivers at the individual level. Knudsen (2001) also 
does not share the utility-maximising ontology. The position in the social structure 
is thus seen as important for attitudes because it affects how individuals can ascribe 
meaning and find identity in their given situation.  
No matter what the ontological differences may be, the central explanatory 
variables deduced from this tradition are the ‘structural controls’ (Austen, 2002). To 
be more specific, this overall model assumes that people belonging to the lower 
strata of society will be in favour of a more egalitarian distribution of gross wages, 
because it is in their economic, class or status interest. Strata are here defined and 
operationalised by for example educational level, type of employment (or non-, or 
self-employment), the level of income and supervision of others at work. In the 
analyses below all of these variables mentioned will be tested, as well as a 
composite measure for ‘objective’ social class location in the form of the European 
Socio-economic Classification schema (ESeC) (Harrison & Rose, 2006; Rose & 
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Harrison, 2007), and a measure of ‘subjective’ social class location. The emphasis 
on status and identity enhancement as possible motivational factors also suggests 
that variables such as political and even religious and ethnic affiliation could be 
important for individuals’ attitudes to the distribution of gross wages in society. The 
same obviously applies to such variables as gender, age and urbanisation. 
In the dataset, the political affiliation of the respondent can be measured by the 
items Q6a-d and Q7a-b (When referring to specific questions in the ISSP 2009 
survey. See the source questionnaire in Appendix C (ISSP Research Group, 2011)). 
Besides the above-treated ‘relative measure’, these items include questions about 
the role of government regarding the unemployed, the poor, income distribution, as 
well as questions of income taxes. All of these tap classic questions on the 
economic policy dimension. Obviously, if respondents subscribe to the ‘left-wing 
statements’ in these items, the hypothesis must be that they also have a tendency to 
be egalitarian.
53
  
                                                          
53 Furthermore Szirmai (1986; 1991), as mentioned, also follows the non-RCT approach a bit 
further. He proposes and tests numerous hypotheses of possible factors influencing the 
individual’s attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages deduced from, among 
other sources, social psychology. Not surprisingly, the content of the current dataset clearly 
restricts which of the hypotheses can be tested here. Some of the central ones are possible to 
test, though. The results were more than meagre. The social-psychological variables do not 
correlate very strongly or significantly for that matter, and in the cases where they do, it is 
often not in the direction the hypotheses forecast. Furthermore, even if the theory above 
predicted that the effects of these variables could not be directly equated with the social 
background of the respondent, much of the effect these variables do portray would probably 
disappear upon controlling for variables such as income, educational level and social class. In 
the subsequent multivariate analyses, these variables are therefore dropped altogether.  For 
the sake of clarity, the formulation of hypothesis following this tradition was reshuffled to 
the long footnote presented here. 
Szirmai (1986; 1991) uses theories of relative deprivation to suggest that individuals should 
want to change the income distribution in society if they feel there is a discrepancy between 
what they earn and what they think they should earn. Simply put, the greater the 
discrepancy—positive or negative—the more the individual wants to change the income 
distribution. It is possible to test this directly via questions Q3 and Q13 from the ISSP 2009 
dataset. These questions ask the respondent respectively whether he or she earns more or less 
than he or she deserves, as well as whether the pay he or she earns is too high or too low to 
be just. Relative deprivation can be operationalised in the following way. Q3 and Q13 
basically measure the same thing, and unsurprisingly they correlate very strongly (Person’s 
r=.709, p>.001).  It therefore seems safe to merge them in an index. The idea is that 
individuals should want to change the income distribution in society if they feel there is a 
discrepancy between what they earn and what they think they should earn. This means 
scoring on either the high end or the low end of an additive index between the two variables. 
The contrasts are the ones exactly in the middle, who are satisfied with their wage level. An 
additive index has therefore been created between by the two variables. The values of this 
index do not make sense in categorical terms because different combinations of the two 
original variables can cause a given score. It therefore only makes sense to treat the index as 
continuous in the regressions. The hypothesis is not linear, but U-shaped. In order to test this, 
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However, in spite of all these elaborate hypotheses, it seems quite unlikely that the 
existence of extraordinary social cleavages should be able to explain Scandinavian 
egalitarianism – if we follow the cross-country main effects argument underlying 
the hypotheses above. If that were the case, the Scandinavian countries should 
contain a bigger share of respondents with a clear interest in a greater degree of 
income equalisation, or a group of people feeling relatively deprived that is larger 
than generally the case in other countries in the dataset. This seems highly unlikely 
given the aforementioned rather low degree of income inequality and low degree of 
poverty in the Scandinavian countries. No matter what, it seems a reasonable idea 
to apply standard ‘structural controls’ to the other correlations of interest to 
minimise bias caused by possible compositional effects. 
5.2.1.2 Justice Beliefs – Consistency in Beliefs or Embeddedness in 
Culture 
The second form of a non-contextual, explanatory model dominating existing 
studies on the subject is rooted in theories about justice beliefs. Operationalised 
justice beliefs are basically attitudinal variables and not background variables as 
most of the above are. Methodologically it is therefore difficult to validly determine 
which way the arrow of causality points between a given justice belief-variable 
correlating with the dependent variable. Theoretically, the not always very explicit 
argument in the justice belief-literature seems to be that the justice beliefs constitute 
                                                                                                                                       
a quadratic and a cubic term of the relative deprivation index was tested to no vain. Also, if 
the individual has earlier had positive experiences, for example, reaching a higher status than 
their family of origin had, then this will, according to Szirmai (1986; 1991), dampen the 
feeling of relative deprivation. This could be called perceived social mobility. Q10a-b 
measures, respectively, where the respondent feels he or she is on a scale of 1–10 in society, 
and where the family he or she grew up in fits on the same scale. By subtracting the second 
from the first statement, a perceived social mobility scale results. This can be seen as an 
operationalisation of the dampening effect that positive experiences have on the level of 
relative deprivation. Q11 asks the respondent directly if her or his current job has a higher 
status than the job their father had when they were in their mid-teens. Q11 is therefore a 
direct measure of this thesis. Lastly, a proxy for measuring cognitive dissonance can be 
constructed in the same manner as the measure of perceived social mobility. By subtracting 
Q14b from Q14a, a measure is obtained of how much the ideal society of the respondent 
deviates from the society the respondent perceives. Even if the images portrayed in these 
items could be argued to form two nominally scaled variables, there seems to be a clear 
progression, with type A (category 1) being the least egalitarian image of society and type E 
(category 5), the most egalitarian. On this ordinal linearity argument it seems reasonable to 
subtract the variables.  
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more fundamental values and therefore guide more specific attitudes in accordance 
with the argumentation underlying Figure 4-1 above. However, as already noticed 
then, this is at best a contested statement, especially when both are measured in the 
same cross-sectional survey-dataset. Furthermore, as will be clear below, quite a lot 
of potential ‘explanatory’ justice belief-driven variables can be deduced from the 
justice belief literature and operationalised in the dataset. As will be described in 
the methodological section below, various steps will therefore be taken to ensure 
that this advantage does not drown in models severely hampered by 
multicollinearity and respondent dropouts.   
The theories of justice beliefs fundamentally deal with the normative question of 
whether the distribution of resources and income in society should reflect the 
principle of equality, need, or equity in order to be considered just (Arts et al., 
1995; Kelley & Evans, 1993; Kluegel & Miyano, 1995; Petterson, 1995; Szirmai, 
1986; Szirmai, 1991). These three overall justice beliefs are disaggregated and 
operationalised in different ways. Kluegel and Miyano (1995) fruitfully 
disaggregate the equity-belief in two sub-dimensions. The first sub-dimension, the 
concept of success ideology, thus denotes whether: 
‘Opportunity is widely and equally available, and that individuals 
therefore are personally responsible for their own economic fates.’ 
(Kluegel and Miyano, 1995, p. 85).  
This concept can thus be seen as an individual ontological statement – or maybe an 
expression of an individual’s belief system. Conversely, the second sub-dimension, 
the concept of market justice, denotes the normative side of the belief in equity: that 
rewards should be proportional to effort (Kelley and Evans, 1993; Kluegel and 
Miyano, 1995). 
In contrast to this disaggregation of the equity dimension, Kluegel & Miyano 
(1995) combine the equality and need dimensions in one egalitarianism index in 
their operationalisation. This seems a bit too superfluous given, for example, the 
very clear distinction between social benefits and services distributed according to 
the principles of citizenship (equality), need and merit in the social policy literature 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999; Goul Andersen, 2012a; Rothstein, 1998). Possibly, 
because of this lack of focus on the equality dimension, then with exactly the 
exception of the equality justice belief, there are quite good opportunities for 
operationalising the various dimensions of the justice belief concepts derived 
above.  
Starting with the need dimension, the items Q12c-d indicate attitudes to whether a 
person who has children or a family to support should be entitled to higher earnings 
because of this need. The other items in the same battery Q12a-b and e-f signify 
that either responsibility at work, education, hard work or how well a person does at 
their job, should be crucial for deciding the wage level. These are all different 
manifestations of the normative side of the merit or equity dimension, denoted 
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market justice above. In addition, Q8a-b, measuring attitudes towards what extent it 
is fair that people with higher incomes can buy better health care or education for 
their children, can be seen as a quite indirect proxy for this concept. Q8a-b could 
also be seen as something quite different though. See more below under the heading 
‘adaption hypothesis’. 
The sub-dimension best captured by the dataset seems to be the success ideology, as 
well as possible different limitations to the success ideology belief in the various 
items of Q1 and Q2. Pure success ideology statements appear in Q1d-e, where the 
respondents indicate whether having ambition and working hard is sufficient to ‘get 
ahead’. The remaining items in Q1 and Q2 indicate possible limitations to the 
success ideology. Q1f-g and Q2a ask whether the society is corrupt and you need 
nepotistic connections to get ahead. The importance of having the right social 
background is captured in Q1a-b, the importance of possible discriminating factors 
such as race, religion and gender in Q1i-k, and finally Q2b-d captures the questions 
of the same kinds of barriers to entering university. 
What could be labelled the between-country, micro-level, main-effect hypotheses 
concerning all these variables is straightforward. Egalitarian respondents can be 
thought to subscribe more to the need (and if it could be measured properly, the 
equality dimension), than the equity dimension. Concerning the sub-dimensions of 
the equity dimension, the egalitarians should not subscribe to the normative market 
justice concepts that say rewards should follow achievement; they should not 
believe in the success ideology that ‘opportunity is widely and equally available’, 
and instead, perceive numerous limitations to this ideal which for most people is 
probably normatively positive.  
Stretching the concept a bit, justice beliefs could be argued to function as either or 
both micro- or macro-level ‘explanatory’ variables. In the literature, justice beliefs 
are usually understood as micro-level effects, the idea being that individuals differ 
in attitudes which are internally consistent – and as mentioned, these attitudes are 
assumed derived from the overall justice beliefs. As macro-level explanations, the 
effects of culture in embedding the attitudes of the individuals of a society are 
emphasised. The thesis of American exceptionalism offers the most obvious 
example. According to this national narrative, the American culture subscribes to 
both the principles of success ideology and market justice. This leads to an 
acceptance of greater differences in wage levels than elsewhere (Alesina, Di Tella, 
& MacCulloch, 2004; Bendix & Lipset, 1959; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; McCall, 
2013; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006).  
If both a significant micro- and macro-level effect of the same justice beliefs appear 
in the same analysis, it has the following interpretation. In countries with a high 
degree of aggregated ‘equity culture’ – as for example the proposed American one 
– this culture spills over to the non-equity-oriented respondents in that country to 
also become less egalitarian, than corresponding respondents in countries where the 
equity orientation is not as strong in general (Hox, 2010; Lolle, 2004).  
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In the Scandinavian context, the aforementioned claim of a Scandinavian ‘passion 
for equality’ could likewise be seen as a special Scandinavian variant of a possible 
culture influencing the Scandinavians to be egalitarians in general (Andersen, 1983; 
Graubard, 1986; Svendsen et al., 2012). One might therefore assume that the 
background for Scandinavian egalitarianism is an embeddedness of the individuals 
in a unique justice belief culture. This could assume the opposite form of American 
exceptionalism: Scandinavians ought then to subscribe to the opposite of success 
ideology and market justice, rendering them hostile towards a broad dispersion of 
wages. Again, there could be a spillover from the macro level to the micro level, so 
that even the equity-oriented Scandinavians become more egalitarian than similar 
respondents elsewhere do. In statistical terms, this thesis could be termed a 
between-country main effect thesis at both the micro and macro level. 
There is also the possibility that it is not as simple as the Scandinavians basically 
being the ‘opposite’ of the Americans. First, maybe subscribing to success-ideology 
and even market justice does not correlate with the respondents’ attitudes to the 
level of inequality in gross wages to the same extent in Scandinavia as elsewhere. 
Second, it is also relevant to keep the aforementioned limitations of the ISSP 2009 
dataset in mind. The dataset is not very well suited to capturing citizenship or pure 
egalitarian justice beliefs. Even if a Scandinavian justice-belief culture does exist, 
we cannot be sure to capture it with the existing data. Many such theses can be 
tested however by cross-level interactions between variables measuring justice 
beliefs at the micro level, and the macro-level Scandinavian dummy. The various 
main-effect theses at the micro and macro level will be tested using hierarchical 
model building. 
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5.2.1.3 Modelling Scandinavian Uniqueness 
The existing research focusing on attitudes towards the level of gross wage 
dispersion has mainly focused on the forms of explanation presented above plus the 
contextual explanations of especially the ISJP. In industrial relations research, 
however, a discussion has addressed how the industrial relations system influences 
the interests and attitudes of wage-earners and other groups in society. The 
hypotheses below can thus perhaps to a greater extent than the two sections above 
try to model a form of known Scandinavian uniqueness as explanatory factors.  
As also described above, Åberg (1984) e.g. argued that the extraordinarily 
centralised Swedish labour-market system had changed how its members perceived 
‘fair’ salaries. The argument is that centralisation changes the focal point for wage-
earners from the employers to other groups of wage-earners. In a centralised trade 
union movement, if a group of wage-earners raises demands for wage raises, they 
no longer merely have to have this claim accepted or legitimised by the employers, 
but also by other groups of wage-earners. This shift in the focus leads to a need for 
criteria to evaluate what constitutes fair salaries that are more neutral than labour-
market strength or value among the different wage-earner groups. Åberg (1984) 
labels these more neutral criteria ‘non-market criteria’54 and claims that when the 
wage-earner groups subscribe to these criteria, it becomes difficult to legitimise the 
fact that certain groups earn much more or much less than the others. Centralisation 
therefore instilled extraordinarily egalitarian attitudes among the Swedish wage-
earners towards wage gaps between occupations (Andersen, 1983; Dølvik, 2013; 
Graubard, 1986; Lund, 1981; Åberg, 1984).  
As described in Chapter 1 and 3 things have surely changed since 1984 in 
Scandinavia, but the trade-union density rates in the Scandinavian countries remain 
very high compared to those of other countries, and the collective bargaining 
agreements between the large and influential trade unions and employers’ 
associations remain important and receive considerable attention. This is all 
reflected in the scores on bargaining coordination and governability (Erixon, 2010; 
OECD, 2004). The effects Åberg (1984) proposes could therefore remain valid 
today and thus offer a potential explanation of Scandinavian egalitarianism.  
A number of distinctions are relevant when we operationalise the arguments above. 
An extremely high trade-union density characterised Åberg’s (1984) context, where 
almost all wage-earners were union members. Åberg (1984) is therefore unclear 
about whether the impact on attitudes just affects the trade-union members (a micro 
effect) or society in general (a macro effect). If the effect is understood as a micro-
level effect, only the wage-earning union members are socialised or influenced to 
adopt egalitarian attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages. In this 
                                                          
54 According to Åberg (1984), these include a company’s financial capability to give pay 
raises, the company’s market situation and future development, the nature of the work, how 
dangerous it is and the educational level of certain groups of workers. 
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narrative, Scandinavian egalitarianism would then be explained by a greater 
proportion of respondents who are trade-union members (or were) than is the case 
in other countries. If the effect is instead understood as a macro-level effect, the 
strength of a strong trade-union movement instead lies in its discursive, 
institutional, and structural impact on society as a whole. In this case, the individual 
union member (or former member) will not necessarily be more egalitarian than a 
non-member. However, countries with high trade-union density rates will have a 
tendency to lower median attitudes towards wage gaps.  
Two versions of an interaction hypothesis based on the argument above are also 
deducible. As such, one interpretation of the effect of the shift towards non-market 
criteria could be that the relationship between social class or educational level (as 
the supposedly crucial social cleavage in late-modern society) and the dependent 
variable varies with either trade-union density rates (macro) or trade-union 
membership (micro). The examples of non-market criteria mentioned by Åberg 
(1984) all seem to suggest that people take ‘the bigger picture’ into consideration 
when evaluating what constitutes fair wages (see the footnote on the last page as 
well as the classic descriptions the Danish and Swedish industrial relations models 
in Chapter 3). This proposed egalitarian effect of education also goes under the 
name of the ‘enlightenment hypothesis’ elsewhere in the literature (Kelley & Evans, 
1993; Szirmai, 1986). This argument means that social cleavage structures in 
attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages could be dampened in 
countries with high trade-union density rates (macro) or among trade-union 
members (micro). The argument is that the privileged, well-educated strata of 
society will look beyond their narrow self-interest and consider other criteria when 
determining their attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages.  
An almost contrary but related hypothesis goes under the heading of ‘system 
blaming’. The hypothesis goes that people who perceive that the society, among 
other things, is dominated by antagonistic class relations or social conflict, will be 
more inclined to be egalitarian than others (Szirmai, 1986; Szirmai, 1991). Maybe 
the social democratic legacy in the welfare state and the highly organised labour 
markets has left an imprint on the Scandinavians as societies actually dominated by 
perceived social conflict and antagonistic class relations. The low level of actual 
inequality speaks against this thesis, but on the other hand, the results of Svallfors 
(2004; 2006) and Svallfors & Brooks (2010) could actually speak for such a thesis. 
In the question battery Q9, four different versions of items measuring whether the 
respondents actually view the society as dominated by antagonistic struggles 
between key social groups can be found.  
5.2.1.4 Post-Rationalization and Justification of the Reality 
Experienced 
Finally, this last explanatory section deals with the issue treated in the ‘top of the 
mind’ section above: the relation between perceived wage levels (‘do earn’) and 
just wage levels (‘should earn’). The results of that section showed that there is a 
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strong correlation between the two, but on the other hand, it was quite clear that 
respondents do not simply extrapolate from ‘do earn’ to ‘should earn’. Instead, ‘do 
earn’ seems to form a mental anchor from which respondents take a considered 
stand on ‘should earn’.  
To summarise the more theoretical background: it is a standard argument within 
social psychology that how the context is perceived is important for attitudes. It 
affects how individuals form meaning and find identity in their situation (Knudsen, 
2001). Moreover, social psychology theory emphasises that people will go to great 
lengths to uphold the belief that they live in a just world. As such, they will post-
rationalise and attempt to justify the reality they experience, including the 
distribution of gross incomes, in order to make it fit the dictum that the world in 
which they live is actually just (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Lerner, 1980).  
In this light, it seems obvious that the actual degree of differences in levels of 
inequality in gross wages between occupations—and maybe more importantly the 
perception of the size of this difference—should be crucial for attitudes as to how 
big the differences should be for an individual in this country. In addition, the items 
Q8a-b could be seen as a test for the adaption hypothesis. If a respondent lives in a 
society where people perceive the level of inequality in gross wages to be high, then 
the adaption mechanism could be assumed to lead to two outcomes. First, as 
already mentioned, people need to legitimise the level of inequality in itself, and 
second, it is likely that they also need to legitimise some of the likely outcomes of 
living in an unequal society. Two such likely outcomes are that the richer strata can 
buy better healthcare and education for their children, than most people in society 
can.  
In any case the question is obviously still whether the Scandinavian egalitarianism 
disappears upon controlling for the perceived level of inequality in gross wages, or 
do Scandinavians want an even more egalitarian gross wage distribution than they 
perceive. The first scenario would surely still be an interesting result since, as was 
seen in the introduction, the actual wage distributions in Scandinavia are not so 
exceptionally egalitarian in comparative perspective anymore. How and why these 
views of the actual level of inequality in gross wages vary between countries and 
respondents will be a focus in later sections focussing on the three Scandinavian 
countries and in particular, on their media output.  
5.2.2. DATA AND METHODS 
In order to be able to test the different forms of explanatory models presented 
above, different linear multilevel models (MLA)—random intercept (RI) as well as 
random slope (RS)—will be estimated in the following analyses. The notorious 
‘small-N problem’ also affects these analyses. This problem is enhanced somewhat 
by the inevitable respondent dropouts in multiple regression analyses. The number 
of countries included thus drops from 38 to 31 in the analysis below. The number of 
respondents in the ISSP 2009 dataset on the other hand enables us to create models 
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with many individual-level variables simultaneously. However, very big models are 
hardly parsimonious, and would anyway create models severely hampered by 
multicollinearity. Before running the multivariate models, a number of steps will 
thus be conducted to minimise the number of explanatory variables and extract the 
central ones to be included in the multivariate analyses. The methodological 
problems will be discussed along the way. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, 
however, a clear conclusion can be drawn based on the combined results of the 
analyses.  
5.2.2.1 Dependent Variable 
In the analyses that follow, the ‘Chairmen vs. Low paid occupations’ index is for 
the reasons elaborated above used as the dependent variable. The index has been 
logarithmically transformed in order to remedy the effects of the extreme outliers in 
the data. 
5.2.2.2 Explanatory Variables – Reducing the Risk of Multicollinearity 
One possible reason for the focus on social cleavages and justice beliefs in the 
existing research is, as mentioned, that the variables present in the datasets of the 
social inequality module are well suited to testing these theoretical models. Firstly, 
the well developed — and in time increasingly comprehensive — ISSP background 
module allows a thorough testing of the social cleavage model. Moreover, the 
variable denoting those who are, have been, or never were trade-union members 
forms the basis of the test of the effect of trade-union movements. Trade-union 
density is estimated simply by aggregating a dummy for current/former trade-union 
membership.  
Secondly, as demonstrated above, basically all of the attitudinal variables apparent 
in the ISSP 2009 dataset are connected to the different justice beliefs and their sub-
dimensions. In the analyses below, they are therefore in principle all relevant as 
possible explanatory variables for Scandinavian egalitarianism. Thirdly, to measure 
the effect of the perceived level of inequality in gross wages, a measure equivalent 
to the dependent variable is thus created by use of the items indicating what the 
respondents believe the same occupations actually earn on average.  
As also mentioned, it is clear that it is imperative to deal somehow with this maze 
of possible explanatory variables before we enter them into the actual MLA 
regression equations. This will be done in a number of ways. In order to simplify 
the following analysis, minimise the likelihood of estimating models with severe 
multicollinearity, and enhance the validity of the concepts, the first step is therefore 
merging the 33 attitudinal variables into a number of additive indexes (Agresti & 
Finlay, 2009). This process is the subject of the subsequent sub-section. Forming 
these indexes, the variables are joined into factors via a factor analysis. The 
reliability of these factors is then tested in reliability tests. On this basis the factors 
are corrected before creating the final indexes.  
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A shorter subsection will thereafter finally deal with a few variables from the social 
cleavage model that deserve special attention. This is first and foremost the creation 
of useful variables for household and personal income on the basis of the national 
income variables in the ISSP 2009 dataset, and secondly, it is the creation of a 
variable measuring the ‘objective’ social class position of the respondent. 
Identification of Common Factors underlying the Attitudinal Variables 
in ISSP 2009 
The attitudinal variables in ISSP 2009 are all ordinal-scaled and all – except the 
four items of Q9 – have exactly five categories. It is therefore possible to include all 
attitudinal variables except the four items of Q9 in the same factor analysis. A 
separate analysis of the items of Q9 will be also conducted. The results of this large 
factor analysis can be seen in Table 5-8 below.   
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 T
a
b
le 5
-8
 F
a
cto
r A
n
a
lysis o
f a
ll F
ive-C
a
teg
o
ry O
rd
in
a
l-S
ca
led
 V
a
ria
b
les in
 IS
S
P
 2
0
0
9
 
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t 
1
 
2
 
3
 
4
 
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
9
 
Q
1
a G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: H
o
w
 im
p
o
rta
n
t is co
m
in
g
 fro
m
 a w
ea
lth
y
 fa
m
ily
?
 
.4
7
6
 
-.0
1
7
 
-.0
2
2
 
-.0
1
8
 
.1
0
9
 
.5
0
7
 
.0
6
6
 
.0
5
9
 
-.0
8
0
 
Q
1
b
 G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: H
o
w
 im
p
o
rta
n
t is h
a
v
in
g
 w
e
ll-ed
u
cated
 p
are
n
ts?
 
.1
8
1
 
.0
4
3
 
-.0
6
7
 
.0
6
5
 
.1
2
2
 
.7
4
3
 
.0
4
1
 
.0
3
8
 
.0
4
9
 
Q
1
c G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: H
o
w
 im
p
o
rta
n
t is h
a
v
in
g
 a g
o
o
d
 ed
u
catio
n
 y
o
u
rse
lf?
 
-.0
3
4
 
-.0
0
9
 
.0
2
7
 
.0
1
4
 
.0
4
1
 
.6
6
4
 
-.0
1
3
 
-.0
0
3
 
.3
7
1
 
Q
1
d
 G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: H
o
w
 Im
p
o
rta
n
t is h
a
v
in
g
 a
m
b
itio
n
?
 
.0
5
3
 
.0
1
8
 
.0
5
8
 
-.0
8
6
 
-.0
5
1
 
.1
3
1
 
-.0
5
3
 
.0
4
7
 
.7
6
1
 
Q
1
e G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: H
o
w
 im
p
o
rta
n
t is h
a
rd
 w
o
rk
?
 
-.0
7
9
 
-.0
4
8
 
.1
3
0
 
-.0
2
3
 
-.0
2
5
 
.0
4
5
 
.0
0
7
 
.0
2
7
 
.7
7
9
 
Q
1
f G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: H
o
w
 im
p
o
rta
n
t is k
n
o
w
in
g
 th
e rig
h
t p
eo
p
le
?
 
.6
4
2
 
-.0
5
1
 
.0
4
3
 
.0
6
2
 
-.0
8
7
 
.1
6
1
 
.0
1
8
 
-.0
0
5
 
.1
5
8
 
Q
1
g
 G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: H
o
w
 im
p
o
rta
n
t is h
a
v
in
g
 p
o
litica
l co
n
n
ectio
n
s?
 
.7
9
1
 
.0
2
4
 
.0
1
5
 
.0
4
6
 
-.0
8
8
 
.1
0
4
 
-.0
2
0
 
.0
8
4
 
-.0
0
8
 
Q
1
h
 G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: H
o
w
 im
p
o
rta
n
t is g
iv
in
g
 b
rib
es?
 
.7
3
2
 
.0
2
0
 
.0
3
2
 
-.0
2
9
 
.0
6
9
 
-.1
0
7
 
.0
0
5
 
.1
7
1
 
-.1
0
9
 
Q
1
i G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: H
o
w
 im
p
o
rta
n
t is a p
erso
n
´s race
?
 
.1
3
4
 
-.0
0
6
 
-.0
0
2
 
-.0
5
2
 
-.0
2
1
 
-.0
2
8
 
-.0
2
6
 
.8
0
9
 
.0
2
2
 
Q
1
j G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: H
o
w
 im
p
o
rta
n
t is a p
erso
n
´s re
lig
io
n
?
 
-.0
6
3
 
-.0
0
7
 
-.0
3
3
 
.0
5
8
 
.0
0
5
 
-.0
3
9
 
.0
2
8
 
.8
3
9
 
.0
1
6
 
Q
1
k
 G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: H
o
w
 im
p
o
rta
n
t is b
e
in
g
 b
o
rn
 a m
a
n
 o
r a w
o
m
a
n
?
 
.0
3
3
 
-.0
2
8
 
.0
1
0
 
-.0
4
6
 
.0
4
1
 
-.0
0
8
 
-.0
2
7
 
.8
1
3
 
.0
2
3
 
Q
2
a G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: T
o
 g
et a
ll th
e w
a
y
 to
 th
e to
p
 in
 <
R
s co
u
n
try
>
 to
d
a
y
, y
o
u
 h
a
v
e to
 
b
e co
rru
p
t. 
.4
4
1
 
-.0
9
5
 
.0
3
2
 
.0
0
2
 
.4
4
2
 
-.1
5
9
 
-.0
2
7
 
-.0
6
4
 
-.0
4
2
 
Q
2
b
 G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: In
 <
R
s co
u
n
try
>
 o
n
ly
 stu
d
e
n
ts fro
m
 th
e b
est seco
n
d
ary
 sc
h
o
o
ls 
h
a
v
e a g
o
o
d
 c
h
a
n
ce to
 o
b
ta
in
 a u
n
iv
e
rsity
 e
d
u
catio
n
. 
.0
0
1
 
-.0
8
1
 
-.0
2
7
 
.1
1
4
 
.7
2
5
 
.0
8
5
 
.0
9
2
 
.0
7
6
 
.0
3
1
 
Q
2
c G
ettin
g
 a
h
ead
: In
 <
R
s co
u
n
try
>
 o
n
ly
 th
e ric
h
 can
 a
ffo
rd
 th
e co
sts o
f atte
n
d
in
g
 
u
n
iv
ersity
. 
.0
2
8
 
-.1
6
4
 
-.0
0
1
 
.0
5
9
 
.7
6
1
 
.0
4
2
 
.0
5
3
 
.0
0
5
 
.0
4
7
 
Q
2
d
 
G
ettin
g
 
a
h
ead
: 
In
 
<
R
s 
co
u
n
try
>
 
p
eo
p
le
 
h
a
v
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
c
h
a
n
ces 
to
 
e
n
te
r 
u
n
iv
ersity
, re
g
ard
less o
f th
e
ir g
e
n
d
er, eth
n
icity
 o
r so
cia
l b
ack
g
ro
u
n
d
. 
.1
0
7
 
-.0
5
1
 
-.0
8
1
 
.1
5
3
 
-.5
4
6
 
-.1
0
7
 
.2
0
2
 
-.0
4
1
 
.1
7
8
 
Q
6
a D
iffere
n
ces in
 in
co
m
e in
 <
R
s co
u
n
try
>
 are to
o
 larg
e. 
.0
2
4
 
-.6
5
7
 
.0
3
5
 
.0
0
4
 
.1
6
2
 
-.0
4
1
 
.0
0
7
 
-.0
1
2
 
.0
7
0
 
Q
6
b
 It is th
e resp
o
n
sib
ility
 o
f th
e g
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t to
 re
d
u
ce th
e d
iffere
n
ces in
 in
co
m
e
 
b
etw
een
 p
eo
p
le w
ith
 h
ig
h
 in
co
m
es a
n
d
 th
o
se w
ith
 lo
w
 in
co
m
es. 
.0
1
2
 
-.6
8
5
 
-.0
3
7
 
.1
3
7
 
.1
1
9
 
-.0
0
8
 
-.0
4
1
 
.0
2
3
 
.0
0
8
 
Q
6
c T
h
e g
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t sh
o
u
ld
 p
ro
v
id
e a d
ecen
t sta
n
d
ard
 o
f liv
in
g
 fo
r th
e u
n
e
m
p
lo
y
ed
. 
-.0
9
9
 
-.6
7
7
 
-.0
1
1
 
.0
9
9
 
-.1
0
7
 
.1
3
9
 
.0
4
8
 
.1
2
0
 
-.1
0
4
 
Q
6
d
 T
h
e g
o
v
ern
m
e
n
t sh
o
u
ld
 sp
e
n
d
 less o
n
 b
en
e
fits fo
r th
e p
o
o
r. 
.0
3
8
 
.3
6
6
 
-.1
4
4
 
.1
9
5
 
.2
5
7
 
-.1
8
4
 
.1
4
8
 
.0
4
0
 
.2
1
2
 
Q
7
a T
ax
: D
o
 y
o
u
 th
in
k
 p
eo
p
le w
ith
 h
ig
h
 in
co
m
es sh
o
u
ld
 p
a
y
 a la
rg
er sh
are o
f th
e
ir 
in
co
m
e in
 ta
x
es th
a
n
 th
o
se w
ith
 lo
w
 in
co
m
es? 
.0
2
2
 
-.6
0
5
 
-.0
1
1
 
-.0
2
6
 
.0
3
5
 
-.0
7
4
 
.0
0
3
 
-.0
2
2
 
.0
5
4
 
Q
7
b
 T
a
x
: G
e
n
e
ra
lly
, h
o
w
 w
o
u
ld
 y
o
u
 d
escrib
e ta
x
es in
 <
R
s co
u
n
try
>
 to
d
a
y
 fo
r th
o
se
 
w
ith
 h
ig
h
 in
co
m
es? 
-.1
5
5
 
.4
6
9
 
.0
4
4
 
.0
6
6
 
-.0
3
7
 
.1
3
8
 
.1
7
4
 
.1
6
5
 
-.0
4
6
 
Q
8
a Ju
st o
r u
n
ju
st - th
a
t p
eo
p
le w
ith
 h
ig
h
e
r in
co
m
es ca
n
 b
u
y
 b
ette
r h
ea
lth
 care th
a
n
 
p
eo
p
le w
ith
 lo
w
er in
co
m
es?
 
-.0
0
2
 
.0
0
7
 
.0
3
5
 
-.0
8
6
 
-.0
0
7
 
.0
1
2
 
.9
3
6
 
.0
0
7
 
-.0
5
5
 
Q
8
b
 Ju
st o
r u
n
ju
st - th
at p
eo
p
le w
ith
 h
ig
h
er in
co
m
es ca
n
 b
u
y
 b
ette
r ed
u
catio
n
 fo
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 th
a
n
 p
eo
p
le w
ith
 lo
w
er in
co
m
es?
 
-.0
0
2
 
-.0
2
1
 
.0
2
3
 
-.0
7
1
 
.0
1
0
 
.0
0
0
 
.9
5
2
 
-.0
2
2
 
-.0
2
6
 
Q
1
2
a Im
p
o
rta
n
t fo
r p
ay
: H
o
w
 m
u
c
h
 resp
o
n
sib
ility
 g
o
es w
ith
 th
e jo
b
?
 
-.0
1
4
 
.0
1
6
 
.7
1
5
 
-.0
6
7
 
.0
2
5
 
.1
0
7
 
.0
2
9
 
-.0
3
3
 
-.0
5
2
 
Q
1
2
b
 Im
p
o
rta
n
t fo
r p
a
y
: th
e n
u
m
b
e
r o
f y
ea
rs sp
en
t in
 ed
u
catio
n
 a
n
d
 tra
in
in
g
?
 
-.0
5
2
 
.0
1
3
 
.4
1
2
 
.3
0
7
 
.0
0
1
 
.2
8
4
 
.0
4
5
 
.0
4
9
 
-.0
6
8
 
Q
1
2
c Im
p
o
rta
n
t fo
r p
ay
: w
h
a
t is n
eed
ed
 to
 su
p
p
o
rt a fa
m
ily
?
 
-.0
0
7
 
-.0
4
3
 
.0
2
9
 
.8
9
4
 
.0
1
8
 
.0
1
8
 
-.0
7
1
 
-.0
1
6
 
-.0
4
1
 
Q
1
2
d
 Im
p
o
rta
n
t fo
r p
a
y
: w
h
eth
er th
e p
erso
n
 h
as ch
ild
re
n
 to
 su
p
p
o
rt?
 
.0
5
0
 
-.0
5
3
 
.0
2
5
 
.8
9
1
 
-.0
1
4
 
-.0
1
5
 
-.0
7
5
 
.0
0
8
 
-.0
6
4
 
Q
1
2
e Im
p
o
rta
n
t fo
r p
ay
: h
o
w
 w
ell h
e o
r sh
e d
o
es th
e jo
b
?
 
.0
6
3
 
.0
1
1
 
.8
0
7
 
-.0
0
4
 
.0
0
5
 
-.1
4
3
 
-.0
0
8
 
-.0
1
2
 
.0
9
9
 
Q
1
2
f Im
p
o
rta
n
t fo
r p
a
y
: H
o
w
 h
ard
 h
e o
r sh
e w
o
rk
s at th
e jo
b
?
 
.0
4
7
 
-.0
0
5
 
.7
5
0
 
.0
9
9
 
.0
1
1
 
-.1
6
8
 
.0
1
1
 
.0
1
5
 
.1
5
7
 
N
o
tes: E
x
tractio
n
 M
eth
o
d
: P
rin
cip
al C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t A
n
aly
sis. R
o
tatio
n
 M
eth
o
d
: O
b
lim
in
 w
ith
 K
aiser N
o
rm
alizatio
n
. K
M
O
 an
d
 B
artlett’s test=
0
.7
7
3
*
*
*
. 
V
ariab
les fo
rm
in
g
 a facto
r are m
ark
ed
 in
 b
o
ld
. A
u
th
o
r’s o
w
n
 calcu
latio
n
s.  
S
o
u
rce: S
o
cial In
eq
u
ality
 M
o
d
u
le IV
 (2
0
0
9
) o
f th
e In
tern
atio
n
al S
o
cial S
u
rv
ey
 P
ro
g
ram
 (IS
S
P
).  
 
CHAPTER 5. AGGREGATED SURVEY RESULTS 
 143 
The overall results of Table 5-8 are that nine factors can be identified which are 
based on the 29 attitudinal variables originally entered into the model. The high and 
significant KMO value also indicates that the variables clearly correlate and clump 
into factors.  
The first factor, containing Q1f-g and Q2a, contains one of the possible limitations 
of the success ideology identified above, namely, whether one believes society is 
corrupt and one needs nepotistic connections in order to advance.  
The second factor contains all items of Q6 and Q7. As described above, these 
constitute an alternative and less direct measure of political affiliation. All these tap 
into classic questions of the economic dimension of politics. Because of its 
centrality, the relative measure of Q6a will be subtracted from the combined 
measure of Q6 and Q7, though.  
The third factor contains the items Q12a, b, e and f. These items tap as described 
above into the market justice norms, which say that rewards should be proportional 
to effort. Effort is here defined as: responsibility, education and training as well as 
hard work and doing well on the job. 
The fourth factor measures the need justice belief. It therefore measures whether a 
person’s wage level should be influenced by whether he or she has children or a 
family to support. The items are Q12 c and d.  
The fifth factor is once again in the category of limitations to believing in the 
success ideology. It contains the items Q2b, c and d and deals with whether the 
respondents believe that equal opportunities exist for people to enter university.  
The sixth factor also seems to concern limitations to believing in the success 
ideology and contains the items Q1a, b and c. The items ask whether having rich or 
well-educated parents, or having a good education yourself, is crucial to getting 
ahead.  
The seventh factor contains the two items from Q8 asking whether it is fair that 
people with high incomes can buy better healthcare or education for their children 
than others can. This was above operationalised as an alternative operationalisation 
of the market justice norms also found in the items of the third factor.  
The eighth factor – as do factors 1, 5 and 6 – deals with limitations to believing in 
the success ideology. The items Q1i, j and k capture different kinds of 
discrimination according to race, religion or gender.   
Finally, the ninth factor as described above measures the pure success ideology 
statements – that ambition and hard work are crucial to getting ahead (Q1d and e).  
- 
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The factors revealed by the analysis matched surprisingly well the expectations 
from the theoretical section above. One thing that is perhaps a bit surprising is that 
so many different factors appeared. As many as four different factors for limitations 
to success ideology appeared. It could have been expected that these items would 
clump into fever factors.  
The correlation matrix below also clearly shows that the four items of Q9 
measuring perceived social conflict clearly form a factor as well.  
Table 5-9 Correlation Matrix of the Four Items of Q9 in ISSP 2009 
 Q9a Q9b Q9c Q9d 
Q9a Conflicts: between poor people and rich people? 
1.000 .580 .521 .668 
Q9b Conflicts: between the working class and the middle class? 
.580 1.000 .514 .466 
Q9c Conflicts: between management and workers? 
.521 .514 1.000 .564 
Q9d Conflicts: between people at the top and people at the bottom? 
.668 .466 .564 1.000 
Notes: KMO and Bartlett’s test=0.769***.  
Source: Social Inequality Module IV (2009) of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP).  
 
The 10 factors identified in Tables 5-8 and 5-9 were in the following procedures 
gathered into indexes. A number of variables in this process were ‘turned around’ in 
order to create meaningful additive indexes. Reliability tests of these preliminary 
indexes were then conducted. On the basis of these tests the indexes were corrected. 
The reliability tests of the 10 factors in overall terms show that the factors function 
well as indexes, although in four cases an item was removed from the initial 
factors.
55
 In the variable description in Table 8-14 in Appendix A, information can 
                                                          
55 The statistical reliability measured by Cronbach’s alpha can be increased in four of the 
factors by subtracting a variable from the indexes. Firstly, Cronbach’s alpha can be increased 
by as much as 0.1 by subtracting a variable from factor 1 and 5. In factor 1, the item Q2a is 
subtracted. This also makes conceptual sense since, where items Q1f-g measure views about 
nepotism, Q2a more generally measures views about whether the society is corrupt. In factor 
5, the item Q2d is removed. It measures discrimination barriers for entering university, 
instead of social background barriers of Q2b-c, so also this makes some conceptual sense. 
Concerning factor 3 and 6, Cronbach’s alpha only increases minimally by removing a 
variable, therefore a conceptual discussion must surely be the determining factor. In factor 3, 
the reliability is increased slightly by removing Q12b. This item measures achievements in 
the form of education, and not responsibility, hard work or doing well as the other three 
items in the factor. This is maybe a slightly more elitist conceptualisation of achievements 
than the other three. This conceptual difference prompts the removal of also this item. In 
factor 6, the factor to be removed is the effect of your own education in getting ahead (Q1c). 
This is clearly conceptually different from the two other items – having wealthy or well-
educated parents. The item is therefore removed before creating the final index.  
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be found on the construction of these 10 final indexes, as well as on all other 
constructed or recoded variables.  
Operationalising Income and Social Class  
For each country there is a variable denoting household income and one denoting 
personal income. These are continuous and given in national currencies. As the case 
was in the descriptive analyses above, one cannot therefore just merge the national 
variables into two cross-country income variables – the scores for each country 
would be on very different scales. It is therefore imperative to standardise the 
national scores before merging. For both the household and personal income 
variables, the process has therefore proceeded in two identical steps. For each 
nation and for both household and personal income, a standardised national income 
variable has first to be constructed. This is done by dividing the respondent’s 
income score by his/her country’s median income score, as calculated on the same 
variable in the dataset. These national variables then denote how big a proportion of 
the country’s median income the respondent earns in household or personal income. 
These new standardised national income variables are therefore on the same scale, 
and secondly, they are merged into a cross-national household income variable and 
a cross-national personal income variable.  
As mentioned above, the variable for ‘objective’ class location – the European 
Socio-economic Classification schema or ESeC) – is constructed according to the 
recoding algorithms provided by the ESeC consortium (Harrison & Rose, 2006; 
Rose & Harrison, 2007). Since the days of Karl Marx and Max Weber, social class 
has been a key concept in sociology and the social sciences in general. Who 
belongs to different classes, which classes actually exist, and how we can precisely 
define and measure social classes, have always been matters of controversy 
(Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996; Ganzeboom & 
Treiman, 2003; Harrison & Rose, 2006; Harrits, 2013; Rose & Harrison, 2007; 
Svallfors, 2004; Svallfors, 2006). Although this discussion will probably continue, 
the European Statistical Office has, as a part of their ‘Statistical Harmonization 
Programme’ and upon the recommendations of an appointed group of experts, 
created a common European Socio-economic Classification scheme (ESeC). The 
classification is a categorisation based on the concept of employment relations as 
well as the most widely used social class scheme – The Erikson-Goldthorpe-
Portocarero scheme (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Rose & Harrison, 2007). The 
ESeC comes in a 10-, 6-, 5- and 3-class model.
56
 The dilemma in actual analyses 
using the ESeC on survey data is obviously the trade-off between using a class 
model with many classes, gaining precision and richness of information in 
measuring many logically distinct classes, but at the same time sacrificing statistical 
significance in having especially higher-ranked classes with very few respondents. 
In this dissertation, a compromise solution has been chosen by using the 6-class 
                                                          
56 See Tables 8-12 and 8-13 in Appendix A for what the different classes more precisely 
entail and how the different class models are related. 
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version. This also secures continuity with, for example, Svallfors (2004; 2006), who 
also uses a 6-class model, albeit a slightly different one.  
In creating the 6-class composite measure, information from four different variables 
in the ISSP 2009 dataset is used. The information is:  
1) whether the respondent is self-employed and if so, the number of 
employees he/she has (NEMPLOY); 
2) if the respondent is not self-employed, then which sector he/she works in, 
or, whether he/she has never worked (WRKTYPE); 
3) whether the respondent supervises others at work (WRKSUP); 
4) finally, the occupation of the respondent expressed in ISCO-codes (ISCO-
88).  
In the bivariate analyses below, both the composite measure and the three original 
variables will be investigated. In this way, it is possible to gain a glimpse of the 
possible sources of attitudinal class differences. To prevent multicollinearity in the 
multivariate regression models, only the composite objective class measure will be 
used there though.  
5.2.2.3 Bivariate Correlations with the Dependent Variable 
The purpose of the subsequent subsection is twofold. Primarily it constitutes the 
second step to selecting the relevant variables for the multilevel analyses below. 
This is done by investigating the bivariate correlations between the potential 
explanatory variables identified above and the dependent variable. This 
‘minimisation’ effort should increase both the parsimony of the following models 
as well as minimise respondent dropouts and the risk of multicollinearity. Secondly, 
as described above the variable for ‘objective’ class status was created from four 
original variables in the dataset. Even if the composite measure is used in the 
subsequent multivariate analyses, it is relevant to investigate from which of the 
original variables stems a possible variation on the composite measure on attitudes 
to the level of inequality in gross wages. The variables will be introduced in blocks 
more or less matching their operationalisation in the theoretical sections above, 
starting with the social cleavage model:  
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Table 5-10 Bivariate Associations between Various Possible Explanatory Variables 
for Self-Interest, Social Class, Political Identity and other Background Variables 
and the Dependent Variable: Attitudes to the Level of Inequality in Gross Wages in 
ISSP 2009 
Self-interest Social class, political identity and attitudes 
Level of education 
 
 Social Class 
 
 
- No formal qualification 
 
-.307***  (.039) 
 
- Salariat 
 
.263***  (.183***) 
 
- Lowest formal qual. 
 
-.246***  (-.067) 
 
- Intermediate empl. 
 
.134***  (.099) 
 
- Above low. Formal qual. 
 
-.222***(-.256***) 
 
- Small employers/self-empl. 
 
.144***  (.006) 
 
- Higher sec. compl. 
 
-.156***  (-.077) 
 
- Lower sales & service 
 
-.007 (.068) 
 
- Above higher sec. 
 
-.098***  (-.105*) 
 
- Lower technical 
 
.062*  (-.000) 
 
- University degree (ref.) - - Routine (ref.) - 
Public vs. private sector 
 
 Subjective social class 
 
 
- Government 
 
-.033 (-.151**) 
 
- Lower class -.321*** (-.029) 
 
- Publ. owned firm 
 
-.032 (-.206**) - Working class 
 
-.295*** (-.214***) 
 
- Private 
 
-.041* (-.048) 
 
- Lower middle class 
 
-.232*** (-.141*) 
 
- Self-empl. (ref.) 
 
- - Middle class 
 
-.145*** (-.110**) 
 
  - Upper mid./upper class (ref.) 
 
- 
 
  Self-placement 10 pt. scale .044*** (.028**) 
Supervise others at work 
 
 Vote on last election 
 
 
- Yes 
 
.186*** (.073*) 
 
- Yes 
 
.103*** (-.029) 
 
- No (ref.) - - No (ref.) - 
Work status 
 
 Party affiliation 
 
 
- Employed full time 
 
.014 (-.011) 
 
- Far left 
 
-.105 (-.073) 
 
- Employed part time 
 
-.151*** (-.056) 
 
- Left, centre left 
 
-.006 (.105) 
 
- Employed less than part time 
 
-.064 (-.079) 
 
- Centre, liberal 
 
.075 (.274**) 
 
- Helping family member 
 
.080 (.377) 
 
- Right, conservative 
 
.185*** (.292***) 
 
- Student 
 
-.111* (.292***) 
 
- Far right (ref.) 
 
- 
 
- Outside the labour force (ref.) - Political affiliation index 
 
.128*** (.198***) 
 
  The relative measure 
 
.073*** (.119***) 
 
Household income .042*** (-.004) Trade union membership  
Personal income .005*** (-.005) - Member .037* (-.104*) 
Years of education .020***  (.014**) - Once member .070*** (-.017) 
Number of employees .000 (.001) - Never member (ref.) - 
Other background variables 
Urbanisation 
 
 Marital status 
 
 
- Urban, big city 
 
.151***  (.213***) 
 
- Married 
 
.096*** (-.086*) 
 
- Suburb 
 
.115**  (.119*) 
 
- Widowed 
 
.079** (-.091) 
 
- Town/small city 
 
.080*  (.142**) 
 
- Divorced 
 
.016 (-.160**) 
 
- Country village 
 
.058  (.047) 
 
- Separated 
 
.004 (-.218) 
 
- Home in the country (ref.) - - Never married (ref.) - 
Gender 
 
 Persons in household -.009* (.008) 
- Male 
 
.185*** (.099**) 
 
Hours worked weekly .003*** (.001) 
- Female (ref.) - Age .004*** (-.02*) 
Notes: Fixed effects models. Shown are between-Country Unstandardised Regression Coefficients, with 
Scandinavian Coefficients in Brackets.  Source: Social Inequality Module IV (2009) of the International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP).  
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Table 5-10 shows, unsurprisingly, that it is possible to identify social cleavages in 
attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages in Scandinavia and elsewhere. In 
many cases though, there are quite big differences between the Scandinavian 
coefficients and the overall coefficients of the remaining countries. In general, the 
classic social cleavages seem to matter less for attitudes to the level of inequality in 
gross wages in Scandinavia than they do elsewhere. This can be seen in variables 
measuring income, objective and subjective social class and level of education. On 
the other hand, the sector of employment, as well as the political affiliation of the 
respondent seems to matter more in Scandinavia than elsewhere. The effect of 
objective social class in Scandinavia therefore to a greater extent than elsewhere 
seems to be driven by the sector employing the respondent. The other background 
variables show quite strong effects of urbanisation, gender and age. It is impossible 
to include all these variables in the subsequent multivariate analyses, for if done so 
the models would suffer from massive multicollinearity and the respondent dropout 
would leave us with a very small and not very representative sample. Only the 
following variables will be retained and included in the subsequent analyses: 
 Household income 
 Social class 
 Subjective social class 
 Level of education 
 Trade-union membership 
 The relative measure 
 Age  
 Gender   
Besides the overall arguments mentioned above that it is imperative to minimise the 
number of variables in the multivariate analyses below, there are also more specific 
theoretical as well as empirical arguments for retaining exactly these variables.  
Empirically, they are all among the variables correlating most strongly in the 
bivariate analyses above. Variables such as party- and political affiliation also 
correlate strongly, but unfortunately the dropout is severe including these variables 
in the models. In addition, the relative measure should, as argued above, capture 
most of the political affiliation of the respondent, which is directed at the level of 
inequality in society and is therefore obviously here the most theoretically 
important variable. Urbanisation also correlates quite strongly with the dependent 
variable, but upon controlling for income, educational level and social class, the 
effect of this variable unsurprisingly disappears altogether. Income, social class and 
education should quite validly capture the relevant social background of the 
respondent. The subjective class measure should capture the less objective 
‘identity’ side of the social background of the respondent. The objective and 
subjective social background should correlate, but they are not necessarily alike. 
Trade-union membership is for obvious reasons retained even though it does not 
correlate very strongly. Age and gender correlate quite strongly and are retained as 
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standard controls. Before the multivariate analyses, the attitudinal indexes created 
above are correlated with the dependent variable:         
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All attitudinal indexes except two correlate quite strongly and significantly with the 
dependent variable in Scandinavia and elsewhere. Indexes 3, 6, 7 and 9 actually 
have a stronger effect in Scandinavia than in the other countries in general. This is 
somewhat in line with the indications above: that Scandinavians’ attitudes to the 
level of inequality in gross wages to a greater extent than elsewhere seem to be 
connected with political affiliation and other attitudes of the respondent but, to a 
lesser extent, to classic social cleavages. These speculations and others will be dealt 
with in the subsequent multivariate analyses that try to explain Scandinavian 
egalitarianism statistically.   
5.2.3. ANALYSES 
After the two steps taken above to restrict the number of explanatory variables to 
the most relevant, we are now ready to proceed with building the multivariate 
models designed to attempt statistically to explain Scandinavian egalitarianism 
using the explanatory variables deduced from the above-cited existing literature. 
5.2.3.1 Building a General Model: the Effects of Social Cleavages and 
Justice Beliefs at the Individual Level 
Firstly, we investigate the effect of individual-level variables selected above. The 
analysis will be built hierarchically, with the variables entered in blocks as above. 
To calculate validly the explained variance in MLA, it is crucial that the same cases 
are present in all models. Explained variance is then calculated on a comparison of 
the remaining variance at, respectively, the macro and the micro levels, and the 
variance at the same levels in the so-called zero model. This is an ‘empty model’ 
containing only the dependent variable, but the same cases as the other models 
(Hox, 2010; Lolle, 2004). The final, individual-level RI-model (model 5) forms the 
basis on which all the later models (Tables 5-12 – 5-15) will be built:  
  
- 
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Table 5-12 Individual-Level Explanations of the Variation in Attitudes to the Level 
of Inequality in Gross Wages in ISSP 2009 
 Model 0  Model 1  
 
Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 
Fixed effects       
National-level variables       
Scandinavian   ‒0.77* ‒0.82* ‒0.86* ‒0.86** -0.88** 
Individual-level variables       
Gender (male)   0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
Age (cov.) 
 
  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
Household income (cov.)   0.01*** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01* 
Social Class       
- Salariat   0.17*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
- Intermediate employee   0.13*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
- Small employers/self-employed   0.13*** 0.10** 0.08* 0.08* 
- Lower Sales & Service   0.06* 0.05 0.04 0.04 
- Lower Technical   0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
- Routine (ref.)   - - - - 
Education        
- No formal qualification   -0.22*** -0.19*** -0.17*** -0.15** 
- Lowest formal qualification   -0.17*** -0.13*** -0.11** -0.09** 
- Above lowest formal qualification   ‒0.16*** -0.11*** -0.09** -0.08** 
- Upper secondary complete   -0.07** -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 
- Above upper secondary level   -0.05* -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
- University degree complete (ref.)   - - - - 
Subjective social class        
- Lower class    -0.15*** -0.12** -0.11** 
- Working class    -0.15*** -0.11*** -0.10** 
- Lower middle class    -0.11*** -0.07** -0.07* 
- Middle class    -0.07** -0.05 -0.05 
- Upper middle/upper class (ref.)    - - - 
Trade union membership       
- Member    -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
- Once member    0.01 0.01 0.01 
- Never member (ref.)    - - - 
The relative measure (cov.)    0.07*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
Need ind. 1-5 (cov.)     0.06*** 0.06*** 
Mark. Just. – Just deserts ind. 1-5 (cov.)     -0.08*** -0.08*** 
Mark. Just. - Mon. sh. buy ind. 1-5 
(cov.) 
    -0.05*** -0.05*** 
Succ. Ideo. Ind. 1-5 (cov.)     -0.02 -0.02 
Lim. – Soc. Backg. Ind. 1-5 (cov.)      -0.03** 
Lim. – Ent. Uni. Ind. 1-5 (cov.)      0.04*** 
Perc. Soc. Confl. Ind. 1-5 (cov.)      0.02 
Random effects       
Variance at individual level 0.944*** 0.944*** 0.924*** 0.917*** 0.909*** 0.907*** 
Variance at national level 0.312*** 0.268*** 0.265*** 0.262*** 0.248*** 0.253*** 
Intra-class correlation (country) 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Explained variance at individual level ‒ 0% 2% 3% 4% 4% 
Explained variance at national level ‒ 14% 16% 16% 21% 19 % 
Notes: Multilevel analysis (random intercept models). Unstandardised regression coefficients and random effects. The 
dependent variable is created by taking, for each respondent, the natural logarithm of the ratio between the chairman of 
a large national corporation and an average of the statements for a shop assistant and an unskilled factory worker. 
Because the covariates and factors in the models have not been logarithmically transformed, they denote an estimated 
percentage difference regarding the dependent variable. For a factor, this is between a certain group and the reference 
group. For a covariate, it is the estimated percentage effect of rising one step on the covariate scale. Model 0 is an 
empty model; Model 1 only contains the Scandinavian dummy; in Model 2, variables indicating the social and 
compositional background of the respondents variables are added; in Model 3, variables indicating subjective social 
class, trade union membership and political affiliation are added; in Model 4 the selected justice belief indexes are 
added and finally in model 5 the indexes indicating limitations to success ideology and perceived social conflicts are 
added. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, N (national level) = 31, n (individual level) = 18,149. 
Source: Social Inequality Module IV (2009) of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). 
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In Table 5-12, the Scandinavian dummy remains practically unchanged from Model 
1 to Model 5. Scandinavians are on average estimated to score slightly more than 
80 per cent lower on the dependent variable than an average respondent from the 
other countries. If anything the Scandinavian egalitarianism is not explained, but 
rather suppressed by the variables entered in the models above. This was already 
indicated in Table 5-11 by the slightly stronger coefficients of some of the justice 
belief indexes in Scandinavia than elsewhere. The Scandinavian egalitarianism 
therefore does not appear to be explained by social cleavages, justice beliefs or 
simple main effects of high trade-union density rates. While the effects of the 
variables denoting social cleavages in Models 2 and 3 were expected theoretically, 
it was maybe surprising that Scandinavian justice beliefs hardly seem exceptional. 
Were this the case, the Scandinavian dummy would either be increased or 
explained. It should also be emphasised that this is not due to the variables not 
being associated with the dependent variable. As seen in Tables 5-10 – 5-11, all 
variables in the models do bivariately correlate quite strongly with the dependent 
variable.
57
  
There are also some other results of Table 5-12 worth noticing. First of all, and 
maybe somewhat surprisingly, almost all explanatory variables entered in the 
models above appear as clear independent effects remaining mostly unchanged 
across the models. This seems to make the elaborate path-model approach of 
Szirmai (1986; 1991), which we decided not to follow, redundant anyway. The rule 
applies to the various variables measuring objective as well as more subjective 
social cleavages in models 2 and 3, and to the justice beliefs, the limitations and the 
perceived social conflict indexes in models 4 and 5. The effect of subjective class 
position is therefore, as above indicated, also not the same as the objective social 
background of the individual.   
The notable exceptions are obviously the bivariate main-effects of trade-union 
membership apparently captured by the social cleavage variables. Alternative 
models excluding the two other variables of model 3, and including them in turn, 
were also tested. It is apparent that the effect of trade union-membership is more or 
less unchanged when the objective cleavages in model 2 are controlled for. It 
disappears after including these two more subjective variables in model 3 though. 
This seems to be somewhat in accordance with the theses above. The effect of 
trade-union membership is not a proxy for labour-market position as a social 
cleavage. Instead, its effect could be political – changing attitudes of the members. 
This does on the other hand not rule out self-selection effects of applying for trade-
                                                          
57 Drawing the conclusion, it is important to recall that the variables in the ISSP 2009 dataset 
were ill-equipped to measure citizenship-based equality justice beliefs. We therefore cannot 
be sure that Scandinavian egalitarianism would not to a somewhat greater extent be 
explained statistically, if such variables were present.   
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union membership. The other two exceptions are the ‘success ideology’ and the 
‘perceived social conflicts’ indexes.   
The coefficients displayed in Table 5-12 are overall between-country main effects. 
It is thus important to keep in mind that the RI-models above make the rather 
unlikely assumption of similar average effects of factors and covariates across 
countries. As proposed above, it is therefore in theory possible that the RI-models 
of Table 5-12 hide the fact that the justice beliefs correlate differently with the 
dependent variable in the Scandinavian countries than elsewhere. In fact, the 
existence of crucial between-country main effects explaining Scandinavian 
egalitarianism is ontologically at odds with the complex and contextual ontology 
elaborated in Chapter 2.  
Statistically, Scandinavian contextual effects of justice beliefs that are markedly 
different from elsewhere have been hard to locate, though. In the RS-models below 
the effect of each of the significant justice belief indexes has in turn been allowed to 
vary between countries. This means that in separate models, each in which the 
effect of a particular justice belief index were allowed to vary between countries, a 
cross level interaction between the Scandinavian dummy and that particular justice 
belief index were constructed. The result is that in the few cases where a significant 
variation in the effect of a given justice belief covariate can actually be found 
(statistically speaking this is a significant variance parameter between the slopes), 
in neither case has the cross-level interaction explained any of this variance. This 
means the justice belief indexes do not have a statistically significant different 
effect on attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages in the Scandinavian 
countries from elsewhere. Again, this does not mean that citizenship-based equality 
justice beliefs should not have a stronger statistical effect on attitudes to the level of 
inequality in gross wages in Scandinavia than elsewhere. With the ISSP 2009 
dataset, it is unfortunately not possible to test such a hypothesis. With not much 
gained from the possible micro-level effects of justice beliefs in explaining the 
Scandinavian egalitarianism, we will turn to the possible macro-level effects of 
justice-belief cultures below.  
5.2.3.2 Country-Level Explanations of Scandinavian Egalitarianism   
The following analysis of national-level explanations suffers somewhat from ‘the 
small-N problem’. Thirty-one countries remain after fixating the individual-level 
explanations in Model 5 above. Hox (2010) recommends having at least 30 cases at 
the macro level to be able to trust the estimated effects of the covariates. Since we 
are only just meeting these requirements, the effect of only one national-level 
covariate at a time, in addition to the Scandinavian dummy, will therefore be tested 
in each of the following models. In addition, coefficients significant at a borderline 
0.1 will also be shown in the table.  
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In the following analysis, nine alternative models with eight different country-level 
covariates in addition to the Scandinavian dummy will be presented. Firstly, the 
national means of the significant justice belief indexes from Table 5-12 will be 
aggregated to test whether Scandinavian egalitarianism is really not associated with 
subscription to a specific measurable justice belief on the average—interpreted as 
an expression of a justice-belief culture. An aggregated version of the social 
conflicts index is also presented. In contrast to other insignificant indexes at the 
micro level, this index actually seems to have some macro-level effect.  
Secondly, the trade-union density in the countries will be estimated and tested. In 
Table 5-12, union membership does not appear significant on the micro level, 
regardless of whether it is placed in the model in its original triadic form, or a 
dummy created merging the first two categories. In the bivariate correlations of 
table 5-10, it does though. To test the macro-level impact of trade-union 
movements, a proxy for union density will be estimated by aggregating the mean of 
the dummy for member/former member vs non-member. 
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Table 5-13  shows that among the significant justice belief indexes in Table 5-12, 
only the ‘Market justice – money should buy’ index appears to have some macro-
level or cultural effect on attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages that 
cannot merely be ascribed to the individual-level effect controlled for in the model. 
Furthermore, the aggregated index for ‘social conflicts’ also appears to have some 
macro-level effect—but no micro-level effect. In contrast to the hypothesis, 
countries in which people on average perceive a low degree of conflict between 
social groups therefore also have more egalitarian tendencies than in countries 
where this is not the case. As in Table 5-12, these indexes are mostly unable to 
account for Scandinavian egalitarianism. Taken at face value they do explain 
approximately 15 percent of the Scandinavian dummy each. As the justice belief 
indexes are now tested as individual-level variables in both RI and RS-modes and 
in an aggregated macro-level form, Scandinavian egalitarianism clearly does not 
appear to be connected to a special justice belief culture in general – at least in the 
form of the dimensions it is possible to measure with the ISSP 2009 dataset.  
The estimated trade-union density in Model 8 explains approximately one-quarter 
of the Scandinavian dummy, even if the covariate is not significant. This is hardly 
surprising, since as we saw above the Scandinavian countries, despite the decline 
over the last 20‒25 years, still exhibit extraordinarily high trade-union density rates 
in international comparisons. In an ordinary bivariate OLS-regression analysis, R
2
 
is as high as 0.4 between the Scandinavian dummy and the estimated trade-union 
density. The association can therefore be seen as an expression of collinearity, for 
which reason it is not surprising that trade-union density is insignificant in a model 
with the Scandinavian dummy. In fact, trade-union density has a very strong and 
highly significant effect when the Scandinavian dummy is not included in the 
model.  
5.2.3.3     Do Social Background or Perceived Social Conflicts have a 
Special Effect in Scandinavia or other Union-dense 
Countries? 
In order to test the hypothesis from the section on ‘modelling Scandinavian 
egalitarianism’ we will turn to RS-models. This is necessary, because it was 
proposed in Section 5.2.1.3 that a contingent effect of social background is 
connected with a subscription to non-market criteria in countries with high trade-
union density rates (macro) or with trade-union membership (micro) (Åberg, 1984).  
To test these ideas the models in Table 5-14 below follow a stepwise approach. 
Firstly, the effect of social class or educational level varying between countries will 
be confirmed by a display of significant variance parameters between the slopes of 
the countries (Model 1, 5). It will thereafter be investigated in three alternative 
models whether the effect of social class or education is contingent upon the fact of 
a country being Scandinavian or not (Model 2, 6), the trade-union density (macro) 
(Model 3, 7) or trade-union membership (micro) (Model 4, 8). Thereafter the 
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perceived social conflicts index, which appeared significant in an aggregated 
version above, will be put through the same treatment.  
To an even greater extent than above, the ‘small-N problem’ constrains the analysis 
in estimating RS-models. Hox (2010) thus recommends a minimum of 50 cases on 
the country level if one is interested in cross-level interactions, and a minimum of 
100 cases on the country level for reliable variance estimates. The following 
analyses, with just 31 cases on the country level, are therefore quite limited, and the 
results must be seen as somewhat provisional. With these constraints, it has only 
been possible to allow the effect of one covariate to vary between cases on the 
macro level and to build only one interaction term per model. The models simply 
cannot be estimated otherwise. In addition, the expanded level of significance of 0.1 
from above has been maintained.  
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Tables 5-12 and 5-13 were largely unsuccessful in explaining Scandinavian 
egalitarianism by either social cleavages or justice beliefs at the micro level, nor by 
cultural effects of the same at the macro level. All the models in Table 5-14 display 
significant variance parameters between the slopes. This means the effect of 
household income, social class, educational level or perceived social conflicts on 
attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages actually varies between the 
countries. These variance parameters are largely unexplained by whether a country 
is Scandinavian or not (models 2, 6 and 10), the level of trade-union density 
(models 3, 7 and 11) or whether a respondent is a member/former member of a 
trade union or not (models 4, 8 and 12). Table 5-14 therefore seems to repeat the 
more or less unsuccessful pattern of the two previous tables.  
As with the macro-level effect of perceived social conflicts in model 8 of Table 5-
13, important results hide in the detail. In model 2, a borderline significant 
interaction term appears between social class and the Scandinavian dummy. Firstly, 
this coefficient is at the same level as the estimated main effect of objective social 
class position. This means that in contrast to the countries in general, there is in 
general no effect of social class on attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages 
in Scandinavia. Taking this varying effect of social class between countries into 
consideration, Scandinavian egalitarianism is also estimated to be clearer than in the 
RI-models above. A Scandinavian is now estimated to score 94 per cent lower on 
the dependent variable than an average respondent from the other countries. 
Secondly, because the variance parameter between the slopes in this case is so tiny, 
it only seems the cross-level interaction does not explain this variation at all. In fact, 
this parameter drops from 0.000231 to 0.000210, and so the ‘adverse’ effects of 
class in Scandinavia actually explain around 9 percent of the variation between the 
slopes. Since the three Scandinavian countries only constitute 9.7% of the total 
amount of countries in the sample, and 13.3% of the total amount of valid 
respondents in the analysis, this must be seen as a significant effect.  
Also in model 7 a more clearly significant cross-level interaction between estimated 
trade-union density and the level of education of the respondent appears. In 
addition, the coefficients more or less cancel themselves out. Here around 13 per 
cent of the variance parameter is explained. Finally, in model 10, tentative 
suggestions also appear that the macro-level effect of the social conflicts index 
identified in Table 5-13, which was in the opposite direction to the hypothesis, 
actually to a large extent could be a Scandinavian effect. The main-effect 
coefficient is positive and borderline significant, while the interaction term is 
negative, strong, and significant. Again, the Scandinavian dummy is now not 
significant. This could suggest that the Scandinavian dummy in this model is 
explained to such an extent that it does not appear significant anymore, although the 
statistical limitations described above means that this must be seen as a somewhat 
tentative conclusion.   
Although tentative, these results do seem to repeat the pattern of the bivariate 
analyses of Tables 5-10 – 5-11 above. Objective class differences or cleavages 
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seem to matter less for attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages in 
Scandinavia than elsewhere. In addition, Åberg’s (1984) thesis seems to gain some 
credence if interpreted as a macro-level explanation. In countries where trade-union 
density is high, the highly educated to a greater extent than elsewhere seems to take 
‘the bigger picture’ into consideration and support lower levels of inequality in 
wage levels, than highly educated elsewhere. Lastly, the effects of perceiving the 
society to be characterised by social conflicts between different groups of society 
seem to be different and stronger in Scandinavia than in other comparable 
countries. A crucial question is what happens to these tentative results upon control 
for the crucial ‘mental anchor’ dealt with above – the perceived level of inequality 
in gross wages.   
5.2.3.4 The Self-Legitimising Low Degree of Perceived Level of 
Inequality in Gross Wages   
This final analysis investigates the effect of the perceived level of inequality in 
gross wages (PLI) in several aspects. Most importantly of course is the effect on 
explaining the Scandinavian dummy and the general variation at the micro and 
macro levels. This will be tested both with the PLI as an individual-level variable as 
well as in an aggregated form as a country-level variable (Models 1‒3). Thereafter 
the three tentative effects identified in models 2, 7 and 10 in Table 5-14  above, as 
well as the aggregated effect of the social conflicts index identified in Table 5-13, 
will be controlled for the effect of PLI in models 4-7 below. Lastly, in Models 8‒
11, random slope models with the PLI will investigate whether the effect of this 
covariate varies between countries, and whether this is conditioned by trade-union 
density or by a country being Scandinavian or not. In addition, it will be 
investigated whether the relative measure somehow conditions the relations 
between perceived and just levels of inequality in gross wages.   
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Table 5-15 in many ways presents remarkable results. Firstly, also after controlling 
for the variables fixated from model 5 in Table 5-12 and onwards, the PLI 
unsurprisingly still matters a lot to attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages 
in Scandinavia and elsewhere. Roughly 60 percent of the Scandinavian dummy is 
thus explained in Model 1 after controlling for the micro-level PLI covariate. This 
is far more than in any of the models above. On the other hand, it is worthwhile 
noticing that the Scandinavian dummy is still significant and negative. 
Scandinavians are on average still estimated to score 35 per cent lower on the 
dependent variable than an average respondent from the other countries. This means 
Scandinavian egalitarianism is not solely the result of Scandinavians perceiving 
smaller differences in gross wage levels than elsewhere.  
If we turn to the overall variation between respondents and countries, 42% ‒ 4% = 
38% extra variance on the individual level, and 83% ‒ 19% = 64% of the variance 
on the country level is explained after controlling for the covariate. Model 3 also 
shows that the effect is mainly an individual-level effect as opposed to a country-
level effect. If one trusts the borderline significant macro-level covariate in model 3 
however, the interpretation is that in countries where the respondents in general 
perceive large wage differences, then even the respondents within these countries 
who do not perceive large wage differences, have a tendency to find larger wage 
differences just, than do similar respondents in other countries. Because these are 
continuous variables, this ‘regression towards the mean’ effect also works the other 
way. In countries perceived as egalitarian – such as the Scandinavian countries – 
respondents who perceive large differences in wage levels also have a tendency to 
be more egalitarian than similar respondents in other countries do.  
Secondly, the interesting significant effects identified in Table 5-13 and 5-14 above 
are controlled for the effect of PLI in models 4-7. Firstly, the effect of the 
aggregated index of the existence of conflicts between social groups in Model 7 in 
Table 5-13 is explained by controlling for the PLI in model 4. This is in line with 
Kerr’s (2011) results. He argues that when societies become more unequal, the 
sense of conflict between social groups increases. This also suggests a reversed 
causal direction from Szirmai’s (1986; 1991) system-blaming hypothesis: It is the 
equality in Scandinavia which explain the low feeling of social conflict – not the 
other way around. The interaction between trade-union density and level of 
education in model 6 also appears, after control for PLI, not significant at all. In 
model 5 on the other hand, even after controlling for PLI, there is a borderline-
significant interaction effect between social class and the Scandinavian dummy. In 
addition, the coefficients of the interaction term and the social class main effect are 
still exactly alike. In contrast to other countries, objective social class therefore does 
not seem to have any independent effect on attitudes to the level of inequality in 
gross wages in Scandinavia.
58
 
                                                          
58 As we will see in Chapter 6, this aggregated result hides disaggregated differences. Class 
does matter in Sweden, but not in Denmark and Norway.   
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Thirdly, the clearly significant variance parameter for the slopes in Models 8‒11 
further indicate that the strength of the correlation between PLI and the dependent 
variable at the micro level varies between countries. The clearly non-significant, 
cross-level interactions in Models 9 and 10 at the same time show that this is not 
related to whether a country is Scandinavian or not, nor whether it has a high trade-
union density. The clearest pattern that can be deduced by regressing the PLI 
covariate and the dependent variable for each country individually is that the 
correlation appears to be weaker in the Eastern-European countries than in the 
countries in general.  
A rather remarkable cross-level interaction with the relative measure does seem to 
appear in model 11. The cross-level interaction does manage to explain some of the 
variance between the slopes of the PLI, but not any extra variance on the 
Scandinavian dummy. The interaction can be interpreted in two ways: Firstly, one 
could take a point of departure in the PLI. In this case, the bigger the differences in 
wage levels the respondent perceives, the stronger the correlation between their 
attitudes to the level of inequality in just wages and their more political views on 
the overall income distribution in society. The background for this first 
interpretation is mostly methodological. The items on perceived wages appear 
before the items on just wages, which again comes before the item on the relative 
measure in the ISSP 2009 questionnaire. The perceived-earnings items therefore 
function not just as a mental anchor for the just-earnings questions. They could be 
argued to prime the consciousness of the respondents when they answer the 
statement forming the relative measure. On the other hand, this is not totally in 
opposition to Kerr’s (2011) results just mentioned above. To repeat, he argues that 
when societies become more unequal, the sense of conflict between social groups 
increases. It is not so far-fetched an idea that if people sense a high degree of 
conflict between social groups, their abstract political attention in the form of the 
relative measure, as well their concrete attitudes to the wage levels of these social 
groups, will be highly correlated.     
The second interpretation is based on the assumption that respondents in general 
have consistent attitudes when answering questionnaires.  Theoretically, the idea is 
in line with the justice belief tradition, and the tradition distinguishing between 
values and attitudes. The relative measure could be seen as measuring values to the 
level of inequality in society, which are more abstract and from which the 
respondents more concrete attitudes and perceptions of the level of inequality in 
gross wages to a large extent stem. Therefore, the interpretation goes as follows. 
Economically neo-liberalistic respondents to a high extent disagrees that the 
differences in income in society are two high (this means they score high on the 
relative measure). Because the market ‘clears itself’, and the actual wages levels 
therefore per definition equals the just wage levels, there should a very high 
correlation between PLI and the dependent variable among these respondents.  
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5.3. SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE ON CHAPTER 5 
Åberg (1984), Graubard (1986) and Andersen (1983) in the 1980s claimed that the 
Scandinavians were extraordinarily egalitarian. The empirical findings above 
suggest that the extraordinarily egalitarian attitudes to the level of inequality in 
gross wages in Scandinavia persist today. 
The findings also indicate that this generally cannot be credited to most mainstream 
non-contextual explanations in the existing studies. These are the marginal 
economic utility of the individual and social cleavages in general, individual 
convictions regarding justice and their connection to national narratives/cultural 
justice beliefs – at least the ones possible to operationalise in the dataset. These 
explanations do explain some of the differences between individuals as well as 
between countries, but not Scandinavian egalitarianism (cf. Tables 5-12 and 5-13).  
Probing more deeply, significant results seem to appear. Firstly, while both a 
micro- or macro-level main-effect of trade-union membership as suggested by 
Åberg (1984) is difficult to locate, borderline-significant interaction effects 
describing a diminishing effect of educational level in countries with rising trade-
union density rates appears in Table 5-14. This is one possibility of what could be 
expected following Åberg’s (1984) thesis concerning a shift towards non-market 
criteria in societies with high trade-union density rates. Unfortunately, this 
borderline effect disappears altogether after control for the perceived level of 
inequality in gross wages in Table 5-15. Theoretically, this is a very surprising 
result, as the effect of trade-union densities, in contrast to the effect of social 
cleavages and justice beliefs, actually could be seen as an attempt to model 
something, which at least was uniquely Scandinavian. Because of the much 
aggregated nature of these analyses, much could still be hidden. In the following 
disaggregated analyses focussing only on the two Scandinavian countries, the effect 
of trade union membership will be investigated once more in a strictly Scandinavian 
context.  
In general, the analyses testing existing explanations therefore portrayed many 
‘non-findings’. There were also important findings though. Unsurprisingly much of 
the untamable micro- and macro-level variation was finally explained by 
introducing the perceived level of inequality in gross wages (PLI) as a covariate. As 
the case was also in the ‘top of the mind’ section above, the conclusion is that 
individuals’ perceptions of the actual level inequality in gross wages in their 
country appear to be crucial for their attitudes to the just levels of the same. The 
comparatively quite low actual or rather perceived degree of differences in gross 
wage levels between occupations in Scandinavia therefore seems self-legitimising. 
Furthermore, two other effects in Table 5-15 also point in the same direction. First, 
the effect of the aggregated index for the existence of conflicts between social 
groups found in 5-13 was completely explained after control for the perceived level 
of inequality in gross wages (PLI). Secondly, even after control for PLI, a 
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significant cross-level interaction, with the same size of coefficient as the main 
effect, between the Scandinavian dummy and the objective social class measure, 
remained.  
The various empirical results could suggest a Scandinavian nexus, where a 
perceived – rather than an actual – low degree of inequality in gross wages leads the 
Scandinavians to the following: Firstly, to see their society as quite harmonic 
without major conflicts between social groups; and secondly and more importantly, 
this leads to small attitudinal class differences – and even the higher strata of 
Scandinavians – to be egalitarian, in comparative perspective.  
This does not mean that the Scandinavian nexus is a forever-stable equilibrium 
though. Even if the descriptive analyses seem to reveal a Scandinavian egalitarian 
equilibrium at an aggregated level as having been stable since 1992, the analyses of 
the consensus dimension reveal a potential for big changes. The Scandinavians in 
2009, to a much greater extent than in 1992 and 1999, disagree about just gross 
wage levels for various occupations. A key subject in the coming analysis sections 
is therefore to focus on unravelling the matter of, which are the groups that change 
their attitudes, and in which of the countries.  
On a more general ontological level, the results so far seem to confirm that the 
attitudes of individuals are contingent and possibly changeable over time. This 
statement seems obvious. However, several of the theoretical models presented 
suggest otherwise. The social cleavage model in its simplest forms indicates static 
attitudes directly mirroring the economic interests of individuals. These very strict 
RCT assumptions are obviously softened by, for example, Knudsen (2001) and 
Szirmai (1986; 1991), but the emphasis on static social cleavages remains. Both the 
micro and macro versions of the justice belief model actually emphasise the same 
kind of static attitudes. In the macro versions, individuals are culturally ‘doped’ and 
have a tendency to adopt the values of, for example, American exceptionalism (the 
same could be said about the cultural orientations of countries in the International 
Social Justice Project). In the micro version, individuals are thought to have very 
clear-cut and consistent attitudes that differ only between individuals instead of 
countries or cultures.  
The results oppose this static view. The results of Table 5-15 suggest that the reality 
people perceive matters for their attitudes. One interpretation is that Scandinavian 
citizens express a positive nexus of consistent positive attitudes towards the current 
state of matters in Scandinavia. This positive nexus could also be labelled a self-
reinforcing feedback mechanism. Scandinavians express a perception of their 
societies as dominated by low perceived levels of inequality in gross wages, and to 
be living in quite harmonic societies without major conflicts between social groups. 
This nexus is so positive that it leads even the higher-strata Scandinavians to be 
unusually egalitarian. Alternatively, the effects of the reality people perceive could 
also function as something due to a psychological need to post-rationalise and 
justify the reality perceived to fit the picture of living in a world (a society) that is 
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largely just. In this picture, Scandinavians are exceptionally egalitarian because 
they must justify the very equal distribution of wages they perceive. The 
experimental results of Chapter 4 seems to suggest that most people, at least when 
provoked, take a reflective stand on the issue of just wages. This points more in the 
direction of the first, rather than the second scenario, and is in line with the view of 
human nature described in Chapter 2.  
In any case, the results of Chapters 4-5 indicate that even if Scandinavian 
egalitarianism currently seems stable, it is not necessarily stable or based on an 
unchangeable ‘passion for equality’. Instead, it is contingent and depends especially 
on the development of the context in which the Scandinavians live and therefore, on 
all of the factors and parts of the political economy described in Chapter 3. Chapter 
6 will delve more deeply into the issues of what the descriptions of the developing 
political economies in Chapter 3 mostly focussed on – the differences between 
Denmark and Sweden. 
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CHAPTER 6. DISAGGREGATING 
SCANDINAVIAN EGALITARIANISM 
Chapter 6 changes focus from the aggregated to the disaggregated perspective. The 
analyses of Chapter 5 followed a long line of comparative research comparing the 
Scandinavian countries externally to other especially Western countries. In Chapter 
6, the focus will, instead, be on the internal similarities and differences within the 
Scandinavian block: both the differences between Denmark and Sweden, but also 
the attitudinal patterns of various social groups within the two countries. There are 
both good empirical and theoretical reasons for making this change of perspective. 
The description of the development of the Scandinavian political economies (PEs) 
in Chapter 3 actually focussed primarily on the differences between Denmark and 
Sweden. 
The basic empirical approach of the chapter is to investigate the relationship 
between the medians of various social groups, as well as the standard errors of the 
same groups. The logic behind this approach is central, and will therefore be 
explained before turning to formulating hypotheses for Denmark and Sweden, 
respectively. If, to a great extent, attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross 
wages are structured by a given cleavage in society — e.g. social class — then 
consistent differences in the median levels of the various social classes can be 
expected. At the same time, the standard errors for each of the social classes should 
remain low. This second part is, at first glance, maybe a bit less intuitive, but really, 
the idea is rather simple. A low standard error for a given class signifies little 
variation in how that particular class relates attitudinally to the dependent variable. 
A situation with rather large differences in the medians of, for instance, the social 
classes, but at the same time, small standard errors for each of these classes 
signifies that attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages to a high 
extent are divided according to social class. In such a situation, social class can also 
be labelled as forming a significant and consistent attitudinal cleavage. In the 
situation where social class does not structure attitudes to the level of inequality in 
gross wages, there will not be much consistent difference in the median levels of 
various social classes. At the same time, intra-group variation, and hence standard 
errors of the various classes, will be higher. As described above and below, a 
significant rise in standard errors can be associated with a reflective shock induced 
by an economic crisis.  
In Section 3.7 different scenarios on how the changing PEs of Denmark and 
Sweden, could affect the attitudinal patterns of the countries’ citizens were 
deduced. The first of these of these scenarios is the possibility that the expected 
attitudinal patterns of Denmark and Sweden should not be that different at all, in 
according to recent data. This scenario stems from the idea that attitudes towards 
the level of inequality in gross wages, in both Denmark and Sweden, somehow 
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stem directly from the changes in actual wage dispersion levels and actual class 
structures, where Denmark and Sweden, as seen in the analysis of Section 3.5, are 
not that different anymore. However, this ‘Scandinavian similarity scenario’, 
despite a superficial reading of the results of Chapter 5, does not seem that realistic. 
Section 5.2, and especially the analysis of Subsection 5.2.2.3, indicated that 
Scandinavians’ attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages seem, to a 
higher extent than elsewhere, to be connected to the political affiliation and other 
attitudes of the respondent, but to classic social cleavages to a lesser extent, as the 
Scandinavian similarity scenario presumes.  
Starting with Denmark, it was argued in Chapter 3 that both the historical legacy, 
and hence the historically constructed normative institutions (HCNI), as well as the 
more recent programmatic and material developments in Denmark, were dominated 
by institutionalised class-compromises and consensus. Recent developments in the 
Danish PE do not seem to change this picture dramatically, except perhaps blurring 
potential ideological class divisions even further. The scenario deduced was, 
therefore, that if all of this translates into Danish attitudes towards the level of 
inequality in gross wages, they should to a great extent, be consensual with small 
differences in medians — across social classes. Therefore, even if Danish attitudes 
towards the level of inequality in gross wages are conditioned mostly by the present 
and more material changes in the political economy, an egalitarian, but non-
cleavaged attitudinal pattern is to be expected.  
The analyses of Subsection 5.1.2.4 also revealed that while the Danish and 
Norwegian standard deviations rose tremendously with regard to most measures of 
attitudes towards gross wages from 1999 to 2009, the corresponding Swedish 
standard deviations were quite stable. The rise in standard deviations could 
potentially signify a transition underway in Norway and Denmark in particular. As 
described in Chapter 3, the rise in standard deviations is probably mostly related to 
the financial crisis in the short term. Norway and especially Denmark were hit 
harder by the financial crisis in 2008 than Sweden was (Goul Andersen, 2013). The 
financial crisis could therefore constitute exactly the kind of reality or reflective 
shock modelled experimentally in Section 4.3. The results from applying these 
interventions showed dramatically higher standard deviations in this instance.  
The development in Sweden, on the other hand, does not, seem to be path-
dependent to the same extent as in Denmark. The historical legacy of the PE of 
Sweden is one of ideological class struggles in the IRS, as well as in the 
parliamentary sphere, to a greater extent than in Denmark. While the events of the 
1980s in particular can be seen as a revival of an even more open class struggle, the 
outcome in the last couple of decades has perhaps resulted in signs of a divergence 
from the ideological, class-struggle path. Crucially, both the Swedish IRS and the 
interplay between central actors in the parliamentary sphere over time seem to be 
moving more and more in the Danish direction. Swedish attitudes are therefore at a 
more noticeable watershed than Danish ones. It is an empirical question as to 
whether Swedish attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages will be 
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influenced mostly by the historical ideological class legacy, or by more recent 
developments. If Swedish attitudes are still dominated mainly by the HCNI, they 
could be more dominated median-wise by ideological differences in attitudes, 
following broadly the ‘old’ social classes of society. If, instead, with some lag, they 
start to parallel more recent developments in the Swedish PE, then Swedish 
attitudes should increasingly become consensual across social classes, like the 
corresponding Danish attitudes.  
Sweden suffered less from the financial crisis in 2008 than Norway and especially 
Denmark (Goul Andersen, 2013). The Swedish standard errors in 2009 are 
therefore not expected to increase considerably from 1999 to 2009. Instead, 
Sweden, as described in Chapter 3, had its own severe financial and economic crisis 
in the early to mid-1990s. Following the same logic as concerning Denmark, 
inflated Swedish standard errors could thus be expected in 1992 and 1999, not 
2009. In fact, the results of Subsection 5.2.3.4 do not seem to suggest high Swedish 
standard deviations in 1992, 1999 or 2009. There is therefore also another 
possibility. The class legacy of the Swedish HCNI was probably still quite strong in 
the 1990s. The reality or reflective shock of the crisis in the 1990s, in Sweden, 
could have increased the dispersion of attitudes to wages, in the same way as 
happened to Norway and Denmark in 2009. However, in contrast to these two 
countries, the Swedes might have separated according to the politicised and salient 
social class divisions. This would not necessarily stir up the overall standard errors 
measures, but clear attitudinal cleavages should be identifiable, following more or 
less the classic social classes.
59
  
Based on the elaboration of the Danish and Swedish scenarios above, the analyses 
of Chapter 6 will, like Chapter 3, focus on the differences between Denmark and 
Sweden. The Norwegian case for our purpose again seems less interesting 
theoretically and empirically than the corresponding Danish and Swedish cases. An 
analysis of the Norwegian data, applying the same methods and approach as in this 
                                                          
59 It should be mentioned that there are also other empirical results, which in different ways 
point to a higher degree of politicisation of the issue of wages in Sweden in the 1990s, than 
in other Scandinavian countries. First, a stronger correlation appears between the relative and 
the more absolute measure in Sweden than in the other Scandinavian countries in 1992 and 
1999 (see Table 4-2). Second, the correlation between perceptions of the actual level of gross 
wage inequality and attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages is also somewhat 
weaker in 1999, than it is in other Scandinavian countries. As indicated above, these results 
could signify a politicisation of the issue of wages, because people firstly connect the 
question of wages to their stance on the economic, political left–right scale; hence the 
stronger correlations in Table 4-2. Secondly, people also take a clear stance and separate the 
issues of perceived and just gross wage levels; hence the weaker correlation in Table 4-4. 
Lastly, the Swedes were also found to be much more critical to the perceived wage levels of 
chairmen in 1999 (Table 5-6) than their Scandinavian neighbours. 
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chapter, has however also been conducted. The results are, to a remarkable extent, 
similar to the Danish, but not to the Swedish results. In addition, the Norwegian 
1992 results also largely mirror the 1999 results. For the sake of brevity, the 
Norwegian disaggregated analysis has been cut out. Interested readers can find the 
complete analysis in a downloadable working paper (Kjærsgård, 2012a).     
6.1. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
To investigate the possible scenarios described above, a number of methodological 
considerations are necessary. First, the descriptions of the developing PEs in 
Scandinavia and the above-summarised deduced scenarios are focussed on 
primarily: whether attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages can be 
expected to be divided according to social classes. In spite of the theoretical 
centrality of social classes, this is not the only likely or interesting attitudinal 
cleavage to investigate.  
It seems relevant to investigate how the various generations in Scandinavia relate to 
the issue of the level of inequality in gross wages, and whether this changes over 
time. Older generations were brought up during the heyday of classic Scandinavian 
political economies. Their identity as belonging to a social class might adhere more 
to these experiences than is the case for younger generations. Thus the class identity 
of older Swedish generations is likely to be stronger than that of corresponding 
Danish older generations (cf. Chapters 3 & 4). Obviously, a generational 
perspective is also important to try to detect change in the seemingly stable 
Scandinavian attitudinal patterns revealed in Chapter 5. While older generations 
might retain social class as a central part of their identity, younger generations 
might follow other divisions. A good candidate could, for example, be educational 
groups. These have been suggested to supplant social class as the dominating 
cleavage in late-modern societies (Harrits, 2013). Another possibility is the old, but 
still relevant cleavage between urban and rural areas of society (Zielinski, 2002). 
Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that the central (future) conflict in the Social 
Democratic Welfare State regime is the fight between the large public sector, 
employing mostly women, and the private sector, employing the majority of 
employed men. In short, Esping-Andersen (1990) predicts Scandinavian attitudes to 
be divided along the lines of gender and sector of employment, which also is 
interesting to investigate. Yet another obvious possible compartmentalisation, 
correlated with both class and education, is income. Attitudes towards wages are as 
described in Subsection 5.2.1.1 obviously argued to be influenced by the 
respondents’ own income. Furthermore, because of its contextual and theoretical 
centrality, we will return to the issue of trade union membership. The analyses of 
Chapter 5 failed to produce significant effects of trade union membership or trade 
union density. The question to be investigated below is whether at least the 
Scandinavian countries do not portray different patterns on this central variable.  
- 
 
172 
Lastly, the issue of just wage levels is, as argued in Chapters 1 and 3, also a 
political question. The results of Subsection 5.2.2.3 even seemed to suggest that the 
issue of just wage differences was connected to the political attitudes of the 
respondent in Scandinavia to a higher extent than elsewhere. Following the scenario 
described above, maybe Danes do not deviate in attitudes towards the level of 
inequality in gross wages along the lines of social class. This does not mean that the 
political affiliation, as described in Chapter 4, does not play a major role in the 
belief system of the respondent (Goul Andersen, Andersen, Borre, Møller Hansen, 
& Nielsen, 2007; Shamshiri-Petersen, 2010). In addition, political affiliation was 
not measured directly in the analyses of Chapter 5. The reason is that political party 
affiliation is measured in national variables in the ISSP 2009 dataset, as was the 
case with income. In contrast to income, it is debatable whether you can merge very 
different national political party cleavages into something other than a very crude, 
and ultimately misleading, left–right scale-variable, which is probably why GESIS 
– Leibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences have chosen not to create a cross-country 
variable in the 2009 dataset.
60
 Dealing with only two countries, we can retain and 
use the national party lines reflected in the national political affiliation variables.  
The analyses below will take all of these potential cleavages seriously. There are 
several ways to structure disaggregated comparisons. Since the focus is on 
identifying how the Scandinavian countries differ or are similar, the choice here has 
been to analyse one country at a time: first Denmark, then Sweden. The analyses 
will proceed by disaggregating the scores of each of the two countries on the 
various social groups/cleavages or in other words, the variables mentioned in the 
last paragraph. The structure of each of the three country analyses sections will 
follow more or less how ‘natural’ or unchangeable the following various 
background variables are: 
 Age groups (trying to distinguish between generation, age, and periodic 
effects) 
 Gender 
 Urbanisation 
 Education 
 Objective social class 
 Household income 
 Employment status 
 Trade union membership 
 Political affiliation 
 Subjective social class  
                                                          
60 In the ISSP 1987 and 1999 datasets these are merged into a variable with five categories, 
from far left to far right. In the 1992 dataset, respondents were simply asked about their 
political affiliation from the far left to the far right on a 10-point scale. 
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It is important to emphasise that the logic of this chapter is on identifying possible 
cleavages in Denmark and Sweden and is thus highly descriptive. This is quite 
different from the ‘control logic’ of the multilevel regression analyses of Section 
5.2. The potential cleavages signified in the variables above are likely to be strongly 
correlated, although this is not crucial for the division logic. A 
compartmentalisation between, for example, urban and rural respondents, does 
exist, no matter if it is caused by differences in educational status or not. Before 
concluding the chapter, a split hierarchical regression analysis will be conducted for 
Denmark and Sweden, using the 2009 dataset and the variables in the list above. 
The purpose is to accommodate the control logic, and the obvious question of 
where the divisions identified in the descriptive analyses of the following pages 
stem from.    
The analyses below will focus on just one measure of just one of the dimensions 
investigated in Section 5.1. For the same reason, as retaining it as the dependent 
variable in Section 5.2, the ‘chairmen vs. low-paid occupations’ index will be the 
measure of focus in this chapter. The analyses below are, therefore, more restricted 
than the analyses of Chapter 5: first, the focus is just on one dependent variable, 
instead of a whole range of dependent variables, as in Section 5.1; second, only two 
Scandinavian countries will be investigated, instead of the 19–38 countries in 
Chapter 5. The analyses below are wide-ranging in other ways though.  
The analyses below will widen the time span of the analyses and thus incorporate 
the Swedish 1992 data only used previously in Table 5-5. This data stems from 
ISSP’s Social Inequality module II of 1992. As already mentioned, unfortunately, 
only Norway and Sweden, but not Denmark, participated in this second round of 
the Social Inequality module, and none of the three countries participated in the first 
round in 1987 (ISSP Research Group, 2011), which prevents the possibility of an 
even longer time span. Furthermore, the Swedes were not asked about the salaries 
of shop assistants, which is why a slightly reversed dependent variable is created 
and used in the 1992 dataset. This reflects only the chairman to unskilled factory 
worker gross wage ratio. It does not make much difference though. As can be seen 
in the analyses of Subsection 5.1.2.1, people in general hardly distinguish between 
the salaries of unskilled factory workers and shop assistants. Testing the Norwegian 
results of 1992, with the commonly used dependent variable, also yields almost 
identical results (not shown).  
In each of these analyses, the medians of each ‘social group’ and the standard errors 
of the same will be presented.
61
 For both the medians and standard errors of the 
various social groups compared, there will be a focus on both how the general level 
between the groups is, and how the development over time is. This is necessary in 
order to investigate the effect of the various factors in the scenarios described for 
                                                          
61 For comparison, the same scale will be used in each instance: 1.5–3.5 in medians; 0–1.5 in 
standard errors. 
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Denmark and Sweden above.
62
 For some of the variables below, issues arise of how 
to operationalise them. These will be dealt with along the way. 
6.2. ANALYSES 
As elaborated above, the analyses will proceed with one country at a time, starting 
with Denmark. In very short, the expected scenario for Denmark states that we 
should see a high degree of consensus, as measured by medians. This means that 
the median levels of various social groups — and especially social classes — 
should not be far apart in either 1999 or 2009. The shock of the financial crisis in 
2008 should, on the other hand, lead to increased standard errors for the various 
social groups in 2009, as compared to 1999. 
6.2.1.  DENMARK 
As elaborated above, the first section investigates the effect of generation on 
attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages in Denmark. For all Danish 
analyses, data is restricted to 1999 and 2009, as mentioned above.  
6.2.1.1 Generations 
Before embarking on the empirical results, a classic demarcation, important when 
investigating respondents belonging to different age groups, will be presented. The 
presentation will be based on Hellevik (1991, pp. 378-386). Firstly, age group 
divisions can be understood as an effect linked to the respondents being in a 
                                                          
62 It is also important to mention that there are certain data-wise limitations and 
complications for 1992 and 1999, which we did not need to face in the analyses of the 2009 
dataset, in Section 5.2. The Danish dataset was not included in the integrated dataset of 1999. 
Even if a separate Danish dataset were available, the background variables are not always 
alike, which of course has consequences. The Danish dataset does not contain any 
urbanisation variables, and the education of the respondent is measured in a different and 
more sophisticated way in Denmark, using two questions, both with numerous categories. 
However, these two variables are almost similar to the Danish educational questions of ISSP 
2009. It was possible to create a Danish degree variable also for 1999, using a slightly 
modified version of the syntax used to create the Danish degree variable of 2009. The Danish 
variable for household income in 1999 is categorical and not continuous, like the Swedish 
and Norwegian variables. As will be evident below, this of course has consequences when 
creating comparable measures, and it is not possible to copy the rather elaborate procedure 
for constructing income variables, described in Subsection 5.2.2.2.  Furthermore, the 
Swedish data of 1992 is also clearly not as comprehensive as the corresponding Norwegian 
data. No Swedish data of 1992 is available concerning employment status, household 
income, trade union membership and subjective social class variable, which is why this 
cannot be investigated either. In neither of the two countries was it possible to construct the 
European Socio-economic Classification Scheme (ESeC) variable for objective social class. 
In spite the limitations mentioned, in most cases, reasonable comparative measures for the 
countries have been created, working over quite a long time span. 
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specific age interval, or a certain part of their life cycle. This means a certain 
homogeneity in attitudes can be expected within persons of a specific age span, 
because they share concerns and life experiences; i.e. most of the 25–34 year olds 
share the experience of finding their first real full-time job, being a parent etc. From 
this viewpoint, the formation of an individual’s values is assumed to be heavily 
influenced by near-present experiences of the individual, common interests or a 
gradual socialization process. Secondly, generation effects are very different, in that 
they put a heavy influence on the formative experiences in childhood and early 
youth. Values from this perspective are seen as very static over time at the 
individual level, influenced heavily by the primary socialization process in the 
family, but also secondary socialization processes at school and with friends, plus 
maybe formative political experiences in youth. This tradition argues that people 
growing up in a specific period of history share a common frame of reference, 
sharing the experience of formative ‘mega events’ during their upbringing. This 
branch of sociology has, at a basic level, penetrated to everyday discussions of 
common people. In academic sociology, on the other hand, a great deal of effort has 
been put into trying to define, for example, what actually is a formative experience, 
constituting the reference point for a generation? This discussion surely also entails 
a disagreement on what a generation is, which generations exist and where to draw 
the boundaries between them (Corsten, 1999; Roche, 2003). Not trying to resolve 
this discussion, our demarcation of generations below follows a very pragmatic 
approach: 
 Born before 1945: war and pre-war generations 
 Born 1945–1959: often labelled the ‘baby-boomer’ generation 
 Born 1960–1969 
 Born 1970–1979 
 Born 1980 and thereafter 
This demarcation will be used for both of the two countries. Thirdly, the literature 
on generations and age groups also emphasise the importance of periodic effects. 
Periodic effects are caused by different kinds of events or developments present at 
the time of the investigation one conducts, or in the period leading up to that. In our 
case, it is the development of various parts of the Scandinavian political economies 
and economic crises, which forms the background for the possible period effects 
identified. These periodic effects potentially affect all respondents, independent of 
generation or life-cycle effects. To make matters even more complicated, it is quite 
possible that periodic effects do not affect all age groups in the same way. To use 
statistical terminology, different interaction effects between various generations or 
respondents in a certain age interval and a periodic effect can thus be expected. 
Since the reality often appears to be a mix of various effects, then even when a time 
series is available — as in our case — these effects are often hard to distinguish in 
actual analyses. Lastly, it is also worth keeping in mind that the composition of 
especially the youngest and oldest generation changes over the surveys. First, new 
respondents are added in the youngest generation, as they turn eighteen and can 
- 
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participate in the survey. Second, many members of the oldest cohorts die between 
the surveys, and therefore the composition of the oldest generation also changes 
somewhat. Nevertheless, the basic demarcations are useful tools when interpreting 
outcomes. Keeping these considerations in mind, we will now turn to the empirical 
analyses.    
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Looking at the medians in general, there seems to be no clear divide between 
different generations in either 1999 or 2009. Among all generations, except the 
youngest and the baby-boomer generation, the medians were, in practice, 
unanimous in 2009. The median of the youngest groups rose somewhat between 
1999 and 2009.
63
 The baby-boomer generation
64
  also kept its low median of 1999 
in 2009. The picture could indicate possible age-cleavage emerging among these 
three groups; something that only future data will reveal. Turning to the level of 
intra-age group consensus: in 1999, all generations had very small and almost 
similar standard errors; in 2009, on the other, hand all groups, except perhaps the 
baby boomers, portrayed radically increased standard errors. Interestingly, it was 
especially the oldest respondents, followed by the youngest respondents, who 
showed the largest standard errors: the 65–74 year olds were off the charts, with a 
standard error of 1.9 in 2009. 
If we are to elaborate on the results based on the demarcation between life-circle-, 
generation- and periodic effects, the baby boomers’ development seems to 
correspond with a quite clear generation effect. They median level and standard 
error remains low and practically unchanged from 1999 to 2009. The attitudinal 
mark imprinted in this generation’s youth persists through time, and the mark has 
furthermore been quite equal across the generation’s members, indicated by the 
persistently low standard errors. The results of the other generations can best be 
explained because of a periodic effect, generally leading the majority of the 
respondent in each group towards a common median or equilibrium in 2009.
65
 This 
periodic mark is not as strong or consistent as the mark put on the baby boomers in 
their youth, reflected in the markedly risen standard errors of 2009. The somewhat 
deviant result of the youngest generation could indicate both a generation-, a life-
circle effect and as mentioned the entrance of younger less egalitarian cohorts in the 
generation in 2009. Only future data will show. 
The Danish generational pattern therefore also seems to conform to the scenarios 
described above quite well. First, Danish age groups were extraordinarily 
consensual in both 1999 and 2009, with some signs of an emerging division 
between the youngest generation and the baby boomers in 2009. This could suggest 
that something other than the classic consensual Danish HCNI was affecting the 
youngest generation, and therefore indicates change in the consensual Danish 
model. Second, the financial crisis, as expected, seemed to influence the standard 
errors of all generations tremendously, except the baby boomers, although the 
longer-term effects of this reality and reflective shock remains to be seen. How and 
                                                          
63 It does not matter, whether we call them 18–24 year olds, or born 1980 and after (see 
Figure 8-1 in Appendix B). 
64 In the Danish political debate, this generation, known as the ‘sixty-eighters’, is often 
described as having special political views and orientations. 
65 This is even clearer in Figure 8-1 in Appendix B, following respondents of specific age 
intervals. 
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for how long the media react to the financial crisis is probably important for judging 
whether the Danes, in accordance with a thermostat logic, go back to normal 
attitudinally (Soroka & Wlezien, 2005), or whether the crisis has induced sustained 
path departure in the patterns of Danish attitudes towards the level of inequality in 
gross wages.    
6.2.1.2 Gender 
Figure 6-2 below investigates whether attitudinal cleavages linked to gender can be 
identified in Denmark in 1999 or 2009.  
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What we see is that the male median levels in both years are very similar. Gender is 
clearly not a dominating divide in Denmark, concerning attitudes towards the level 
of inequality in gross wages. However, within each gender, the disagreement 
clearly rises from 1999–2009, as, in particular, males in Denmark seem to move 
towards polarisation. This is not surprising, because the two genders entail all 
generations, so the tendency to rapidly rising standard errors is much less 
outspoken, but still present in Figure 6-2 than in Figure 6-1. 
6.2.1.3 Urbanisation 
Figure 6-3 below investigates whether attitudinal divisions linked to urbanisation 
can be identified in Denmark. As mentioned above, unfortunately there is no 
urbanisation variable in the Danish version of ISSP 1999, so only 2009 results can 
be shown.  
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Although there is not much to tell when there are only data from 2009, the results 
again seem to repeat the patterns above. There is almost no difference in the 
medians, while the standard error of the urban group is markedly higher than the 
two other groups. However, the urban standard error of 0.83 is not at the level of 
the older groups of above. 
6.2.1.4 Education 
Education is, as previously mentioned, argued to be the most prominent cleavage 
existing in late-modern societies. Figure 6-4 below investigates whether cleavages 
linked to education can be identified in Denmark.  
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Median-wise, Denmark, in 1999, had an almost linear effect of education, where 
higher education meant more tolerance for inequality. In 2009, there is a slight 
tendency of a gap appearing between ‘lowest formal’ and ‘above lowest formal’, 
versus the other educational groups. There is thus, in general, a rising tendency, not 
followed by ‘university degree completed’ and ‘above lowest formal’. The 
differences still seem very small, but are as notable as the generational differences 
seen above. Turning to the standard errors of the various educational groups, we see 
clear polarisation tendencies. While respondents with the lowest formal 
qualifications consistently show large standard errors, and above lowest, plus above 
higher secondary education show consistent low standard errors, university degree 
completed and higher secondary complete portray a clear rising trend, in 
accordance with the above. The analysis thus more or less replicates what is found 
above: in 1999, there are very low standard errors for almost all groups. In 2009, on 
the other hand, the standard errors have exploded for a majority of the groups 
investigated. Although there are differences between the groups, deeming education 
to be a significant divide in attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages 
Denmark is clearly not substantiated.  
6.2.1.5 Social Class 
In the analysis below the same 6-class version of the ESeC, as used in Chapter 5, 
will be used to measure social class. The Danish results are portrayed in Figure 6-5 
below.   
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Although median differences between the highest class — the salariat — and the 
two lowest classes emerges in 2009, the differences are, as above small, and 
probably, in most cases, insignificant. The medium-level classes, in between the 
two extremes, are not surprisingly, also placed in between the two extremes in 
2009. The pattern of 1999 is stranger however. Turning to the standard errors, the 
pattern of above with drastically risen standard errors in 2009 is very clear here. If 
one trusts the demarcation, not much class-consciousness seems to be present in 
Denmark in 2009; at least, class-consciousness as measured with the ESeC.  
6.2.1.6 Household Income 
The analyses above tap into quite stable attitudinal cleavages often thought to have 
their base in the socialization processes of childhood or youth. We now move to a 
more experience- or interest-based and volatile view on attitudes, by investigating 
which effect a person’s household income has on his/her attitudes. Unfortunately, 
the variables measuring the household income of the three countries differ a lot in 
the three datasets, which is why comparison has been difficult. As mentioned, the 
Danish variable for household income in 1999 is categorical and not continuous, 
unlike the Swedish and Norwegian variables. The 1992 dataset only contains a 
Norwegian and not a Swedish household income variable, and even for the 
continuous variables, the scales vary.
66
 All of this, of course, has consequences in 
creating comparable measures, and it is not possible to copy the rather elaborate 
procedure constructing income variables described in Subsection 5.2.2.2. To solve 
this dilemma, a very pragmatic approach has been followed. In each case, it has 
been tried as precisely as possible to divide the three samples into five groups: the 
poorest 20 % of the samples’ households; the 20–40 %, 40-60 %; 60–80 %; and the 
richest 20 %. Although the groups in each case do not exactly match 20 % of the 
respondents, especially not when categorical recordings have been used, the results 
should be fairly accurate.
67
 Figure 6-6 below investigates whether divisions linked 
to household income can be identified in Denmark. 
  
                                                          
66 The Norwegians and Danes were asked about gross yearly salaries in their national 
currency, while the Swedes were asked about gross monthly salaries in their national 
currency (ISSP Research Group, 2011). Of course, the general tendency for inflation in all 
countries also makes the value of a certain amount of Danish, Norwegian or Swedish kroner 
change between the three datasets. 
67 See N for the various groups in the notes below Figure 6-6. 
F
ig
u
re 6
-6
 A
ttitu
d
es to
w
a
rd
s th
e L
evel o
f In
eq
u
a
lity in
 G
ro
ss W
a
g
es fo
r D
ifferen
t H
o
u
seh
o
ld
 In
co
m
e G
ro
u
p
s in
 D
en
m
a
rk in
 IS
S
P
 
1
9
9
9
 a
n
d
 2
0
0
9
, m
ed
ia
n
s a
n
d
 sta
n
d
a
rd
 erro
rs 
M
ed
ia
n
s 
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
 E
rro
rs 
 
 
N
o
tes: T
h
e statem
en
ts o
f th
e ch
airm
an
 o
f a larg
e n
atio
n
al co
rp
o
ratio
n
 v
ariab
le are d
iv
id
ed
 w
ith
 an
 in
d
ex
 co
n
stru
cted
 fro
m
 an
 av
erag
e o
f th
e tw
o
 lo
w
est p
aid
 
o
ccu
p
atio
n
s; th
at is, th
e statem
en
ts o
f th
e tw
o
 o
ccu
p
atio
n
s: sh
o
p
 assistan
t an
d
 u
n
sk
illed
 facto
ry
 w
o
rk
er 
are su
m
m
arised
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 tw
o
. L
astly
, th
e ch
airm
en
 
statem
en
ts are th
en
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 th
e lo
w
-p
aid
 o
ccu
p
atio
n
s in
d
ex
. 
N
 (1
9
9
9
): 0
–
2
0
 %
 lo
w
est fam
ily
 in
co
m
es=
1
8
2
; 2
1
–
4
0
 %
=
2
0
7
; 4
1
–
6
0
 %
=
4
3
9
; 6
1
–
8
0
 %
=
2
1
9
; 8
1
–
1
0
0
 %
=
3
1
7
.  
N
 (2
0
0
9
): 0
–
2
0
 %
 lo
w
est fam
ily
 in
co
m
es=
1
8
0
, 2
1
–
4
0
 %
=
1
5
0
; 4
1
–
6
0
 %
=
2
7
2
; 6
1
–
8
0
 %
=
3
0
6
; 8
1
–
1
0
0
 %
=
3
5
6
.  
S
o
u
rces: T
h
e S
o
cial In
eq
u
ality
 M
o
d
u
les (III–
IV
: 1
9
9
9
 an
d
 2
0
0
9
) o
f th
e In
tern
atio
n
al S
o
cial S
u
rv
ey
 P
ro
g
ram
 (IS
S
P
).  
 
 
1
.5
1
.7
1
.9
2
.1
2
.3
2
.5
2
.7
2
.9
3
.1
3
.3
3
.5
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
9
0
-2
0
 %
 lo
w
est fam
ily
in
co
m
es D
en
m
ark
2
1
-4
0
 %
 D
e
n
m
ark
4
1
-6
0
 %
 D
e
n
m
ark
6
1
-8
0
 %
 D
e
n
m
ark
8
1
-1
0
0%
 D
en
m
ark
0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8 1
1
.2
1
.4
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
9
0
-2
0
 %
 lo
w
est
fam
ily in
co
m
es
D
en
m
ark
2
1
-4
0
 %
 D
e
n
m
ark
4
1
-6
0
 %
 D
e
n
m
ark
6
1
-8
0
 %
 D
e
n
m
ark
8
1
-1
0
0%
 D
en
m
ark
                                                                                                                                                                             189
                                                                                                                                                                           
Income was found to matter less for the variation in attitudes to the level of 
inequality in gross wages in Scandinavia than elsewhere in the analyses of Chapter 
5.The patterns of the figures of Chapter 6 so far, again unsurprisingly, seem to 
repeat. The group medians move closer from 1999 to 2009. Only the richest 20 % 
of the respondents stand out a bit from the rest, although the difference is very 
small. The standard errors of the various groups also replicate the above patterns. A 
clear rising tendency can generally be subscribed to the groups: the 21–40 % 
group’s standard error reached a value of 2.17 in 2009. Only the richest 39 % of the 
sampled Danish respondents portrayed more or less stable low standard errors in 
both 1999 and 2009.  
6.2.1.7 Employment Status 
In Figure 6-7 below it will be investigated which effect a Danish respondent’s 
current employment status has on their attitudes towards the level of inequality in 
gross wages. Unfortunately, there are very few unemployed respondents, which is 
why unemployed only appear in 1999 in the figure below. 
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The employment status medians generally behave in the same way as seen above. 
What is seen is thus a move towards equal median levels in 2009. The only group 
deviating —this time markedly — is the students, with a median of 2.75 in 2009, 
which mirrors the youngest generation of Figure 6-1. As seen above with the oldest 
and youngest age groups, the retired and students portray huge rises in standard 
errors from 1999 to 2009. The two employed groups rise, but not excessively.  
6.2.1.8 Trade Union Membership 
Trade union membership theoretically has been argued, in Chapter 5, to be one of 
the few obvious variables to explain Scandinavian egalitarianism on attitudes 
towards the level of inequality in gross wages. Surprisingly, the various analyses in 
Chapter 5, trying to test various possible effects of trade union membership 
appeared rather meagre. Below, trade union membership, is given the benefit of 
doubt. In the analysis below, the trade union membership variable changes from 
1999 to 2009 from being a dichotomous variable, denoting if a respondent is a trade 
union member, to a trichotomous variable, with the added category ‘former 
member’ in 2009. Figure 6-8 below investigates whether divisions linked to trade 
union membership can be identified in Denmark. 
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In contrast to what could be expected from the literature presented, being a trade 
member or not again seems not to make much difference in Denmark, in either 
1999 or 2009. The medians are almost in line in both 1999 and 2009, rising a little 
bit, while the standard errors all rise from 1999 to 2009.  
6.2.1.9 Political Vote at Last General Election 
The various results concerning trade union membership seem to suggest that the 
Danes are no longer orienting to trade unions and old-fashioned class-membership, 
although this does not mean that they are not devoting their political identity 
towards the political system and political parties. Figure 6-9 investigates, whether 
cleavages linked to general political orientation can be identified. The Scandinavian 
political systems are multi-party systems with low barriers for running and getting 
into parliament. At each general election, a multitude of parties therefore run, and 
quite a lot of those acquire seats in parliament. For the sake of simplicity and the 
small N problem, only the seven biggest parties are represented in Figure 6-9 
below, as well as the corresponding figure for Sweden later in the text. 
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For Danish standards, the differences between the medians of the different political 
parties are quite large in 2009, especially the voters for ‘radikale venstre’ (the 
Social Liberal Party), do not seem that ‘social’ or egalitarian, after all, in 2009. A 
look at the corresponding standard errors does show a very large tendency for 
polarisation within the party though. Focussing on the standard errors, excluding 
the social liberals, and ‘venstre’ (the Liberal Party), belonging to a certain political 
party does seem to matter much more for the consistency of Danish attitudes in 
2009, than the various possible cleavages tested above. 
6.2.1.10 Self-Reported Social Class 
The analysis in Figure 6-10 investigates the effect of feeling; one belongs to a 
specific social class. Here, we are thus dealing with a more subjective version of 
class relations. The ESeC or ‘objective’ class position defined class position based 
on one’s employment relations. It is worth mentioning that in Denmark, Norway 
nor Sweden no more than a maximum of ten respondents admitted belonging to 
either the under or upper class in 1992, 1999 or 2009. These groups are therefore 
omitted in the analyses of subjective social class. This result is of course interesting 
in its own right, and could be seen as an indicator of Scandinavian egalitarianism, 
identified in the existing literature, where everybody more or less sees themself as 
belonging to the not-extreme classes. 
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Together with the results of disaggregating on political orientation, as one of only 
two analyses so far, we can see some tendency for an expected median divide 
appearing in 2009, between the subjectively felt upper-middle class being relatively 
anti-egalitarian and the subjectively felt working class being very egalitarian. The 
middle/lower-middle class lies in between. People’s subjective class identity in 
Denmark thus seems to matter more for their attitudes towards the level of 
inequality in gross wages rather than the other potential divisions presented above, 
except maybe from political orientation. The class-consciousness of the working 
class has clear limits, reflected in the very low degree of intra-group consensus in 
2009, presented in the right-hand side of Figure 6-10. The other groups, except the 
middle class, also portray rising standard errors from 1999 to 2009. 
6.2.2. SUMMARY OF THE DANISH DESCRIPTIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
In this subsection, we will try to sum up the general Danish trends identified above. 
Starting with the medians, the Danes, in general, showed clear signs of an unaltered 
or even increased degree of homogeneity in medians across the groups investigated. 
There are only three real exceptions from this picture. Firstly, the students of Figure 
6-4 and the youngest generation of Figure 6-1 show a dramatic increase in median 
values from 1999 to 2009. These groups reflect many of the same respondents, and 
because they are the young people of the future, a rise in the aggregated Danish 
median can possibly be expected, as the more egalitarian generations pass away. 
The interpretation is also based on the assumption that the attitudes towards the 
level of inequality in gross wages remain more or less stable for a generation over 
time, which given the results above, does not seem totally realistic, at least when 
subtracting the baby boomers. This generation also shows consistent median levels 
from 1999 to 2009, and somewhat lower than the remaining generations. In the 
multivariate analyses below, one of the things we will be able to test is whether the 
effect of the students and the younger generations can be separated. In addition, it 
will be investigated which effect this has when controlling for the same groups’ 
perceptions of the actual level of inequality in gross wages. Secondly, divides based 
on political affiliation or self-reported social class appeared in Figures 6-9 and 6-10.  
This political or class-consciousness apparently did not have much to do with 
‘objective’ class position, education, income, employment status or trade union 
membership.   
When we look at the standard errors, on the other hand, we see a dramatic 
development, which is not incompatible with the medians’ development though. 
The general picture is that in 1999 there was a very big within-group consensus in 
all cases, except for the respondents with the lowest formal qualifications, and the 
voters for the conservative party. In 2009, almost all groups have clearly raised 
standard errors, several of these considerably. The groups that are stagnant or only 
rise marginally are, firstly, the political parties in general, minus the liberal and 
Social Liberal followers in 2009. Secondly, it is the females, the baby-boomer 
generation, the full-time employed, with above lowest formal qualifications or 
- 
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above higher secondary school, and the subjective middle class. Everybody else 
raises tremendously, some even off the scale. The results thus reveal a very low 
level of group consciousness in Denmark in 2009, with political affiliation as the 
only real general exception.  
The results therefore align very well with the scenario expected for Danish attitudes 
towards the level of inequality in gross wages. Danes disaggregated in most social 
groups portray surprisingly small attitudinal divisions, fitting well with the 
continued Danish tradition for consensus and seeking compromise. The cleavages 
possible to identify — self-reported social class and political affiliation — do not 
seem much connected to any objective measure of social position, such as ESeC, 
education, employment status, urbanisation or income. Instead, they seem to be 
politicised value divisions, which are not connected to trade union membership 
either. Also, as expected, the financial crisis seems to have delivered a reality shock 
affecting almost all groups’ standard errors to rise significantly from 1999 to 2009. 
The only generally resilient group consciousness is political affiliation. This result 
again points to the idea that Danish attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross 
wages of 2009 are structured by political value cleavages. In the analyses below it 
will be exciting to see whether the same tendencies can be found in Sweden, or 
whether the differences between Denmark and Sweden also lead to quite different 
attitudinal patterns in the disaggregated perspective. The analyses thus continue in a 
similar fashion with the Swedish results. 
6.2.3. SWEDEN 
The Swedish analyses follow the same structure as the corresponding Danish ones. 
In contrast to Denmark, it was not possible to deduce one consistent scenario, as the 
context of Swedish is at a watershed in 2009. First, the Swedish HCNI is affected 
by the legacy of ideological class struggle, revived in the 1980s. This, coupled with 
the severe economic and financial crisis in the early to mid-1990s in Sweden, 
should induce Swedish attitudes to be clearly divided, according to social groups 
and especially social class. However, in 2009, Sweden suffered less from the 
financial crisis than Denmark, and since the 1990s, the PE has drifted in the Danish 
direction. The question is whether we can see this in the attitudinal patterns, with a 
trend in the direction of smaller differences in medians between various social 
groups, with perhaps larger group standard errors. Alternatively, the class heritage 
of the 1990s and before could still be strong, thus affecting attitudinal patterns. The 
analyses again start out with generations in Figure 6-11 below. 
6.2.3.1 Generations 
As a start, it will be interesting to investigate whether generational gaps can be 
identified in Sweden in 1992, 1999 or 2009.   
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Sweden portrays much larger median differences between generations than 
Denmark or Norway.
68
 Furthermore, in direct opposition to Denmark, it is not the 
youngest respondents that are the most anti-egalitarian, but the eldest.
69
 In terms of 
intra-group differences, the general tendency of highly risen standard errors found 
especially in Denmark, but also in Norway in 2009, is not repeated. The exception 
are the war and pre-war generations, which, like in Denmark and Norway, show 
markedly larger standard errors in 2009 than in the other two surveys. In contrast to 
Norway and Denmark, the youngest respondents in Sweden do not show seriously 
rising standard errors. 
If we elaborate on the patterns above, we see both signs of generational, periodical 
and even age effects. Most obviously, the patterns suggest clear generational 
effects. Looking at the medians, three groups seem to appear: the youngest; the 
oldest; and everybody else. Again, it should be remembered that the composition of 
the oldest and youngest generation changes somewhat through time. The low 
standard errors for all groups except the oldest generation also suggest a clear 
attitudinal pattern within each generation, especially when looking at the age-
intervals (see Figure 8-2 in Appendix B), where the results could also suggest an 
age effect appearing in Sweden in 1999 and 2009. The effect of age thus seems 
more or less linear, with greater age correlated with less egalitarianism. Lastly, the 
results, as in the other cases, also suggest some periodic effect, resembling the 
Norwegians somewhat in that all generations portray a general rising tendency. 
Even with this first Swedish figure of Chapter 6 (Figure 6-11), the country seems to 
live up to the expectations of portraying quite different attitudinal patterns from 
Denmark. The generational effects, which seem to be apparent in Figure 6-11, 
could reflect the different epochs of the Swedish PEs in which they grew up. While 
most generations grew up in the heyday of a classic well-organised Swedish 
political economy, the oldest generation could still be influenced by memories of 
the times before the expansive Social Democratic Welfare State and centralised 
collective bargaining dominated. However, this generation did have a median at a 
level with the other age groups in 1992. The rather deviant medians of the youngest 
generation could be the result of the first generation being influenced by the heated 
class struggles of the 1980s, and then a gradual détente in the Danish direction 
through the 1990s. The second result, in accordance with the scenario concerning 
Sweden, is that the standard errors remain low in all generations, in all three 
surveys (except for the eldest in 2009). The economic and financial crisis of the 
1990s, and to a lesser extent 2008, may have functioned as a reality shock, inducing 
the oldest to increase their medians from 1.92–2.65 from 1992 to 1999, but the 
standard errors have not followed.   
                                                          
68 Again, we can see the same result in Figure 8-2 in Appendix B, when dividing the 
respondents on age intervals. 
69 See also Figure 8-2 in Appendix B for the Swedish respondents divided into age intervals.  
CHAPTER 6. DISAGGREGATING SCANDINAVIAN EGALITARIANISM 
 201 
6.2.3.2 Gender 
Based on the interesting results disaggregating on generations, it will be interesting 
to investigate whether divisions also linked to gender can be identified in Sweden in 
1992, 1999 or 2009.  
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Median-wise, we see consistent and much bigger gender differences than is the case 
was in either Denmark or Norway. Swedish females portray a clear rising trend 
over the whole period, while males are stagnant from 1999–2009. In this way, 
Sweden is similar to Denmark, but the general picture is very different. The 
development in the Swedish standard errors more or less mirrors the result of 
Figure 6-11, also sustaining a quite high intra-group consensus in 2009. 
6.2.3.3 Urbanisation 
Figure 6-13 below investigates whether compartmentalisation linked to urbanisation 
can be identified in Sweden.  
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Again, we see larger differences in medians in Sweden than the case was, when 
investigating urbanisation in Denmark and Norway. As in Norway, the 
development over time is generally rising, but in direct contrast, the tendency goes 
towards reduced differences between groups. This could be seen as the first sign 
that some Swedish attitudinal patterns are moving in the Danish direction in 2009. 
The Swedish standard errors again remain rather low through the whole period.  
6.2.3.4 Education 
Figure 6-14 below investigates whether cleavages linked to education — the 
supposedly dominating cleavage in late-modern societies — can be identified in 
Sweden in the period covered by the three datasets.  
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The large and consistent Swedish median divides, identified by gender and 
generations, found further disaggregating with regard to educational groups. 
Respondents with a university degree completed, and education above higher 
secondary school are consistently much less egalitarian than all other educational 
groups. In 1992 it looks like the higher secondary completed group belonged to the 
top group, as was the case in Denmark. However, in 1999 and 2009, these three 
bottom groups have virtually identical medians, which was the case in Norway. In 
Denmark and Norway, some educational groups’ standard errors rose tremendously 
from 1999–2009, while others remained quite low. This is also the case in Sweden, 
but only the above higher secondary school group belongs to the sharply rising 
group. The Swedish patterns thus seem to deviate again from the Danish and 
Norwegian ones, in that the general level of intra-group consensus is higher. The 
results are also in accordance with the expected patterns for Sweden. Educational 
level clearly seems to become a crucial attitudinal cleavage in Sweden after 1992. 
The trend, even in 2009, is that the Swedish patterns do not move in the Danish 
direction. Instead, the median level divisions remain strong, and the standard errors 
generally remain low.   
6.2.3.5 Social Class  
Unfortunately, the variables necessary to construct a Swedish variable for objective 
social class do not exist in the ISSP 1992 dataset. Figure 6-15 therefore investigates 
whether cleavages linked to social class can be identified in Sweden in the period 
from 1999 to 2009.  
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The consistent Swedish median differences, this time between social classes, are 
again enormous compared to the Danish and Norwegian figures. Furthermore, they 
follow a classical class pattern, with the lower classes in the bottom rising towards 
the higher classes in the top, which is very anti-egalitarian by Scandinavian 
standards. Turning to the standard errors, the figures are as low for all social classes 
also in 2009, as they were for educational groups in Figure 6-14. The main reason 
small employers and self-employed are off the charts is most likely the low N for 
this group. Even if educational level appeared as a significant cleavage in Sweden 
after 1992, traditional class cleavages are still prevalent and strong even in 2009. 
Class-wise, Swedish attitudinal patterns do not seem to be affected by the changes 
in the PE, by portraying a trend towards Danish attitudinal patterns.  
6.2.3.6 Household Income 
Unfortunately, no Swedish household income variable exists in the ISSP 1992 
dataset. Figure 6-16 thus investigates whether divisions linked to household income 
can be identified in Sweden in the period 1999–2009.  
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In median-terms, the Swedish results disaggregated by household income are 
noticeable, and while a more or less linear effect was seen in Denmark and Norway 
(higher household income indicates less egalitarianism), in Sweden the richest 19 % 
of the respondents are clearly much less egalitarian than everybody else, who are 
quite alike. Turning to the standard errors a rising pattern can be seen for all groups 
except the 21–40 % respondents.  
The development in standard errors is again not as dramatic as in the Danish and 
Norwegian cases though. It is important to notice that the large differences in 
median levels, which emerge from Figures 6-14–6-16, concerning educational 
level, social class and household income, are actually caused largely by the absolute 
top groups not being like the other groups. The highest income group, the salariat 
and self-employed/small employers, and respondents with a completed university 
degree, portray substantially higher median levels than other groups. This is a very 
interesting result, since it could signify that the perceived Swedish class society — 
the HCNI —could be largely characterised by the elite deviating from the rest of the 
population. The bottom strata of the population, on the other hand, do not seem to 
be particularly separate from the middle class. In Chapter 7, this idea will be 
explored directly, by investigating how the Swedish media actually present the 
economic elite, operationalised as ‘the rich’.  
6.2.3.7 Employment Status 
Figure 6-17 investigates whether divisions linked to employment status can be 
identified in Sweden. Unfortunately, no Swedish employment status data exist in 
the ISSP 1992 dataset, and as with Denmark and Norway, very few respondents are 
unemployed in each of the three surveys.  
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The Swedish employment status groups again portray much bigger median 
differences than was the case in the other two countries. In 1999, this difference 
was huge, spanning from 1.67 for the part-time employed, to 3.21 for retired 
Swedes. The tendency in 2009 is, on the other hand, a much smaller, but still 
significant division. The retired Swedes median thus falls steeply, while the part-
time employed rises sharply. In terms of standard errors, we again see only one 
group departing from the trend of steady low standard errors in all three surveys: 
retired Swedish respondents in 2009, who rise from 0.36–0.75 from 1999–2009. 
The patterns of the retired Swedes are obviously quite similar to the pattern of the 
oldest generation in Figure 6-11. Together with urbanisation, portrayed in Figure 6-
13, disaggregating by employment status is so far the only figure portraying trends 
in attitudinal patterns, which are moving in the Danish direction in 2009. Notice 
however, that there are no elite groups among the five categories in Figure 6-17. 
The results are therefore not in opposition to the idea of elite separation from the 
rest, which was described in the subsection on household income.  
6.2.3.8 Trade Union Membership 
Figure 6-18 investigates whether divides linked to trade union membership can be 
identified in Sweden, Again, a Swedish trade union membership variable is 
unfortunately missing from the 1992 dataset. 
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The median difference among trade union members, former members and 
never/non-members resembles, to a large extent, the pattern of the corresponding 
figures of Denmark and Norway, with small median differences between groups, 
than the case has been in the Swedish analyses so far. In terms of standard errors we 
also see rather large differences in the development between the groups (except for 
present members), which is also a pattern more closely resembling Denmark and 
Norway. Trade union membership might have had important attitudinal micro level 
effects in the heyday of classic Scandinavian political economies, but the results of 
Chapters 5 and 6 clearly suggest that those days are long gone.  
6.2.3.9 Political Vote at Last General Election 
Figure 6-19 investigates whether cleavages linked to political affiliation can be 
identified in Sweden; this time, in all three datasets. Political affiliation was the 
dominant attitudinal cleavage emerging in the Danish analysis in Section 6.2.1. 
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As a start, it is worth noting that the majority of the Swedish respondents, in 
contrast to the Danes and Norwegians, consistently say they voted for one of the 
two major parties: ‘Moderata samlingspartiet’, here translated to the Liberal 
Conservatives and ‘Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti’, here translated as 
the Social Democrats. The medians and standard errors of the other parties 
portrayed thus suffer from the small N problem, and the results of these are 
somewhat uncertain. Between these two major parties, we see large and consistent 
differences in median levels. The standard error of the liberal conservatives rose 
markedly in 1999. This may reflect the fact that this party started to gain more 
voters, who did not traditionally identify with all their views of a more right-wing 
nature. The same interpretation probably applies to the similar results of the Danish 
Liberal Party above.  
6.2.3.10 Self-Reported Social Class 
Figure 6-20 investigates whether divisions linked to subjective social class can be 
identified in Sweden. Once again, a variable containing Swedish information on 
self-reported social class, does not exist in the 1992 dataset, and we will have to do 
without. 
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The polarised median tendencies again turn out to be rampant in Sweden, 
disaggregated by subjective social class, even more so than in Denmark and 
Norway. Furthermore, the pattern ranges from the consistently egalitarian working 
class to the anti-egalitarian upper-middle class. Turning to the standard errors, two 
groups portray quite significant rising tendencies from 1999 to 2009 in Swedish 
terms. These are the upper-middle and the lower-middle class. Figure 6-20 more or 
less repeats the elite separation idea of Figures 6-14–6-16. Only here, the working 
class actually does appear as a separate group from other non-elite groups. 
Identifying oneself as working class in a survey is a strong identity statement, 
which is why this somewhat deviant result is maybe not that surprising after all. 
6.2.4. SUMMARY OF THE SWEDISH DESCRIPTIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
Sweden clearly stood out from Norway and Denmark in having much bigger 
between-group differences in medians in almost all instances. Only when 
disaggregating on urbanisation and trade union membership did results mirror the 
other two countries. It should be mentioned that even if these differences between 
groups were consistent, for urbanisation and employment status there are tendencies 
for the groups’ median levels approaching each other in 2009. Figures 6-11 and 6-
14 also portrayed that the median values of educational groups and generations 
become more separate from 1992 to 1999. As elaborated above, this could be seen 
as an effect of the Swedish crisis of the early mid-1990s, making the Swedes 
disperse attitudinally, according to existing social cleavages. One could maybe also 
notice that, in contrast to Denmark and Norway, the ranking of the groups in 
Sweden follows a less surprising pattern. The least egalitarian groups are thus: 
males; older/retired; urban; 19 % richest; full-time employed; the voters for the 
liberal conservatives; and higher social classes/subjective upper-middle class 
respondents. The well-off groups in society are thus the least egalitarian. In terms of 
intra-group differences or standard errors, the Swedish results, in general, also 
deviated from the Danish and Norwegian results, although to a somewhat lesser 
degree. The groups’ standard errors, in most cases in Norway, and especially in 
Denmark, rose significantly from 1999–2009. In Sweden, most groups remained at 
a low, almost 1999 level in 2009. The only real exception from this is in Sweden, in 
2009, is the older/retired, the above higher secondary educational group, former and 
non-members of trade unions, voters for the liberal conservatives and the lower- 
and upper-middle classes.  
For now, the wider perspectives of these results show that the Swedish attitudinal 
class society does not seem to be disappearing, although it does appear to being 
changing characteristics somewhat. In fact, Swedish attitudinal patterns seem more 
and more to resemble the dichotomous class structure, comprised of elite groups 
and the rest of the population, which was so dominant in the descriptions of the 
development of the Swedish PE in Chapter 3. In 1992 and to some extent in 1999, 
there are also consistent attitudinal cleavages. However, here, more than two 
distinct groups are identifiable. So do the changes in the Swedish PE induce the 
- 
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Swedish patterns of attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages, to 
move in a Danish direction? For the non-elite social groups the answer seems to be 
yes. The elite does, on the other hand, not seem to move attitudinally towards the 
non-elite groups, but rather further away from them, from 1999 to 2009. The 
multivariate analyses below will reveal further insight into these questions.   
6.3. SEPARATING THE WHEAT FROM THE CHAFF IN 
DENMARK AND SWEDEN IN 2009 
The last analytical step in this chapter deviates from the solely descriptive logic 
above, and returns to the ‘control logic’ of Section 5.2. As described, many of the 
ten variables splitting the sample of Danish and Swedish respondents above, ought 
to be strongly correlated. It can be argued that attitudinal divisions are important, as 
they exist in real life, no matter what their background. In spite of this, it is still 
relevant to investigate how the various divides relate in the two countries, and 
furthermore, try to separate, which cleavages actually seem to be fundamental, and 
which are merely an expression of other more fundamental variables.  
To investigate this, a hierarchical regression analysis with five models, split by 
Denmark and Sweden, will be presented below. This analysis will use the same ten 
factors as the analyses above. In addition, the analysis will only be conducted with 
the 2009 dataset. The argument is twofold. For Denmark, the 2009 dataset showed 
dramatically risen standard errors as compared to 1999. As argued, these are 
probably caused, to a large extent, by the shock of the crisis in 2008, but it was 
found, in the descriptive analyses, to be difficult to subscribe these much to any 
new persistent cleavage. For Sweden, the 2009 dataset seemed to show a great deal 
of path-dependency with earlier data and the class- cleavage legacy of their HCNI. 
This is somewhat surprising, given the changes in the Swedish political economy 
since the 1990s. It is interesting to investigate which form of social cleavage seems 
to be driving these Swedish descriptive divides. Is it traditional class divisions or 
has education taken over, especially for the younger generations? In addition, is it 
possible to identify a potential for changes happening in the otherwise seemingly 
stable Swedish patterns of attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages? 
Which effect does it, for example, have when the Swedes’ perceptions of the level 
of inequality in gross wages is taken into account? 
For both countries, the effect of controlling for the perceived level of inequality in 
gross wages (PLI) is therefore very interesting to investigate. As argued in Chapters 
2–5, individuals’ PLI in their own country appear to be crucial for their attitudes 
towards the just levels of the same. This leads to questions such as, for example. 
How much are divisions descriptively appearing above actually caused by different 
perceptions in various social groups? As described in Chapter 3, the media mediates 
the myths, representations and stereotypes of the HCNI and the rest of the political 
economy, to the citizens of the countries, and thus forms the background for the 
same citizens’ PLIs. Investigating the effect of the perceived level of inequality in 
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gross wages, on explaining attitudinal divides in the two countries, therefore 
connects this chapter with the media analyses of Chapter 7. 
A few further methodological clarifications are also in order, before the analysis is 
presented. First, a split hierarchical regression analysis is conducted, to try to 
separate the relations and paths between the various divides, as described. The 
variables are therefore entered in five blocks. The order of these again seeks to 
reflect more or less how ‘natural’ or unchangeable the various background variables 
are: 
1. Gender, generations and urbanisation 
2. Education and household income 
3. Social class (ESeC) and employment status 
4. Trade union membership, self-reported social class and political affiliation 
5. The perceived level of inequality in gross wages 
To mitigate the effect of extreme outliers present also in the Danish and Swedish 
data, the same logarithmically transformed version of the dependent variable, as 
used in Section 5.2, will be used here. In addition, categories in the variables 
containing less than thirty respondents in either of the countries have been omitted. 
This is done in order both to save space in the already very large tables presented 
below, and also to prevent confusion by presenting categories, which often tends to 
present mysterious coefficients, which, because of the small n’s, by default seems 
to be insignificant anyway. The categories omitted are:  
 No formal education (education) 
 Working less than part-time and helping family member (employment 
status)
70
 
 Lower class (self-reported social class) 
 The Christian People’s party, new alliance and the Left-Wing Alliance 
(political affiliation, Denmark) 
 The Christian democrats and the Sweden Democrats (political 
affiliation, Sweden) 
The omitted categories are interesting in themselves. Unsurprisingly, they suggest 
that the Danish and Swedish samples contain few respondents from the lowest 
social strata of society. The Scandinavian multi-party systems also leave some of 
the niche parties with very few respondents. Without further ado, the Danish 
analysis is presented in Table 6-1 below. 
                                                          
70 This variable has already placed the categories 7–10 (retired, housewife/man, permanently 
disabled, other not in the labour force) in an ‘outside the labour market’ category. In fact, 
there are only four categories with more than thirty respondents in the original variable: 
working full-time; working part-time; students; and retired. 
- 
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Table 6-1 Identifying Spurious Social Cleavages in Attitudes to the Level of 
Inequality in Gross Wages in Denmark in ISSP 2009 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 
Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Gender (male) 0.14* 0.12(*) 0.15* 0.13(*) 0.19*** 
Generations  
 
     
- Born 1980 and thereafter 0.18 0.19 0.10 0.12 0.25* 
- Born 1970–1979 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.27** 
- Born 1960–1969 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.15 
- The baby-boomer generation -0.20* -0.18(*) -0.16 -0.10 -0.06 
- War and pre-war generations (ref.) - - - - - 
Urbanisation      
- Urban, a big city 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.13 
- Suburb of a big city  0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 0.05 
- Town or small city 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 
- Country village -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 
- Farm, home in the country (ref.) - - - - - 
Education       
- Lowest formal qualification  -0.18 -0.07 -0.02 0.09 
- Above lowest formal qualification  -0.46** -0.31(*) -0.25 -0.05 
- Upper secondary complete  -0.06 0.02 0.02 0.07 
- Above upper secondary level  -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 
- University degree complete (ref.)  - - - - 
Household income      
- 0–20 % lowest incomes  -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.07 
- 21–40 %  0.03 0.05 0.10 0.04 
- 41–60 %  -0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 
- 61–80 %  -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 
- 81–100 % highest incomes (ref.)  - - - - 
Social Class      
- Salariat   0.21(*) 0.14 0.14(*) 
- Intermediate employee   0.19 0.16 0.11 
- Small employers/self-employed   0.09 0.02 0.08 
- Lower Sales & Service   0.17 0.19 0.23* 
- Lower Technical   -0.03 -0.02 0.02 
- Routine (ref.)   - - - 
Employment status 
 
     
- Employed full-time 
 
  -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 
- Employed part-time 
 
  -0.01 -0.02 0.02 
- Student 
 
  0.37(*) 0.34(*) 0.17 
- Outside the labour force (ref.)   - - - 
Trade union membership      
- Member    -0.10 -0.15 
- Once a member    -0.06 -0.07 
- Never a member (ref.)    - - 
Subjective social class       
- Working class    -0.12 -0.10 
- Lower-middle class    -0.04 -0.09 
- Middle class    -0.02 -0.01 
- Upper-middle/upper class (ref.)    - - 
Political affiliation      
- The Social Liberal Party    0.25(*) 0.16 
- The Conservative Party    -0.06 0.12 
- The Socialist People’s Party    -0.27** -0.23** 
- The Danish People’s Party    -0.25* -0.14* 
- The Liberal Party    0.07 0.13 
- The Social Democrats (ref.)    - - 
Perc. lev. of ineq. in gross wages (cov.)     0.66*** 
Explained variance (adjusted r2) 2 % 2 % 2% 4% 53% 
Notes: Multiple linear regressions. Unstandardized regression coefficients. The dependent variable is created by taking, 
for each respondent, the natural logarithm of the ratio between the chairman of a large national corporation and an 
average of the statements for a shop assistant and an unskilled factory worker. Since the covariates and factors in the 
models have not been transformed logarithmically, they denote an estimated per-cent-wise difference regarding the 
dependent variable. For a factor, this is between a certain group and the reference group. For a covariate, it is the 
estimated per-cent-wise effect of rising one step on the covariate scale. (*) p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001, N (all models) = 993. 
Source: Social Inequality Module IV (2009) of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). 
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Table 6-1 unsurprisingly shows very few statistically significant and strong 
divisions. The level of explained variance in Models 1-4 is correspondingly 
suspiciously low (but at the level with the aggregated analyses of Chapter 5). 
Furthermore, as expected, it is really only political affiliation, which remains as a 
significant cleavage after controlling for the other variables in Model 4, and again 
trade union membership remains utterly irrelevant. Model 4 shows that voters of the 
Socialist People’s Party and the Danish People’s Party want, on average, around 25 
% lower levels of inequality in gross wages than the average Social Democrat voter. 
The voters of the so-called Social Liberal Party, on average, want 25 % higher 
levels of inequality in gross wages than the average Social Democrat voter. The 
seemingly strong effect of self-reported social class, identified in Figure 6-10, is 
explained after controlling for the other variables in the table, especially political 
affiliation.  
Besides these effects, males on average seem to be somewhat less egalitarian than 
females. Across Models 1–4, they consistently score 12–15 % higher on the 
dependent variable than females, even if this was not easy to identify in Figure 6-2. 
The respondents of the educational group, above lowest formal education, appear 
quite egalitarian in Model 2, as well as in Figure 6-4 above. This group contains 
skilled workers; a category of people that played a dominant role in the history of 
the Danish political economy, as described in Chapter 3. After controlling for social 
class, and again, especially political affiliation, the distinct egalitarianism of this 
group is statistically explained: the vast majority of this educational group, in fact, 
indicated that they voted for the Liberal Party, the Socialist People’s Party and the 
Danish People’s Party, in that order. The same happens to the relatively egalitarian 
baby-boomer generation of Model 2 and Figure 6-1. Their extra egalitarianism 
seems compositionally based, and is explained after controlling for educational 
level, household income and social class. 
Model 5 introduces the logarithmically transformed covariate for the perceived 
level of inequality in gross wages (PLI), also used in Table 5-16.
71
 Unsurprisingly, 
this covariate has a very strong and highly significant effect, and again explains a 
large amount of the otherwise to a great extent unexplained variance. Of more 
interest is that the introduction of this variable brings forward some seemingly 
suppressed divisions, as well as explains the relative inegalitarianism of the 
students. First, the students’ otherwise strong, but borderline significant, 
inegalitarianism in Model 4 is completely explained by the introduction of the PLI 
covariate. Therefore, the Danish students, on average, both perceive and wish the 
level of inequality in gross wages to be higher than other groups. An obvious 
explanation for this result is that the students, because of their relative inexperience 
with the labour market, are more ill-informed about actual wage differences than 
other employment status groups.  
                                                          
71 In Table 4-4, a non-logarithmically transformed version of the PLI was used.  
- 
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Secondly, the introduction of the PLI also brings forward some seemingly 
suppressed cleavages. First, males now appear clearly and significantly less 
egalitarian than females. Danish males, on average, perceive a little bit of a lower 
degree of inequality in gross wages than females. However, they are, at the same 
time, less egalitarian than the females. The interpretation of the suppressor effect is 
thus that had the Danish males perceived the same degree of inequality in gross 
wages as Danish females, the males would, on average, wish the level of inequality 
in gross wages to be 19 % higher than the females. Second, a stronger suppressor 
effect is likewise found concerning the generational cleavages. The oldest 
generation and, to some extent, the baby boomers perceive higher levels of 
inequality in gross wages than the younger generations, especially the respondents 
born from 1970–1979. Controlling for this suppressor effect, the two youngest 
generations of Danes are significantly less egalitarian than the oldest generations. It 
should also be remembered that this generational effect is net, or independent of the 
younger generations’ possible status as students, which is controlled for in the 
model. 
Perceptions of the actual level of inequality in gross wages clearly differ among 
various social groups, and this has clear effects, which are hidden in the descriptive 
results above. Most significantly, and some might say alarmingly for the egalitarian 
Danish model, the younger generations both perceive smaller, and wish for larger 
differences in levels of inequality in gross wages, than the older more egalitarian 
generations. This result signifies two things. First, the younger generations did not 
experience the heyday of Scandinavian political economies, and whatever is being 
mediated of the HCNI by the Danish media to these generations does not seem to 
have the same impact as with the older generations. Which myths, images and 
stereotypes of the relevant HCNI (presentations of the rich) the Danish media, are 
actually mediating, will be investigated in Chapter 7. Second, this result could spell 
a change underway in the otherwise legitimate egalitarian Danish political 
economy, hidden by the descriptive statistics above, and the aggregate analyses of 
Chapter 5. Table 6-2 presents the same analyses with Swedish data.  
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Table 6-2 Identifying Spurious Social Cleavages in Attitudes to the Level of 
Inequality in Gross Wages in Sweden in ISSP 2009 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 
Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Gender (male) 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.11* 
Generations  
 
     
- Born 1980 and thereafter -0.38*** -0.43*** -0.33** -0.36** 0.01 
- Born 1970–1979 -0.27** -0.41*** -0.32** -0.31** 0.03 
- Born 1960–1969 -0.16* -0.28** -0.19(*) -0.20(*) 0.04 
- The baby-boomer generation -0.13 -0.23** -0.15 -0.13 0 
- War and pre-war generations (ref.) - - - - - 
Urbanisation      
- Urban, a big city 0.21* 0.20* 0.19(*) 0.14(*) 0.19* 
- Suburb of a big city  0.15 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.13(*) 
- Town or small city 0.15 0.19* 0.18(*) 0.14(*) 0.15(*) 
- Country village 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.12 
- Farm, home in the country (ref.) - - - - - 
Education       
- Lowest formal qualification  -0.16(*) -0.12 -0.13 -0.09 
- Above lowest formal qualification  -0.21* -0.18* -0.21* -0.12(*) 
- Upper secondary complete  -0.13(*) -0.11 -0.14 -0.09 
- Above upper secondary level  -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 
- University degree complete (ref.)  - - - - 
Household income      
- 0–20 % lowest incomes  -0.30** -0.30** -0.22* -0.15(*) 
- 21–40 %  -0.36*** -0.34*** -0.25** -0.17* 
- 41–60 %  -0.28** -0.26** -0.19* -0.18** 
- 61–80 %  -0.20** -0.19* -0.11 -0.11(*) 
- 81–100 % highest incomes (ref.)  - - - - 
Social Class      
- Salariat   0.15 0.08 0.02 
- Intermediate employee   0.09 0.04 0.01 
- Small employers/self-employed   0.17 0.01 0.09 
- Lower Sales & Service   0.21* 0.18(*) 0.11 
- Lower Technical   -0.07 -0.10 -0.05 
- Routine (ref.)   - - - 
Employment status 
 
     
- Employed full-time 
 
  -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 
- Employed part-time 
 
  -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 
- Student 
 
  -0.10 -0.05 -0.07 
- Outside the labour force (ref.)   - - - 
Trade union membership      
- Member    -0.01 -0.02 
- Once a member    0.03 -0.06 
- Never a member (ref.)    - - 
Subjective social class       
- Working class    -0.06 -0.19* 
- Lower-middle class    -0.01 -0.09 
- Middle class    -0.09 -0.12 
- Upper-middle/upper class (ref.)    - - 
Political affiliation      
- The Centre Party    -0.12 -0.04 
- The Liberal Party    0.25* 0.18* 
- The Green Party    -0.09 -0.10 
- The Liberal Conservatives    0.21** 0.14* 
- The Left Party    -0.12 -0.26** 
- The Social Democrats (ref.)    - - 
Perc. lev. of ineq. in gross wages (cov.)     0.46*** 
Explained variance (adjusted r2) 5 % 9 % 10 % 12 % 46 % 
Notes: Multiple linear regressions. Unstandardized regression coefficients. The dependent variable is created by taking, 
for each respondent, the natural logarithm of the ratio between the chairman of a large national corporation and an 
average of the statements for a shop assistant and an unskilled factory worker. Since the covariates and factors in the 
models have not been logarithmically transformed, they denote an estimated per-cent-wise difference regarding the 
dependent variable. For a factor, this is between a certain group and the reference group. For a covariate, it is the 
estimated per-cent-wise effect of rising one step on the covariate scale. (*) p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001, N (all models) = 736. 
Source: Social Inequality Module IV (2009) of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). 
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Table 6-2, again unsurprisingly, shows more stronger and more statistically 
significant attitudinal divisions than Table 6-1, with the corresponding Danish 
results. The best indicator of the much larger effect of social cleavages in 
explaining attitudes towards the level of inequality in Sweden in contrast to 
Denmark can perhaps be found in the level of explained variance. Models 1–4 in 
Table 6-1 only explained between 2 and 4 % of the variance (a result on a level 
with the explained variance in the aggregated analyses of Chapter 5). In the 
corresponding models of Table 6-2, 5–12 % variance is explained. Also, in contrast 
to the Danish results, the introduction of PLI in Model 5 ‘only’ manages to increase 
r
2 
to 46 %. In the Danish case, r
2
 was 53 % in Model 5. As elaborated in Chapter 4, 
this difference could be seen as an indicator of a higher degree of politicisation with 
regard to the issue of wages in Sweden than in Denmark, because politicisation 
could induce respondents to clearly separate the issues of ‘should earn’ from ‘do 
earn’. 
In the disaggregated analyses of Section 6.2.3, Sweden portrayed noteworthy 
divisions on almost all measures investigated. In the multivariate analyses of Table 
6-2 most of these divisions become insignificant after controlling for the other 
variables. Only household income retains a very large and significant effect across 
the models. In spite of the poor performance of income in explaining variation in 
the aggregated analyses of Section 5.2, household income appears to be the 
dominating attitudinal cleavage in Sweden in 2009. A closer look reveals that it is 
not exactly a linear effect of income, which is seen in Figure 6-16 and Table 6-2. 
Instead, the richest 19 % of the respondent households deviate in being clearly less 
egalitarian than other income groups. In Figure 6-21 below, this ‘economical-elite 
effect’ becomes even more apparent when household income is disaggregated on 
income deciles instead of just five groups, as in Figure 6-16. 
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As mentioned in the Swedish summary of Section 6.2.4, this clearly suggests that 
the Swedish elite groups — which seem to be especially the rich — seem to move 
away from the remaining groups attitudinally. 
Besides household income, gender also appears to be an even stronger divide than 
in Denmark. The urbanisation variable also seems to suggest that people coming 
from rural areas are more egalitarian than city dwellers, even after controlling for 
differences in income, education etc. As in Denmark, political affiliation also 
separates the relative egalitarians of especially the Left Party, from the relative 
inegalitarians of the Liberal Conservatives and the Liberal Party. The Social 
Democrats are placed in between these two poles, learning towards the relative 
egalitarian wing. Lastly, the strong and significant generational effects also seen in 
Figure 6-11, also remain in Models 1–4 of Table 6-2. These effects appear to be 
almost linear in the way that, on average, the younger respondent the more 
egalitarian.  
However, the introduction of the PLI in Model 5 changes this picture dramatically. 
Both the differences between males and females, but especially the generational 
differences, disappear completely after controlling for the Swedish respondents’ 
perceptions of the actual level of inequality in gross wages. In contrast to Denmark, 
males not only wish for, but also perceive larger differences in gross wages than 
females. The same goes for the older generations. The relative egalitarianism of the 
older generations of Swedish respondents corresponds perfectly with similar 
perceptions of larger actual wage differences.   
Firstly, the perception of the actual level of inequality in gross wages, as with 
Denmark, seems to vary quite a lot between social groups. Secondly, these 
differences in perceptions seemingly have a considerable effect on the same groups’ 
attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages. Swedish attitudes towards 
the level of inequality in gross wages were argued to be at a watershed in 2009. The 
question was whether these attitudes seemed to be influenced by the historical 
ideological class legacy, or more recent changes in the Swedish political economy, 
leaning towards a convergence with the corresponding Danish PE. The answer 
seems to be both. The relative inegalitarian perceptions and attitudes of the older 
generations of Swedes seem to fit with the classic image of the Swedish political 
economy as dominated by class, and class cleavages. The different patterns of the 
younger generations could suggest these patterns have weakened, in possible 
accordance with the change in the Swedish political economy, moving in the 
Danish direction.     
The perceptions of the level of inequality in gross wages are, as argued, to a large 
extent assumed to be built on the basis of the images, myths and stereotypes of the 
Swedish HCNI mediated by the Swedish media. Even more than Denmark, it seems 
clear that elite groups, and especially rich groups, could be important herein. 
However, at the same time, the results clearly indicate that the different generations 
receive and possibly interpret the images, myths and perception differently. 
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Investigating which images of the rich the Swedish media actually present is the 
next step undertaken in Chapter 7. 
6.4. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 6 
Section 5.1 showed that when comparing a range of Western countries in 
aggregated analyses, Denmark, Norway and Sweden seemed very similar. To recap, 
the three Scandinavian countries were found, in both 1999 and 2009, to wish for 
exceptionally low differences between gross wages at the top and bottom of the 
occupational hierarchy. The Scandinavians were, comparatively speaking, quite 
satisfied with the perceived gross wage levels of the investigated occupations; only 
the salaries of chairmen were seen as increasingly unjust. Scandinavian 
egalitarianism was, therefore, argued to be characterised more as an aversion to top 
excess, rather than a wish to spoil the of the labour market bottom excessively.  
Interestingly, quite different results appeared when disaggregating the results on 
social groups in Denmark and Sweden. While the overall development of the 
various social groups in Denmark and Norway followed more or less the same 
pattern, the Swedish groups followed an almost opposite pattern. Overly simplified, 
the general result of the disaggregated analyses of Chapter 6 is that, in Sweden, 
large between-group differences exist and remain, but at the same time, the intra-
group differences are small, also in 2009. In Denmark and Norway, the differences 
between groups are small (with notable exceptions), whereas the intra-group 
differences skyrocket in 2009 for a majority of the groups investigated (more so in 
Denmark than in Norway).  
It is important to keep in mind that, in spite of the group differences identified in 
the descriptive analyses above, the highest group median values of Chapter 6 would 
still be placed among the bottom six countries in the third column of Table 5-3, in 
Subsection 5.1.2.2 above (displaying the same dependent variable in 1999).
72
 This 
empirical result again serves to remind us that despite the differences in attitudinal 
patterns and development in the political economies of Denmark and Sweden, in 
the aggregated perspective, the Scandinavian countries are quite alike attitudinally.  
Furthermore, the multivariate analysis of Chapter 6 revealed that relatively large 
Swedish divisions seemed to be dominated by attitudinal differences between 
household income groups, as well as political differences between the respondents. 
The attitudinal differences between generations and gender were, on the other hand, 
found to coincide with similar differences in the perceptions of the level of actual 
inequality in gross wages among the same groups. The multivariate Danish result 
confirmed very small attitudinal social divisions, dominated by the political 
affiliation of the respondents. After controlling for the perceived level of inequality 
in gross wages, suppressed generational effects appeared. The two youngest Danish 
                                                          
72 Retired Swedes in 1999 = 3.21, and 65–74-year-old Swedes in 1999 = 3.49. 
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generations appear to be clearly less egalitarian than the remaining generations. 
This could spark change in the legitimacy of the otherwise seemingly stable 
egalitarian Danish attitudinal model.  
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CHAPTER 7. THE THREE SIDES OF 
THE EQUALITY-COIN  
The key result following the disaggregated perspective in the chapters above were 
the differences identified between Denmark and Sweden. As described in Chapter 
3, these differences were firstly apparent in the development of the macro level 
structures of the political economies of Denmark and Sweden. Secondly, also the 
actual patterns of Danish and Swedish attitudes towards the level of inequality in 
gross wages were found in especially Chapter 6 to differ quite a lot. The purpose of 
the analyses of Chapter 7 is to investigate the link between the macro level political 
economy, and the Scandinavians’ micro level attitudes towards the level of 
inequality in gross wages. As presented in the conceptual model of the dissertation 
outlined in Chapter 2, the media and its output is argued to perform this key role of 
mediating the macro level phenomena to the micro level.  
Attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages can, as argued in Chapter 1, 
be seen as corresponding attitudes to the top-middle gap. A historically constructed 
normative institution (HCNI) was furthermore defined as: a particular 
representation of the past; a representation that in myths, presentations and 
stereotypes define: ‘who the others are’ and in a sense also ‘who we are’. A 
multiplicity of ‘others’ exists in the circles of social identification for a certain 
individual at a certain time (de Swaan, 1995). However, since most people per 
default declare as belonging to the warm and competent middle (Fiske et al., 2007; 
Larsen, 2013), the relevant possible ‘others’ in this case are the constructed top. 
Because the attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages concern the 
economic top, it is more precise to label the relevant top, ‘the rich’. 
Fiske, Cuddy and Glick (2007) suggest stereotypes are constructed concerning all 
groups not considered both warm and competent as the middle (class) is. In 
contrast, ‘the rich’ are found to spur ambivalent emotions and attitudes by being 
viewed positively as competent, but at the same time negatively as cold. The use of 
negative stereotypes of ‘the poor’ and deservingness criteria tapping into different 
marginalised groups’ moral character in media presentations of these groups is well 
known in existing literature. Stereotypes are classical subjects for media to build 
stories on (Gilens, 2000; Gilens, 1996; Larsen, 2013; Larsen & Dejgaard, 2013). 
Since ‘the rich’ are found to be perceived as both competent and cold, it is 
analogically likely that presentations and stereotypes of the correspondingly 
deserving or undeserving rich (McCall, 2013; Rowlingson & Connor, 2011) also 
exist in media output. An important prerequisite therefore is that ‘the rich’ must be 
considered as being a distinct group of ‘others’ separate from the ‘us’ of the middle 
class, in a HCNI in a given society. This also means that by investigating how and 
whether the media represents ‘the rich’, traces of the myths, presentations and 
stereotypes in the Scandinavian HCNIs should appear.  
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On this basis, Chapter 2 outlined the basic conceptual model of the dissertation. It 
was here argued that the media performs a crucial mediating role between the 
relevant macro level structures of society – in our case the dual sided political 
economy (PE) – and the attitudes (and perceptions) of the citizens of a society at a 
given point in time. Following the conceptual model outlined in Chapter 2 and the 
scenarios deduced in Section 3.7 there should be a degree of correspondence 
between the PE, the media output and the attitudes of the citizens within the 
Scandinavian countries – although lags can be expected between each of the three 
phenomena. Both in terms of the development in the political economies, but also 
in the actual attitudinal patterns measured, Denmark and Sweden were in fact found 
to be quite different – and in both cases controlling for the perceived level of actual 
inequality in gross wages (PLI) had a great effect on attitudinal patterns. Especially 
in the Swedish case substantial differences existed between the PLI of various 
groups. Not just the normative attitudes, but obviously also the differences in 
perceptions between various social groups are likely to be influenced by the myths, 
images and stereotypes of the HCNIs of Denmark and Sweden mediated by the 
media.  
Chapter 7 seeks to complete the empirical puzzle outlined in Chapter 2, linking the 
developing political economies of Scandinavia (Chapter 3) to perceptions of and 
attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages (Chapters 4-6), by 
investigating how myths, representations and stereotypes of ‘the rich’ the Danish 
and Swedish media actually have mediated to the Danish and Swedish citizens from 
1996 to 2013. As argued, such an investigation provides a way to more or less 
directly investigate the otherwise abstract and fluffy contents of the HCNIs. The 
following section will expand on some of the concepts and ideas introduced in this 
section. The outcome of this endeavour is the development and elaboration of the 
main, as well as alternative hypotheses for both Denmark and Sweden. These 
hypotheses will then be tested in the analyses sections of the chapter. Before that, a 
data and methods section will elaborate on the issues of how to collect the relevant 
data and how to conduct the investigation. 
7.1. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The following section first tries to model the different ideal typical possibilities of 
how the media could be representing ‘the rich’ over time in Denmark and Sweden 
in general or in individual newspapers in the two countries. As it was elaborated in 
Chapter 3, and will be apparent below, it is interesting whether there is a difference 
between the media’s presentation before and after the financial crisis. At a very 
basic level, and although the lines between the categories in practice are 
discussable, a newspaper article can present the rich in three ways: negatively, 
positively and rather neutrally. It will later be argued that a neutral presentation of 
the rich in some cases can correspond to a non-construction of the rich as a social 
group independent from the middle class. Such a situation will also be argued to 
have consequences for the social construction of the top-middle gap in society. In 
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other words, this construction equals the HCNI of society concerning the perceived 
basic (class) nature of society, a construction which de Swaan (1995) labels the 
widest circle of social identification.  
The section secondly combines existing literature and results with the issue voting-
paradigm from election studies. It proposed that the issue of the rich and the top-
middle wage gap to a high extent could be a salient position issue in Sweden, while 
it in contrast is a not so salient valence issue in Denmark. Thirdly, the section tries 
to operationalise and develop this overall idea into more specific hypotheses on 
which patterns, we can expect to see, in the representation of the rich in major 
Danish and Swedish national newspapers from 1996-2013.  
7.1.1. THE THREE IDEAL TYPICAL POSSIBILITIES OF PRESENTING 
THE RICH IN SCANDINAVIAN NEWSPAPERS 
It seems quite straightforward to imagine the rich being presented positively as ‘the 
deserving rich’, and negatively as ‘the undeserving rich’ (McCall, 2013; 
Rowlingson & Connor, 2011). Following Fiske, Cuddy and Glick (2007), ‘the rich’ 
should spur ambivalent emotions, stereotypes and hence media presentations. 
Besides these two rather obvious conflicting ideal-types of the ‘deserving- and 
undeserving rich’, a third option will also be presented.  
The first ideal typical possibility of ‘the undeserving rich’ could take its departure 
from the classic social democratic and ultimately Marxist ideology presented in 
Section 1.4. Following this ideal-type, media representations of the rich would 
consistently remain sceptical towards and portray the rich in a not so positive light. 
In the Scandinavian context this means that just as the poor are portrayed in a more 
positive light in the Scandinavian media and discursively lifted into the middle class 
(cf. Section 1.4), the excesses at the top of society are looked upon with scepticism. 
Furthermore the financial crisis from 2008 and onwards could possibly have 
exploited a possible ‘capitalist-sceptical’ ideological reservoir even further. The 
assumption must then furthermore be that we expect to see a sharp rise for articles 
about the rich following the financial crisis.  
The second possibility is a radical divergence from the ‘capitalist-sceptical’ legacy: 
Here the rich are not presented negatively as the ‘class-enemy’, but instead 
positively as the entrepreneurs and job creators. Rowlingson & Connor (2011) 
distinguish between three overall criteria for being considered ‘deserving rich’: 
Rewarding merit/hard work, incentives, character. Typical newspaper articles 
subscribing to this kind of reasoning would e.g. emphasise (See also: Bamfield & 
Horton, 2009; McCall, 2013):  
 How the rich have worked hard and struggled to get to where they are 
now. 
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 The need for incentives in order to maximise the benefits for the rest of 
society in creating wealth, jobs and competitive companies 
 Showing restraint in their character and consumption, by paying their high 
taxes with compliance and furthermore giving more money back to society 
in the form of charity and donations. 
If this discourse remains strong in the wake of the financial crisis, it could even be 
reinforced. It is possible the rich could then be presented as our only hope of getting 
the countries out of the perceived economic turmoil. 
Because ‘the rich’ are supposed to spur ambivalent emotions, stereotypes and hence 
media representations, it seems unlikely that either form of presentation could exist 
without at least some images of the opposite popping up. The negative and the 
positive positions form two opposite axes in discursive struggles, on which 
attributes, labels or stereotypes to assign to ‘the rich’. What is crucial to notice is 
that both of these positions therefore construct ‘the rich’ as being distinct from ‘us’ 
– the average middle class citizen (Fiske et al., 2007).73  
Besides the two opposites, there is also a third possibility. Maybe the ideological 
reservoir or rather the myths, images and stereotypes of the HCNI concerning the 
basic (class) nature of society, which the media mediates, could be neither a 
‘capitalist-sceptical’ or a ‘capitalist-friendly’ one. Instead, in a given society it 
could be the myth and image that there are no such things as excessively rich 
people with supernormal profits. Maybe the history of the political economy in a 
country is perceived as such a success that the issue of wage, income and class 
differences is basically solved. The rich would maybe not even form a distinct class 
in such a case. They just belong to the upper part of the all-encompassing middle 
class. In this scenario, the assumption is that there are very few articles about the 
rich in the newspapers of such a country both before and after the financial crisis 
and the few articles there are, are written in a quite neutral manner.  
The three ideal typical possibilities of presenting the rich are likely to exist in both 
Danish and Swedish media. However, the main hypothesis to be investigated in this 
chapter is that there are good reasons to suspect that it varies quite a lot, which 
positions respectively the Danish and Swedish media mainly subscribe to in the 
period investigated.
74
  
                                                          
73 This idea is also prominent in classical works in the social sciences. Melvin Lerner (1980) 
for example describes a constructed ‘world of the rich and beautiful’, in which the rule of just 
desserts, prominent in the perceived ‘just world’ which most people live in, does not apply. 
74 In both countries, the period investigated will be 1996-2013; why will be elaborated 
below. 
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7.1.2. A SALIENT POSITION ISSUE IN SWEDEN VERSUS A NOT SO 
SALIENT VALENCE ISSUE IN DENMARK? 
What should this overall thesis mean for how we expect the newspapers to 
construct the rich in Denmark and Sweden? A useful perspective here is the issue 
voting paradigm from election studies. At a very basic level, issues – such as the 
distribution of income between the top and the middle strata of society – can take 
the form of position or valence issues. A valence issue is an issue about which 
voters will usually share a common preference, whereas a position issue is a 
divisive issue for which there are different preferences among the voters. When 
judging politicians on position issues, the voters obviously judge the extent to 
which a politician’s position or goal on an issue is in accordance with the voter’s 
position. In valence issues there is no real disagreement on the positions/goals; 
voters instead judge the politicians on their perceived competence or the means they 
would use to reach the goal (Borre, 2001). In the following hypotheses, we will try 
to apply the issue voting perspective on the results and interpretations of the 
chapters above. 
If we start with Denmark, it was argued in Chapter 3 that the legacy of the classic 
Danish PE – the background for the Danish historically constructed normative 
institutions (HCNIs) concerning the basic (class) nature of society – was one of 
compromise and consensus seeking between the various interest groups making up 
the Danish society. Although changes in the programmatic institutions of the 
Danish PE are continuing to take place, the basic consensus seeking and 
coordinating characteristic of the Danish PE seems to remain intact until today. The 
high degree of consensus between various social groups also seemed to be mirrored 
in Danish attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages. In Chapter 6, 
Denmark (and Norway) portrayed very small differences in median attitudes 
between social groups. In fact, almost no class or other attitudinal cleavages existed 
towards the top-middle gap in gross wages in Denmark. The only consistent Danish 
attitudinal cleavage remaining in the models of the multivariate analyses was 
related to the political affiliation of the respondents. On the other hand, the degree 
of intra-group agreement appearing in Chapter 6 was clearly smaller than in 
Sweden. This widespread overall between group similarity in median attitudes, and 
at the same time intra-group confusion, seems to suggest that the issue to a higher 
extent is not a very salient valence issue in Denmark.  
Chapter 3 also argued that the legacy of the classic Swedish PE is to a higher extent 
one of a peaceful, but highly ideological, class struggle. After great upheaval from 
the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, recent developments in the Swedish PE suggest a 
new path emerging largely mirroring the Danish both in the parliamentary sphere 
and in the industrial relations system. In addition, the more material conditions of 
the Danish and Swedish PEs have largely converged in recent decades. In spite of 
these newer tendencies, Sweden still portrayed consistent cleavages in median 
attitudes between social groups. In the multivariate analysis, the Swedish cleavages 
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appeared mainly driven by differences between groups of household income and 
the political affiliations of the respondents. 
On this basis, and as the argument also was in Chapter 6, the Swedish media seems 
to be at a watershed in the period investigated. Because of the idea of lag and the 
inertness of HCNIs argued above, the main hypothesis must be that the Swedish 
media must still mediate the historical myth, image or stereotype of Sweden as a 
class society. The issue of the distribution of income between the top and the 
middle strata of society should thus largely be a position issue in Sweden, where the 
positions or cleavages more or less still follow the lines of the social classes (Lipset 
& Rokkan, 1967). Overall, these positions should therefore be reflected in the 
presentations of the rich in the Swedish newspapers, where we could expect to see 
representatives of both negative positions described above, as well as the opposite 
positive.  
On the other hand, the changes in the Swedish political economy in recent decades, 
and the changes in the actual class structure reflected in the shift to a knowledge, 
service and welfare economy, making it to a very little extent distinguishable from 
the corresponding Danish class structure, is also likely to at least somewhat affect 
the Swedish media output. It is possible a gradual change over time can be seen, 
where the media output concerning the rich gradually changes to being a steadily 
less salient, and to a steadily higher degree a valence issue – also in Sweden. 
Besides these differences in the political economies and attitudinal patterns between 
Denmark and Sweden, it is again also important to bear in mind that Sweden, as 
described in Chapter 3, suffered less from the financial crisis starting in 2008 than 
Denmark, but had their severe crisis in the 1990s. The diverse impact of the 
financial crisis in Denmark and Sweden will remain important for the 
operationalised hypotheses below.  
7.1.3. OPERATIONALISING HYPOTHESES 
On the following pages, these general theses for Denmark and Sweden will be 
sought to be operationalised. If we start with Denmark, the hypothesis is that 
because of the relatively low level of salience of the issue, we in general do not 
expect to see much portrayal of the rich in the Danish media before or after the 
financial crisis – compared to Sweden. The articles to be found are probably also 
written in a quite neutral and often factual manner, not really presenting the rich in 
a certain light at all. Remember the crux of the Danish HCNI was argued to be that 
the society is not constituted of very distinct social classes at all, but instead a 
myriad of sectorial interests to be bridged in compromises. It seems possible though 
that this non-constructing hypothesis could change temporarily in the wake of the 
financial crisis. This is firstly because Denmark, at least compared to Sweden, was 
hit quite hard by the financial crisis (cf. Chapter 3). Secondly, it is simply because 
this quite radical change in the economic situation of the country invites a 
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discussion about the distribution of the available resources in society, which at that 
point must be perceived to be quite scarce. In that case, we would see an increase in 
articles critical of the rich or an increase in articles positive to the rich or both. This 
financial crisis effect will probably fade out quite fast though, and the Danish 
newspapers should return to the pre-financial crisis’ mostly neutral outline.  
We cannot expect to see large differences between the individual Danish 
newspapers. This concerns both the actual number of the articles about the rich per 
month, but also the representation of the rich in these articles. It is again a 
possibility though that there could be a temporal change in this following the 
financial crisis, where the newspapers more or less voluntarily are forced to cover a 
very hot political issue at the time both globally and nationally and therefore maybe 
also to take a stand on the issue. Maybe the effect of the crisis is therefore to 
politicise and polarise the media construction of the rich even in Denmark 
(Hedegaard, 2014b; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Togeby, 2004; Zaller, 1992). Following 
the crisis, in this scenario, the economically liberal newspapers could enhance a 
positive construction of ‘the rich’ as hardworking, risk-taking job-creators. The 
social democratic oriented newspapers on the other hand could return to a clear 
critical representation of the rich they to a greater extent pursued historically. No 
matter what the overall hypothesis is, the effect is more temporal and minor than in 
Sweden. 
The main hypothesis for Sweden presumes a relatively high degree of salience. We 
therefore in general expect to see more debate and therefore a larger number of 
articles about the rich per month than in Denmark. These articles can in general 
furthermore be assumed not to be written in a neutral manner, but in either a 
negative or a positive one. The assumption is that because the issue still constitutes 
a crucial political and journalistic cleavage – a position issue - in Sweden, the 
economically liberal newspapers will consistently present the rich in a positive 
manner, while the social democratic newspapers will portray the rich in a negative 
manner. If the virtual social democratic ideational hegemony claimed by Esping 
Andersen (1980) has not disappeared completely, it is furthermore possible that the 
critical discourse is a bit stronger. This means that even if we in general see positive 
articles in the economically liberal newspapers, the average number of positive 
articles per month or per economically liberal newspaper is lower than the average 
of negative articles per month or per social democratic newspaper. If the Swedish 
media output gradually changes from this outlook, as suggested above, the pattern 
should to a steadily greater extent start to resemble what is proposed for the Danish 
media. 
What can the effect of the financial crisis in Sweden be then? Two possible 
conflicting effects can be considered here. First, it is possible that we will not see 
much difference between the pre- and post-financial crisis. Compared to most other 
western countries Sweden was, as described in Chapter 3, hit very gently by the 
financial crisis and already in 2010 experienced impressive GDP growth – and 
falling unemployment rates – a situation rather opposite from Denmark (Goul 
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Andersen, 2013). The resources could therefore possibly be experienced as less 
scarce than in the Danish case, inducing less reason to discuss its distribution. 
Moreover, if the assumption is true that the issue was already hotly debated in 
Swedish media before the financial crisis, then the salience could possibly already 
be near a kind of saturation point, not being able to rise much more. On the other 
hand, the crisis can also be considered a perfect match for the ideological and 
journalistic positions of the Swedish media refuelling an already salient debate. 
Following this argument, the financial crisis effect could also be expected to last 
longer in Sweden – simply because the issue is assumed to fit with the political and 
journalistic positions of the newspapers in Sweden.  
7.2. DATA AND METHODS 
The following section will mainly deal with both the overall design oriented issues 
and the approach of the article as well as some of the more practical methodological 
issues arising when conducting a study of the development of newspaper 
representations of ‘the rich’ in a Danish and Swedish context. These are not trivial 
issues.  
7.2.1. THE SELECTION OF A SEARCH ALGORITHM 
First, it is by no means straightforward which search algorithm to use to identify a 
relevant sample of articles concerning ‘the rich’ (McCall, 2013). It is simply much 
more straightforward, which keywords are relevant, when you are interested in 
benefit fraud, social assistance etc. More or less, you just use these words translated 
into the relevant languages plus a few synonyms. Hereby you collect your relevant 
sample of newspaper articles.
75
  
As it will be shown below, this is by no means the case when you are interested in 
the newspapers’ presentation of ‘the rich’. The question is how do you identify the 
relevant sample of articles concerning the rich in Denmark and Sweden? It was 
decided to actually stick to the most direct translation of the subject of interest and 
straightforwardly to search for articles containing the word ‘rig/rik’ [rich] or 
‘rige/rika’ [the rich] somewhere in the text. Although a number of different 
approaches have been tried, there are a number of good theoretical and practical 
arguments against other solutions and for the selection of that particular search 
algorithm.  
First, all attempts to expand the search algorithm with different synonyms or related 
concepts, which could be used to describe the upper strata of society, appeared 
biased. In order to test the hypothesis and the change in proportions of articles 
presenting ‘the rich’ in either a negative, more or less neutral or a positive light, we 
seemed to need a search algorithm that was not severely biased in either direction. 
                                                          
75 See for example (Dejgaard & Larsen, 2011; Lundström, 2011). 
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Furthermore, this criterion needed to be met not just at a single point in time, but in 
the whole period from 1996 – 2013 and in both Denmark and Sweden. When trying 
to obtain a balance by e.g. having three ‘positive’ and three ‘negative’ search terms, 
the obtained sample was still to a varying extent biased through time. An illustrative 
example of this is the case of the word ‘capitalist’. In the early years, this was a 
term which maybe unsurprisingly could have been applied to capture a considerable 
proportion of the articles describing ‘the rich’ negatively. As time passed, the fame 
of this concept vanished, and in the later years – but only before the financial crisis 
– it was sometimes even used as a positive adjective to describe a risk-taking 
entrepreneur.  
One solution to this problem was to expand the search algorithm with all the 
possible synonyms and relevant concepts you could think of, or that you could find 
in articles you had read, which were more or less related to the subject. Even if it 
was technically possible to include many words in the search algorithms in 
Infomedia and Mediearkivet (see below), and it obviously decreased the bias, it was 
almost impossible to be sure all relevant search terms were included in the whole 
period in the two countries. Furthermore, very broad search algorithms led to a new 
problem: they inherently invited a tremendous amount of ‘noise’ in the form of 
articles not relevant for the topic of the investigation. Although smaller, this was a 
problem we also ended up dealing with in our final search algorithm (see details 
below).  
Because of these concerns, and after trying out different search algorithms and 
skimming and reading through numerous newspaper articles appearing, when using 
the different possible search algorithms, in different newspapers at different points 
in time, it was decided to abandon all attempts to create a very expansive search 
algorithm and return to the ‘rig/rik’ [rich] or ‘rige/rika’ algorithm.76  
It is also important to emphasise that this choice was furthermore not a forced upon, 
second best, but practical solution. The concept of ‘the rich’ firstly seems to be the 
concept actually used in the meagre non-Scandinavian existing literature on 
attitudes and media presentations of the upper strata of society. In qualitative 
interviews on the subject, it furthermore seems to be a preferred term to use by the 
interviewees to describe the upper strata (Bamfield & Horton, 2009; Fiske et al., 
2007; McCall, 2013). The concept of ‘the rich’ is basically the negation to the 
concept of ‘the poor’. It therefore seems reasonable to suspect that media 
constructions aiming to bind to existing images or stereotypes of the upper strata of 
society in many cases are likely to use the same term.  
Secondly, at first glance one could maybe think that the concept of ‘the rich’ has a 
quite severe negative bias. It seems strange if this negative bias is larger than the 
                                                          
76 This non-linear process of trying different and refining search algorithms resembles what 
Lundström (2011) describes as a constant comparative technique, which he also employs. 
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corresponding positive bias in the concept of ‘the poor’ though. Poverty is almost 
inherently unjust, and existing studies seem to document more negative 
presentations of ‘the poor’ than positive ones, refuting this simple first hand claim. 
Obviously, things are more complicated than the positive – negative dichotomy.  
One of the consequences of the ambivalence- findings concerning the emotional 
attitudinal response spurred by the rich is that it seems likely there is great room for 
representing ‘the rich’ both positively and negatively in media articles – depending 
on which dimension is emphasised in the presentations (Fiske et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, Denmark becomes a kind of a critical case, with the perspective of 
Fiske, Cuddy and Glick (2007). The authors here claim that warmth and 
competence are two universal dimensions of social cognition. They claim that 
whichever social group not having a high perceived level of competence and 
warmth is subject to emotional arousal and stereotyping. Stereotypes are as 
mentioned classical subjects for the media to build stories on (Gilens, 2000; Gilens, 
1996; Larsen, 2013; Larsen & Dejgaard, 2013). If we assume that ‘the rich’, not 
only in the USA but in general, are perceived to be competent but not very warm, 
can it then really be that the Danish media do not build on and construct stereotypes 
of ‘the rich’ as somehow being separate from the warm and competent middle class, 
as the thesis above described?  
7.2.2. THE SELECTION OF NEWSPAPERS AND TIME PERIOD 
The online media archives Infomedia (Infomedia A/S, 2013) and Mediearkivet 
(Retriever Sverige AB, 2013) have been used to extract Danish and Swedish 
newspaper articles correspondingly. The five largest national newspapers in each 
country have been chosen for maximum discursive impact. This selection also 
allows for having variation on both the journalistic and political profile in 
accordance with the recommendations and definitions of (Dejgaard & Larsen, 2011; 
Lundström, 2011).
77
  
                                                          
77 It should also be mentioned that three other newspapers labelled by Larsen & Dejgaard 
(2011) as ‘serious-newspapers’ were considered – Børsen and Information in Denmark and 
Dagens Industri in Sweden. There are two reasons for why they are not included though. 
First, while these newspapers do deal with abstract subjects – probably also the one under 
investigation here – they focus on narrow groups of selected readers, a niche. Børsen and 
Dagens Industri focus on the business community, while Information’s niche is mainly left-
wing intellectuals and students (A/S Dagbladet Information, 2013; Dagbladet Børsen A/S, 
2014; Dagens Industri, 2013). For this reason, they were not found relevant for investigating 
developments in the broad societal discourse. Second, both Danish newspapers entered the 
Infomedia achieve as late as 2006 (Infomedia A/S, 2013). Including them would therefore 
have severely restricted the timeframe it was possible to investigate, which for the reasons 
we will now turn to, would have been very unfortunate. 
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Table 7-1 Classification of the Five Largest Danish and Swedish Nation-wide 
Newspapers 
 Social Democratic Conservative Economically Liberal 
  Danish  
Newsstand Tabloid Ekstra Bladet (EB)  BT (BT) 
Serious Popular    
Semi-Serious Politiken (POL) Berlingske (BL) Jyllands Posten (JP) 
   Swedish  
Newsstand Tabloid Aftonbladet (AB)  Expressen (EX) 
Serious Popular   Göteborg Posten (GP) 
Semi-Serious  Svenska Dagbladet (SD) Dagens Nyheter (DN) 
Sources: (Dansk Oplagskontrol, 2013; Larsen et al., 2011; Lundström, 2011; Tidningsutgivarna, 2013). 
 
It is clear from Table 7-1 that the five selected newspapers in each country secure 
variation on both dimensions chosen – journalistic style and political orientation 
(ex-post). At the same time, these are the five largest newspapers in Denmark and 
Sweden – except maybe from a few of the freesheets who have been omitted – 
indicating that these should have a general discursive impact on different strata of 
the population.  
Which time period should be chosen for the analyses then? To identify general 
quantified trends in the depiction of the rich in the 10 newspapers, a maximum 
timespan has been chosen (Lundström, 2011, p. 314). If we start with the Danish 
newspapers, JP entered the archive 9
th
 of January 1996. The four other newspapers 
entered Infomedia as early as 1990 (Infomedia A/S, 2013). In the Swedish case, all 
the five selected newspapers entered Mediearkivet earlier than 1996 (Retriever 
Sverige AB, 2013). Since it was decided to count the number of articles on a 
monthly basis, the first full month where all 10 newspapers were available was 
February 1996 – the starting point of the analyses. The last full month available, 
when the data collection started, was April 2013. Therefore, this month became the 
last month of collecting the gross sample of newspaper articles. 
This expansive approach to collecting a gross sample of newspaper articles will be 
followed only in the first part of the analysis. As Lundström (2011) does, the focus 
will be narrowed on specific time periods of interest later. The two time periods 
chosen are the periods in which the survey data for the third and fourth rounds of 
the International Social Survey Program’s (ISSP) Social Inequality Module was 
collected in Denmark and Sweden (ISSP Research Group, 2011). These data 
constituted the core of the analyses of Chapters 4-6 above. The data collection 
periods are: 
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 December 2000 to May 2001 (Denmark)78 + February 1999 to June 1999 
(Sweden).
79
  
 September 2009 to January 2010 (Denmark)80 + February 2009 to May 
2009 (Sweden).
81
  
The periods chosen are then:  
 T1: November 1998 to May 2001. 
 T2: November 2008 to January 2010.  
These periods include the whole data collection period for both surveys in both 
countries plus the three months before the collections start in either country. These 
three months were included for the following reason. It must be assumed that if the 
attitudes towards the top-middle gap of the respondents in the survey are influenced 
by the media’s presentation of the rich, then those attitudes are probably not just 
affected by the presentation of the day the respondent answers the questionnaire, 
but also by the presentations in the period leading up to that. The two selected time 
periods furthermore have the advantage of providing a post- and a pre-financial 
snapshot, important for testing the hypothesis deduced above. 
7.3. AGGREGATED COVERAGE OF THE RICH IN DENMARK 
AND SWEDEN 1996-2013  
The section aims to get a broad overview of the development in the media coverage 
of the rich the entire period of full months, from which we have the articles of all 10 
newspapers. That is from 1
st
 February 1996 to 30
th 
April 2013. 
The samples obtained by simply searching for articles containing the word ‘rig/rik’ 
[rich] or ‘rige/rika’ [the rich] somewhere in the text are very encompassing. This is 
because by searching in the entire text of the articles, we should also be able to 
capture relevant articles, where a version of the word rich is not part of the headline 
or lead paragraph of the article, which is quite likely. Unfortunately, the vast 
majority of the articles retrieved this way are not relevant at all, but pure noise.  
To eliminate the vast majority of noise-articles we utilised the NOT command in 
Infomedia and the corresponding ANDNOT command in Mediearkivet. When you 
utilise this command articles containing the word ‘rig/rik’ OR ‘rige/rika’ and one of 
the words specified after the NOT/ANDNOT command will be discarded.  
                                                          
78 (Tobiasen & Sander Andersen, 2005). 
79 (ISSP Research Group, 2002). 
80 (ISSP Research Group, 2011). 
81 (ISSP Research Group, 2011). 
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To select the NOT/ANDNOT words we chose a few months from different points 
in the timespan of 1996-2013 in the two countries, and looked for which words 
actually seemed to appear together with different versions of the word ‘rich’ in the 
noise-articles. These usually fall under themes as ‘rich’ in foreign countries, sports, 
culture and lifestyle-articles.  
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Figure 7-1 reveals results, which for Denmark seem to fit with the theoretical 
expectations deduced in the hypothesis above quite well. The average number of 
articles and thus the salience of the issue of the rich seems to lie at around 40-50 
articles per month in more or less the entire period investigated. This is, as 
expected, clearly lower than in Sweden, but on the other hand the difference is not 
overwhelming from 2006-2013. Overall, the tendency in Sweden is thus a gradual 
decline over time starting from an average of approximately 80 in 1996 being 
reduced to approximately 50-60 in April 2006, followed in the rest of the period 
investigated by relative stability in the average monthly level of articles. In 
addition, as expected for Denmark, we see what seems to be a temporal lagged 
financial crisis effect from June 2010-May 2012. Only in this period, we see a 
noticeable rise from the general average of 40-50 articles. If this rise corresponds to 
a debate following the financial crisis there was clearly a two-year lag in this effect, 
and the effect clearly seems temporal. In 2013, the average number of articles per 
month is down to around 40-50 again.  
Sweden on the other hand does not seem to conform to its expected role as more or 
less a Danish opposite. This suggests that not just the historical legacy of the 
Swedish HCNI as a class society, which influences the media patterns, but also the 
more recent changes in the Swedish political economy, could have an effect. The 
general Swedish level is as mentioned higher than in Denmark, but the question is if 
the minute difference from 2006 and onwards really can be labelled substantial. The 
Swedish story is actually mostly one of much bigger variation over the period than 
in Denmark. There are remarkable peak periods in Sweden. The first is before the 
decline sets in, lasting from December 1998-October 2000. In the ‘stable period’ 
from 2006-2013, there is first a remarkable peak from April-December 2007 and 
second a less dramatic but longer peak from March 2010-January 2011. The 
financial crisis therefore does not seem to form a crucial event for the debate about 
the rich in Sweden. This fits with the thesis that there is not much effect, because 
Sweden experienced a very mild crisis. On the other hand, the quite low average at 
this point does not go well with the additional argument presented above: that the 
salience of ‘the rich’ debate is already at a saturation point, not being able to rise 
much more. The debate was clearly more intense from 1998-2000. It is difficult to 
deduce more or get closer to answering these questions from the aggregated graphs 
above. The disaggregated and qualitative investigations below will allow that. 
7.4. DISAGGREGATED ON THE FIVE NEWSPAPERS IN THE 
TWO COUNTRIES 
Below the results of Figure 7-1 are disaggregated on the five newspapers in each 
country:  
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Figure 7-2 portrays interesting and especially for Sweden quite surprising results. If 
we nevertheless again start with Denmark, the results are largely in accordance with 
the thesis deduced above. Compared to Sweden we do not see very big differences 
between the Danish newspapers in any period investigated. Instead, they seem to 
follow the overall trend quite well. Important differences may be hidden in the 
details though. Whereas Berlingske and especially Politiken vary very little in their 
average coverage in the whole period, Ekstra Bladet and especially Jyllands Posten 
vary more.
82
  
What about the temporal lagged financial crisis effect identified above, then? 
Actually, Ekstra Bladet seems to react already in the months followed directly by 
the financial crisis, while BT follows in late 2009. Jyllands Posten and Berlingske 
also follow in 2009 and 2010 correspondingly, but only in a few selected months. 
The only semi-serious, social democratic newspaper Politiken apparently does not 
alter its average in the whole period investigated. If the thesis is right that the 
temporal lagged effect of the financial crisis is characterised by a temporal return to 
the historical political profiles on the issue of the various newspapers, it seems that 
only Ekstra Bladet holds the old rich-critical social democratic banner high. Only 
later analyses will reveal this though. 
Sweden portrays different results than expected, but which again point to the fact 
that the changes in Swedish political economy of the last couple of decades seem 
gradually to have had an effect. Most importantly we see that the end of the decline 
identified in Figure 7-1 to be in 2006 corresponds to a virtual convergence of all 
five newspapers of around 10 articles on the subject each per month. Although we 
as expected see quite big differences between the different newspapers before 2006, 
after this time they are much smaller and actually comparable to the Danish 
differences. If we follow the individual newspapers, we also see very clear and 
interesting trends throughout the period. Whereas Göteborg Posten and especially 
Svenska Dagbladet continue to decline throughout the period, Dagens Nyheter 
continue to rise, actually becoming the highest scoring semi-serious newspaper 
from 2009 and forward. Even if the tabloids generally follow each other quite well, 
Aftonbladet from 2011 and forward clearly seems to increase their coverage of the 
subject. Except from a few peak months directly following the financial crisis by 
Göteborg Posten and Aftonbladet, the general effect of the financial crisis on the 
debate in Sweden seems to be almost non-existing.  
It could be the Swedish media’s presentation of the rich from 2006 and onwards, in 
accordance with the developments in the Swedish PE, more and more is starting to 
resemble the corresponding Danish. Before 2006, all semi-serious newspapers 
                                                          
82 It should be mentioned that Infomedia distinguishes between the different local sections of 
Jyllands Posten from December 2004 and forward. In counting the total number of articles 
for this newspaper, we have added all these up. The high average value from 2005-2008 for 
this newspaper could therefore be seen as a bit inflated; at least all of them have not been 
available to all readers of the paper. 
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except Dagens Nyheter and both tabloids hotly debated the issue. It could seem that 
after 2010, only Aftonbladet held the old sceptical social democratic banner high. 
Their new ‘capitalist positive’ counterpart could have been the liberalistic Dagens 
Nyheter. We need to investigate the actual content of the articles in order to test 
these ideas though.  
7.5. THE TYPES OF REPRESENTATIONS OF THE RICH 
The graphs thus far have left many interesting indications. In order to really 
investigate the development of the representation of the rich in Danish and Swedish 
nationwide newspapers, we need to investigate the actual content in the articles and 
not just count them. We have here decided to narrow the focus even further on the 
articles actually mentioning ‘the rich’ (‘de rige’/‘de rika’) within the overall 
samples presented above. The argument for this is that these articles at least in 
principle explicitly focus on the rich as a group. Table 7-2 below portrays 
descriptive statistics about the amount of Danish and Swedish articles in each of the 
two time periods selected, with this rather narrow search algorithm.  
Table 7-2 Number of References to ‘de rige’ in the Five Danish Newspapers and to 
‘de rika’ in the Five Swedish Newspapers in the Two Periods Selected 
  T1* T2** Total 
Danish 
 
-Frequency 
 
147 
 
124 
 
271 
 
 -Percentage of total number of references 
 
54% 
 
46% 
 
100% 
 
 -Average number of articles per month 4.7 8.3  
Swedish -Frequency 
 
386 
 
101 
 
487 
 
 -Percentage of total number of references 
 
79% 
 
21% 
 
100% 
 -Average number of articles per month 12.5 6.7  
Notes: * T1=01.11.1998-31.05.2001; **T2=01.11.2008-31.01.2010. 
 
Table 7-2 confirms the development seen above, but is maybe even clearer. While 
the average number of references to the rich per month nearly doubles in Danish 
newspapers from T1-T2, it nearly halves in corresponding Swedish newspapers. 
The Danish and Swedish levels are actually almost alike in T2, whereas the debate 
was much more intense in Sweden than in Denmark in T1. The question is still 
what these debates contain though, and what the reason is for the surprising decline 
in Sweden and maybe not so surprising rise in Denmark. In Table 7-3 below, the 
references above are coded into the categories elaborated in Subsection 7.1.1 above: 
negative, neutral and positive. 
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Table 7-3 Number of References to ‘de rige’ in the Five Danish Newspapers and to 
‘de rika’ in the Five Swedish Newspapers in the two Periods Selected, Coded into 
Three Broad Categories 
   T1* T2** 
Danish Negative -Frequency 
 
37 
 
49 
 
  -Average number of articles per month 
 
1.2 3.3 
 
  -Relative development***  +174% 
 Neutral -Frequency 
 
70 
 
55 
 
  -Average number of articles per month 
 
2.3 3.7 
 
  - Relative development***  +62% 
 Positive -Frequency 
 
21 
 
11 
 
  -Average number of articles per month 
 
0.7 0.7 
 
  - Relative development***  +8% 
Swedish Negative -Frequency 
 
108 
 
31 
 
  -Average number of articles per month 
 
3.5 2.1 
 
  - Relative development***  -41% 
 Neutral -Frequency 
 
155 
 
35 
 
  -Average number of articles per month 
 
5.0 2.3 
 
  - Relative development***  -53% 
 Positive -Frequency 
 
32 
 
19 
 
  -Average number of articles per month 
 
1.0 1.3 
 
  - Relative development***  +23% 
Notes: * T1=01.11.1998-31.5.2001; **T2=01.11.2008-31.01.2010; *** ([average number of articles per 
month in T2-average number of articles per month in T1] / [average number of articles per month in 
T1]). 
 
First, Table 7-3 shows the remarkable rise in the average amount of articles in 
Denmark is caused by a relative rise in all three categories. Clearly most remarkable 
is the rise among the articles coded as negative, contrasted by a virtual standstill 
among the positive articles. In obvious contrast, the likewise stark Swedish decline 
identified in Table 7-2 translates into a general decline among the categories; only 
the amount of positive references holds the line and actually rises 23%. In T2, we 
actually see an almost equal share of references among the three categories in 
Sweden, something seen in neither of the two periods in Denmark nor in T1 in 
Sweden. Table 7-4 below will focus on the remarkable results of Table 7-3: the 
development of negative articles in Denmark and the development of positive 
articles in Sweden.  
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Table 7-4 Number of References to ‘de rige’ in the Five Danish Newspapers and to 
‘de rika’ in the Five Swedish Newspapers in the Two Periods Selected and focusing 
on the Categories Sceptical/Negative and Positive 
   T1* T2** 
Danish: Negative Jyllands Posten -Frequency 
 
10 
 
5 
 
  -Average number of articles/month 
 
0.32 0.33 
 Politiken -Frequency 
 
7 4 
  -Average number of articles/month 
 
0.23 0.26 
 Berlingske -Frequency 
 
4 4 
  -Average number of articles/month 
 
0.13 0.26 
 Ekstra Bladet -Frequency 
 
8 25 
  -Average number of articles/month 
 
0.26 1.67 
 BT -Frequency 
 
8 11 
  -Average number of articles/month 
 
0.26 0.73 
Swedish: Positive Dagens Nyheter -Frequency 
 
2 3 
  -Average number of articles/month 
 
0.06 0.20 
 Aftonbladet -Frequency 
 
5 3 
  -Average number of articles/month 
 
0.19 0.20 
 Expressen -Frequency 
 
7 11 
  -Average number of articles/month 
 
0.23 0.73 
 Göteborg Posten  
 
-Frequency 
 
4 0 
  -Average number of articles/month 
 
0.13 0.00 
 Svenska Dagbladet  
 
-Frequency 
 
14 2 
  -Average number of articles/month 
 
0.45 0.13 
Notes: *T1=01.11.1998-31.5.2001; **T2=01.11.2008-31.01.2010. 
 
Table 7-4 shows results, which are not in good accordance with what was suggested 
above. First, the rise in the negative articles about the rich in the second period in 
Denmark is clearly driven by the two tabloid newspapers Ekstra Bladet and BT. Not 
surprisingly it is the social democratic tabloid Ekstra Bladet (ex-post in Table 7-1) 
whose development is most dramatic. However, the supposedly economically 
liberal tabloid BT also triples their average number of negative articles per month. 
The serious popular newspapers on the other hand do not seem to have reacted to 
the financial crisis by being more critical to the rich at all. It was therefore clearly 
the journalistic style rather than the ex-post political profile of the newspapers that 
mattered for how the Danish newspapers responded to the financial crisis. It could 
be plausible that these negative articles therefore are an expression of rather short-
term indignation among the working class readers of the two tabloids to the 
misbehaviour of individuals or groups of ‘the rich’ before and into the financial 
crisis. This critique could be grounded in an almost silenced working class identity 
in opposition to the rich, but the non-response of all the semi-serious newspapers on 
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the other hand suggests this debate did not materialise into a critique of the rich on a 
more abstract and structural level. As hypothesised, this is possibly because 
resource distribution is not a crucial political or journalistic cleavage in the Danish 
media market anymore. It is therefore also not surprising that the increased salience 
fades out after May 2012 (see Figure 7-1). 
Second, we hypothesised above that because the top-middle wage-gap and 
distribution of income in general should be a salient position issue in the Swedish 
newspapers, with the positions corresponding more or less to the classic class 
cleavages, there should be clear proponents of both positive and sceptical views of 
the rich. Moreover, it is therefore not surprising that the Swedish rise in positive 
articles is born by the two main economically liberal newspapers Dagens Nyheter 
and especially Expressen. Actually, it is more surprising that only Svenska 
Dagbladet really took up that position in the first period. As it was seen in Table 7-
4 the positive references constituted really the minor part of the total number of 
articles about the rich in T1, suggesting a strong social democratic, critical 
hegemony. It is therefore even more surprising that we seem to see no ‘critical’ 
effect of the financial crisis. Rather the results in Tables 7-3 and 7-4 as well as 
Figures 7-1 and 7-2 rather support a gradual change from a critical hegemony to a 
situation resembling the Danish one.  
The results above leave open the question of whether the Swedish newspapers 
simply are on the way to ‘becoming Danish’, debating anything but the rich in 
society, and if they are presented in articles, is it only on special occasions or 
mostly in a rather neutral manner? To investigate these assumptions we will look 
qualitatively at the content of the two ‘critical cases’ identified in Table 7-4: the 
references coded as negative in T2 in Denmark and the references coded as positive 
in Sweden in T2. In both cases, we will compare them with the corresponding 
situation in T1.  
7.6. THE QUALITATIVE CONTENT 
In contrast to the quantitative tendencies for convergence between Denmark and 
Sweden identified above, the sections below will show substantial differences in 
how the rich are portrayed qualitatively in the Danish and Swedish articles. The 
results are that a large part of the Swedish references including the ones coded as 
positive and neutral refer explicitly to the rich as a group separate from the middle 
class, and in the case of the positive often take up a defensive stand against an 
implicit or explicit existing critical discourse. Another perspective on this is that 
‘the rich’ in the Swedish references are presented as a group of acting subjects – 
with a shared agenda, moral characteristics etc. In contrast, the Danish references 
almost do not discuss the rich as such as a distinct group or individually as in the 
Swedish case. Instead, the references are relational, collective and actually focussed 
on issues of inequality and redistribution at large, rather than the rich as a group or 
a social class in society. This also means the rich are not as in the Swedish case 
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presented as a distinct group of acting subjects. Instead, ‘the rich’ in the Danish 
presentations are rather an ‘object’ upon which ‘we’ as a collective have a right to 
and do act, in order to ensure ‘the right’ distribution of incomes, resources, welfare 
rights, life chances and personal liberty in society.  
As above the references presented below include both reader commentaries 
(LTTEs), editorials and various forms of informative articles. These references 
presented are selected to clearly exemplify the types of presentation claimed. One 
could claim that it is strange to include LTTEs in a study of media output. As it will 
be apparent below, these often use some of the same frames and images of the rich 
as the articles written by the newspapers themselves. This is not surprising since 
editors at the newspapers obviously choose these particular LTTEs. The images are 
often sharper though, and could maybe be claimed to be a more clear expression of 
the impact of HCNIs on the Danes and Swedes. Because the purpose is to identify 
the images, stereotypes and presentation of ‘the rich’ in the Danish and Swedish 
HCNIs, it is actually not imperative ‘who’ presents the images, but rather ‘which’ 
images are presented. Nevertheless, for the benefit of doubt and to the extent that it 
is possible, quotes from both LTTEs as well as newspaper-authored articles will be 
presented in tandem below. The quotes were selected as representing exemplaries 
of the general tendencies sought to be documented and described.   
7.6.1. THE NEGATIVE ARTICLES IN DENMARK  
Starting with the negative Danish references in T2 a very clear pattern appears. 
Even if the references should be focussed on the rich as a group, a vast majority of 
the negative Danish references in T2 have some kind of collective reference 
attached.  
Most dominantly more than half of all these articles describe how the rich ‘get’ or 
‘have been given’ something that others in society – lowly paid or everybody else – 
have not. What ‘have been given’ are typically tax deductions or advantages in 
connection to reforms of taxes or the characteristics of the existing tax system. 
These are not the only examples though; also exemptions from cut-downs, better 
access to (private) healthcare, dentistry and the prospects of worry-free lives as 
pensioners are mentioned. Sometimes there are explicit references to who the 
‘giver’ is: the politicians, the state, the government, named politicians or even ‘us’. 
Other times the references are not explicit, but implicitly the address is the same. 
Below two quotes will be presented trying to exemplify typical references in this 
category. The first is a reader commentary (LTTE), while the second is meant as an 
informative article from the newspaper Berlingske:  
‘It is not strange that the current government gets millions in 
contributions from the largest Danish firms, when the Danish managers 
get a 440.000 DKK tax reliefs a year. It is obvious who is paying the 
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party of VKO.
83
 It is the managers and the richest Danes, who again 
share the Christmas presents of the government, while the rest of us can 
look forward to a petty tax relief of a petty 300 DKK a month. This must 
absolutely be called a skewed policy on the income distribution.’ 
(Lannov, 2009) [Author’s translation]84  
Moreover, the informative article from Berlingske: 
‘The inequality in the health conditions of the ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’ in 
Denmark is growing. The difference in the life expectancy between high 
and low has been rising in recent years, and now new statistics from AE-
Rådet
85
 show that an unskilled worker has twice the number of visits to 
the general practitioner and uses up to 57 percent more on medicine as a 
highly educated person - at the same time, however, far less on dentist-
visits, which are paid privately.’ (Holm Nielsen, 2009) [Author’s 
translation] 
The second most frequently seen reference is equally collective and related to the 
first type. Here the call is that the rich in different ways ‘could’ and ‘should’ pay 
more back to society. This is first and foremost by paying higher taxes
86
 or it is by 
accepting user charges for certain public benefits. Again, these articles are 
unsurprisingly mainly LTTEs. The quote below exemplifies a typical form of the 
collective reference we have sought to describe: 
‘I am so tired of listening to the rich bastards talking about lowering the 
top-tax. Just the other day Nasar Khader
87
 started bleating along the 
same lines. Why not lower the bottom-tax. That would benefit more 
people and the consumption in society would be increased considerably, 
because the ordinary Dane does not have too much to live by from day 
to day as it is now. An increased consumption would also create more 
jobs, and it is about time the lowest paid will be favoured.’ (Serwin, 
2009) [Author’s translation] 
                                                          
83 A commonly used abbreviation for the parties of the government from 2001-2011 and their 
main supporting party. 
84 In each case the translation is as close to the text as possible. In some cases unique national 
expressions are used in the quotes, which, if translated directly, would confuse the meaning. 
In these cases, the meaning and not the individual words are translated.  
85 In their own words, the Economic Council of the Labour Movement (ECLM) is a Danish 
economic policy institute and think-tank working to promote social justice in Denmark. The 
ECLM secretariat is funded by the Danish trade union confederation (LO), and by revenue 
from research and analysis carried out on behalf of various clients (The Economic Council of 
the Labour Movement, 2014).  
86 Including the infamous millionaire-tax, this was eventually scrapped. 
87 Politician who shifted political parties. 
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The three quotes clearly illustrate that it is not the rich individually or as a group in 
itself that are the main reference and concern of negative Danish articles of T2. 
Even when focussing just on references to ‘the rich’, it is not the rich as a group in 
itself that is important; it is their ‘contributions’ vs. ‘given rights’ compared to the 
rest of society and therefore ultimately the level and manner of inequality in society 
that is discoursivised.  
If we compare these results to the negative Danish references in T1 we see 
similarities, but also differences. In T1, large parts of the articles are also the rich 
‘get’ or ‘have been given’ type. The only real difference is the subject. In T1, the 
dominant subject is the housing market (mostly in Copenhagen) in different ways 
described as being consciously regulated to benefit the rich by the politicians. In 
addition, taxes, health and home care are mentioned: 
‘It is the rich and the well-educated, who occupy the best apartments – 
also the social housing flats, who were supposed to be for the socially 
disadvantaged.’ (Løcke, 2001) [Author’s translation]  
Again, it is not only informative articles which are following this form: 
‘…When the politicians with Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen in 
the forefront say that they want to do so much for us elderly, I need to 
say it is empty words. I do not buy their fancy words. As a pensioner,
88
 I 
cannot afford to pay my transport to be operated. The option of freely 
selecting a hospital is thus apparently only for those who can afford to 
pay, meaning all the rich.’ (Grave, 2000) [Author’s translation] 
However, and in contrast to T2, the second largest group of references actually 
describes the rich as a group in itself. The themes vary, but the general conclusion 
is the rich are portrayed as a group of immoral, selfish and snobbish people. Again 
first an opinion piece and then an informative article:  
‘John Stefan Olsen, TV and film author, 2 December in BT says: ‘We 
have in the last 25 years become stinking rich, very selfish and have 
enough in ourselves’. I have to agree with John Stefan. The rich have 
become richer. The poor have become poorer, and as far as I can see, 
when I look around, it is the poor who are doing voluntary work – so the 
poor are not selfish or have enough in themselves.’ (Nielsen, 2000) 
[Author’s translation] 
In addition, the informative article from the newspaper Jyllands Posten: 
                                                          
88 The word used is ‘folkepensionist’, which could be translated to ‘people’s pensioner’. This 
reference indicates that she does not have a private or labour market pension scheme, but 
lives from the state old-age pension scheme.  
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‘The municipality of Gentofte together with the neighbouring 
municipality, Lyngby-Taarbæk,
89
 has disproportionately many polluted 
sites from former dry cleaning establishments, and the explanation given 
by the man in charge of the county’s groundwater is that the rich citizens 
in these municipalities to a greater extent than elsewhere had their fur 
and fine clothes rinsed.’ (Bjerg, 2000) [Author’s translation] 
The apparent negative Danish rise from T1-T2 is therefore put into a new light. 
Where substantial parts of the negative presentations of the rich in Danish 
newspapers in T1 actually distinguish and are critical to the rich as a group, in T2 
clearly the main concern is not the rich in themselves, but questions about 
redistribution and inequality in resources and opportunities in society.  
7.6.2. THE POSITIVE ARTICLES IN SWEDEN 
The second case we will look into is the positive Swedish references in T1 and T2. 
In both T1 and T2, we see a stark difference from the strong collective and 
inequality context identified in the sceptical Danish articles. Almost every positive 
Swedish article in both periods refers explicitly to the rich as a group, often taking 
up a defensive stand against an existing critical discourse.  
Typical themes for this defence in both T1 and T2 include firstly arguing that most 
of ‘the rich’ are giving a lot or too much back to society in the form of paying taxes 
and ‘we’ should be grateful rather than critical. In T2, the criticisms are often aimed 
explicitly to the social democrats’ proposal for a new ‘millionaire tax’ and a 
reintroduced wealth tax:  
‘Sahlin and Östros90 have now informed the public that they wish to 
increase the tax for the ‘rich’, if they regain power. Do they by that 
mean that the wealth tax for the richest 20-30 families in Sweden ought 
to be reintroduced?’ (Nylander, 2009) [Author’s translation] 
The following editorial from Expressen is even more specific in singling out just a 
single man as representing ‘the rich’: 
‘…The richest person in Sweden is the owner of H&M Stefan Persson. 
He is also our best taxpayer. Last year Persson delivered 797.4 million 
SEK to the tax-authorities. That huge sum can be difficult to 
comprehend. However, it is easy to claim that this money pays for a 
whole lot of public welfare, Mona Sahlin. Maybe a billionaire is 
                                                          
89 Gentofte and Lyngby-Taarbæk are two municipalities north of Copenhagen known for 
their high proportion of affluent inhabitants.  
90 Mona Sahlin and Thomas Östros were respectively the political leader and the political 
spokesperson on economic issues for the Swedish Social Democrats in 2009. 
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supposed to give up all assets before qualifying to be a contributor to the 
welfare? With Stefan Persson’s tax-money, you can for example pay for 
approximately 1600 nursing home spaces or hire approximately 2000 
teachers. Stefan Persson apparently also thinks it is cool to pay his taxes, 
in contrast to some of his tax-tormented colleagues. He does not stop 
there. Last year he donated 350 million to the Karolinska institute. Other 
Swedish business leaders dismiss charity with a reference to the high tax 
burden. H&M-Persson is a hero. Mona Sahlin should honour him 
instead of increasing his taxes.’ (Expressen, 2009) [Author’s translation]    
In the positive articles, it is secondly argued that ‘the rich’ targeted in debates or 
policies are often not exceptional, but rather ordinary responsible Swedes. This 
reader commentary is a good example: 
‘In the article,91 it is ‘humorously’ claimed, ‘the rich never wanted to 
pay taxes on their assets’. Is the person, who builds and maintains his 
house, paid his loans and then by the state assigned a high taxable real 
estate-value value, rich? No, he has tied up assets in his house, but he is 
not rich.’ (Böttiger, 2000) [Author’s translation] 
Lastly, there is a group of references especially prominent in T1 arguing that it is 
benefitting everybody that the rich are buying many apartments in central 
Stockholm. These references argue that the housing problems there are not caused 
by too little intervention and regulation, but by too much, making it impossible for 
the free market to work its wonders.  
The second most prominent type of positive Swedish references is ‘red carpet’-like 
descriptions and portraits of the life of ‘the rich and beautiful’ (Lerner, 1980), 
describing their homes, where they spend their holidays etc., but also how they 
enjoy simple things and give to charity. This informative article about the 
establishment of a millionaire dating-bureau is a good example hereof: 
‘Wealthy and lonely? Now a dating-bureau for all with Rolex watches 
and full accounts exist.  
 
Who wants a millionaire? Now a dating-bureau for the successful – but 
lonely – starts up in Scandinavia. Maybe you fit the standard of the 
exclusive costumers of the dating-bureau? Alternatively, search for a 
partner yourself. Scandinavian world offers a major opening discount. 
The membership fee is lowered from 58.000 to 4.000 SEK…FACTS 
ABOUT THE RICH. 80 percent of the Swedish millionaires are already 
occupied. Swedish income statistics speak against the image of the 
lonely millionaire. On the contrary, the high-income earners are to a 
                                                          
91 John Böttiger refers to an article written by Svenska Dagbladet on 23 April 2000.  
CHAPTER 7. THE THREE SIDES OF THE EQUALITY-COIN 
 257 
larger extent than the rest of the population married or cohabiting.’ 
(Hansson, 2000) [Author’s translation] 
 
The Swedish explicit representations of the rich as a distinct group are in striking 
contrast to the Danish collective discourse identified above. This tendency is not 
limited to the positive references though. Not surprisingly, a majority of the 
negative Swedish articles present the rich in the same ‘group-wise’ and even ‘class-
wise’ manner. Even among the references coded as neutral, although not a majority, 
but a significant share, also adhere to this textual context: 
‘…Joakim Palme narrated how the class-cleavages in society endure, 
that people on average have gotten lower incomes during the ‘90s – but 
only the rich earn more. The cleavages have increased especially in 
recent years….’(Wangersjö, 2000) [Author’s translation] 
The Danish quote by Holm Nielsen (2009) presented four pages above constitutes 
basically the same form of informative article, summarising investigations 
conducted externally to the newspaper. The differences between the two articles are 
striking though. While the Swedish article refers to ‘class cleavages’, the Danish 
article refers to ‘the inequality in the health conditions of the ‘rich’ and the 
‘poor’’.92 Obviously, this result probably reflects the terms used by Professor 
Joakim Palme in the study referred, but this is on the other hand also quite revealing 
on the elite discourse concerning the subject in the two countries. The Palme 
example might be exemplary, but it reflects a general trend in such articles in 
Sweden. Here is another example: 
‘Now the rich are richer – again. The pay gap is as large as 1950 today. 
Wage differences between the Swedish power elite and ordinary 
workers have increased dramatically in recent years. The inequality 
today is as large today as in the 1950s. A top manager earns 26 times as 
much as an industrial worker. This is shown in a large survey LO 
presents today. ‘‘Elites’ comeback - A study of income for the power 
elite in 1950 to 1995’.’ (Holmqvist & Crofts, 1999) [Author’s 
translation] 
Even if the actual subject of the quote is wage inequality, the high wage earners are 
equated with being not only the rich or the economic elite – they are ‘makteliten’ in 
Swedish, which translates directly to the power elite. Similar Danish articles simply 
do not make such connotations. 
                                                          
92 Other similarly used phrases in such Danish articles could be: ‘the differences between the 
rich and the poor’ or simply ‘income differences in society’. 
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7.6.3. IMAGES OF THE RICH 
In contrast to the trend identified in the quantitative media analyses, the qualitative 
results above seem in accordance with original theoretical idea, that the top-middle 
relationship is mostly a position issue in Swedish media, while it in contrast is a 
valence issue in Denmark. Accordingly, the qualitative results secondly seem in 
accord with HCNI of the two countries: The compromising consensus democracy in 
Denmark, as well as the peaceful, but ideological and class cleavaged, ‘folkehem’ 
in Sweden. Another way to even more directly try to test this idea fully seems to be 
to focus on which images of the rich are portrayed in the qualitative content of the 
Danish and Swedish articles. Is it clear whom they are represented as, and is this 
clearly distinct from the broad middle class? If the Swedish images of the rich build 
on the historical legacy, the rich could be portrayed as classic capitalists owning the 
means of (the industrial) production. In the first half of the last century, these were 
even epitomised by a few dominant families (cf. Chapter 3). The Swedish rich 
could accordingly be imaged as a clearly distinct class of traditional industrialists 
with a few individuals or families dominating. Denmark has largely lacked 
dominant, visible capitalist families historically.
93
 It is therefore much less clear 
which historical image of the rich Danish representations could build on (cf. 
Chapter 3). This could leave greater room for diversity in presentations and greater 
room for more generic and modern images of different elites, such as financiers, 
CEOs and even the highly educated, to be in focus. Again as elaborated above, such 
‘rich’ do not necessarily form a distinct class, but rather the upper echelons of the 
wide middle class.  
Already in the seven Danish and six Swedish quotes presented above, it is clear that 
the Danish and Sweden images of the rich do in fact differ in general. It is relevant 
not just to dwell on the quotes selected above though. In the Danish articles – 
positive, negative and neutral – the one dominant image of the rich is geographical. 
In a substantial quantity of the articles ‘the rich’ are portrayed as the inhabitants of 
certain counties, municipalities or towns, especially north of Copenhagen. Also 
certain quarters within Copenhagen or Aarhus and even ‘the right’ areas within 
these quarters are mentioned. ‘The beach road’ (strandvejen) and ‘the whiskey-
zone’ (whiskeybæltet) seem the ultimate symbols of where the rich live in 
Denmark.
94
 In these articles there are no references to individuals, the occupation of 
                                                          
93 The word largely should be emphasised here. Denmark had and has a few large family 
owned enterprises. These include the Kirk Christiansen family owning Lego and maybe 
especially A.P. Møller, his family and descendants owning the A.P. Møller Mærsk 
Corporation.  
94 The municipalities obviously differ before and after the municipality reform implemented 
in 2007, merging 275 municipalities into 98 larger ones (Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet, 
2005). Some of the municipalities mentioned are Gentofte, Frederiksberg, Søllerød, Lyngby-
Tårbæk and Hørsholm. Some of the prominent towns and quarters mentioned are: Vedbæk, 
Hellerup, Ørestaden, Frederiksberg and Østerbro all in or north of Copenhagen as well as 
Skåde and the right part of Risskov, which are suburbs of the second largest city, Aarhus. 
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people living in these areas or how they have acquired their wealth. There are 
articles directly or indirectly mentioning selected individuals or occupations as 
representing ‘the rich’. These are mostly different kinds of celebrities and not 
named traditional capitalists of any form.
95
 One article about the families owning 
the corporations A.P. Møller Mærsk, Lego and Danfoss could be seen as singling 
out traditional capitalists though. The article is written in mostly neutral language 
informing the reader of the size of their wealth, and of how much it grew last year: 
‘One man, as usual, stands out from the crowd. He personally has a 
fortune of nearly 100 billion DKK. It is, of course, Mærsk Mc-Kinney 
Møller, the uncrowned king of the Danish business community, which 
tops the list with the firm A.P. Møller. Last year Mr. Møller noted a loss 
of 20 billion, but this year he takes a solid revenge and adds 40 billion to 
his assets. The company can especially thank the rising oil prices for the 
increased earnings. There is a long way down to the next places where 
the families behind Lego and Danfoss 'only' can juggle 32 and 24 
billion. On the other hand, there is also here a reason to smile all the way 
to the bank. Both families have since last year deposited 10 billion in 
their bank accounts. Both companies have been through trims and 
restructuring and if measured on assets, the operations were a success.’ 
(Rughede, 2000) [Author’s translation] 
Mærsk Mc-Kinney Møller at the age of 98 died in 2012. The quote illustrates that 
with his death maybe the last personified symbol of ‘the rich’ in Denmark – except 
maybe for the royal family – died also. A last question to ask is what group the rich 
are imaged as belonging to. Here again there is great variety, so great that besides 
the people living in certain geographical areas or certain specific persons or 
families, it seems safe to claim that the rich are not portrayed as a unified group or 
class in the Danish media at all in either of the two periods. In the positively coded 
references, the rich are often argued to be ‘normal’ Danes.96 Similarly, some use 
very unspecific frames connected to ‘the rich’ to describe who they are.97 Besides a 
                                                                                                                                       
 
95 Mentioned individuals are models such as Helena Christensen, the actor Brigitte Nielsen, 
an unspecified rich football player, the entertainer Finn Nørbygaard and the celebrity 
businesspersons Peter Asschenfeldt and Asger Aamund. The royal family is in contrast to the 
individuals mentioned several times.  
96 In the discussion about taxes and tax reforms, it is for example often emphasised that ‘the 
rich’ i.e. the ones paying the ‘top (income) tax’ for example are a large proportion of the 
population. They are also again presented as responsible house owners punished for their 
responsible behaviour. A number of articles also discuss the rich pensioners, and whether 
they should have the same rights to government paid welfare services as everybody else.  
97 The rich and beautiful (thin and healthy are also not always flatteringly meant as synonyms 
used), the rich red wine endulgers, rich career parents, the ones who can afford a full Bang & 
Olufsen stereo and TV. 
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few references to managers, ‘the rich and highly educated’ are in several instances 
mentioned together. The rich hereby clearly become more a synonym for the ‘elite’, 
not necessarily defined by wealth, but by other forms of capital. 
To sum up then, besides people living in certain geographical areas, the now 
deceased Mærsk Mc-Kinney Møller and elites such as the highly educated, the 
Danish media do not portray an image of the rich as a unified group or class at all. 
This is exactly in accordance with the expectations deduced above. 
In Sweden, this image as expected deviates. However, there are only a few 
references connecting the rich to the image of individuals or families of rich 
industrial capitalists. The geographic connotation – especially the Stockholm 
suburb Danderyd – does as in Denmark appear in Sweden also.98 However, 
connecting ‘the rich’ just to people living in certain geographic areas is much less 
common in Sweden than in Denmark. Instead, as hinted above, many both positive 
and negative Swedish articles refer and describe ‘the rich’ as a relatively small 
group of people clearly distinct from the rest of the population. This is done in 
different ways. First, and with one prominent example quoted above, much more 
Swedish than Danish references refer to rich individuals.
99
 Second, a number of 
articles also describe the life of ‘the rich’.100 Descriptions of the lives of the rich and 
beautiful are prominent in Danish tabloids and can be found in at least one of the 
freesheets – but not the newspapers selected here. However, the open discussion of 
the characteristics of the so-called rich is almost not seen in Denmark, and not at all 
in T2. As argued above, whereas the rich are presented as a group of acting 
subjects, with shared interests and characteristics in Sweden, they are mostly 
presented as an object of action in Denmark. In other words, the rich are discussed 
in Denmark, but it is usually with a collective reference, and not as directly as for 
                                                          
98 Besides Danderyd, other wealthier suburbs or areas in Stockholm area are also mentioned: 
the city centre, Lidingö, Täby, Bromma, Enskede and Djurholm. As in Denmark, the 
geographic image of the rich seems to be very much connected to the vicinity of the capital. 
There are a few instances where other areas, such as the harbour area of Helsingborg or the 
rich neighbourhoods of Göteborg (Askim, the city centre and Örgryte) are mentioned. 
99 These range from the king and the rest of the royal family, H&M Persson, the Switzerland 
residing owner of IKEA Ingvar Kamprad, former NHL players, pop stars such as E-type, 
Roxette and Ace of Base, actors and Dan Olufson, the owner of a consultancy firm, who 
apparently spends his Fridays in Cannes, while he goes on three-week buffalo hunting trips 
in Africa.  
100 Prominently, ‘the rich’ in general all own a summer house on the island of Gotland or in 
the village of Torekov in the province of Scania. Stories tell about how they all meet on a 
specific inn on Gotland – there are interviews with both the owner and the employees there. 
There are stories of which car brands are available for only the rich, which upper secondary 
schools they attend and finally, which magazines they read. A particular magazine ‘for the 
rich’ is described in a LTTE as superficial, materialistic and un-intellectual. The title of that 
LTTE by the way also translates to ‘fuck the rich’ (Aftonbladet, 2000). 
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example revealed in just the headline of a Swedish LTTE, written by the host of a 
program for children on Swedish national public TV: 
‘There is something very unsympathetic about the rich.’ (Leksell, 2000) 
[Author’s translation] 
In Denmark the connotations mentioned with ‘the rich’ were often the highly 
educated and in some instances e.g. managers. Binding the rich directly to other 
connotations is also common in Swedish articles, but the connotations are often 
quite different and often connected to the perceived moral character of this group.
101
 
As described above, and in stark contrast to Denmark, it is very common also in 
informative articles to connect ‘the rich’ to concepts as ‘klasskillnader’ (class 
divides) or ‘överklass’ (the upper class). As also referred in the quote concerning 
the dating site for the rich, a few articles also describe strategies or ways how to 
‘catch a rich guy and marry to get millions’.  
Although ‘the rich’ as described are clearly a group discussed as being separate 
from the broad middle class, it has also in Sweden been hard to find many direct 
images matching the classic industrialist capitalist. A number of articles refer more 
or less vaguely to ‘top managers’, and the firstly presented Swedish quote referred 
to the 20-30 richest families, in accordance with the original industrialist dynasties 
dominating SAF in the first part of the last century. There is one quote, though, 
which clearly uses this image of the rich: 
‘MUF is only for the rich.  
So Thomas Idergard resigned as MUF
102
 chairman. One who has 
Thatcher's favourite, the minister that as the English church ran a reverse 
Robin Hood policy, can of course only be missed in an extreme group 
consisting of only the very rich. It is not among the ordinary income 
earners you find those, who want to further worsen the situation for 
those who already have little. It is among the rich managers of SAF and 
the confederation of industries the myth is kept alive that if you want to 
get the poor to do something useful you have to make him poorer. In 
contrast, if you want to make the rich do something useful then you 
must give him a chance to make money. This is nothing else but pure 
deception.’ (Johnson, 1998) [Author’s translation] 
                                                          
101 The rich are described e.g. as those with capital but little imagination and few ideas, the 
rich and powerful, the power elite, those who cheat with their taxes, those who speculate on 
the stock exchanges, the rich and strong, the rich, thin and beautiful, those who can afford to 
be FTMs (full time moms); the rich are greedy, selfish, a class of lonely people, who are 
often alcoholics and finally in three instances LTTEs arguing that as the bible says, the rich 
have a defunct moral character.  
102 ‘Moderata Ungdomsförbundet’ or the Moderate Youth League/Swedish Young 
Conservatives. It is the youth wing of the Swedish Moderate Party. 
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It is not coincidental that the classic reference to ‘the rich managers of SAF’ is 
from 1998, rather than 2009. Even if this connotation referring back to the 
classic Swedish political economy gradually seems to have vanished, it is 
clear that the rich – whoever they are – are imaged as a group of people 
separated from the broad middle class in Sweden. This reader commentary 
from Expressen in 2009 concerning a curious idea – organised bus trips to 
areas where the rich live – clearly exemplifies that the debate concerning ‘the 
rich’ is not dead in Sweden yet. I am sure such an idea would never 
materialise in Denmark: 
‘Tough times bring strange sides in humans forward, particularly envy. 
This has been clearly felt lately by the much talk about those who have, 
and those who have succeeded.  
Tough times means that those who have not succeeded at all costs want 
to be rich. One should rob others of their wealth, one should whine, 
demand and one should do anything except fight to progress yourself. 
Above all, do not be satisfied with what you have. In the TV programme 
‘Debatt’, 13 October, we were informed about a new phenomenon: that 
there is an association: ‘Everything for everybody’,103 where members 
organise bus trips to areas where the rich live. The purpose is, I suppose, 
that the rich should feel shame because they are economically secured. 
Absolutely incredible! I myself am just an ordinary pauper who is not 
disturbed by the fact that others have succeeded – in the case only that 
they are acquiring their wealth and things in a fair way and are enjoying 
doing just that. People can be rich in various ways. It does not 
necessarily need to be rich in money. ‘Those who consider themselves 
to be poor shall not demand fish from others. He can ask to borrow a 
fishing rod and learn how to fish’.’ (Trusz, 2009) [Author’s translation] 
7.7. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 7 
Scandinavian egalitarianism is a well-known and supposedly well-described 
concept. The Scandinavian welfare institutions are famous for promoting equality 
and the Scandinavian people and media in general support the endeavour. A closer 
look at this literature reveals the Scandinavian egalitarianism to be mainly defined 
in terms of the poorer strata and their relations to the middle class (cf. Section 1.4). 
This is only one side of the equality coin though. The second side of the equality 
coin concerns the richer strata and their relations to the middle class. This chapter 
has sought to improve our knowledge of Scandinavian egalitarianism in relation to 
this more forgotten side of the equality coin.  
                                                          
103 In Swedish: ‘Allt åt alla’.  
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The general theoretical idea of the chapter was to propose that the top-middle 
relationship (the second side of the equality coin) can be mostly a position or a 
valence issue in a given society at a given point in time. Being a position issue, a 
discursive struggle will rage. The struggle will deal with which labels and 
stereotypes to assign to ‘the rich’ – negative or positive. In both cases, the rich are 
represented as being not a part of ‘us’ – the broad middle-class citizens. Being a 
valence issue the rich are not presented as a distinct social entity clearly separate 
from the middle class. The perception and goal of maintaining the rich as merely 
the upper part of ‘us’ – the broad middle class – is not discussed. What is discussed 
are instead the ‘means’ or just contributions and/or rights of that particular sup-
group in relation to the rest of ‘us’ – the broad middle class. The overall hypothesis 
of the chapter was that the issue of ‘the rich’ to a high extent could be perceived as 
a salient position issue in Sweden and a not so salient valence issue in Denmark. 
The background therefore was the results of the previous chapters of the 
dissertation: first, the somewhat different historical legacy of the political economy 
of Denmark and Sweden described in Chapter 3, and second, the survey results 
indicating Swedes to be much more divided according to social class on the issue of 
the top-middle gap in Chapter 6.  
The Swedish results were somewhat surprising though and did not merely confine 
to the simple hypothesis. In contrast, the quantitative results did not seem to portray 
a steadily salient and politicised debate over ‘the rich’ in society. Instead, from 
2006 and forward the graphs looked mysteriously like the Danish graphs, both in 
aggregated terms and disaggregated on newspapers, and even the financial crisis did 
not seem to have much effect. In addition, when focussing just on the references to 
‘the rich’ in particular, the Swedish newspapers neared a Danish average level in 
T2, with a clear decline in the average level of both the negative and the neutral 
references from T1 to T2. A closer qualitative analysis of the positive Swedish 
references clearly revealed that this was not the whole story though. A large part of 
the Swedish references including the ones coded as positive and neutral refer 
explicitly to the rich as a group separate from the middle class, and in the case of 
the positive often take up a defensive stand against an implicit or explicit existing 
critical discourse. 
In Denmark, we did see a short but clear lagged effect of the financial crisis from 
June 2010-May 2012. The lag was probably caused by the fact that it took the 
public and the media some time to realise how severe the Danish crisis actually 
was, also compared to most other western countries. Once this rather shocking truth 
became widespread knowledge, it would be strange not to see at least some effect 
on the amount of references to the rich in any context. Therefore it is actually not 
surprising that the amount of references negative to the rich was clearly higher in 
the second period sampled in the later analyses (T2) than in the first (T1). What is 
surprising is that even under these very special circumstances only the two 
‘newsstand-tabloid’ newspapers Ekstra Bladet and BT reacted by printing 
substantially more negative references to the rich in T2 than in T1. Even more 
surprising was the qualitative nature of the negative references. Almost without 
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exception, these did not really discuss the rich as such as a distinct group or 
individually as in the Swedish case. Instead, the references were relational, 
collective and actually focussed on issues of inequality and redistribution at large, 
rather than the rich as a group or a social class in society. 
These results lead to two conclusions. First, even if Swedish newspapers 
individually and collectively on the surface seem to debate ‘the rich’ less as time 
passes, and even if the debate is also becoming less non-positive as time passes, the 
issue of ‘the rich’ can still be characterised as a rather salient and politicised 
position issue in 2013. Because a large part of all the Swedish references refer 
explicitly to ‘the rich’ as a group or individuals herein as distinct from the middle 
class and the rest of society, this representation equals a social construction of an 
‘us-and-them’ cleavage in society. This is precisely the same way, as Rothstein 
(1998) proposed, residualised/targeted benefits do in Anglo-Saxon countries, as 
Fiske, Cuddy and Glick (2007) argue, that ‘the rich’ are represented in USA or as 
Lundström (2011) or Gilens (1996) claim happens in relations to the media’s 
portrayal of poorer (black) strata in USA.  
Second, if we turn to the Danish case, an almost opposite conclusion can be made. 
Even if we clearly see a negative reaction once the severity of the financial crisis is 
realised, ‘the rich’ are not really a salient and politicised position issue, even in this 
extraordinary situation. Instead ‘the rich’ or individual rich people are almost never 
constructed as being really distinct from the middle class and the rest of society. 
Instead, Danes – even when your search algorithm explicitly searches for ‘the rich’ 
only – debate the overall distribution of resources and opportunity in society. In the 
concepts of issue voting these results suggest that the ‘the rich’ is really a valence 
issue in Denmark. This means there is no disagreement on the position or goal, 
which we here interpret as the perception and norm that the rich more or less are 
and should be confined to the upper middle class. What are discussed are instead 
the ‘means’ or just contributions and/or rights of that particular sub-group in 
relation to the rest of ‘us’ – the broad middle class. Even the negative Danish 
references are therefore really non-constructing the rich as a social entity separate 
from the regular society. 
The results mark a peculiar continuity from the differences between Denmark and 
Sweden that Esping-Andersen (1980) identified more than 30 years ago. In 
addition, there really seems to be three and not two sides of the equality coin: the 
bottom-middle relationship, the top-middle relationship and in the Danish case the 
middle-middle-middle relationship. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
The aim of the dissertation has been to investigate the state of Scandinavian 
egalitarianism; more specifically, to try to understand the attitudes of Scandinavian 
citizens towards the level of inequality in gross wages. The overall research 
question (RQ) sought to be answered in the dissertation is: 
What attitudes do Scandinavians express towards the level of inequality in gross 
wages, how do these attitudes develop over time and why do the Scandinavians 
express these attitudes? 
The Scandinavian countries are well known for their egalitarian political 
economies, institutionally constituted of the social democratic welfare (state) 
regime and the industrial relations system(s). The main theoretical relevance of the 
dissertation in the aggregated perspective is accordingly to try to understand if and 
how this Scandinavian model reproduces its public legitimacy. The reproduction is 
to happen in a situation where many characteristics of the Scandinavian political 
economy(ies) are changing. In the disaggregated perspective, the question is 
furthermore how different the answer is in the two countries epitomising the ‘West- 
and East Nordic model’ – Denmark and Sweden.  
The empirical relevance is also straightforward. The Scandinavian countries have 
managed to acquire the envy of many countries in being successful on most 
measures of societal success. They even seem to have defeated the supposed trade-
offs between economic growth, small wage and income differences as well as 
generous social protection and expansive welfare systems. The institutions of the 
Scandinavian political economy(ies) and the high degree of economic equality they 
produce constitute the foundation behind these outcomes. But with a fundamentally 
changed class structure, a steady weakening of the central actors behind the creation 
of the model(s) and also changes in especially the industrial relations system(s), the 
attitudes of Scandinavians, utilising their reflective potential, could be some of the 
last veto players, the last line of defence of this/these renowned model(s). 
The structure of the dissertation in general followed the split between the 
aggregated and disaggregated perspective. In Chapter 3, the descriptions of the 
development in the Scandinavian political economies first followed the aggregated 
perspective, and then the main part of the chapter focussed on the differences 
between Denmark and Sweden. The analyses in Chapters 5-7 were also split on 
perspective. Chapter 5 followed the aggregated perspective and sought to gain an 
understanding of Scandinavian attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross 
wages in comparative perspective. Chapter 6 switched to the disaggregated 
perspective, and sought to reveal and understand the differences between Danish 
and Swedish attitudes. Finally, in Chapter 7, a media study sought to reveal the 
differences in portrayals of ‘the rich’ in Danish and Swedish media.  
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Following these two different perspectives, the dissertation aimed to gain an 
understanding of the interplay between the various levels and factors portrayed in 
the conceptual model of the dissertation (Figure 2-2). Building on this model, one 
overall scenario and some alternative ideas were developed in Section 3.7. In order 
to understand and evaluate how the myriad of quite diverse empirical and 
theoretical results of the thesis fit together as a whole, it seems imperative to first 
recap on the central concepts in the dissertation, and how these are assumed to fit in 
the overall scenario. 
The dissertation used the term political economy (PE) to denote the key macro level 
structures of society influencing the formation of attitudes towards the level of 
inequality in gross wages in society. The term was understood very broadly in the 
dissertation as the interplay between the economic and political spheres of society. 
Crucially the term PE was argued to be dual-sided. First, on the more or less 
material side, the following factors were found important. The main institutions 
governing the two spheres – the industrial relations system (IRS) and the welfare 
(state) regime – were key concepts of the programmatic institutions constituting the 
political economy. Operating within these institutional spheres, the key actors of the 
dissertation were the labour/trade union movement, the corresponding organisations 
on the employer’s side and the strength and character of the traditional left wing of 
the political spectrum. The foundation behind these institutions and actors was 
argued to be the economic structures of society and especially the developing social 
class structures.  
Second, the PE was argued to have an immaterial side also, demarcated under the 
terms of historically constructed normative institutions (HCNI). These were in turn 
defined as: a particular representation of the past, a representation that in myths, 
representations and stereotypes define: ‘who the others are’ and in a sense also 
‘who we are’. They are therefore by definition inert and although the material sides 
of the political economy continuously influence them through history, the myths, 
representations and stereotypes concerning for example ‘the rich’ and the class 
structure of society should largely be based on a historical representation of them. 
They are therefore not just an unbiased reflection of the current social stratification 
of society. Multiplicities of socially constructed ‘others’ defined by the HCNI exist 
at a given society in a point in time. However, since the level of inequality in gross 
wages can be viewed as attitudes towards the (class?) gap between the economic 
top and middle strata of society, the relevant ‘others’ in the dissertation are 
therefore the economic top strata of society or in a social constructivist sense ‘the 
perceived rich’. 
On this basis, the overall scenario proposed was in simple terms that various time 
lags were to be expected between the components described above. Changes in the 
material parts the PE are - with some time lag - assumed to influence the HCNI and 
hereby the media presentations of among other things ‘the rich’. In time, ultimately 
Scandinavian attitudinal patterns will be affected and change. The general tendency 
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over time is thus assumed towards correspondence or equilibrium between the 
various macro and micro components (I will discuss this last point further below).  
In the aggregated perspective, this deduced to the scenario that the overall level of 
Scandinavian attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages must still be 
egalitarian, although the trend over time could be a decline of this egalitarian 
position. The argument was that although changes in material sides of the 
Scandinavian political economies are happening, in a comparative perspective, the 
arrow still points towards economic equality. First, Section 3.5 showed that the 
Scandinavian levels of wage and income inequality, also disaggregated on the top-
middle and middle-bottom ratios, are still low in comparative perspective. Second, 
the programmatic institutions of the industrial relations systems and welfare regime 
in Scandinavia are, in comparative perspective, still strong and committed at 
securing a high degree of gross and net income equality. Lastly, the Scandinavian 
parliamentary left wings and trade union movements – although increasingly 
weakened and fragmented – are still strong, in comparative perspective. 
The disaggregated scenarios focussed on the differences between Denmark and 
Sweden. In short, although many changes have taken place in all parts of the 
political economy, Denmark was argued to have retained its historical characteristic 
as a compromising ‘consensus-democracy’ with blurred and unpoliticised class 
lines. Correspondingly, the idea of the consensus-democracy is basically that the 
society is not constituted of a few social classes with diverging interests, but instead 
of a great number of sectorial groups each with their interests to be bridged in 
compromises. Building on this foundation, both the historical legacy, but also 
recent developments in the constituting parts of the Danish PE, should lead the 
Danish media not to present the media as a distinct social group in society, but 
rather as one of the broad range of groups making up the very broad middle class. 
As with any others of these groups, the interests of this group have to be respected, 
but the group also has to make concessions to be able to reach solutions everybody 
can accept. In terms of attitudinal patterns, the Danish political economy, the 
consensus-democracy and a media not presenting ‘the rich’ as a distinct class 
should translate into Danish attitudes to the level of inequality in gross wages to be 
very consensual across social classes and other potential cleavages. The financial 
crisis starting in 2008 hit Denmark hard though, and it was proposed it could 
function as a joker at least temporarily stirring up Danish media and attitudinal 
patterns.  
The developments in recent decades in the political economy in Sweden do not 
seem to have been as path dependent as the corresponding Danish developments. 
The legacy of the classic Swedish political economy was, in contrast to Denmark, 
one of an ‘ideological class struggle’ in the IRS as well as in the parliamentary 
sphere (although in comparative perspective a very orderly and institutionalised 
one). While the events of especially the 1980s enhanced by the economic crisis 
from 1990-1993 can be seen as a revival of an even more open class struggle, the 
outcome in the last couple of decades is maybe a sign of a divergence from the 
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ideological, class struggle path. Crucially both the Swedish IRS and the interplay 
between central actors in the parliamentary sphere over time seem to move more 
and more in the Danish direction. This means, first, smaller ideological differences 
in the parliamentary sphere concerning the management of the economy and 
welfare state as well as the distribution of resources in society. It secondly means a 
more decentralised yet highly institutionalised and coordinated IRS.  
Both the media output, but also Swedish attitudes, were therefore to a higher extent 
than corresponding in Denmark argued to be at a watershed. The Swedish HCNI 
could still be influenced by the still quite recent legacy of a quite vivid class 
struggle. It was thus proposed that it was likely that the Swedish media might still 
be influenced by this overall societal image when presenting the social stratification 
of society and place of ‘the rich’ herein. Because of the lags described above, it was 
argued to be more an empirical question, whether Swedish attitudes towards the 
level of inequality in gross wages would be mostly influenced by the historical 
ideological class legacy or the more recent developments. If Swedish attitudes were 
still mostly dominated by the HCNI, they could be more dominated by ideological 
differences in attitudes, broadly following the ‘old’ social classes of society. If they 
instead, with some lag, started to parallel the more recent developments in the 
Swedish PE, Swedish attitudes should to a higher and higher extent gradually 
become consensual across social classes, like the corresponding Danish attitudes.  
8.1. MAIN RESULTS – EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL 
Chapter 5 of the dissertation contained the analyses of the aggregated perspective. 
As described above, the expectations in very short were that the Scandinavians in 
comparative perspective would still be very egalitarian. Although the trend might 
be that, this level of egalitarianism could become less exceptional over time.  
A very quick answer to these simple propositions is the following. Firstly, 
Scandinavians do in fact seem exceptionally egalitarian in the period from 1992 – 
2009. The Scandinavian countries most clearly and consistently stood out from the 
other western countries, when investigating attitudes towards the level of inequality 
in gross wages in the analyses of Section 5.1. No matter which of the three 
aggregated or the three disaggregated measures were tested here, the Scandinavians 
wanted very small levels of inequality in gross wages in 1992-2009. As argued 
above, in spite the unavoidable ‘bias’ of contextuality in the responses, these results 
can also be seen as a confirmation of reliability of the central dependent variable in 
the survey analyses of the dissertation. The expectations concerning the trend were 
secondly not met though. In contrast, the median level of Scandinavian attitudes 
towards the level of inequality in gross wages almost did not change in the three 
datasets – 1992, 1999 and 2009. Moreover, this is not because there is an inherent 
stability-bias in the measures hereof. Several countries have changed their median 
levels significantly across the period investigated (e.g. Australia scored 3.55 in 
1992 and 8.0 in 2009 on the main dependent variable in Table 5-5). 
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These descriptive aggregated results suggested two things. First, in spite of 
globalisation, changes in the Scandinavian political economy(ies) and the 
weakening of central actors behind the model, there was in fact still an exceptional 
degree of Scandinavian egalitarianism worth investigating. Second, what needed an 
explanation, at least in the aggregated perspective, was in fact that in spite of the 
changes, a quite remarkably stable egalitarian Scandinavian attitudinal equilibrium 
seemed to appear.  
The purpose of the analyses of Section 5.2 was exactly to try to reveal the drivers 
behind the seemingly stable Scandinavian egalitarian attitudinal equilibrium. The 
maybe most remarkable, but maybe not that surprising, result was that the 
equilibrium generally cannot be ascribed to most mainstream non-contextual 
explanations in the existing studies. These were identified as the marginal economic 
utility of the individual and social cleavages in general, individual convictions 
regarding justice and their connection to national narratives/cultural justice beliefs – 
at least the ones possible to operationalise in the dataset. These theories explain 
some of the differences between individuals as well as between countries, but not 
the Scandinavian egalitarianism (cf. Tables 5-12 and 5-13).  
This ‘surprising’ result was in fact not that surprising after all. The ontology of 
Critical Realism specifically specifies that the social world is both complex and 
contextual. Although the social world in the realist sense is assumed to exist 
independently of the observer, the impact of social mechanisms (i.e. causal 
potentials) in a concrete situation depends on the interplay between various social 
mechanisms unique for that context. 
In fact, several results seemed to confirm the importance of unique contextual 
effects and especially the power of perceptions. First, Section 3.5 showed that the 
actual Scandinavian – especially Danish and Norwegian – levels of inequality in 
gross wages or income inequality in general are not that uniquely low anymore. In 
fact, they are approaching the levels of other western countries. In spite of this, 
Scandinavians still perceive uniquely low levels of inequality in gross wages. 
Accordingly, by introducing the covariate for the perceived actual degree of 
inequality in gross wages (PLI) in Table 5-15, we are able to explain roughly 60% 
of the Scandinavian dummy, signifying Scandinavian egalitarianism. These results 
are in accordance with the results of a survey-experiment analysed in Section 4.3. 
The conclusion is that individuals’ perceptions of the actual levels of inequality in 
gross wages in their country appear to be crucial for their attitudes towards the just 
levels of the same. The comparatively low perceived – rather than actual – level of 
inequality in gross wage levels between occupations in Scandinavia therefore seems 
self-legitimising.  
Second, other effects also point in the same direction. First, the effect of the 
aggregated index for the existence of conflicts between social groups found in 
Table 5-13 was completely explained after controlling for the perceived level of 
inequality in gross wages (PLI) in Table 5-15. In accordance with existing 
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literature, this signifies that in countries perceived as egalitarian, like the 
Scandinavian countries, people also experience a low degree of conflicts between 
social groups. Secondly, Section 5.1.2.3 showed that Scandinavians in general find 
the wage levels they perceive uniquely just. Thirdly, even after controlling for PLI, 
a significant cross level interaction, with the same size of the coefficient as the main 
effect, between the Scandinavian dummy and the objective social class measure, 
remained in Table 5-15. This means that in contrast to in other countries, social 
class does on average not matter for attitudes towards the level of inequality in 
gross wages in Scandinavia – at least in Denmark and Norway.  
The various aggregated empirical results therefore suggest a Scandinavian nexus, 
where a perceived – rather than an actual – low degree of inequality in gross wages 
leads the Scandinavians to the following: firstly, to see their society as quite 
harmonic without major conflicts between social groups; secondly and more 
importantly, this leads to small attitudinal class differences and even the higher 
strata Scandinavians to be egalitarian, in a comparative perspective. The very small 
attitudinal differences between social classes are as the disaggregated results show a 
Danish and Norwegian characteristic, but not a Swedish one. Lastly, the perceived 
harmonious society also leads the Scandinavians in general to find the wage levels 
they perceive just.  
In addition to these results, it is also relevant to dwell on the actual content of 
Scandinavian egalitarianism. The results of Section 5.1 showed that Scandinavian 
egalitarianism seems to be mostly expressed as an aversion to top excess rather than 
a wish to spoil the bottom of the labour market excessively. The only exception to 
the rule of finding the perceived wage levels just concerns the perceived wage level 
of chairmen of large national corporations. The Scandinavians want to reduce these 
by between 33 – 40% in 2009.  
Larsen (2013) finds that the ‘bottom’ of society is perceived very narrow in 
Denmark and Sweden, and even still sharing the norms of the ‘trustworthy middle 
class’. This is in contrast to the US and Great Britain, where most people are 
perceived as belonging to ‘the bottom’ of society, a bottom also perceived as not at 
all sharing the norms of the ‘trustworthy middle class’. While this ‘lifting of the 
bottom into the middle class-effect’ seems to be identified the Scandinavian 
countries in Larsen’s (2013) book, a corresponding ‘keeping the top down in the 
middle class’ does not seem to be uniformly present in Scandinavian attitudes. The 
aggregated results suggest that the ideal of a society constituted only of a wide 
perceived middle class is not completely instituted in the mind of all Scandinavians. 
This preliminary aggregated answer appeared to differ quite substantially between 
Denmark and Sweden in the disaggregated analyses. While the perceived or 
socially constructed bottom-middle relationship, as revealed in Larsen’s (2013) 
book, might explain Nordic vs. Anglo-Saxon differences, the perceived or socially 
constructed top-middle relationship might explain continued differences between 
the ‘West- and East Nordic model’ i.e. between Denmark and Sweden (Knudsen & 
Rothstein, 1994).  
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Chapters 6 and 7 followed the disaggregated perspective and hence zoomed in on 
intra-Scandinavian differences – the differences between Denmark and Sweden. As 
described above, the expectations in very short were that quite substantial 
differences were to be expected between Denmark and Sweden – both in the media 
output concerning ‘the rich’ and the attitudes towards the level of inequality in 
gross wages. The Danish ‘consensus-democracy’ was expected to lead, first, the 
Danish media not to present ‘the rich’ as a distinct group in society, and, second, 
the Danish attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages to be very 
consensual across social classes and other potential cleavages. In contrast, the 
Swedish legacy of ‘ideological class struggle’ should lead the Swedish media to 
present the rich as a distinct group in society, and the Swedish attitudes towards the 
level of inequality in gross wages to be cleavage according to social class. Changes 
in the Swedish political economy in recent decades led to a trend-hypothesis also. 
Because these changes seem to make the Swedish PE appear more and more as the 
corresponding Danish PE, the Swedish media and attitudinal patterns could be 
expected in time to start to resemble the Danish more and more. 
The results of Chapters 6 and 7 largely confined to the expectations – and the 
notion of a west and east Nordic model clearly seems still to be relevant. In short, 
the general results of the descriptive disaggregated analyses of Chapter 6 are that in 
Sweden big between-group differences exist and remain, but at the same time, the 
intra-group differences are small, also in 2009. The multivariate analysis sought to 
separate the wheat from the chaff among the descriptively appeared cleavages. 
They revealed that the relatively large Swedish cleavages seemed dominated by 
political differences between the respondents, as well as attitudinal differences 
between household income groups – especially the relatively in-egalitarian 
attitudes
104
 of the richest decile of the Swedish respondents (‘the rich’?). The 
attitudinal cleavages between generations and gender were completely explained 
after controlling for the perceived level of actual inequality in gross wages (PLI). 
The perceptions of the level of inequality in gross wages are as argued largely 
assumed to be built based on the images, myths and stereotypes of the Swedish 
HCNI mediated by the Swedish media. The Swedish survey results clearly indicate 
that the different generations receive and possibly interpret the images, myths and 
stereotypes differently.  
                                                          
104 It is important to keep in mind that in spite of the group differences identified in the 
descriptive analyses of Chapter 6, the highest Scandinavian group median values (Retired 
Swedes in 1999 = 3.21 and 65-74 year old Swedes in 1999 = 3.49) would still be placed 
among the bottom six countries in the third column of Table 5-3 in sub-section 5.1.2.2 
(displaying the same dependent variable in 1999). This empirical result again serves to 
remind us that in spite of the differences in attitudinal patterns and development in the 
political economies of Denmark and Sweden, in the aggregated perspective, the 
Scandinavian countries are quite alike attitudinally.  
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The representations of the rich in Swedish media analysed in Chapter 7 also 
confined more or less to the expectations. The qualitative analyses of Section 7.6 
revealed a large part of the Swedish references including the ones coded as positive 
and neutral referring explicitly to the rich as a group separate from the middle class, 
and in the case of the positive ones often taking up a defensive stand against an 
implicit or explicit existing critical discourse. The qualitative results for Sweden are 
in accordance with the theoretical idea that the issue of ‘the rich’ is still a position 
issue in Sweden. Being a position issue a discursive struggle will rage. The struggle 
will deal with which labels and stereotypes to assign to ‘the rich’ – negative or 
positive. In both cases, the rich are represented as being not a part of ‘us’ – the 
broad middle-class citizens. The qualitative results therefore also confine to the 
‘ideological class struggle legacy’ in Sweden. The quantitative Swedish media 
analyses indicated that the trend-hypothesis has empirical relevance also. From 
2006 and onwards the graphs looked mysteriously like the Danish graphs, both in 
aggregated terms and disaggregated on newspapers, and even the financial crisis did 
not seem to have much effect. In addition, when focussing just on the references to 
‘the rich’ in particular, the Swedish newspapers neared a Danish average level in 
T2, with a clear decline in the average level of both the negative and the neutral 
references from T1 to T2. 
In contrast to Sweden, in Denmark (and Norway) the descriptive results of the 
disaggregated analyses of Chapter 6 showed that the attitudinal differences between 
groups are small (with notable exceptions), whereas the intra-group differences 
skyrocket in 2009 for a majority of the groups investigated (more so in Denmark 
than in Norway). The multivariate Danish result confirmed very small attitudinal 
social cleavages dominated by the political affiliation of the respondents. After 
controlling for the perceived level of inequality in gross wages, suppressed 
generational effects appeared. The two youngest Danish generations appear as 
clearly less egalitarian than the remaining generations. This could spark change in 
the legitimacy of the otherwise seemingly stable egalitarian Danish attitudinal 
model (more below). 
The analyses of the Danish media’s representation of ‘the rich’ – both quantitative 
and qualitative – also confined very well with what was expected. Quantitatively 
the salience was lower than in Sweden, at least until 2006, although we did see a 
lagged temporary effect of the financial crisis. What is surprising is that even under 
these very special circumstances only the two ‘newsstand-tabloid’ newspapers 
Ekstra Bladet and BT reacted by printing substantially more negative references to 
‘the rich’ in T2 (1 November 2008 to 31 January 2010) than in T1 (1 November  
1998 to 31 May 2001). The qualitative nature of the Danish references also 
followed the expected pattern. Even the negative references in the midst of the 
financial crisis which hit Denmark hard followed this pattern. Almost without 
exception, these did not really discuss ‘the rich’ as such as a distinct group or 
individually as in the Swedish case. Instead, the references were relational, 
collective and actually focussed on issues of inequality and redistribution at large, 
rather than ‘the rich’ as a distinct group or a social class in society. 
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8.2. CONSEQUENCES OF SUBSCRIBING TO THE CRITICAL 
REALIST ONTOLOGY  
In these last two sections, I will try to elevate the view from the immediate results 
of the dissertation. Interesting as they might be, it is my experience that what really 
interests most social scientists is the general questions a study raises, ideas of how 
to move forward and even speculations about the future. I will walk an unknown 
and dangerous path and try to present some, hopefully, educated guesses on these 
questions.  
The first question is, what we can learn from this study theoretically – and maybe 
even meta-theoretically? In this study, I have insisted on, and tried empirically to 
show, that the realist, but complex and contextual ontology of Critical Realism, is 
fruitful to maintain, if one is to gain an understanding of a complex phenomenon as 
Scandinavian attitudes towards the level of wage inequality.  
This firstly means embracing complexity. Attitudes, and indeed Scandinavian 
egalitarianism, cannot just be reduced to macro level structures – being either a 
culture of equality (Andersen, 1983; Graubard, 1986; Svendsen et al., 2012) or the 
superstructure of society (Esping-Andersen, 1980; Hay, 2006; Marx & Engels, 
1968; Marx, 1972). Instead, values and attitudes need to be reproduced, and in the 
process of reproduction, individuals have a reflective potential allowing for, but not 
guaranteeing, change in the attitudinal reproduction processes. This on the other 
hand does not mean that structures do not exist, are not relevant for attitudes or are 
constituted only of the formal institutions of society, as they are in pure rational 
choice inspired approaches to attitudes. 
It secondly means insisting on contextuality. The multilevel analyses of Section 5.2 
revealed how utterly unable existing mainstream non-contextual theories were at 
explaining Scandinavian egalitarianism statistically. Much of the existing literature 
on the attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages is main-effect 
regression-focussed articles, not applying cross level interactions. It is not that there 
is anything wrong with applying the method of main-effect regression analyses, but 
implicit in its design – and the design of Tables 5-12 and 5-13 – is often a rather 
naïve positivist search for linear effects functioning across contexts and time. The 
simple view of causality underlining this search seems rather naïve given the 
contextual and complex understanding of causality in the critical realist ontology of 
the dissertation, and the results are as mentioned meagre at best.  
If applying for example the multilevel methodology, with many countries included, 
a fruitful way of modelling contextual effects is via cross-level interactions. 
However, besides the statistical limitations of this approach – specifically the small 
N-problem – the variables in cross-national datasets are obviously not created for 
testing unique contextual effects. As discussed above, the Social Inequality datasets 
are hampered in at least two ways. First, on the selection of a chairman, instead of 
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for example a CEO to represent the private sector top occupation is obviously 
problematic and seems strange.
105
 Second, all the justice belief-deduced variables 
are connected to the equity/merit or need justice beliefs. In a Scandinavian tradition, 
it is likely that citizen or equality-based justice belief measures would be more 
relevant though, and could possibly be better at explaining Scandinavian 
egalitarianism statistically (Goul Andersen, 1999; Goul Andersen, 2004; Marshall, 
1950). The International Social Justice Project (ISJP) (Kluegel et al., 1995) did 
include some alternative measures to measure the effect of the ‘socialist legacy’. 
This is not necessarily the same as a ‘social-democratic legacy’, but is a place to 
look for inspiration. No Scandinavian countries were included in that dataset 
though, so we do not know how they would function in Scandinavia. 
There are obviously also consequences, and some might say side effects, of 
subscribing to the critical realist ontology. The first of these concerns the issue of 
epistemology and external validity. As described in Chapter 2, structures and 
relations can be stable and certain mechanisms can have prominence in a certain 
period in a certain context in Critical Realism. However, the structures conditioning 
the social mechanisms are a product of human interaction, and as humans in CR are 
viewed as being intentional beings with a reflective potential, structural change is 
surely possible. The contextual limitations of the scope of social studies are 
therefore both in space and in time. The concept of external validity is not ruled out 
totally though. Literature on CR does emphasise that in spite of the contingent 
nature of context-bound structures, social mechanisms identified in one context 
probably also apply in many others.  
One epistemological consequence of adhering to the critical realist ontology is the 
rather restricted possibilities for external generalisation. The second consequence 
concerns the practical design and methodological consequences so intensely 
discussed in the literature on critical realism itself. When adhering to the positivist 
ideal of creating ‘objective’ knowledge of the social world, existing in a realist 
sense, however, at the same time, subscribing to all the complexities of the CR 
                                                          
105 I suppose the inspirational background for this selection in the four Social Inequality 
questionnaires is found in the seminal book: Equality in America – The View from the Top 
(Verba & Orren, 1985). Verba & Orren (1985) ask their sample of ‘Leaders’ in the US what 
they think the average gross salary of a whole range of occupations is, and what they think it 
should be. In their argument for picking the occupations, they do – among which is ‘A 
President of a Top 100 Corporation’ – Verba & Orren (1985) emphasise the following 
arguments. First, the occupations need to represent a great deal of variation, both concerning 
average wage levels and sectors. In this way, they argue, it is easier to get an idea of the just 
wage gap wanted by the respondents. Second, the occupations need to be very 
concrete/precisely defined and it should be clear that the amounts in question are monthly 
gross wages. If this book is the inspiration for the ISSP 1987 survey and henceforth, then 
besides the generic ‘dispersion’ and ‘precision’ arguments, it seems fully coincidental that a 
chairman and not e.g. a CEO of a large national corporation is selected as representing the 
top occupation in the private sector. If correct, this seems a textbook example of unintended 
consequences of path dependency in cross-national attitudinal research.  
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ontology, how do you as a researcher create valid ‘objective’ knowledge about the 
social world?  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the answer given is that an iterative, abductive 
approach must be applied, but what this actually entails varies tremendously in the 
literature on CR. Sayer (1992) for example recommends an extremely qualitative 
approach to tap into structures and social mechanisms of the ‘real strata’ via the 
human ‘internal mode of interpretive access’. Kemp & Holmwood (2003) on the 
other hand seem to recommend going in the total opposite direction by starting with 
quantitative data mining identifying ‘regularities of events’ and ‘patterns of 
connection’ between these. The approach is still clearly not solely positivist, as the 
quote below shows, but the suggested research process, on the other hand, does not 
seem very distinct from that of more or less positivist, quantitative ‘normal-
science’:  
‘it is regularity manifested over a particular tract of time, and this 
regularity may be significant if it provides a glimpse of the causal 
influence of a mechanism while other influences are temporarily 
balanced or absent… spontaneously occurring regularities can be used to 
test structural theories. Success in such a test will involve offering a 
coherent account of the regularities, and theorising the mechanism that 
produces them.’ (p. 177) 
The definition of ‘normal-science’ in CR therefore seems to be quite wide or 
contested – at least methodologically. The flipside of this discussion is obviously 
that it is hard in CR to ultimately define quality criteria of what is the right way to 
go about doing a solid research project. What steps needs to be taken in order to 
insure a high degree of reliability and validity and hence trustworthy claims of 
having created ‘objective’ knowledge about the social world? CR is on the other 
hand not an interpretivist position. In the realist sense, the social world therefore 
exists independently of the observer. It thus does not appear a satisfactory answer 
that the outcome of research processes is always in some form the subjective 
interpretation of social phenomena by the researcher. Since the social world is 
objectively out there, good research should gain some form of ‘objective’ 
knowledge about it – as restricted in space and time as that may be. The approach 
of the dissertation is an attempt to take the CR ontology seriously, by trying to 
model and investigate how the various central components affecting a given 
phenomenon fit together in a convincing way. In accordance with the abstract 
descriptions of the iterative, abstractive method, the process has been characterised 
by switching between inductive and deductive methods, and between theory and 
empirical data (of many sorts), and continuous theoretical reflection over how the 
many pieces of the puzzle could fit together. Hopefully, the result can offer a 
‘coherent account of the regularities, and theorising the mechanism that produces 
them’. (Kemp & Holmwood, 2003, p. 177) 
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8.3. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN SCANDINAVIA 
The last issue to speculate on is generalisation in time. What is to be expected of 
Scandinavian attitudes towards the level of inequality in gross wages in the future? 
And, what are the drivers of the development? 
It is almost cliché that you have to be careful when trying to predict the future. If 
you furthermore adhere strictly to the CR ontology, you definitely have to be even 
more cautious. This is because the impact of social mechanisms in a concrete 
situation depends on the interplay between these various social mechanisms unique 
for that context in that particular point in time – at a different time, the interplay is 
likely to be different. In spite of these precautions, I will try to walk the dangerous 
path of prediction, while trying to be clear about the assumptions I make when 
presenting the ideas.  
The big question of future developments can be specified as to whether we will see 
mostly stability or change in the Scandinavian attitudinal patterns. Changes in the 
Scandinavian political economy(ies) are definitely taking place in these years. The 
question is how the Scandinavians will react to these changes. This question is in 
fact a reformulation of the adaption vs. reaction hypotheses described in various 
places. As described in Chapter 2, the answer to this question again depends 
basically on the ontological assumptions on human nature and motivation. 
However, if we assume that the macro-micro associations portrayed in the 
conceptual model in Figure 2-2 and the overall scenario presented in Section 3.7 
continue to be relevant in the future, we could deduce two tentative conflicting 
scenarios concerning the development in Danish and Swedish attitudes towards the 
level of inequality in gross wages in the coming years.  
The first scenario assumes that the difference we see between Danish and Swedish 
media outputs and attitudes in 2009 is caused only by the time lags involved. The 
material conditions, the interplay of central actors and the programmatic institutions 
of the Swedish IRS resemble the corresponding more or less material parts of the 
Danish PE more and more. It is therefore only a matter of time before the Swedish 
HCNI and hence media presentations of the rich and ultimately Swedish attitudinal 
patterns will resemble the corresponding Danish patterns.  
How much time such a process will take is also a good question though. There were 
some indications in the analyses of Chapter 6 that at least for some generations, the 
patterns were rather consistent through time. If such generational effects dominate, 
then only the generations of Swedes, having their political formative experiences of 
youth after the class struggles ebbed away in the mid-1990s, could be expected to 
portray attitudinal patterns resembling the corresponding Danish patterns. On the 
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other hand, much suggested, that the attitudinal patterns easily change over the 
rather short timeframe from 1992-2009.
106
   
The second scenario assumes that the change or some could even say dismantling 
of the classic Swedish, but maybe also Danish political economy and especially 
IRS, cannot be equated. The relatively in-egalitarianism of the younger Danish 
generations could for example indicate a change underway, as elder Danish 
generations eventually die. How the various programmatic institutions look in 10 
years’ time in both countries is not easy to tell neither is their effect on attitudes and 
media, which will, as we know, depend on the interplay with other social 
mechanisms unique for that context. Therefore, while the first scenario predicts 
Swedish media outputs and attitudinal patterns might start to a higher extent 
resembling the corresponding Danish media outputs and attitudinal patterns in the 
future, the second scenario is sceptical.  
In both of these scenarios the assumption is that the internal developments in the 
macro level phenomena of the political economy, which are crucial for the long-
term development in media outputs and citizen’s attitudes, are implicit. I am 
sceptical that external shocks, as for example caused by the financial crisis, will 
have long-term effects on attitudinal and media patterns in itself. This is not to say 
that such a crisis cannot have an effect; it can temporarily enable people to utilise 
their reflective potential to question the current state of affairs. However, if 
something or somebody does not ‘keep the pot boiling’, the effect seems likely to 
be temporary. As indicated above, the availability and ability to ‘keep the pot 
boiling’ depends both on actors actively trying to keep the issue salient as well as 
the availability of myths, images and stereotypes (HCNIs) to latch on to for the 
media stories. In this argumentation, ultimately, the long-term effect of external 
shocks therefore also depends on the ‘translation’ and ‘politisation’ by the internal 
macro level phenomena encapsulated in the concept of the political economy (See 
also: Hedegaard, 2014b; Taber, 2003).  
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) rotates its core modules, and 
has started to rerun each module every 10 years. If this precedence is continued, 
these and other questions, assumptions and scenarios can be investigated in the fifth 
and sixth rounds of the Social Inequality Module in 2019 and 2029, a future 
endeavour, which I will encourage. Hope you have enjoyed reading this dissertation 
– thank you.  
  
                                                          
106 Good examples are the Danish and Norwegian changes in standard deviations/errors from 
1999 to 2009, and the development in the Australian median value on the dependent variable 
from 3.55 in 1992 to 8.0 in 2009. 
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Table 8-2 Attitudes towards the Levels of Yearly Net Wages for Six Occupations in 
ISSP 1999. Shown are Country Medians in Euros. 
a cabinet minister 
in the <national> 
government 
a chairman of a 
large national 
corporation  
 
a doctor in general 
practice  
 
A skilled worker in 
a factory  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled 
worker in a factory  
 
FR 54.878 FR 91.463 USA 63.571 USA 22.568 NO 16.436 USA 15.893 
GB 48.948 GB 78.108 FR 45.732 NO 19.567 DK 16.484 DK 15.734 
AT 48.167 USA 63.571 GB 41.657 GB 18.746 USA 15.893 NO 15.653 
USA 47.678 CDN 59.987 CDN 41.370 DK 18.731 FR 14.634 FR 14.634 
IL 43.413 WD 52.163 NO 39.134 FR 18.293 IL 13.024 SE 12.592 
CY 41.797 AT 48.167 AUS 38.776 CDN 17.376 SE 12.592 GB 12.497 
WD 41.731 IL 43.413 DK 37.463 WD 15.649 GB 12.497 CDN 12.411 
AUS 38.776 NO 39.134 AT 36.126 AUS 15.511 CDN 12.411 AT 12.042 
DK 37.463 AUS 38.776 WD 34.776 SE 15.320 WD 12.171 IL 11.577 
ED 34.776 NZ 36.452 NZ 29.161 AT 15.052 AT 12.042 ES 10.818 
NO 31.307 DK 35.964 IL 28.942 IL 14.471 AUS 11.633 WD 10.433 
CDN 31.028 ED 34.776 ED 27.820 ED 13.910 ES 10.818 CY 9.718 
PT 29.928 PT 29.928 CY 27.168 ES 13.703 ED 10.433 AUS 9.694 
SE 29.381 SE 29.381 SE 25.184 NZ 12.758 CY 9.404 NZ 9.113 
NZ 29.161 ES 28.848 ES 18.751 CY 12.539 NZ 9.113 ED 8.694 
ES 28.848 CY 27.168 PT 17.957 PT 8.978 PT 7.183 PT 5.986 
SL 18.622 SL 24.829 SL 12.414 SL 5.587 SL 5.587 SL 4.345 
PL 15.130 PL 15.130 PL 7.565 PL 4.539 PL 3.026 PL 3.026 
CZ 11.418 CZ 12.687 CZ 5.075 LV 3.610 LV 2.707 CZ 2.030 
HU 9.303 LV 12.633 HU 4.652 CZ 3.299 CZ 2.537 HU 1.861 
LV 9.024 HU 9.303 LV 3.610 HU 2.481 HU 2.171 LV 1.805 
RUS 4.844 RUS 4.844 BG 3.072 BG 1.843 BG 1.228 BG 1.229 
BG 4.300 BG 3.686 RUS 1.453 RUS 1.453 RUS 727 RUS 484 
Notes: The following countries have asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, USA, United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The remaining countries have asked about monthly 
salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these has been made by multiplying with 12 (cf. the 
national questionnaires downloadable at: (ISSP Research Group, 2011)). The following countries have 
asked about net salaries: Slovenia, Israel, Spain, Latvia, France and Portugal. In Poland, Bulgaria and 
Russia it is unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or net salaries. The statements 
in these countries are assumed as net salaries. The remaining countries have asked about gross salaries 
(cf. the national questionnaires downloadable at: (ISSP Research Group, 2011)). The Australian, 
Slovenian, Spanish and Portuguese statements have furthermore been multiplied with 1000, because the 
respondents here were asked to answer in whole thousands of their local currency (cf. the national 
questionnaires downloadable at: (ISSP Research Group, 2011)).   
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Other measures of attitudes towards 
levels of Wages in 2009 – Net Wages 
and Euros 
 
Table 8-3 Attitudes towards the Levels of Yearly Net Wages for Five Occupations in 
ISSP 2009. Shown are Country Median in PPP Corrected $ 
a cabinet minister in the 
<national> government  
 
a chairman of a large 
national corporation  
 
a doctor in 
general practice  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled 
worker in a factory  
 
country - averages 
CH 140.515 AUS 160.381 US
A 
115.84
5 
CH 31.616 CH 28.103 CH 85.012 
AUS 80.191 USA 154.460 U
S 
96.229 US
A 
23.169 US
A 
23.169 US
A 
79.959 
FR 79.034 CH 140.515 CH 84.309 NO 22.590 NO 22.590 U
S 
75.914 
USA 77.230 FR 131.723 GB 76.264 IS 22.324 IS 22.324 FR 63.491 
NZ 75.082 GB 113.826 NZ 66.174 DK 21.446 AU
S 
21.384 GB 58.962 
GB 68.296 FI 88.873 FR 65.862 AU
S 
21.384 E 21.227 NZ 51.666 
DE 66.118 DE 82.648 NO 52.709 FR 21.076 ES 20.103 DE 45.622 
IL 64.918 NZ 81.444 IS 52.089 FL 20.339 FL 20.339 FI 44.436 
PL 61.475 AT 75.999 DK 50.040 SE 20.262 DK 20.016 IS 43.159 
IS 59.530 SL 75.117 DE 49.589 IL 19.475 FR 19.759 AT 42.707 
AT 56.999 PT 68.966 AT 47.499 ES 18.557 IL 19.475 IL 42.196 
SL 56.338 FL 65.763 FL 47.458 GB 18.212 GB 18.212 SL 42.065 
FL 54.237 ES 61.856 SL 46.948 NZ 17.816 NZ 17.816 FL 41.627 
DK 53.614 PL 61.475 FI 44.436 FI 17.774 FI 17.775 NO 41.414 
FI 53.324 IL 64.918 SE 43.419 AT 17.100 AT 15.437 PT 38.103 
NO 52.709 IS 59.530 PT 43.103 SL 16.901 SL 15.023 ES 37.114 
EE 52.493 EE 59.055 IL 42.196 DE 16.530 DE 13.224 SE 36.279 
PT 51.724 NO 56.474 ES 38.660 PT 13.793 EE 13.123 DK 36.172 
 
SE 48.243 SE 48.243 PL 30.738 EE 13.123 PL 12.295 PL 35.656 
ES 46.392 RUS 45.859 HR 28.255 PL 12.295 PT 12.931 EE 32.808
RUS 45.859 HR 42.383 EE 26.247 HR 11.302 HR 11.302 RU
S 
24.895 
SK 43.361 HU 42.119 CZ 26.023 SK 10.844 SK 10.844 K 24.576 
HU 42.119 CZ 39.034 TR 25.862 LV 10.370 LV 10.370 HR 24.299 
TR 41.379 SK 36.146 SK 21.687 TR 10.345 TR 10.345 TR 23.793 
CZ 32.528 DK 35.743 HU 18.427 RU
S 
9.827 RU
S 
9.827 HU 23.692 
LV 29.630 TR 31.034 LV 17.778 CZ 9.758 CZ 9.758 CZ 23.420 
HR 28.255 UA 30.447 RU
S 
13.103 HU 7.897 HU 7.897 LV 19.556 
UA 26.641 LV 29.630 UA 11.418 UA 7.612 UA 7.612 UA 16.746 
Notes: The following countries have asked about yearly wages: Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand. The remaining countries have asked about monthly wages. The 
recalculation to yearly wages for these has been made by multiplying with 12. 
The following countries have asked about gross wages: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and United Kingdom. In Spain, it is 
unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or net wages. The statements in these 
countries are assumed as net wages, because this was specified in 1999. The remaining countries have 
asked about net wages (cf. the national questionnaires downloadable at: (ISSP Research Group, 2011)).  
The PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 have been subtracted from the 2010 version of 
World Economic Outlook. Because the rates are defined as: ‘National currency per current international 
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dollar’, the recalculations have been made by dividing the national currency statements with the current 
PPP-conversion rate (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2011). 
 
Table 8-4 Attitudes towards the Levels of Yearly Net Wages for Five Occupations in 
ISSP 2009. Shown are Country Medians in Euros. 
a cabinet minister in the 
<national> government  
 
a chairman of a large 
national corporation  
 
a doctor in general 
practice  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled worker in a 
factory  
 
CH 161.355 CH 161.355 CH 96.813 CH 36.305 CH 32.271 
FR 72.000 FR 120.000 USA 83.546 DK 24.351 DK 22.727 
DK 60.877 AUS 118.407 AUS 71.044 NO 22.035 NO 22.035 
AUS 59.203 USA 111.395 FR 60.000 FR 19.200 SE 18.164 
DE 56.333 FI 85.140 DK 56.818 FL 18.000 FR 18.000 
USA 55.697 GB 77.700 GB 52.059 SE 17.338 FL 18.000 
NO 51.415 DE 70.416 NO 51.415 FI 17.028 FI 17.028 
FI 51.084 AT 64.675 NZ 44.642 USA 16.709 USA 16.709 
NZ 50.652 FL 58.200 FI 42.570 IS 16.271 IS 16.271 
AT 48.506 NO 55.080 DE 42.250 AUS 15.788 AUS 15.788 
FL 48.000 NZ 54.944 FL 42.000 AT 14.552 ES 15.600 
GB 46.620 PT 48.000 AT 40.422 ES 14.400 IL 13.639 
IL 45.462 SL 48.000 IS 37.967 DE 14.083 AT 13.137 
IS 43.390 ES 48.000 SE 37.154 IL 13.639 GB 12.432 
SE 41.282 IL 45.462 ES 30.000 GB 12.432 NZ 12.019 
SL 36.000 IS 43.390 SL 30.000 NZ 12.019 DE 11.267 
ES 36.000 SE 41.282 PT 30.000 SL 10.800 SL 9.600 
PT 36.000 DK 40.584 IL 29.550 PT 9.600 PT 9.000 
EE 30.678 EE 34.513 HR 16.361 EE 7.669 EE 7.669 
PL 28.820 PL 28.820 EE 15.339 HR 6.544 HR 6.544 
SK 23.892 HR 24.541 PL 14.410 SK 5.975 SK 5.975 
TR 22.451 HU 22.510 TR 14.032 LV 5.930 LV 5.930 
HU 22.510 CZ 20.858 CZ 13.905 PL 5.764 PL 5.764 
RUS 20.618 RUS 20.618 SK 11.950 TR 5.613 TR 5.613 
CZ 17.382 SK 19.916 LV 10.165 CZ 5.214 CZ 5.214 
LV 16.942 LV 16.942 HU 9.848 RUS 4.418 RUS 4.418 
HR 16.361 TR 16.838 RUS 5.891 HU 4.221 HU 4.221 
UA 7.847 UA 8.968 UA 3.363 UA 2.242 UA 2.242 
Notes: The following countries have asked about yearly wages: Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand. The remaining countries have asked about monthly wages. The 
recalculation to yearly wages for these has been made by multiplying with 12. 
The following countries have asked about gross wages: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and United Kingdom. In Spain, it is 
unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or net wages. The statements in these 
countries are assumed as net wages, because this was specified in 1999. The remaining countries have 
asked about net wages (cf. the national questionnaires downloadable at: (ISSP Research Group, 2011)).  
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Degree of Consensus Apparent in the 
Measures for Attitudes towards Levels 
of Gross Wages for Different 
Occupations in ISSP 1999 and 2009 
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Table 8-6 Coefficients of Variations for the Statements of the Just Wage Levels for 
the Five Occupations Selected in ISSP 2009 
a cabinet minister 
in the <national> 
government  
 
a chairman of a 
large national 
corporation  
 
a doctor in 
general practice  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled 
worker in a factory  
 
country - averages 
USA 0.271 CH 0.573 US
A 
0.391 PL 0.302 DE 3.601 DE 0.862 
GB 0.253 US
A 
0.554 NO 0.222 NO 0.253 PL 0.279 USA 0.295 
NO 0.158 DE 0.541 PL 0.177 PT 0.236 PT 0.271 PL 0.204 
PT 0.119 FL 0.248 PT 0.158 US
A 
0.233 GB 0.245 NO 0.199 
DK 0.123 GB 0.241 GB 0.151 U
S 
0.196 NO 0.216 GB 0.194 
PL 0.107 DK 0.181 DK 0.146 DK 0.103 DK 0.203 PT 0.186 
DE 0.081 PL 0.155 DE 0.057 GB 0.079 AU
S 
0.202 DK 0.151 
RUS 0.071 NO 0.148 AU
S 
0.057 ES 0.032 UA 0.038 CH 0.137 
CH 0.067 FR 0.148 HU 0.043 DE 0.030 ES 0.027 AUS 0.116 
AUS 0.060 PT 0.144 FL 0.043 FI 0.026 LV 0.026 FL 0.072 
ES 0.057 UA 0.140 ES 0.040 IL 0.025 RU
S 
0.026 UA 0.055 
FL 0.053 LV 0.081 NZ 0.038 RU
S 
0.024 US
A 
0.026 FR 0.053 
LV 0.046 SE 0.079 UA 0.034 UA 0.024 TR 0.025 RUS 0.045 
FR 0.041 NZ 0.073 AT 0.034 FR 0.024 FR 0.020 ES 0.040 
HU 0.041 RU
S 
0.071 RU
S 
0.034 EE 0.022 FI 0.017 LV 0.040 
AT 0.039 AU
S 
0.066 FR 0.032 TR 0.020 SL 0.017 NZ 0.033 
UA 0.039 AT 0.061 SL 0.031 CZ 0.018 EE 0.017 FI 0.032 
FI 0.035 EE 0.058 EE 0.031 LV 0.017 HU 0.015 AT 0.031 
NZ 0.034 IS 0.057 LV 0.031 HU 0.015 SE 0.012 HU 0.030 
CZ 0.029 TR 0.056 FI 0.027 SL 0.013 AT 0.011 EE 0.030 
TR 0.026 FI 0.055 CH 0.026 IS 0.012 NZ 0.011 TR 0.029 
SE 0.024 ES 0.045 SE 0.021 SE 0.011 IS 0.010 SE 0.029 
SL 0.024 IL 0.042 TR 0.020 NZ 0.011 SK 0.010 SL 0.023 
SK 0.021 HU 0.036 IL 0.020 AT 0.010 IL 0.010 IL 0.023 
EE 0.020 SK 0.035 IS 0.018 CH 0.010 HR 0.009 IS 0.023 
IS 0.019 SL 0.031 SK 0.015 FL 0.010 FL 0.008 CZ 0.020 
HR 0.018 CZ 0.030 CZ 0.014 SK 0.009 CZ 0.008 SK 0.018 
IL 0.016 HR 0.026 HR 0.011 HR 0.008 CH 0.007 HR 0.014 
Notes: The following countries have asked about yearly wages: Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand. The remaining countries have asked about monthly wages. The 
recalculation to yearly wages for these has been made by multiplying with 12. 
The following countries have asked about gross wages: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and United Kingdom. In Spain, it is 
unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or net wages. The statements in these 
countries are assumed as net wages, because this was specified in 1999. The remaining countries have 
asked about net wages (cf. the national questionnaires downloadable at: (ISSP Research Group, 2011)).   
The PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 have been subtracted from the 2010 version of 
World Economic Outlook. Because the rates are defined as: ‘National currency per current international 
dollar’, the recalculations have been made by dividing the national currency statements with the current 
PPP-conversion rate (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2011). 
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Degree of Consensus Apparent in the 
Measures of attitudes towards the 
Level of Inequality in Gross Wages in 
ISSP 1999 and 2009 
Table 8-7 Degree of Consensus Apparent in the Six Different Measures of Attitudes 
towards the Level of Inequality in Gross Wages in ISSP 1999. Shown are Standard 
Deviations 
AWage dispersion 
index 
BHigh- vs. Low 
paid occ. 
CChairmen vs. Low 
paid occ. 
DHigh paid occ. 
Vs. Skilled worker 
EChairmen vs. 
Skilled worker 
FSkilled worker vs. 
Low paid occ. 
NO 0.432 RUS 0.744 RUS 0.967 NO 0.636 RUS 0.429 RUS 0.035 
RUS 0.390 NO 0.637 CDN 0.426 RUS 0.312 CDN 0.286 BG 0.030 
PL 0.218 PL 0.302 GB 0.414 NZ 0.242 PL 0.273 USA 0.030 
GB 0.208 GB 0.254 LV 0.413 PL 0.217 HU 0.239 IL 0.027 
LV 0.174 LV 0.253 PL 0.396 USA 0.195 GB 0.230 WD 0.020 
CDN 0.171 CDN 0.236 HU 0.343 CDN 0.158 LV 0.230 LV 0.019 
USA 0.159 HU 0.207 FR 0.255 GB 0.146 FR 0.205 SLO 0.018 
PT 0.158 USA 0.203 PT 0.245 HU 0.146 SL 0.166 GB 0.018 
HU 0.144 PT 0.183 USA 0.242 LV 0.145 PT 0.158 FR 0.016 
FR 0.111 FR 0.157 ED 0.195 FR 0.128 NZ 0.155 PT 0.016 
NZ 0.107 ED 0.134 WD 0.188 SL 0.119 ED 0.149 PL 0.015 
ED 0.101 WD 0.124 NZ 0.186 PT 0.111 US 0.148 CY 0.015 
WD 0.100 NZ 0.121 AT 0.157 ED 0.103 WD 0.139 CDN 0.015 
AT 0.092 AT 0.109 SL 0.144 BG 0.100 BG 0.133 ED 0.014 
SL 0.073 SL 0.102 CZ 0.136 WD 0.092 AT 0.119 HU 0.013 
CZ 0.067 CZ 0.094 IL 0.105 AT 0.082 CZ 0.094 ES 0.011 
BG 0.061 BG 0.074 SE 0.103 CZ 0.065 IL 0.091 NZ 0.010 
IL 0.055 IL 0.072 AUS 0.099 IL 0.061 SE 0.081 DK 0.010 
DK 0.055 AUS 0.067 BG 0.086 DK 0.057 AUS 0.073 CZ 0.009 
AUS 0.054 DK 0.063 DK 0.083 AUS 0.050 DK 0.071 AT 0.009 
CY 0.046 SE 0.061 CY 0.064 SE 0.048 CY 0.049 AUS 0.008 
SE 0.045 CY 0.050 ES 0.050 CY 0.038 ES 0.036 NO 0.007 
ES 0.037 ES 0.047 NO 0.032 ES 0.035 NO 0.026 SE 0.005 
Notes: AThe wage dispersion index is calculated by summarising the statements for the three occupations: chairman of a 
large national corporation, minister in the national government and general practitioner and dividing by three. Hereafter 
the statements of the two occupations: shop assistant and unskilled factory worker is summarised and divided by two. 
Lastly, the first index is then divided by the second. 
BThis index is calculated the same way as the wage dispersion index, but the occupation general practitioner is 
withdrawn from the index of the top group. 
CIn the index of the third column the occupation minister in the national government is also withdrawn in the same way.  
DThe index of the fourth column is constructed by dividing the index of the average statements of the top occupations, 
with the statement of a skilled factory worker. 
EThis index taps the chairmen vs. skilled worker wage ratio. 
FThis index is the ratio of a skilled worker to the average of the two low paid occupations – shop assistant and unskilled 
worker in a factory.  
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Table 8-8 Degree of Consensus Apparent in the Three Different Measures of 
Attitudes towards the Level of Inequality in Gross Wages in ISSP 2009. Shown are 
Standard Deviations 
AWage dispersion index BHigh- vs. Low paid occ. CChairmen vs. Low paid occ. 
USA 56.13 GB 8.658 GB 16.89 
GB 7.970 AUS 2.260 USA 3.889 
AUS 2.021 USA 2.107 AUS 3.689 
DE 1.264 DE 1.900 DE 3.649 
CH 0.734 CH 1.077 CH 1.961 
FR 0.325 FR 0.481 FR 0.914 
PT 0.322 FL 0.451 FL 0.830 
FL 0.309 PT 0.436 PT 0.763 
PL 0.254 PL 0.368 PL 0.586 
DK 0.204 UA 0.266 UA 0.449 
NO 0.183 RUS 0.252 NZ 0.384 
UA 0.181 DK 0.232 DK 0.326 
NZ 0.180 NZ 0.231 RUS 0.319 
RUS 0.170 AT 0.182 FI 0.290 
AT 0.137 FI 0.178 AT 0.279 
FI 0.128 HU 0.171 EE 0.223 
HU 0.125 NO 0.162 NO 0.195 
EE 0.095 EE 0.132 LV 0.194 
LV 0.090 LV 0.128 HU 0.185 
SL 0.083 TR 0.106 SE 0.180 
TR 0.077 SE 0.101 IL 0.164 
BG 0.076 CZ 0.099 TR 0.154 
IL 0.073 ES 0.099 IS 0.141 
SE 0.072 SL 0.098 SL 0.135 
CZ 0.071 BG 0.095 BG 0.128 
ES 0.068 IL 0.094 ES 0.127 
SK 0.065 SK 0.089 CZ 0.124 
IS 0.062 IS 0.085 SK 0.119 
CY 0.060 HR 0.061 HR 0.095 
HR 0.044 CY 0.061 CY 0.049 
Notes: AThe wage dispersion index is calculated by summarising the statements for the three 
occupations: chairman of a large national corporation, minister in the national government and general 
practitioner and afterwards dividing this figure by three. Hereafter the statements of the two occupations: 
shop assistant and unskilled factory worker is summarised and divided by two. Lastly, the first index is 
then divided by the second. 
BThis index is calculated the same way as the wage dispersion index, but the occupation general 
practitioner is withdrawn from the index of the top group. 
CIn the index of the third column the occupation minister in the national government is also withdrawn in 
the same way.  
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Degree of Consensus Apparent in the 
Measures of Attitudes towards the 
Degree of Justice in Levels of Gross 
Wages for Different Occupations in 
ISSP 1999 and 2009 
 
Table 8-9 Degree of Consensus Apparent in the Degree of Justice Measures in 
Levels of Gross Wages for Six Occupations in ISSP 1999. Shown are standard 
deviations 
a cabinet minister 
in the <national> 
government 
a chairman of a 
large national 
corporation  
 
a doctor in general 
practice  
 
a skilled worker in 
a factory  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled 
worker in a factory  
 
PL 0.106 NO 153.3 NO 191.6 RUS 0.188 PT 0.096 RUS 0.155 
RUS 0.071 RUS 0.142 USA 2.068 BG 0.072 RUS 0.092 FR 0.101 
PT 0.071 PL 0.137 PT 0.334 PT 0.059 BG 0.070 BG 0.066 
USA 0.059 IL 0.093 RUS 0.289 USA 0.041 CDN 0.061 LV 0.066 
NZ 0.057 PT 0.058 BG 0.160 PL 0.040 PL 0.055 PL 0.054 
LV 0.040 BG 0.057 PL 0.082 LV 0.039 HU 0.050 GB 0.053 
HU 0.039 USA 0.048 LV 0.076 SL 0.038 IL 0.040 PT 0.052 
ES 0.036 NZ 0.046 HU 0.049 IL 0.031 USA 0.040 SL 0.047 
BG 0.038 LV 0.041 GB 0.049 HU 0.031 LV 0.039 USA 0.046 
FR 0.030 HU 0.034 IL 0.029 DK 0.025 SL 0.035 HU 0.042 
ED 0.027 GB 0.031 CDN 0.025 NO 0.023 GB 0.034 CDN 0.038 
CDN 0.025 CDN 0.027 AT 0.023 FR 0.022 ES 0.026 IL 0.032 
IL 0.025 ES 0.021 SL 0.021 WD 0.021 FR 0.026 CY 0.031 
WD 0.021 FR 0.021 FR 0.021 ES 0.018 CZ 0.023 ES 0.028 
SL 0.018 SL 0.020 ED 0.018 ED 0.015 CY 0.020 CZ 0.025 
AT 0.017 SE 0.019 DK 0.018 NZ 0.014 ED 0.019 DK 0.019 
GB 0.016 AT 0.019 CZ 0.016 GB 0.014 NZ 0.018 ED 0.017 
SE 0.016 DK 0.017 NZ 0.014 CY 0.012 SE 0.013 SE 0.015 
DK 0.014 CY 0.017 WD 0.014 CDN 0.011 NO 0.012 NZ 0.013 
AUS 0.013 ED 0.016 ES 0.013 CZ 0.011 WD 0.012 WD 0.011 
NO 0.012 CZ 0.015 AUS 0.009 AT 0.009 DK 0.010 AT 0.010 
CY 0.011 WD 0.014 CY 0.009 AUS 0.008 AT 0.009 NO 0.009 
CZ 0.009 AUS 0.013 SE 0.009 SE 0.007 AUS 0.008 AUS 0.008 
Notes: A Calculated by for each occupation subtracting, what the respondents in the various countries 
think that the occupations actually earns usually, from what the occupation should earn. This figure is 
then standardized by dividing, with the usually earns actually statement of the respondent. 
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Table 8-10 Degree of Consensus Apparent in the Degree of Justice Measures in 
Levels of Gross Wages for Five Occupations in ISSP 2009. Shown are standard 
deviations 
Note: Calculated by for each occupation subtracting, what the respondents in the various countries think 
that the occupations actually earns usually, from what the occupation should earn. This figure is then 
standardized by dividing, with the usually earns actually statement of the respondent. 
 
a cabinet minister in the 
<national> government  
 
a chairman of a large 
national corporation  
 
a doctor in general 
practice  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled worker in a 
factory  
 GB 0.749 USA 364.7 GB 2.126 AUS 38.64 DE 5.938 
NO 0.672 DE 0.860 USA 1.568 GB 1.239 USA 4.245 
SE 0.656 NO 0.723 NO 1.038 NO 1.095 GB 1.244 
PL 0.111 DK 0.638 UA 0.109 DE 0.406 NO 1.220 
PT 0.063 NZ 0.135 TR 0.096 USA 0.352 AUS 0.778 
NZ 0.054 FR 0.134 HU 0.078 PT 0.331 PT 0.420 
UA 0.046 GB 0.072 RUS 0.051 RUS 0.050 DK 0.067 
DK 0.044 SE 0.053 BG 0.044 UA 0.048 UA 0.064 
RUS 0.034 RUS 0.039 DK 0.043 PL 0.036 EE 0.048 
SL 0.032 UA 0.037 PT 0.040 EE 0.035 RUS 0.042 
USA 0.030 EE 0.035 EE 0.038 BG 0.035 SL 0.034 
ES 0.028 IL 0.031 NZ 0.036 TR 0.035 LV 0.030 
TR 0.028 PL 0.028 LV 0.031 HU 0.033 BG 0.029 
DE 0.027 BG 0.028 PL 0.030 DK 0.033 TR 0.027 
HU 0.026 LV 0.028 AUS 0.029 FI 0.031 HU 0.027 
EE 0.025 TR 0.026 IL 0.027 LV 0.028 FI 0.027 
BG 0.025 ES 0.023 FI 0.021 CZ 0.027 PL 0.024 
AUS 0.024 SK 0.021 FR 0.021 IL 0.026 FR 0.023 
FI 0.022 PT 0.021 ES 0.020 SL 0.026 SK 0.021 
IL 0.022 CH 0.020 SL 0.019 ES 0.025 ES 0.020 
AT 0.021 FI 0.020 SE 0.019 FR 0.022 SE 0.018 
IS 0.020 FL 0.019 IS 0.018 SE 0.020 CZ 0.016 
CH 0.018 AUS 0.018 AT 0.018 HR 0.016 HR 0.016 
LV 0.018 HU 0.018 FL 0.018 SK 0.013 IL 0.016 
CZ 0.017 CZ 0.017 CZ 0.017 NZ 0.013 IS 0.014 
FL 0.014 IS 0.015 DE 0.014 IS 0.012 NZ 0.013 
FR 0.014 AT 0.015 HR 0.014 CH 0.012 AT 0.009 
CY 0.011 SL 0.014 SK 0.014 AT 0.010 FL 0.009 
SK 0.011 HR 0.013 CH 0.013 FL 0.010 CH 0.008 
HR 0.009 CY 0.004 CY 0.005 CY 0.009 CY 0.007 
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List of Country Abbreviations used in 
Tables of the Chapter 5 
 
Table 8-11 List of Country Abbreviations used in the Tables of Chapter 5 
GB United Kingdom EE Estonia 
NO Norway BG Bulgaria 
SE Sweden AUS Australia 
PL Poland FI Finland 
PT Portugal IL Israel 
NZ New Zealand AT Austria 
UA Ukraine IS Iceland 
DK Denmark CH Switzerland 
RUS Russia LV Latvia 
SL Slovenia CZ Czech Republic 
USA United States of America FL Flanders 
ES Spain FR France 
TR Turkey CY Cyprus 
DE Germany SK Slovak Republic 
ED East Germany HR Croatia 
WD West Germany HU Hungary 
CDN Canada   
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The content of the different ESeC 
classes and how the different class 
models are related  
Table 8-12 The European socio-economic classification 
 
Source: Taken from Harrison & Rose (2007), p. 464. 
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Table 8-13 Collapsing ESeC from 10 to 6 to 5 to 3 Class Models  
 
Source: Taken from Harrison & Rose (2007), p. 470. 
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Variable Description for the Analyses 
of Section 5.2 
Table 8-14 Variable Description for the Analyses of Section 5.2 
Created variables Scale Comments and origin in the ISSP 2009-
dataset. Original variable name in bold. 
National/macro level-variables   
Scandinavian dummy 0 = Scandinavian country; 1 = others Created by recoding variable V5.  
Aggr. Market justice – just deserts index (3) 1‒5 Each individual is assigned their country’s 
average on the equity index. 
Aggr. Need index (4) 1‒5 Each individual is assigned their country’s 
average on the market vs. need index. 
Aggr. Success ideology index (9) 1‒5 Each individual is assigned their country’s 
average on the success ideology index 
Aggr. Market justice – money should buy 
index (7) 
1‒5 Each individual is assigned their country’s 
average on the money buys index 
Aggr. Political affiliation index (2) 1‒5 Each individual is assigned their country’s 
average on the state and tax index. 
Aggr. Socials conflicts index (10) 1‒4 Each individual is assigned their country’s 
average on the social conflict index. 
Aggr. Limitations – corruption index (1) 1‒5 Each individual is assigned their country’s 
average on the corruption index. 
Aggr. Limitations – entering university index 
(5) 
1‒5 Each individual is assigned their country’s 
average on the university index. 
Aggr. Limitations – social background index 
(6) 
1‒5 Each individual is assigned their country’s 
average on the social background index. 
Aggr. Limitations - discrimination index (8) 1‒5 Each individual is assigned their country’s 
average on the discrimination index. 
Aggr. Perceived level of inequality in gross 
wages 
1.42‒3.91 Each individual is assigned their country’s 
average on the perc. lev. of diff. in pay 
index. 
Estimated trade union density 0.07‒0.96 Each individual is assigned their country’s 
average on the dummy_union variable. 
Individual/micro-level variables   
Perceived level of inequality in gross wages 
(PLI) 
 
‒10.29‒13.42 
 
Created by computing the function: LN 
(v23 / (v24 + v25) / 2). 
 
Household income 0-129 See the description in the text above 
 
Respondent income 0-1020 See the description in the text above 
Social Class 1 = Salariat; 2 = Intermediate employee; 
3 = Small employers/Self-employed; 4 = 
Lower Sales & Service; 5 = Lower 
Technical; 6 = Routine. 
The variable for ‘objective’ class location 
- the European Socio-economic 
Classification schema or ESeC) - is 
constructed according to the recoding 
algorithms provided by the ESeC 
consortium (Harrison & Rose, 2006; Rose 
& Harrison, 2007). 
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Relative deprivation 1‒5 Created by computing the function (v21 + 
v53) / 2. 
Relative deprivation2 1-25 Created by computing rel_depr* 
rel_depr to test for curve linear age 
effects. 
Relative deprivation3 1-125 Created by computing rel_depr * 
rel_depr * rel_depr to test for cubic 
linear age effects. 
Cognitive dissonance -4‒4 Created by computing the function v54 ‒ 
v55. This creates a measure for how far 
one’s ideal society deviates from one’s 
perception of society. 
Status of job compared to father 
 
1 = much higher; 2 = higher; 3 = lower; 
4 = much lower; 5 = about the same. 
Created by recoding v46, to have ‘what I 
deserve’ as category of reference. 
Perceived social mobility ‒9‒9 Created by computing the function v44-
v45. This creates a measure for, if one 
feels they have a higher status than the 
family of origin. 
Subjective social class 1 = lower class; 2 = working class; 3 = 
lower middle class; 4 = middle class; 5 
= higher middle and upper class. 
Created by merging the two last categories 
of the variable v66, which only entailed a 
few respondents individually. 
Employment status 1 = full time; 2 = half time; 3 = less than 
half time; 4 = helping family member; 5 
= student; 6 = outside the labour market 
Created by merging different categories 
people outside the labour market of the 
variable wrkst. Individually, these only 
entailed a few respondents.  
Age square 225‒9604 Created by computing age*age to test for 
curve linear age effects. 
Limitations – corruption index (1) 1‒5 Created by computing the function (v11 + 
v12) / 2.  
Political affiliation index (2) 
 
1‒5 Created by computing the function ( v33 + 
v34 + reversed_v35 + v36 + 
reversed_v37) / 5. 
Market justice – just deserts index (3) 1‒5  Created by computing the function (v47 + 
v51 + v52) / 3. 
Need index (4) 1‒5 Created by computing the function (v49 + 
v50) / 2. 
Limitations – entering university index (5) 1‒5 Created by computing the function (v18 + 
v19) / 2. 
- 
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Limitations – social background index (6) 1‒5 Created by computing the function (v6 + 
v7) / 2. 
Market justice – money should buy index (7) 1‒5 Created by computing the function (v38 + 
v39) / 2. 
Limitations - discrimination index (8) 1‒5 Created by computing the function (v14 + 
v15 + v16) / 3. 
Success ideology index (9) 1‒5 Created by computing the function (v9 + 
v10) / 2. 
Socials conflicts index (10) 1‒4 Created by computing the function (v40 + 
v41 + v42 + v43) / 4. 
Dummy_union 0 = Never a trade union member; 1 = 
present or former trade union member. 
Created by merging the categories of 
present and former member of a trade 
union in the variable union.  
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Appendix B. Appendix for Chapter 6 
Attitudes to the Level of Inequality in 
Gross Wages Disaggregated on Age-
Intervals 
 
Figure 8-1 Attitudes towards the Level of Inequality in Gross Wages for different 
Age-Cohorts in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are Medians and Standard 
Deviations 
Medians Standard Errors 
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Figure 8-2 Attitudes towards the Level of Inequality in Gross Wages for different 
Age-Cohorts in Sweden in ISSP1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are Medians and 
Standard Deviations 
Medians Standard Errors 
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Appendix C. ISSP 2009 Source 
Questionnaire 
 
 International Social Survey Programme 
 
 
2009 Social Inequality IV 
 
Final questionnaire  
August 2008 
 
 
 
 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela  
 
 
  
Social Inequality IV 
Drafting group: 
Australia (Deborah Mitchell, Timothy Phillips, Ann Evans, Ken Reed) 
Czech Republic (Petr Mateju, Jindrich Krejci, Michael Smith) 
Hungary (Peter Robert, Michael Hout). 
Netherlands, convenor (Harry Ganzeboom, Saskia Opdam, Heike Schröder) 
Taiwan (Tony Tam) 
USA (Tom Smith, Jeff Manza) 
 
 CONTENT OF THE 
MODULE 
OLD 
ITEM 
NEW 
ITEM 
STAN-
DARD 
BACK-
GROUND 
OPTION
AL 
TOTAL 
Questions on social inequality 
1a-k, 2a Getting ahead: 4 
dimensions: ascription, 
merit, discrimination, 
corruption 
11 1   12 
2bcd Getting ahead in 
education 
 3   3 
4a-e, 5a-e Actual / should 
occupational earnings 
10    10 
6a Toolarge  1    1 
6b-7b Role government / tax  5    5 
8ab Buying social benefits 2    2 
9a-d Perception of class 
conflict  
4    4 
10ab Top-Bottom 
identification 
 1 1 
(TOPBOT) 
 2 
11 Subjective social 
mobility 
1    1 
12a-f Pay criteria  6    6 
3, 13 Just earn / just pay  1 1   2 
14ab Image of society 2    2 
Questions on social background 
15ab, 22a Fathers occupation  1 1  1 3 
16abc, 22b Mothers occupation    3  1 4 
17 Cultural resources  1    1 
18ab, 19ab,  
23ab 
Respondents first and 
last/current occupation  
1 1 2 (ISCO88 
and 
WRKTYPE) 
2 6 
20 Subjective social class 1    1 
21ab Wealth   2   3 
       
       
24abc, 25abc Non-cognitive traits     6 6 
       
 Total 47 13 3 10 73 
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GENERAL NOTES TO ISSP MEMBERS 
1. All notes which are not part of the questionnaire and intended only for members (for example, 
translation notes, TN) are enclosed in double, square brackets [[like these]].. 
2. All the elements in questions which require local adaptation are enclosed in angle brackets. 
These instructions often relate to adding the name of the relevant country. For example, in 
Australia “Generally, how would you describe taxes in <country> today?” would read “Generally, 
how would you describe taxes in Australia today?” 
3. Every question starts with a reference between square brackets to earlier Social Inequality 
questionnaires: A=1987, B=1992, C=1999, D=2008 (=pretest). The reference also contains the 
ITEM NAME (which refer to names in merged datafile). For example:  [[AHEAD16: C,D]]  “To 
get all the way to the top in <country>, you have to be corrupt.” This question was only asked in 
the Social Inequality module 1999 and in the pretest 2008. 
4. For questions for which no “Can’t choose” is provided, code non-productive or missing answer 
to -99.
5. A fully harmonized file with data of all three previous ISSP Social Inequality rounds (1987, 1992, 
1999) and the 2008 pretest is available at: http://home.fsw.vu.nl/HBG.Ganzeboom/issp2009.
6. The Social Inequality IV module proper consists of 47 attitudinal questions and 13 background 
questions. To be consistent we also present 3 standard background questions that are strongly 
related to the module questions. In addition, we offer 4 background questions and 6 attitudinal  
questions as options. Note that according to ISSP rules the 47 attitudinal questions of the 
module proper need to be presented to the respondents consecutively, the background 
questions, both standard and optional, as well as the optional attitudes can be put in where it fits 
best. Our recommended order is: {Q24abc}, Q1-Q14ab, {Q22ab}, Q15ab, Q16abc, Q17, 
{Q25abc}, {Q23ab}, Q18, Q19ab, Q20, Q21ab. Variables in curly brackets {} are optional.
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Social Inequality IV 
 
[[TN: The word RACE in Q1i should be translated referring to ‘ethnicity’ in a broader sense.]] 
 
To begin we have some questions about opportunities for getting ahead … 
Q1. Please tick one box for each of these to show how important you think it is for getting 
ahead in life… (please tick one box on each line) 
 
Essen-
tial
Very 
Impor-
tant 
Fairly 
impor-
tant 
Not very 
impor-
tant 
Not
impor-
tant at 
all
Can’t
choose
a. [[AHEAD1: ABCD]] 
 … how important is 
coming from a wealthy 
family? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
b. [[AHEAD2: ABD]]  … how important is 
having well-educated 
parents? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
c. [[AHEAD3: ABD]]  
… how important is 
having a good 
education yourself? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
d. [[AHEAD4: ABD]]  
… how important is 
having ambition? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
e. [[AHEAD6: ABD]]  
… how important is hard 
work? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
f. [[AHEAD7: ABCD]]  … how important is 
knowing the right 
people? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
g. [[AHEAD8: ABD]]  … how important is 
having political 
connections? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
h. [[NEW: AHEAD17: D]]  
…how important is 
giving  bribes? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
i. [[AHEAD9: ABD]]  
… how important is a 
person’s race? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
j. [[AHEAD10: ABD]]  
… how important is a 
person’s religion? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
k. [[AHEAD12: ABD]]  … how important is 
being born a man or a 
woman? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
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[[TN to Q2bcd: with ‘university’ we mean the truly academic segment of higher education]] 
 
Q2. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
(please tick one box on each line) 
 
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Neither 
agree
nor
disagree
Dis-
agree
Strongly 
disagree
Can’t
choose
a. [[AHEAD16: CD]]  
To get all the way to the 
top in <country> today, 
you have to be corrupt. 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
b. [[NEW: AHEAD20: D]] 
In <country> only 
students from the best 
secondary schools have 
a good chance to obtain 
a university education. 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
c. [[NEW: AHEAD19: D]] 
In <country>, only the 
rich can afford the costs 
of attending university. 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
d. [[NEW: AHEAD21: D]] 
In <country> people 
have the same chances 
to enter university, 
regardless of their 
gender, ethnicity or 
social background. 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
 
Q3. [[JUSTPAY2: CD]]  Would you say that you earn… If you are not working now, please tell 
about your last job. (please tick one box) 
Much less than I deserve 
Less than I deserve 
□1
□2 
What I deserve □3
More than I deserve □4
Much more than I deserve □5
□6Never worked 
Can’t choose □8
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[[Q4-5 should be on facing pages. However, they should NOT be on the same page –respondents 
should answer the ‘ACTUAL’ earnings questions first, and only then go on to answer the ‘SHOULD 
questions.]] 
 
[[In 1992, Q4-5 asked about YEAR and BEFORE taxes, in 1999 countries could ask the Q5-6 in the 
way that was most customary in their country. You should follow the way that you have asked it 
before. If you did not participate in the 1992 and 1999 ISSP and, you may use whichever of ‘year’, 
‘month’, ‘fortnight’, or ‘week’ is most customary in your nation. Use ‘before’ tax or ‘after’ tax, 
according to the custom in your nation. For example you might say: “Please write how much you 
think they usually earn each year before taxes”, or “Please write how much you think they usually 
earn each week before taxes”, or “Please write how much you think they usually earn each week 
after taxes”.]] 
 
[[A LARGE NATIONAL CORPORATION: a privately owned corporation that operates throughout 
the country, not a corporation owned by the government. “Company” is also acceptable in English 
rather than “corporation”. 
A CABINET MINISTER IN THE <NATIONAL> GOVERNMENT: use the word that makes clear 
sense in your language. For example, in Australia it would be ‘A cabinet minister in the federal 
government’.]] 
 
[[Do not insert “Can’t choose” in the questions.]] 
 
[[Coding instructions: 
• If answered with a range, take best estimate midpoint 
• If answered DK, take –98. 
• If not answered, code –99. 
• If multiple answers, take first.]] 
Q4. We would like to know what you think people in these jobs actually earn. Please write in 
how much you think they usually earn each <YEAR/MONTH/FORTNIGHT/WEEK>, 
<BEFORE/AFTER> taxes. Many people are not exactly sure about this, but your best guess 
will be close enough. This may be difficult, but it is very important. So please try. 
Please write in how much they ACTUALLY earn each <year/month/fortnight/week> 
<before/after> taxes.  
 
a. [[ACTUAL2: ABD]]  
About how much do you think a doctor in general practice earns? 
    ---------------- 
b. [[ACTUAL5: ABCD]]  
How much do you think a chairman of a large national corporation earns? 
    ---------------- 
c. [[ACTUAL12: ABCD]]  
How much do you think a shop assistant earns? 
    ---------------- 
d. [[ACTUAL10: ABCD]]  
How much do you think an unskilled worker in a factory earns? 
    ---------------- 
e. [[ACTUAL11: ABCD]]  
How much do you think a cabinet minister in the <national> government 
earns?    ---------------- 
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Q5. Next, what do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid. How much do you think 
they should earn each <YEAR/MONTH/FORTNIGHT/WEEK>, <BEFORE/AFTER>, regardless 
of what they actually get…  
Please write in how much they SHOULD earn each <year/month/fortnight/week> 
<before/after> taxes.
 
a. [[SHOULD2: ABCD]]  
About how much do you think a doctor in general practice should earn? 
    ---------------- 
b. [[SHOULD5: ABCD]]  
How much do you think a chairman of a large national company should 
earn?    ---------------- 
c. [[SHOULD12: ABCD]]  
How much do you think a shop assistant should earn? 
    ---------------- 
d. [[SHOULD10: ABCD]]  
How much do you think an unskilled worker in a factory should earn? 
    ---------------- 
e. [[SHOULD11: ABCD]]  
How much do you think a cabinet minister in the <national> government 
should earn?    ---------------- 
 
 
 
Q6. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
(Please tick one box on each line) 
 Strongly 
agree Agree 
Neither 
agree
nor
disagree
Dis-
Agree 
Strongly 
disagree
Can’t
choose
a. [[TOLARGE: ABCD]] 
Differences in income in 
<country> are too large. 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
b. [[GOV1: ABCD]]  It is the 
responsibility of the 
government to reduce the 
differences in income 
between people with high 
incomes and those with 
low incomes. 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
c. [[GOV6: ABD]] The 
government should 
provide a decent 
standard of living for the 
unemployed. 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
d. [[GOV4: ABD]] The 
government should spend 
less on benefits for the 
poor. 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
 
 
 7
Q7a. [[TAX4: ABCD]] Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of 
their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share? 
(please tick one box) 
Much larger share □1 
□2 Larger 
The same share □3
Smaller □4
Much smaller share □5
□8Can’t choose 
Q7b. [[TAX3: ABD]] Generally, how would you describe taxes in <country> today for those 
with high incomes? Taxes are… (please tick one box) 
…much too high 
…too high 
□1 
□2 
…about right □3
…too low □4
…much too low □5
□8Can’t choose 
 
[[TN: The translation of JUST OR UNJUST – RIGHT OF WRONG in Q8a and Q8b should have a 
normative interpretation.]]
 
Q8a. [[BUY1: CD]] Is it just or unjust – right or wrong – that people with higher incomes can 
buy better health care than people with lower incomes? (please tick one box) 
 
Very just, definitely right 
Somewhat just, right 
□1
□2 
Neither just nor unjust, mixed feelings □3
□4Somewhat unjust, wrong 
Very unjust, definitely wrong □5
□8Can’t choose 
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Q8b. [[BUY2: CD]] Is it just or unjust – right or wrong – that people with higher incomes can 
buy better education for their children than people with lower incomes? 
(please tick one box) 
 
Very just, definitely right 
Somewhat just, right 
□1
□2 
Neither just nor unjust, mixed feelings □3
Somewhat unjust, wrong □4
Very unjust, definitely wrong □5
□8Can’t choose 
Q9. In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts between different social groups. 
In your opinion, in <country> how much conflict is there between… (please tick one box on 
each line) 
  Very 
strong 
conflicts
Strong
conflicts
Not very 
strong 
conflicts
There
are no 
conflicts
Can’t
choose
a.
 
[[CONFLIC1: ABCD]]
…poor people and rich 
people? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □8
b.
 
[[CONFLIC2: ABCD]]
… the working class and 
the middle class? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □8
c. [[CONFLIC4: ABCD]]
… management and 
workers? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □8
d. [[CONFLIC7: CD]]
… people at the top of 
society and people at the 
bottom? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □8
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[[For Q10ab, Use either numbered or unnumbered boxes, or numbers, to label the answer 
categories. Note that the answer categories of this question MUST be laid out vertically with 10 at 
the top and 1 at the bottom as shown above. Recommendation: please use these figures and page 
layout as proposed, unless consistency with earlier use prevents it.]] 
 
 
Q10a. [[STANDARD BACKGROUND: TOPBOT: ABC]] In our society there are groups which 
tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a 
scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would you put yourself now on this scale?
(Please tick one box) 
TOP □10 TOP 
□9  
□8  
□7  
□6  
□5  
□4  
□3  
□2  
 
BOTTOM □1 BOTTOM 
 
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
1
1
Q10b. [[NEW: FTOPBOT]] And if you think about the family that you grew up in, where did 
they fit in then? (Please tick one box) 
TOP □10 TOP 
□9  
□8  
□7  
□6  
□5  
□4  
□3  
□2  
  
BOTTOM □1 BOTTOM 
 
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
1
1
 10
Q11. [[SUBJMOB: ABC]] Please think about your present job (or your last one if you don’t 
have one now). If you compare this job to the job your father had when you were <14/15/16>, 
would you say that the level of status of your job is (or was)…  (please tick one box.)
□1Much higher than your father’s  
□2Higher  
□3About equal  
□4Lower  
□5Much lower than your father’s  
□6I never had a job  
I don’t know what my father did / father never had a job / never knew 
father / father deceased  □7
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Q12. In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should each of these things 
be, in your opinion… (please tick one box on each line) 
 
Essen-
tial
Very 
Impor-
tant
Fairly 
impor-
tant
Not very 
impor-
tant
Not
impor-
tant at 
all
Can’t
choose 
a. [[PAYCRIT1: BCD]] How 
much responsibility goes 
with the job – how 
important do you think that 
ought to be in deciding 
pay? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
b. [[PAYCRIT2: BCD]]  
… the number of years 
spent in education and 
training? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
c. [[PAYCRIT4: BCD]] 
… what is needed to 
support a family? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
d. [[PAYCRIT5: BCD]] 
… whether the person has 
children to support – how 
important should that be in 
deciding pay? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
e. [[PAYCRIT6: BCD]] 
… how well he or she does 
the job – how important 
should that be in deciding 
pay? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
f. [[PAYCRIT7: BC]] 
… how hard he or she 
works at the job? 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □8
[[TN: The translation of JUST in Q13 should have a normative interpretation.]]  
Q13. [[REFORMULATED: JUSTPAY1:C,D]] Is your pay just? We are not asking about how much 
you would like to earn - but what you feel is just given your skills and effort. If you are not 
working now, please tell about your last job. (please tick one box). 
Much less than is just □1
A little less than is just □2 
About just for me □3
□4A little more than is just 
Much more than is just □5
□6Never had a job 
Can’t choose □8
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[[TN: Please use diagrams and page layout for Q14 as given, unless consistency with earlier use prevents 
it.]] 
Q14. These five diagrams show different types of society. Please read the descriptions and 
look at the diagrams and decide which you think best describes <country> ..
Type A 
A small elite at the 
top, very few people 
in the middle and the 
great mass of people 
at the bottom. 
Type B 
A society like a 
pyramid with a small 
elite at the top, more 
people in the middle, 
and most at the 
bottom. 
Type C 
A pyramid except 
that just a few 
people are at the 
bottom. 
Type D 
A society with 
most people in 
the middle. 
Type E 
Many people 
near the top, and 
only a few near 
the bottom. 
 
 
a. [[DIAGRAM: BCD]] First, what type of society is <country> today – which diagram 
comes closest? (please tick one box )  
Type A □1
Type B □2 
Type C □3
□4Type D 
Type E □5
Can’t choose □8
b. [[DIAOUGHT:BCD]] What do you think <country> ought to be like – which would 
you prefer? (please tick one box )  
Type A □1
Type B □2 
Type C □3
□4Type D 
□5Type E 
□8Can’t choose 
 13
BACKGROUND QUESTIONS 
[[TN: The background questions can be asked separately from the attitudinal questions. Country specific 
wording is allowed as long as it gets this information. Like other demographic and background variables, 
the questions can be put wherever you like in the questionnaire – they need not be with the other ISSP 
questions.]] 
 
[[TN: The age reference – “when you were <14-15-16>” in the questions below – should preferably be 
age 15 (PISA age). Relevant arguments to deviate are (A) when the question of similar questions have 
been asked with a different referent age, and the alternative choice would make the questionnaire  more 
consistent, (B) when age 14 or 16 is clearly more relevant in terms of educational or labor market 
choices.]] 
[[TN: Countries that expect the categories in Q15a, Q16b, Q18a and Q19a not to fit their national 
situation, should add country specific codes. Examples: collective farming in (post)communist countries, 
helper in family business/farm, apprenticeships as first jobs.]] 
 
[[TN: Answers to open alternatives in Q15a, Q16b and Q18a – if included – should be post-coded.]] 
Q15a. [[FWRKTYP: BCD]]  When you were <14-15-16> years old, for whom did your father work? 
If your father did not have a paid job at the time, please give information about his last job 
before that time. (please tick one box)
 Your father 
Employee of a private company or business  □1
Government [national, state or local government]  □2
Self-employed  □3
Other (please specify) ______________________________________________ □4
Can’t choose □8
[[TN: Answers to the open occupation questions (Q15b, Q16c and Q18a) must be coded to the 
international Labour Office’s International Standard Classification of Occupations 1988 – the full 4 digit 
code. Note that recommendations on coding ISCO are available on the ISSP website.]]
Q15b. [[FISKO: ABCD]] When you were 
<14-15-16> years old, what kind of 
work did your father do; what was his 
main occupation?  
Describe fully, using two words or 
more (do not use initials or 
abbreviations). If your father did not 
have a paid job at the time, please give 
information about his last job before 
that time.
 
…………………………………………………………………. 
 
…………………………………………………………………. 
 
…………………………………………………………………. 
 
…………………………………………………………………. 
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Q16a. [[NEW: MWORK: D]]  When you were <14-15-16> years old, did your mother work outside 
the household? If your mother did not work when you were <14-15-16> years old, did your 
mother work before? If she worked before, when did she stop working? (please tick one box) 
 
 Your mother 
Yes, my mother did have a job when I was <14-15-16> years □1
No:  my mother never had a job outside the household □2
  my mother stopped working before she got married □3
  my mother stopped working after she got married, but before her first 
child was born □4 
□5  my mother stopped working after her first child was born 
Can’t choose 
 
□8
Q16b. [[NEW: MWRKTYP: D]] In her last job – i.e. when or before you were <14-15-16> years old, 
for whom did your mother work? If your mother did not have a paid job at the time, please give 
information about her last job before that time. (please tick one box) 
 
 Your mother 
 □1Employee of a private company or business 
 □2Government [national, state or local government] 
Self-employed  □3
Other (please specify) ______________________________________________ □4
My mother never worked outside the household □5
Can’t choose □7
Q16c [[MISKO: BCD]] When you were <14-
15-16> years old, what kind of work did 
your mother do; what was her main 
occupation? 
Describe fully, using two words or more 
(do not use initials or abbreviations). If
your mother did not have a paid job at the 
time, please give information about her 
last job before that time.
 
……………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………- 
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Q17. [[BOOKS: CD]] About how many books were there around your family’s house when you 
were <14-15-16> years old? (please tick one box) 
 
 None □1
 1 or 2 □2
 Around 10 □3
 Around 20 □4
 Around 50 □5
 Around 100 □6
 Around 200 □7
 Around 500 □8
 1000 or more □9
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Q18a. [[NEW: WRKTYP1: D]] In your first job, after leaving full-time education, for whom did you 
work? (please tick one box)  
□1Employee of a private company or business  
□2Government [national, state or local government]  
Self-employed  □3
Other (please specify) ______________________________________________ □4
I have never had a paid job □7
 
Q18b. [[NEW RISKO1: D]] In this first 
job, what was your main occupation?  
Describe fully, using two words or 
more (do not use initials or 
abbreviations).
 
…………………………………………………………………. 
 
………………………………………………………………. 
 
…………………………………………………………………. 
 
…………………………………………………………………. 
 
Q19a. [[STANDARD BACKGROUND: WRKTYPE: ABCD]] In your current job, for whom do you 
work? If you are not working now, please tell us about your most recent job. (please tick one box) 
□1Works for government  
□2Works for a publicly owned firm  
□3Does not work for government or a publicly owned firm and not self-employed  
Self-employed  □4
Other (please specify) ______________________________________________ □5
I have never had a paid job □0
 
[[TN: Answers to Q19b must be coded to the international Labour Office’s International Standard 
Classification of Occupations 1988 – the full 4 digit code. Note that recommendations on coding ISCO 
are available at the ISSP website. Q19a and Q19b are standard background variables.]] 
Q19b. [[STANDARD BACKGROUND
ISCO88: ABCD]] And in your current 
job, what is your main occupation? If 
you are not working now, please tell us 
about your last job.  
Describe fully, using two words or 
more (do not use initials or 
abbreviations). 
 
……………………………………………………………. 
 
…………………………………………………………………. 
 
…………………………………………………………………. 
 
…………………………………………………………………. 
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[[TN: In the past Q20 has been asked in different formats in different countries. Please change to 
the specification here, if this is the case in your country.]] 
 
Q20. [[CLASS: ABCD]] Most people see themselves as belonging to a particular class. Please 
tell me which social class you would say you belong to? (please tick one box) 
 Lower class □1
 Working class □2
□3 Lower middle class 
 Middle class □4
□5 Upper middle class 
 Upper class □6
 
[[TN: Answer categories for Q21ab can vary between countries. Use the following guidelines for 
developing the categories: 
• Categories 1-2 are reserved 
• Choose the midpoint of category 7 to be equivalent of the expected mean wealth using external 
information. 
• Choose midpoints of categories 3 and 11 to be equivalent to approximately 1/6, respectively 6x 
the midpoint of category 7. 
• Interspace other categories evenly between 3, 7 and 11. 
• Add open ended category 12 consistent with 11. 
• Replace € sign with appropriate equivalent in your country.]] 
 
[[TN: ‘your immediate family’ in Q21ab refers to spouse [husband/wife], children or other members 
of the nuclear family]] 
The next few questions are about the things you and your immediate family own. 
Q21a. [[NEW: WEALTH1: D]] About how much money would be left if the home or apartment 
you and/or your immediate family live in was sold, and any debts on it, such as a mortgage 
or personal loan, would have been paid off? Please give your best estimate. (Tick one box.)  
 Just debts □01
□02 I / we do not own a home 
□03 € 1 - € 30.000 
□04 € 30.000 - € 60.000 
□05 € 60.000 - € 90.000 
□06 € 90.000 - € 120.000 
□07 € 120.000 - € 160.000 
□08 € 160.000 - € 200.000 
□09 € 200.000 - € 400.000 
□10 € 400.000 - € 700.000 
□11 € 700.000 - € 1.000.000 
□12 More than € 1.000.000 
 Can’t choose □99
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Q21b. [[NEW: WEALTH2: D]] About how much money would be left if you and/or your 
immediate family converted to cash all savings, stocks, or bonds you own, and then paid off 
any personal debts you have (not including any home loan)? Please give your best 
estimate. (Tick only one box.)
 Just debts □01
 Nothing  □02
□03 €1 - € 15.000 
□04 € 15.000 - € 25.000 
□05 € 25.000 - € 50.000 
□06 € 50.000 - € 80.000 
□07 € 80.000 - € 120.000 
□08 € 120.000 - € 200.000 
□09 € 200.000 - € 300.000 
□10 € 300.000 - € 500.000 
□11 € 500.000 - € 700.000 
□12 More than € 700.000 
 Can’t choose □99
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OPTIONAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES 
[[TN: We recommend to ask Q22ab before Q15 and Q16, and Q23ab before Q18-Q19.]] 
 
[[TN: Use the examples of occupations as specified; however you can substitute a certain occupation 
if it would not work in your country, e.g. because it does not fit the general description.]] 
 
[[TN: Q22ab and Q23ab can be asked in separate formats if this fits better with the way you ask for 
current/last occupation.]]
Q22ab. [[REFORMULATED FCRUDE: ABD]] + [[NEW MCRUDE: D]] Here is a list of different 
types of jobs. Which type of job did your father/mother have when you were <14-15-16> years 
(or earlier when they did not have a paid job at that time?) (please tick one box for your father 
and one box for your mother) 
 
Your
father 
Your
mother 
Professional and technical (for example: doctor, teacher, engineer, 
artist, accountant, nurse) □1 □1
Higher administrative (for example: banker, executive in big business, 
high government official, union official) □2 □2
Clerical (for example: secretary, clerk, office manager, civil servant, 
bookkeeper) □3 □3
Sales (for example: sales manager, shop owner, shop assistant, 
insurance agent, buyer) □4 □4
Service (for example: restaurant owner, police officer, waitress, barber, 
caretaker) □5 □5
Skilled worker (for example: foreman, motor mechanic, printer, 
seamstress, tool and die maker, electrician) □6 □6
Semi-skilled worker (for example: bricklayer, bus driver, cannery 
worker, carpenter, sheet metal worker, baker) □7 □7
Unskilled worker (for example: labourer, porter, unskilled factory 
worker, cleaner) □8 □8
Farm worker (for example: farm labourer, tractor driver) □9 □9
Farm proprietor, farm manager □10 □10
□96Father/mother never had a job  □96
Father/mother unknown □99 □99
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Q23ab. [[REFORMULATED: CRUDE1: D]] + [[REFORMULATED: CRUDE: D]] Here is a list of 
different types of jobs. Which type of job did you have in your first job – after leaving full-time 
education – and which type of job do you have now in your current job? If you are not working 
now, please tell us about your last job.  (please tick one box for your first job and one box for your 
current/last job)
 
Your first 
job
Your
current/last 
job
Professional and technical (for example: doctor, teacher, engineer, 
artist, accountant, nurse) □1 □1
Higher administrative (for example: banker, executive in big business, 
high government official, union official) □2 □2
Clerical (for example: secretary, clerk, office manager, civil servant, 
bookkeeper) □3 □3
Sales (for example: sales manager, shop owner, shop assistant, 
insurance agent, buyer) □4 □4
Service (for example: restaurant owner, police officer, waitress, barber, 
caretaker) □5 □5
Skilled worker (for example: foreman, motor mechanic, printer, 
seamstress, tool and die maker, electrician) □6 □6
Semi-skilled worker (for example: bricklayer, bus driver, cannery worker, 
carpenter, sheet metal worker, baker) □7 □7
Unskilled worker (for example: labourer, porter, unskilled factory worker, 
cleaner) □8 □8
Farm worker (for example: farm labourer, tractor driver) □9 □9
Farm proprietor, farm manager □10 □10
First job is same as current job. □96 □96
I have never had a job □97 □97
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OPTIONAL PERSONALITY TRAITS 
[[TN: We recommend to ask Q24 somewhere before Q1 (i.e. before the module items) and Q25 after 
Q17 (i.e. with the questions on family background). The idea is to keep Q24 and Q25 far apart.]] 
 
Q24. How would you describe yourself as a person? (please tick one box on each line) 
 Strongly 
agree Agree 
Dis-
agree
Strongly 
disagree
Can’t
choose
a. [[NEW: MOT1: D]] I work hard 
to complete my daily tasks, 
even if I am slightly sick or 
when there is another legitimate 
reason for taking a break. 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □8
b. [[NEW: MOT2: D]] I perform to 
the best of my ability even on a 
task that I do not like.  
□1 □2 □3 □4 □8
c. [[NEW: MOT3: D]] I work hard 
to maintain my performance on 
a task, even if the task takes a 
long time to start producing any 
results. 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □8
Q25. Please think about the time you were <14-15-16> years old (or before, if you left school at 
a younger age). How would you describe yourself at the time? (please tick one box on each line) 
 Strongly 
agree Agree 
Dis-
agree
Strongly 
disagree
Can’t
choose
a. [[NEW: MOT5: D]] I tried hard 
to go to school everyday, even 
if I was slightly sick or when 
there was another legitimate 
reason for staying home. 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □8
b. [[NEW: MOT6: D]] I performed 
to the best of my ability in 
school, even on an assignment 
that I did not like.  
□1 □2 □3 □4 □8
c. [[NEW: MOT4: D]] I worked 
hard to maintain my 
performance on a school 
assignment, even if it would 
take a long time to start 
producing any results. 
□1 □2 □3 □4 □8
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The dissertation finds that, compared to people in other western countries, 
the Scandinavians were exceptionally egalitarian in the period from 1992 
to 2009. This Scandinavian egalitarianism seems constituted mostly of an 
aversion to top-level excess, rather than a wish to spoil the bottom of the 
labour market excessively. This egalitarianism cannot be ascribed to main-
stream non-contextual explanations within the field, but instead rests on a 
perceived nexus of legitimated harmonic egalitarian societies. The attitudi-
nal patterns of Danes and Swedes are however quite different. These dif-
ferences are in congruence with the historical differences in the two coun-
tries’ political economies, and with differences in how the media in the two 
countries still represent “the rich”: The Swedish legacy of the ideological 
but peaceful class-society has evolved into representations of the rich as a 
class distinct from the middle class, and into attitudes divided by class and 
income. The Danish legacy of consensus democracy on the other hand has 
evolved into representations of the rich as part of the very wide perceived 
middle class, and very similar attitudinal patterns across class and other po-
tential cleavages.
